Search: background-services.net
10 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 4.1 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-61681hatchet · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Medium4.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-61681 Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. Prior to 0.91.1, the SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler in internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go calls http.Get() on payload.UnsubscribeURL after VerifyPayload() even though BuildSignature() excludes UnsubscribeURL, allowing an authenticated Hatchet tenant to replace that field in an otherwise valid AWS-signed message with an internal URL. The server-side request can reach EC2 Instance Metadata Service, internal services, and internal HTTP APIs, potentially exposing IAM credentials or network-accessible data and functionality. This issue is fixed in version 0.91.1. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.7 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-54339LeslieLeung glean · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) High7.7EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-54339 Glean is a self-hosted RSS reader and personal knowledge management tool. Prior to 0.2.6, POST /api/feeds/discover passes an attacker-supplied feed_url to discover_feed(feed_url), creates a subscription through FeedService.create_subscription(), and enqueues fetch_feed_task. The background path calls fetch_feed(feed.url) and parse_feed(), which assigns each RSS item link to ParsedEntry.url. The task then passes ParsedEntry.url to fetch_and_extract_fulltext(parsed_entry.url) without network-level validation in backend/packages/rss/glean_rss/extractor.py and backend/apps/worker/glean_worker/tasks/feed_fetcher.py. A malicious feed can therefore make the server request private, loopback, link-local, or cloud-metadata resources. The fetched response is stored in Entry.content and can be retrieved through GET /api/entries/{id}, producing non-blind server-side request forgery with full response disclosure. This can bypass network perimeters, probe internal services and ports, expose internal configuration or web content, and potentially disclose cloud metadata access tokens. This issue is fixed in version 0.2.6. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.4 | EPSS 0.4% | Medium6.4EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-79717 CVE-2026-79717 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in galaxy_ng, the Ansible Galaxy server plugin for Pulp, used in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2. An authenticated user with namespace management permissions can set a namespace avatar URL to arbitrary addresses, including internal network and cloud metadata endpoints. A background worker fetches these URLs without destination checks, allowing attackers to probe internal services and enumerate reachable IPs. The HTTP client lacks an overall timeout, enabling denial of service by pinning workers with slow or unresponsive targets. There is no complete mitigation, but risk can be reduced by restricting permissions and applying network egress filtering. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | – | CriticalTenable Research Oracle addresses 1235 CVEs in its third quarterly update of 2026 with 1449 patches, including 261 critical updates. Key Takeaways The third Critical Patch Update (CPU) for 2026 contains fixes for 1235 unique CVEs in 1449 security updates, the largest CPU release. 261 issues (18% of all patches) were assigned a critical severity rating Oracle E-Business Suite received the highest number of patches at 410, accounting for 28.3% of all patches Background On July 21, Oracle released its Critical Patch Update (CPU) for July 2026 , the third quarterly update of the year. This CPU contains fixes for 1235 unique CVEs in 1449 security updates across 32 Oracle product families. Out of the 1449 security updates published this quarter, 18% of patches were assigned a critical severity. High severity patches accounted for the bulk of security patches at 52.7%, followed by medium severity patches at 24.7%. This quarter's update includes 261 critical patches across 228 CVEs. Severity Issues Patched CVEs Critical 261 228 High 763 613 Medium 358 332 Low 67 62 Total 1449 1235 Analysis This quarter, the Oracle E-Business Suite product family contained the highest number of patches at 410, accounting for 28.3% of the total patches, followed by Oracle Fusion Middleware at 355 patches, which accounted for 24.5% of the total patches. A full breakdown of the patches for this quarter can be seen in the following table, which also includes a count of vulnerabilities that can be exploited over a network without authentication. Oracle Product Family Number of Patches Remote Exploit without Auth Oracle E-Business Suite 410 45 Oracle Fusion Middleware 355 219 Oracle Communications 168 122 Oracle PeopleSoft 84 45 Oracle MySQL 54 9 Oracle Siebel CRM 45 32 Oracle Commerce 39 26 Oracle Supply Chain 39 16 Oracle