OpenEMR before 8.5.0 contains a missing authorization flaw in the Care Coordination CCDA and CCR import controllers, which move a document named by the document_id parameter into the import category without checking access to the source document. Authenticated non-administrators with Care Coordination access can recategorize protected patient documents and then download them through normal ACL-checked retrieval.
OpenEMR versions prior to 8.3.0 have an authorization bypass vulnerability allowing authenticated clinicians without high-sensitivity permissions to read and modify encounter-bound forms. Attackers can exploit load_form.php to access restricted clinical notes or care plans and obtain a CSRF token, then use save.php to alter clinical records.
MONAI (Medical Open Network for AI) is an AI toolkit for health care imaging. Prior to 1.6.1, PydicomReader._get_affine() trusts non-finite values in the DICOM PixelSpacing, ImagePositionPatient, and ImageOrientationPatient fields and composes them into an affine matrix without validation. An unauthenticated attacker who can upload a crafted DICOM to a default MONAILabel deployment can propagate NaN or infinity values through LoadImaged, Spacingd, model inference, and output writing, causing inference failures, persistent datastore poisoning, or geometrically corrupted results. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.1.
CVE-2026-101668 is a vulnerability in Oracle Customer Care within Oracle E-Business Suite versions 12.2.3 through 12.2.15. It allows an unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to perform unauthorized read and write operations on accessible data, requiring user interaction from a third party. The vulnerability impacts confidentiality and integrity but not availability, with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 6.1 (medium severity).
CVE-2026-42704 is a high-severity vulnerability in the Kids Care theme by axiomthemes, affecting versions up to and including 3.2.4. It involves an unauthenticated local file inclusion (LFI) flaw due to improper control of filenames in include/require statements in PHP. This vulnerability could allow an attacker to include arbitrary files on the server, potentially leading to full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
A cyberattack on the Arizona Supreme Court system resulted in the theft of personal information for approximately 1.3 million people, including data related to unpaid court fees, fines, and restitution payments dating back 30 years. Additionally, records of nearly 30,000 orders of protection and 150,000 foster care reports from 2010 onward were stolen. The breach began when a court employee clicked a malicious email link. The attack was detected and stopped within two hours, with no evidence of data misuse or sharing. No court cases were affected or delayed, and no records were altered or deleted. Information about jurors, witnesses, or court employees was not compromised.
The US Senate has passed the bipartisan Health Care Cybersecurity and Resilience Act to strengthen cybersecurity in the healthcare sector. The Act aims to reduce successful cyberattacks, particularly ransomware and data extortion, which have severely impacted healthcare providers and patient data. It includes provisions for grants, training, improved interagency coordination, and updated regulations to enhance cybersecurity practices. The legislation now moves to the House of Representatives for consideration. Healthcare breaches have affected over 270 million Americans recently, with significant financial and operational impacts. The Act seeks to improve resilience and response capabilities across healthcare organizations, including rural providers.
The District of Columbia Department of Health Care Finance (DHCF) experienced a data exposure affecting nearly 400,000 Medicaid and DC Healthcare Alliance beneficiaries enrolled between 2023 and 2026. The exposure was due to two reports on the DHCF website that contained hidden personal information accessible to unauthorized users. The exposed data included Medicaid IDs, provider names, dates of birth, race, gender, ethnicity, and ward, but did not include Social Security numbers, names, or financial information. The breach was not caused by hacking but by unintended data exposure. DHCF removed the reports upon discovery in July 2026 and notified affected individuals and the US Department of Health and Human Services. The agency has no evidence that the information was misused but advises vigilance against identity theft and fraud.
This analysis discusses the limited impact that slowing AI development would have on cybersecurity, noting that current AI models are already highly capable for both offensive and defensive purposes. It highlights the rise of ransomware activity in Japan driven by two groups, The Gentlemen and Qilin, with Qilin leveraging generative AI to accelerate attacks. The report emphasizes that foundational security practices remain critical despite AI advancements. It recommends strict management of internet-accessible devices, credential lockdown, multi-factor authentication, and robust endpoint detection to mitigate risks from AI-enhanced ransomware operations.
### Summary
When you share a project with a team, the API lets you attach any team on the instance, including teams you have nothing to do with, as long as you're an admin of the project. Listing a project's teams then returns each team's full member roster. So any logged-in user can spin up a throwaway project, attach team IDs one by one, and read back the name, description, and complete member list of every team on the instance. Normally you can only see teams you belong to; this path ignores that.
### Details
Sharing a project with a team is a two-step flow: you PUT a team to the project, then you GET the project's teams to see them. The share endpoint only enforces that you're an admin of the target project, it doesn't care whether the team you're referencing is one you're allowed to see. Any existing team ID is accepted.
The listing endpoint is even more permissive: read access to the project is enough, which you obviously have on a project you created. And its response isn't just a list of team names, it includes each team's description, creator, and a full members array with every member's username, display name, and admin flag.
Put together, an attacker who owns a single project can walk the team ID space and pull the roster of every team in the instance, including teams they aren't a member of. This contradicts how team visibility works everywhere else in the product, where you only ever see teams you belong to. Emails are stripped from the roster, so what leaks is identities and org structure rather than contact details.
The fix is to require that the caller actually has access to the team they're attaching, not just to the project.
### PoC
The attacker needs nothing but an ordinary account.
1. Create a throwaway project you own:
2. Attach team IDs one by one (sweep the range you want):
```
PUT /api/v1/projects/<your_project_id>/teams
{<SNIP>, "team_id": <N>, <SNIP>}
```
3. Read them back with their rosters:
```
GET /api/v1/projects/<your_project_id>/teams
```
Each entry contains the team name, description, creator, and a members array with every member's username, display name, and admin flag, for teams you are not a member of.
