The Gentlemen is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation active since mid-2025, targeting Windows, Linux, NAS, and BSD systems. It uses a double-extortion approach by encrypting files with ChaCha20 encryption and exfiltrating data. The ransomware kills security processes via vulnerable drivers and spreads laterally using PsExec. A breach in May 2026 exposed internal communications and affiliate details. The group mainly targets organizations in the United States and Europe across various sectors including manufacturing, technology, healthcare, professional services, and retail.
GenieLocker is a new ransomware family active since March 2026, targeting organizations in the Russian Federation, primarily in manufacturing. Attributed to the financially motivated Toy Ghouls group (also known as Bearlyfy, Labubu, and Laboo.boo), this custom-designed ransomware marks a shift from their previous reliance on third-party encryption tools like RedAlert, LockBit, and Babuk. GenieLocker exists in two variants: PE builds for Windows and ELF builds for Linux and ESXi. The Windows version features sophisticated capabilities including process termination, service shutdown, anti-debugging techniques, and advanced encryption using the libsodium library with XChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithm. Initial access typically occurs through compromised VPN credentials from trusted partners, followed by deployment of tools like Mimikatz, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, and SSH utilities for lateral movement before deploying ransomware using PsExec and PAExec.
A previously unseen ransomware family named Spirals was deployed in a double extortion attack against an IT services company in South Asia in June 2026. The Rust-based payload demonstrated sophisticated capabilities including defense evasion, encryption, lateral movement, and privilege escalation. Attackers gained initial access through a compromised internet-facing IIS web server via an ASP.NET web shell, moving rapidly to deploy ransomware within 24 hours. They established persistence using multiple tunneling tools, disabled endpoint security, harvested credentials through SAM hive and LSASS dumps, and deployed reverse-SOCKS proxies for covert command-and-control. The ransomware was distributed across the network using PsExec, encrypting files with AES-128 keys and threatening data publication within six days. The skilled execution suggests potential for wider campaigns, though the threat actor remains unidentified.
GodDamn ransomware represents the third iteration of ransomware developed by Hyadina, following Monster (2022) and Beast (2024). A recent attack in June 2026 demonstrates sophisticated tactics including AnyDesk for remote access, NirSoft-based credential harvesting tools, and the PoisonX kernel driver for defense evasion. PoisonX is a malicious driver signed by Microsoft that terminates security processes at the kernel level. Attackers used PsExec for lateral movement, deployed comprehensive credential theft toolkits comprising 14 different tools, and disabled endpoint defenses before encrypting files. The encrypted files were renamed with victim organization names as extensions. The four-day dwell period allowed attackers to stage payloads and conduct reconnaissance before triggering encryption across at least 10 hosts within the targeted organization.
The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service group emerged as a top-10 threat actor in the first half of 2026. The group exploits vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices like VPNs and firewalls, potentially collaborating with initial access brokers. They employ comprehensive reconnaissance using tools like SharpADWS, NetScan, and Advanced IP Scanner, capturing network traffic with netsh. The attackers disable security products through BYOVD techniques using vulnerable drivers, and deploy custom Go-based backdoors and ransomware variants. They spread laterally via GPO deployment and PsExec, encrypt files using Curve25519 and XChaCha20, and recently developed a C-based ransomware variant using AES256-GCM and RSA. The group targets multiple industries worldwide, particularly in Brazil, China, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand, with attacks focusing on manufacturing, IT services, healthcare, and financial sectors.
The Gentlemen is a ransomware-as-a-service operation tracked as Storm-2697, distinguished by combining robust per-file encryption using Curve25519 with XChaCha20 stream cipher alongside aggressive self-propagation capabilities designed for broad network compromise. Emerging in mid-2025 and transitioning to RaaS by September 2025, the operation recently partnered with BreachForums to recruit affiliates including penetration testers and initial access brokers. Written in Go and obfuscated with Garble, the ransomware employs double extortion tactics, encrypting data while exfiltrating sensitive information. It utilizes 21 distinct lateral movement techniques per target host, including PsExec, WMI, scheduled tasks, services, and PowerShell remoting. The malware disables defenses, deletes shadow copies and forensic artifacts, and can optionally wipe free disk space to prevent recovery, impacting organizations globally across education, transportation, healthcare, and finance sectors.
The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service program has rapidly expanded since mid-2025, claiming over 320 victims with 240 attacks occurring in early 2026. The service provides multi-platform lockers for Windows, Linux, NAS, BSD, and ESXi, enabling comprehensive coverage of corporate environments. During an incident response engagement, an affiliate deployed SystemBC proxy malware for covert tunneling and payload delivery. Analysis of the SystemBC command-and-control server revealed a botnet of over 1,570 victims, primarily corporate and organizational targets. The intrusion progressed from domain controller compromise through credential validation, remote execution via administrative shares, and deployment of Cobalt Strike payloads. Attackers disabled defenses, established persistence through scheduled tasks and services, and ultimately deployed ransomware via Group Policy. The operation demonstrates sophisticated lateral movement capabilities, defense evasion techniques, and integration of mature post-exploit...
