A Zip Slip vulnerability exists in the Unarchive function of pkg/utils/zip.go in github.com/fission/fission up to version 1.24.0. The function improperly joins archive entry names with the destination directory without validating that the resolved path remains inside the destination. This allows crafted zip entries with directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../../tmp/evil) to write files outside the intended extraction directory. The vulnerability can be triggered when the fetcher downloads and extracts a zip archive, potentially allowing an attacker controlling the archive URL to write files arbitrarily within the file system accessible to the fetcher process.
A validation bypass vulnerability exists in the HTTPTrigger resource of the Fission project (github.com/fission/fission) through version 1.24.0. The fields RelativeURL and Prefix were only validated at the CLI level, not at the API server admission level, allowing creation of HTTPTriggers with unsafe or conflicting URL paths via kubectl apply or direct API calls. This could lead to triggers with empty URLs, paths not starting with '/', paths containing directory traversal segments, or collisions with reserved router paths. The issue was fixed in version 1.25.0 by enforcing consistent validation rules at both the API server and CLI layers.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (0457a026ab28fbb641d11e4e9ac9d60d026fd77210972f72e6ac931b4b06c59c)
On npm install, postinstall.js executes shell commands that query cloud instance metadata services (AWS IMDS at 169.254.169.254, plus Tencent, Aliyun, GCP, and Azure endpoints) and extracts the AWS IAM role's temporary security credentials. The captured IAM credentials, hostname, and username are appended as query parameters to an HTTP request to the hardcoded out-of-band host pzs5w7ntzhsnepwk564lyfdci3oucl0a.oastify.com (a Burp Collaborator-style domain). The package.json describes the module as a lightweight string formatting helper; the shipped code contains only the credential-harvesting postinstall, with no string-utility functionality present.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (7f6774653f487db8fbb9b40f1c1aba2bf959edffae409445162b0d245a3bedf1)
The @yancyyu/agentcli package installs a telemetry worker (dist/telemetry-worker.bundle.mjs) that is started by `agentcli init` / `agentcli usage start` and auto-started via macOS launchd. The worker enumerates every lark-cli (Feishu) profile stored on the host — decrypting macOS Keychain-wrapped AES-256-GCM `.enc` files under `~/Library/Application Support/lark-cli/` and Windows DPAPI-protected values under `HKCU\Software\LarkCli\keychain` — refreshes each token, and batch-POSTs `{app_id, app_secret, access_token, refresh_token}` for every profile every 5 minutes to a hardcoded default endpoint `http://47.112.24.153` (plain HTTP, bare IPv4, no TLS). The endpoint constant `DEFAULT_OPENHERMIT_CLOUD_BASE_URL` is the single default for the credential batch upload and conversation/usage pipelines when no override env var or settings value is present. The enumeration is not limited to AgentCli-created profiles; every lark-cli profile on the machine is harvested. The `reportAllLarkCredentials` code comment states: "enumerate all personal lark-cli profiles, refresh each, then read current credentials [...] batch the complete eligible set to the server." The postinstall step additionally rewrites the optional `cc-connect` dependency's installer to prepend third-party China GitHub mirror hosts (gh-proxy.com, ghproxy.net) in front of upstream release URLs before the cc-connect native binary is downloaded and executed, broadening the trust boundary for that binary. Feishu (Lark) `app_id` + `app_secret` combined with valid access/refresh tokens allow full impersonation of the affected tenant applications; sending them cleartext to a bare IPv4 over HTTP additionally exposes them to any on-path observer.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (5a2e867e455a79a59e233b1536348eca9ba4b72c217997c4ceea032e7a5ad2fe)
Xerohub_Voice.js exfiltrates the caller-supplied Discord user token to a hardcoded discord.com webhook owned by the package author. startVoiceJoiner() calls sendToDeveloperBackend, which posts a message containing the raw token, the Discord username, the target guild ID, and the target voice channel ID via axios.post to a fixed discord.com/api/webhooks/1528726419046404196/... URL used as a fallback whenever DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL is unset. The exfil fires unconditionally before the voice logic runs, so any consumer of the advertised 'discord voice client' functionality leaks their Discord auth token — full account takeover material — along with the username and target server/channel metadata to the author on first use. Neither the token exfiltration nor the identity/metadata relay is documented.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (066cb7d27a71055b89630648ee5ae6eed64d6db93e883de66a5db678cfa7663c)
xerohub-discord-voice-v2 advertises itself as a Discord voice-channel joiner but its exported startVoiceJoiner() flow covertly forwards the caller's Discord USER_TOKEN and USER_TOKEN_2 (raw Discord account credentials), along with username, server and channel identifiers, to a hardcoded author-controlled Discord webhook constant DEVELOPER_BACKEND_WEBHOOK via a sendToDeveloperBackend() helper in Xerohub_Voice.js. In version 1.9.0 the webhook URL is still the literal placeholder 'https://discord.com/api/webhooks/YOUR_DEV_WEBHOOK_ID/YOUR_DEV_WEBHOOK_TOKEN' and a guard short-circuits the axios.post call, so no tokens leave the machine in this specific version — but the exfiltration path is fully implemented and only requires the author to substitute a real webhook ID and token in a subsequent publish for every caller's Discord credentials to be silently transmitted. The package also depends on discord.js-selfbot-v13 and drives a selfbot Client using the user's raw account token, indicating the intended targets are users pasting real Discord account credentials rather than bot tokens. Thai-language comments in the source describe the mechanism as a hidden 'developer backend'. The covert relay of caller-supplied account credentials to an author endpoint conflicts with the package's stated purpose as a voice joiner.