### Impact
Information disclosure of the instance-wide team directory: team names, descriptions, and full membership, for teams the attacker has no relationship with. This maps out the organisation's group structure and who belongs where, useful for targeting and social engineering. Any authenticated account is enough; no share link, no admin rights, no victim interaction.
CVE-2026-70778 is a high-severity vulnerability in Oracle Customer Care within Oracle E-Business Suite versions 12.2.3 through 12.2.15. It allows a low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise the product, requiring human interaction from a third party. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized creation, deletion, or modification of critical data, impacting Oracle Customer Care and potentially other products due to scope change.
CVE-2026-62607 is a high-severity vulnerability in Oracle Customer Care within Oracle E-Business Suite versions 12.2.3 through 12.2.15. It allows a high privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise the product, potentially impacting additional Oracle products. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized creation, deletion, or modification of critical data, as well as unauthorized access to all data accessible by Oracle Customer Care. The vulnerability has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.7, indicating significant confidentiality and integrity impacts. Oracle has published a Critical Security Patch Update advisory addressing this and many other vulnerabilities, strongly recommending patch application. No explicit patch link for this specific CVE was provided, but the vendor advisory is authoritative for remediation guidance.
Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. “Experiment is the mother of knowledge.” ― Madeleine L'Engle, A Wrinkle in Time “Don't slide down the rabbit hole. The way down is a breeze, but climbing back's a battle.” ― Kate Morton, The Clockmaker's Daughter Hacker Summer Camp has come and gone, which means it’s time for you to start planning next year’s trip. I’m surely going to recap Camp Season, right? Nope. One of the things that I’ve really enjoyed lately is a segment on the Beers with Talos podcast that we call “Make Hazel a Hacker.” If you haven’t listened to it, this is a perfect time to start. Each episode we take a few minutes and pose a security question, term, or concept to Hazel and force her to come up with an idea or explanation on the spot. There are no parameters, so she’s faced with the entirety of information security — past, present, and future. I know, it’s insane. The craziest part is that (I think) Hazel came up with this idea and still volunteered to put herself in the line of fire. As we put Hazel’s feet to the fire, one of my favorite things happens: The rest of us listen in and offer our thoughts during her brainstorming process. Invariably, we’ve got three very different answers, ideas, hints, or directions for her. It’s surely maddening for Hazel, but to me, the best part of the discussion that inevitably follows is that although they’re all different, they’re all correct. For example, this past episode I asked her about a behavioral indicator (regarding “wallpaper.bmp”) that seems benign on its own, but can be interesting to use as a pivot for a threat hunt. We had various interesting angles to consider, backed by years of knowledge and experience. It gave us a good conversation, and that was a .bmp! One of the most nebulous things to learn in this field is that multiple things can be both different and correct. When you are making your decisions this week — whether it’s deciding on a new pivot in your hunting, what devices to prioritize in your patching and updating, or which books or online training to focus on — take a quick second and get a second, third, and fourth opinion. Then try something that’s outside of your normal wheelhouse but sounds good when it’s proposed. None of this is a solo sport. It’s a team game and the best plays come from a mix of perspectives, experiences, and mistakes. The “right” answer can wear many faces, and your ability to hold different truths will lead you to undiscovered territory, the rabbit hole where anomaly lives and breathes. So... welcome back from Vegas. Now go down a rabbit hole on a path you wouldn’t normally take because one of your friends (Joe) or your mortal enemy (Dave) told you that it would work. “She'd been to Narnia, Wonderland, Hogwarts, Dictionopolis. She had tessered, fallen through the rabbit hole, crossed the ice bridge into the unknown world beyond.” ― Anne Ursu, Breadcrumbs The one big thing Cisco Talos recently discovered "JWR," a previously undocumented, real-time phishing framework and likely variant of "The Outsider" phishing-as-a-service platform. JWR uses an open WebSocket connection that allows attackers to monitor keystrokes live and dynamically steer victims through fake checkout and login flows. Currently deployed via SMS lures impersonating regional toll and postal authorities, JWR enables operators to steal payment data, 2FA codes, identity documents, and device fingerprints. Why do I care? Because JWR is operator-driven in real time, attackers can actively bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) by prompting victims for 2FA codes exactly when needed. The sheer volume of collected data gives threat actors a comprehensive identity profile primed for extensive follow-on fraud and network compromise. Furthermore, JWR's seamless integration with legitimate e-commerce platforms like Shopify makes these lures incredibly convincing to the untrained eye. So now what? Prioritize user education around SMS-based phish…
In the Mira hormone monitor device firmware v1.7.1.47 build 01070147, a remote unauthenticated attacker within BLE range (approximately 10–30 meters) can silently rebind the device to an attacker-controlled account, extract stored hormone measurements in cleartext, cause a denial-of-service via malformed or undocumented command opcodes, and passively track the user via a static random BLE address that never rotates.
The Mira hormone monitor device firmware accepts a 0x01 write from any BLE central without authentication, causing the device to reboot into bootloader mode. An attacker could cause a denial-of-service condition or disrupt ovulation tracking and fertility monitoring workflow.
The Mira Android companion app v4.5.15.4 identifies the paired Mira hormone analyzer by performing a substring match against the BLE advertisement name only, with no cryptographic peripheral authentication, MAC allowlist, or bonded-identity check. An attacker could capture live session token information and inject forged hormone measurements into the victim's cloud record and clinical trend view.