AdaptixC2 is an emerging open-source post-exploitation framework rapidly adopted by threat actors in APT attacks and ransomware campaigns. Written in Go and C++, it supports Windows, macOS, and Linux with extensive modularity through Beacon Object Files (BOFs). The framework enables diverse command-and-control channels including HTTP/S, TCP, mTLS, DNS, DoH, and SMB with RC4 encryption throughout. It implements sophisticated evasion techniques targeting both network detection systems and endpoint defenses. Despite advanced obfuscation capabilities, network-level detection remains viable through analysis of distinctive communication patterns, header structures, and behavioral indicators. The framework supports credential harvesting via LSASS dumping, LAPS exploitation, and Kerberos attacks, alongside defense evasion through process injection and lateral movement via WinRM and PsExec. Combined NDR and EDR solutions provide effective multi-layered detection coverage against AdaptixC2 operations across network ...
LeakNet, a ransomware operator, has expanded its initial access methods by utilizing ClickFix lures on compromised websites and implementing a new Deno-based, in-memory loader. The group has shifted from relying on initial access brokers to running its own campaigns. LeakNet's post-exploitation playbook remains consistent, involving jli.dll side-loading, PsExec-based lateral movement, and S3 bucket payload staging. The Deno loader executes base64-encoded payloads in memory, making detection challenging for traditional security tools. Defenders are advised to focus on behavioral signals and implement measures such as blocking newly registered domains, restricting Win-R access, and limiting PsExec usage to authorized administrators.
Huntress SOC analysts have uncovered sophisticated data exfiltration techniques employed by threat actors. The analysis reveals the use of various tools for data staging, including WinZip, 7Zip, and Windows' native tar.exe. Exfiltration methods observed include the use of finger.exe and backup utilities like restic, BackBlaze, and s5cmd. A specific incident on February 25, 2026, involved INC ransomware deployment, with the threat actor using PSEXEC for privilege escalation and creating a scheduled task to run a malicious PowerShell script. The actor utilized the Restic backup utility, renamed as winupdate.exe, to exfiltrate data. Similar tactics were observed in a previous incident on February 9, suggesting a pattern in the threat actor's methodology.
The ransomware group Qilin has been highly active in 2025, publishing over 40 victim cases per month on its leak site. Manufacturing, professional services, and wholesale trade are the most affected sectors. Attackers likely originate from Eastern Europe or Russian-speaking regions. They use tools like Cyberduck for data exfiltration and leverage notepad.exe and mspaint.exe to view sensitive information. The attack flow includes initial VPN access, reconnaissance, credential theft, lateral movement, and ransomware deployment. Two encryptors are often used: one spread via PsExec and another targeting network shares. The ransomware encrypts files, deletes backups, and leaves ransom notes. Persistence is achieved through scheduled tasks and registry modifications.
From September to December 2024, incidents involving CrossC2, an extension tool for Cobalt Strike Beacon on Linux, were confirmed. The attacker used CrossC2 along with other tools like PsExec, Plink, and Cobalt Strike to penetrate AD. A custom malware called ReadNimeLoader was used as a loader for Cobalt Strike. The campaign may have affected multiple countries. CrossC2 is an unofficial Beacon and builder compatible with Cobalt Strike 4.1+, designed for Linux and macOS. It contains anti-analysis features and encrypted configuration data. The attack flow involved java.exe, ReadNimeLoader, and OdinLdr to execute Cobalt Strike Beacon. Other tools used include SystemBC, GetNPUsers, and privilege escalation tools. The campaign shows potential connections to BlackBasta based on similar characteristics.
A new ransomware variant called KawaLocker (KAWA4096) was recently observed in an attack. The threat actor gained initial access via RDP using a compromised account and employed various tools to disable security measures. HRSword, a monitoring tool, was deployed along with kernel drivers sysdiag.sys and hrwfpdr.sys. The attacker used PsExec to enable RDP on additional endpoints. KawaLocker ransomware was then deployed against the E:\ volume, encrypting files and leaving a ransom note. Post-encryption, the attacker deleted Volume Shadow Copies, cleared Windows Event Logs, and removed the ransomware executable. The incident highlights the importance of detecting and remediating such attacks promptly.
This analysis explores the sophisticated tactics employed by LockBit ransomware attackers, focusing on DLL sideloading and masquerading techniques. These methods allow attackers to evade detection and maximize impact. DLL sideloading involves tricking legitimate applications into loading malicious DLLs, exploiting trusted programs. Masquerading tactics include renaming malicious files, spoofing process names, and using legitimate icons to blend in with system processes. Recent attacks have utilized trusted applications like Jarsigner.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, and Clink_x86.exe alongside malicious DLLs. The attack chain encompasses initial access, privilege escalation, discovery, credential theft, lateral movement, and impact stages. Attackers employ various tools and techniques, including remote desktop access, NSSM, PsExec, and PowerShell scripts for file encryption.
A series of attacks targeting financial organizations across Africa has been observed since July 2023. The threat actor, tracked as CL-CRI-1014, uses open-source and publicly available tools like PoshC2, Chisel, and Classroom Spy to establish attack frameworks, create tunnels for network communication, and perform remote administration. They forge file signatures to disguise their toolset and mask malicious activities. The attackers are suspected to be acting as initial access brokers, creating footholds in financial institutions to sell access on darknet markets. Their playbook includes lateral movement techniques such as creating remote services, executing through DCOM, and using PsExec. The threat actor also employs evasion methods like using packers and signing tools with stolen signatures.