Financial Services Applications 31 26 Oracle GoldenGate 27 9 Oracle Enterprise Manager 27 13 Oracle Retail Applications 22 20 Oracle JD Edwards 20 4 Oracle Java SE 19 17 Oracle Virtualization 16 0 Oracle Database Server 15 6 Oracle TimesTen In-Memory Database 14 4 Oracle Utilities Applications 14 10 Oracle Construction and Engineering 7 7 Oracle Analytics 7 5 Oracle Systems 6 0 Oracle SQL Developer 5 5 Oracle Autonomous Health Framework 4 3 Oracle Application Testing Suite 4 4 Oracle Food and Beverage Applications 4 4 Oracle HealthCare Applications 4 4 Oracle APEX 3 2 Oracle Hospitality Applications 2 2 Oracle Essbase 1 1 Oracle Global Lifecycle Management 1 1 Oracle NoSQL Database 1 1 Oracle Spatial Studio 1 1 Solution Customers are advised to apply all relevant patches in this quarter's CPU. Please refer to the July 2026 advisory for full details. Identifying affected systems A list of Tenable plugins to identify these vulnerabilities will appear here as they're released. This link uses a search filter to ensure that all matching plugin coverage will appear as it is released. Get more information Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - July 2026 Oracle July 2026 Critical Patch Update Risk Matrices Oracle Advisory to CVE Map Join Tenable's Research Special Operations (RSO) Team on Tenable Connect for further discussions on the latest cyber threats. Learn more about Tenable One , the Exposure Management Platform for the modern attack surface. | Tenable Research | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database pinokio-redis is a malicious npm package and part of the multi-wave "forge-jsx" cross-platform RAT campaign (Wave 4). It was published by npm account 'donimique' (donimiqueakers@gmail.com). The package.json description ('Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge') and the bundled README.md (literally titled "# forge-jsx") do not match the package name or the shipped code. On npm install the declared postinstall chain (postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs, ensure-dist.mjs, postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs, postinstall-bootstrap.mjs, postinstall-agent.mjs) runs scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs, which spawns dist/cli-agent.js as a detached, window-hidden background process. The agent connects over WebSocket to a command-and-control relay whose host, ports and default password are stored as an AES-256-GCM blob in dist/deploymentCipherData.js and decrypted at runtime by XOR-reconstructing a 32-byte key from two halves embedded in dist/deploymentDefaults.js. The decrypted C2 configuration is publicHost 212.193.3.61, relayPort 9877 (WebSocket relay), apiPort 8765 (HTTP API), default password 'secret'. Postinstall also registers OS-level autostart (Windows Run key, macOS LaunchAgent, Linux systemd/XDG autostart; service name forge-js-worker) pointing at a durable copy of the agent stored in a hidden '.forge-jsxy' directory under the platform application-data folder, so the implant survives removal of the npm package. Once running it performs credential-grade theft: dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js walks the filesystem for BIP39-checksum-valid mnemonics, secp256k1/WIF private keys and BIP32 extended keys (xprv/tprv/zprv); dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js enumerates Chromium/Edge/Brave/Vivaldi/Yandex/Opera profiles across Windows, macOS and Linux and copies extension LevelDB stores (including MetaMask/Phantom-shaped wallet stores); harvested data is uploaded to the Hugging Face Hub using an embedded hf_ write token (dist/hfCredentials.js) or delivered via the relay; dist/hostInventorySend.js POSTs host inventory (hostname/platform/node/OS) to the relay and dist/discordRelayUpload.js forwards agent-side PNG screenshots to per-client Discord channels. This is the first wave of the campaign to ship rotated AES key material (new DEPLOYMENT_KEY_A/KEY_B/MASK_A/MASK_B byte arrays, hex 12335cede9edad1edbce89fd3ef0836c8edd3778e48f3f38f2330198ec8b1eb0), verified byte-identical across the four donimique-account packages (zod-pino434, zod-pino444, zredis-typed, pinokio-redis) — a single shared build. C2 212.193.3.61 (AS206216, Advin Services LLC, Nurnberg DE) is reused from the Wave 3 pino-zod/zod-pino IP rotation. The campaign is definitively linked by shared C2 infrastructure, the hardcoded '.forge-jsxy' durable directory, the dist/deploymentCipherData.js + dist/deploymentDefaults.js XOR-key fingerprint, and the '# forge-jsx' README tell that spans multiple package names and npm accounts. Only one version of pinokio-redis (1.0.127) exists and all versions are malicious. Tarball SHA-256: a400b0342add77fd3a58e086334b35e11d79e234b180bb360f48adcd61ec4acd, SHA-1: 04b6035df92ef9eb790d64d425c05c51fce46ca7. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2593226767577439cd32d202e0e5e07ef74a6526f9ad7cb42f4bad087d04aa30) The package name presents as a Redis client for Pinokio, but the shipped tarball contains a credential-harvest and data-relay toolkit that has no relationship to Redis. dist/discordRelayUpload.js issues outbound POSTs and shells out (ping) to relay collected content; dist/hfCredentials.js and dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js decode base64-embedded blobs (Buffer.from(..., 'base64')) at runtime; dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js performs fetch() calls to huggingface.co endpoints under a "secret scan" module name — a shape consistent with harvesting scanned secrets rather than defending them. dist/deploymentDefaults.js and scripts/encode-deployment.mjs carry base64-encoded deployment configuration decoded at runtime, obscuring destination endpoints. scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs runs at npm install (postinstall) and issues network activity (GET, ping) on install without user interaction, providing auto-execution on default install. The combination — install-time auto-executed agent, base64-obfuscated configuration/payloads across multiple files, a Discord upload relay path, and a "secretScan" module that fetches to remote endpoints — describes an installer-side credential and data exfiltration toolkit, not a Redis integration. Name/purpose mismatch, install-time execution, and multi-file obfuscation together satisfy the active-attack shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d8c9c7ad731c0929056de138dff2c461e808854d25aea316f6fe865a3d04d8c0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full co | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database zredis-typed is a malicious npm package and part of the multi-wave "forge-jsx" cross-platform RAT campaign (Wave 4). It was published by npm account 'donimique' (donimiqueakers@gmail.com). The package.json description ('Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge') and the bundled README.md (literally titled "# forge-jsx") do not match the package name or the shipped code. On npm install the declared postinstall chain (postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs, ensure-dist.mjs, postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs, postinstall-bootstrap.mjs, postinstall-agent.mjs) runs scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs, which spawns dist/cli-agent.js as a detached, window-hidden background process. The agent connects over WebSocket to a command-and-control relay whose host, ports and default password are stored as an AES-256-GCM blob in dist/deploymentCipherData.js and decrypted at runtime by XOR-reconstructing a 32-byte key from two halves embedded in dist/deploymentDefaults.js. The decrypted C2 configuration is publicHost 212.193.3.61, relayPort 9877 (WebSocket relay), apiPort 8765 (HTTP API), default password 'secret'. Postinstall also registers OS-level autostart (Windows Run key, macOS LaunchAgent, Linux systemd/XDG autostart; service name forge-js-worker) pointing at a durable copy of the agent stored in a hidden '.forge-jsxy' directory under the platform application-data folder, so the implant survives removal of the npm package. Once running it performs credential-grade theft: dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js walks the filesystem for BIP39-checksum-valid mnemonics, secp256k1/WIF private keys and BIP32 extended keys (xprv/tprv/zprv); dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js enumerates Chromium/Edge/Brave/Vivaldi/Yandex/Opera profiles across Windows, macOS and Linux and copies extension LevelDB stores (including MetaMask/Phantom-shaped wallet stores); harvested data is uploaded to the Hugging Face Hub using an embedded hf_ write token (dist/hfCredentials.js) or delivered via the relay; dist/hostInventorySend.js POSTs host inventory (hostname/platform/node/OS) to the relay and dist/discordRelayUpload.js forwards agent-side PNG screenshots to per-client Discord channels. This is the first wave of the campaign to ship rotated AES key material (new DEPLOYMENT_KEY_A/KEY_B/MASK_A/MASK_B byte arrays, hex 12335cede9edad1edbce89fd3ef0836c8edd3778e48f3f38f2330198ec8b1eb0), verified byte-identical across the four donimique-account packages (zod-pino434, zod-pino444, zredis-typed, pinokio-redis) — a single shared build. C2 212.193.3.61 (AS206216, Advin Services LLC, Nurnberg DE) is reused from the Wave 3 pino-zod/zod-pino IP rotation. The campaign is definitively linked by shared C2 infrastructure, the hardcoded '.forge-jsxy' durable directory, the dist/deploymentCipherData.js + dist/deploymentDefaults.js XOR-key fingerprint, and the '# forge-jsx' README tell that spans multiple package names and npm accounts. Only one version of zredis-typed (1.0.127) exists; all versions are malicious. Tarball SHA-256: a1853a45bcb561f96e0e7c0dec7f96e640ae53be62e65158880812ff104c9e41, SHA-1: b74170f2d850bfd8d0a9d750af88a03ba2c42e61. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (330bc399769c68aa2a7f09a635bb038680c88c855268cc3643759492ebd96de9) The package name presents as a typed Redis client, but the tarball ships a multi-file exfiltration payload unrelated to any Redis functionality. `dist/discordRelayUpload.js` performs host reconnaissance (ping) and POSTs base64-encoded content to remote endpoints. `dist/relayServer.js` similarly runs ping-based host probing. `dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js` fetches attacker-controlled URLs on huggingface.co (used here as a data/staging endpoint), and `dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js` performs credential/secret scanning with base64 encoding of results. `dist/hfCredentials.js` handles third-party (Hugging Face) credential material via base64 decode. `dist/deploymentDefaults.js` and `scripts/encode-deployment.mjs` encode/decode deployment payloads via base64. `scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs` is registered as an install-time agent that performs outbound GET requests and host ping — running automatically on `npm install`. The combination of postinstall-time network activity, host reconnaissance, filesystem secret scanning, base64-encoded payload handling, Discord-labeled relay upload, and hardcoded remote fetch endpoints is unambiguous credential/data exfiltration disguised as a Redis type package. Nothing in the shipped modules implements a Redis client. The traced content also tripped the safety filter on downstream analysis, corroborating the malware shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (73b8d51428450de7f67cb29aa402a94aefd62bdcf03e4f0eee43c554576eec2e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General TAG-182, an Iran-nexus threat cluster, is conducting surveillance operations targeting Iranian citizens both domestically and abroad using MarkiRAT malware. The group distributes fake Android applications masquerading as VPN services and media players through social media platforms, particularly Instagram. Following Iran's partial internet restoration in May 2026 after an 88-day shutdown, these surveillance activities have intensified as Iranian security apparatus seeks to monitor perceived dissidents and anti-government activists. MarkiRAT samples demonstrate tradecraft overlaps with previously documented Ferocious Kitten operations, including use of Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS). The group operates infrastructure across multiple autonomous systems, utilizing domains with naming conventions mimicking legitimate services like Microsoft, Google, and Facebook. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research A stolen session cookie sat in underground markets for seven weeks before attackers used it to poison 32 Red Hat packages in the npm software registry, an example of the industrial approach behind modern supply chain attacks. Key takeaways Miasma is a self-propagating npm worm derived from Mini Shai-Hulud that TeamPCP open-sourced on May 12. The public release of the full weaponized toolchain means any operator can now replicate structurally identical supply chain campaigns. The Miasma campaign compromised 89-plus npm packages across three waves (June 1-5), affecting Red Hat, Vapi.ai, and Microsoft Azure repositories. The worm produced malicious packages with valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestations, defeating the highest tier of supply-chain integrity verification. The root cause was a stolen developer credential that sat in infostealer logs for seven weeks before weaponization. This infostealer-to-supply-chain pipeline is the defining pattern of the Developer Credential Economy. The Miasma campaign’s third wave (June 5) introduced a significant escalation: persistence files that target AI coding assistants (Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI, VS Code), expanding the attack surface from package registries to the developer’s local environment. Relying on execution-layer detection, such as EDR, is insufficient against supply chain threats because EDR tools lack visibility into the ephemeral CI/CD environments where credential theft and weaponization occur. Organizations should treat developer credentials as control-plane infrastructure and adopt a phased Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) approach: harden the generation layer, neutralize harvested secrets in real time, and enforce human-gated publishing controls. Background on the Miasma worm and npm supply chain attack On June 1, the Miasma self-propagating worm compromised 32 official npm packages under the @redhat-cloud-services namespace, delivering a credential-harvesting payload to an estimated 80,000 to 117,000 weekly downloads. Within five days, the campaign escalated through three distinct attack waves and forced GitHub to disable 73 repositories across four Microsoft organizations . The technical details of the Miasma supply-chain attack are alarming: valid Supply Chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA) provenance attestations on malicious packages; a novel execution technique that bypasses install-script monitoring; and a new persistence mechanism that targets AI coding assistants. But the most important detail is a timestamp. Dark web monitoring firm Whiteintel detected a Red Hat employee’s GitHub credential and session cookie in infostealer logs on April 13. A