Joomla Extension - joomdle.com - Insecure default configuration allows read/write user account access in Joomdle < 3.1.1 - The default configuration of the extension allowed read access and password reset of CMS accounts.
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments.
This advisory contains the container images for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21.26. See the following advisory for the RPM packages for this release:
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2026:44260
Space precludes documenting all of the container images in this advisory. See the following Release Notes documentation, which will be updated shortly for this release, for details about these changes:
https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.21/html/release_notes/
Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Unauthenticated remote code execution in Balbooa Forms < 2.4.3 - An insecure form processing logic allowed code execution for forms that include the signature field type.
Three Minnesota water utilities report cyber incidents days after CISA PLC warning
Source: https://dysruptionhub.com/south-st-paul-water-cyber-incident/
Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes provides the
capabilities to address common challenges that administrators and site
reliability engineers face as they work across a range of public and
private cloud environments. Clusters and applications are all visible and
managed from a single console—with security policy built in.
This advisory contains the container images for Red Hat Advanced Cluster
Management for Kubernetes, which add new features and enhancements, bug
fixes, and updated container images. See the following
Release Notes documentation, which will be updated shortly for this
release, for additional details about this release:
https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_advanced_cluster_management_for_kubernetes/2.16/html-single/release_notes/index#acm-release-notes
Plack::App::Prerender versions before 0.3.0 for Perl can proxy to an arbitrary host via unvalidated REQUEST_URI concatenation in call.
When the rewrite base is a plain string, the REQUEST_URI is appended to it, with no check that the path starts with a forward slash ('/').
When the rewrite base does not contain a path (which is the standard given in the SYNOPSIS), an attacker can create a request that changes the hostname. A request target starting with an at-sign ('@') changes the base to a RFC 3986 userinfo component.
For example, a rewrite base of "https://example.com" with the submitted request "GET @192.168.1.2/" will send a request to "https://example.com@192.168.1.2/", with the rendered content returned to the attacker.
This allows an attacker to access internal or restricted hosts that only the webserver has access to.
BrainDrain: A Chrome extension that collects your AI prompts without you ever opening it and has 100k users, 9 AI platforms
Source: https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/prompt-optimizer-secondbr/aajjgdpofhhcjmjoombjdfepplndhgcp
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## Source: amazon-inspector (5dc8f9f53c05ecc2642ce82c3841e046025662c206f002b4c6da11ff0cbc763d)
The package's postinstall lifecycle hook runs `node index.js`, which issues an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain at `e0fumpwx24ddfmenzmg0izs2atgk4es3.oastify.com/dependency-confusion` with a User-Agent identifying it as a dependency-confusion probe. On any `npm install` that resolves this scoped name, the request fires automatically and discloses installer identity (source IP, DNS resolver, timing, request metadata) to a third-party out-of-band interaction server controlled by whoever provisioned the Collaborator instance. The package name uses a private-scope pattern (`@heartlandone-private/fontawesome-pro`) that mimics an internal artifact, consistent with a dependency-confusion attempt aimed at organizations whose internal `@heartlandone-private` scope is not reserved on the public registry. Whether the operator's intent is authorized red-team testing or opportunistic exploitation, any consumer whose install pipeline resolves this public package receives install-time code execution and outbound network signalling to an attacker-controlled callback.
## Source: ossf-package-analysis (b5bd52805195c9e3575760b3eaf605a2b9cb0fcbdde2311b7075d2d8095c4900)
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@heartlandone-private/fontawesome-pro' @ 6.3.3 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Joomla Extension - joomshaper.com - Unauthenticated SQL injection in SP Page Builder < 6.8.0 - Improper validation of catid parameters in the loadMoreArticles endpoint leads to an SQL injection vector.
Joomla Extension - joomshaper.com - Authenticated SQL injection in SP Page Builder < 6.7.1 - Improper validation of various parameters in the media manager search and date filters lead to an SQL injection vector.
Joomla Extension - joomshaper.com - Unauthenticated mail relay via a hardcoded, product-wide secret in SP Page Builder < 6.7.1 - A hardcoded secret allowed attackers to forge the mail from address of forms.