second sighting appeared on May 15. The credential sat in underground markets for approximately seven weeks before attackers weaponized it on June 1. That seven-week gap is the signature of an emerging threat model that Tenable’s Research Special Operations (RSO) team calls the Developer Credential Economy , and has been tracking since March 2026. The Developer Credential Economy is a structured black market for highly privileged developer credentials where open-source supply chain compromises function as credential generation infrastructure, underground markets serve as the distribution layer, and multiple threat actors with distinct motivations weaponize the harvested access downstream. The Miasma campaign is the clearest example of this model to date, and it validates a pattern that has been accelerating across the npm, PyPI, and GitHub ecosystems throughout 2026. The three-layer economy, explained through Miasma When it first assessed this pattern in March, Tenable RSO built the analysis around the TeamPCP cascading campaign (Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, Telnyx, and 66+ npm packages) and the Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 Axios compromise . The thesis identified a three-layer structure: credential generation, distribution, and weaponization. Three months later, the Miasma campaign validates each layer with striking clarity. Layer Actor / group Operational focus Primary targets Miasma validation Generation TeamPCP Bulk credential harvesting via tool exploitation Trivy, KICS, TanStack, Red Hat npm scope Miasma's payload sweeps GitHub tokens, cloud credentials, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and .env files from every infected environment Distribution Underground markets, infostealer aggregators Credential brokering and tooling proliferation Stolen developer credentials; open-sourced worm code Red Hat employee credential sat in infostealer logs for seven weeks before weaponization; Shai-Hulud source published May 12 Weaponization Sapphire Sleet (DPRK-nexus), LAPSUS$, Miasma operator, copycat actors State-sponsored exfiltration, data theft, cascading supply chain compromise Axios (npm), Mercor AI, @vapi-ai/server-sdk, Azure/durabletask Each Miasma wave generates A fresh credential pool, feeding the next wave and enabling downstream actors Layer 1: Credential generation The Developer Credential Economy’s first layer is extraction. Threat actors compromise developer tooling and open-source infrastructure not primarily to distribute malware to end users, but to harvest the credentials those environments contain, such as GitHub tokens, npm publishing tokens, cloud provider credentials, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and API keys. TeamPCP pioneered this at scale beginning in September 2025 with the original Shai-Hulud worm. Its defining innovation was cascading credential extraction: compromise one trusted tool, harvest the credentials it holds, and use those credentials to compromise the next tool in the dependency chain. The Trivy vulnerability scanner compromise yielded CI/CD runner secrets. Those secrets enabled the KICS compromise . KICS yielded additional cloud credentials. Each link in the chain generated a broader set of privileged access. By May, TeamPCP had refined this into the Mini Shai-Hulud variant, which introduced two capabilities that made the generation layer dramatically more efficient: Wormable propagation : The malware queries the npm registry for every package the compromised identity can publish, and republishes itself across all of them automatically. CI/CD pipeline hijack via OpenID Connect (OIDC) token extraction : Rather than stealing static credentials, Mini Shai-Hulud requests short-lived OIDC tokens through GitHub Actions, enabling it to publish packages with valid cryptographic provenance. In the Miasma supply chain campaign, this generation layer operated through a Red Hat employee’s compromised GitHub account. The worm’s payload swept the infected environment for: GitHub tokens and personal access tokens npm publishing tokens AWS, GCP, and Azure cloud credentials HashiCorp Vault tokens Kubernetes service account tokens SSH private keys Docker registry credentials GPG keys .env files The June variant added dedicated collectors for GCP and Azure cloud identities, going beyond secret extraction to enumerate all cloud access the infected machine holds. Every machine that ran npm install against a compromised @redhat-cloud-services package version became a credential generation node. Layer 2: Distribution The second layer is the marketplace. Stolen credentials flow from the generation layer into underground markets, infostealer log aggregators, and access brokering services, where they become available to any buyer. The Miasma supply chain-attack timeline makes this layer visible in a way previous campaigns did not. Whiteintel detected the Red Hat employee’s GitHub credential and session cookie in infostealer logs on April 13. That credential was not generated by a targeted supply chain attack against Red Hat; a commodity infostealer harvested it, one of 13.2 million infostealer infections that SpyCloud's 2025 Identity Exposure Report documented as producing an average of 50 credentials per infection. The credential entered the distribution layer as one data point among billions: SpyCloud recaptured 5.3 billion credential pairs, 18.1 million exposed API keys and tokens, and 8.6 billion stolen session cookies from criminal underground monitoring in 2025 alone. For seven weeks, the credential sat in the distribution layer before someone acted on it. That dwell time is the systemic gap that the Developer Credential Economy exploits. Organizations that do not monitor underground markets for exposed developer credentials are operating on the assumption that the generation-to-weaponization pipeline does not exist, or that it operates too slowly to matter. Miasma demonstrates that even a seven-week window, which is long by underground market standards, is more than sufficient for weaponization. The distribution layer was further amplified on May 12, when TeamPCP published the complete Mini Shai-Hulud source code on GitHub under an MIT License with the message “Shai-Hulud: Open Sourcing The Carnage.” The release included CI cache-poisoning scripts, the OIDC token extractor, and the credential stealer with its propagation logic. This is the supply chain equivalent of publishing a working exploit framework: the tooling itself became a distribution channel, lowering the barrier to entry for any operator who wants to run a structurally identical campaign. Layer 3: Weaponization The third layer is operational use. Actors with distinct motivations acquire credentials from the distribution layer and weaponize them against specific targets. In March, the RSO team documented at least three distinct actors operating from the same credential pool : TeamPCP harvested at scale: Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 (DPRK-nexus) operationalized stolen npm tokens for financial gain through the Axios compromise and LAPSUS$ exploited compromised Tailscale VPN credentials from the LiteLLM breach for data theft from Mercor AI. The same credential ecosystem fed all three. Miasma’s weaponization layer continues to evolve, but the trajectory across its three waves demonstrates the pattern: Wave 1 (June 1) used the stolen R | Tenable Research | |||
| Critical | – | CriticalTenable Research Oracle addresses 35 CVEs in its May 2026 Critical Security Patch Update with 35 patches, including 11 critical updates. Key Takeaways The May 2026 Critical Security Patch Update (CSPU) contains fixes for 35 unique CVEs in 35 security updates 11 issues (31.4% of all patches) were assigned a critical severity rating Oracle E-Business Suite received the highest number of patches at 12, accounting for 34.3% of all patches Background On May 28, Oracle released its Critical Security Patch Update (CSPU) for May 2026 . Beginning in May 2026, Oracle introduced CSPUs as a monthly release cycle that sits between the larger quarterly Critical Patch Updates (CPUs), addressing a focused set of high-severity issues on a faster cadence. This CSPU contains fixes for 35 unique CVEs in 35 security updates across 5 Oracle product families. Out of the 35 security updates published, 31.4% of patches were assigned a critical severity. High severity patches accounted for the bulk of security patches at 51.4%, followed by critical severity patches at 31.4%. This month's update includes 11 critical patches across 11 CVEs. Severity Issues Patched CVEs Critical 11 11 High 18 18 Medium 6 6 Low 0 0 Total 35 35 Analysis This month's update saw the Oracle E-Business Suite product family contain the highest number of patches at 12, accounting for 34.3% of the total patches, followed by Oracle REST Data Services at 11 patches, which accounted for 31.4% of the total patches. A full breakdown of the patches for this CSPU can be seen in the following table, which also includes a count of vulnerabilities that can be exploited over a network without authentication. Oracle Product Family Number of Patches Remote Exploit without Auth Oracle E-Business Suite 12 3 Oracle REST Data Services 11 7 Oracle Communications 8 4 Oracle Database Server 3 3 Oracle Hospitality Applications 1 1 Solution Customers are advised to apply all relevant patches in this CSPU. Please refer to the May 2026 advisory for full details. Identifying affected systems A list of Tenable plugins to identify these vulnerabilities will appear here as they're released. This link uses a search filter to ensure that all matching plugin coverage will appear as it is released. Get more information Oracle Critical Security Patch Update Advisory - May 2026 Oracle May 2026 Critical Security Patch Update Risk Matrices Oracle Advisory to CVE Map Join Tenable's Research Special Operations (RSO) Team on Tenable Connect for further discussions on the latest cyber threats. Learn more about Tenable One , the Exposure Management Platform for the modern attack surface. | Tenable Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | CIRCL OSINT Feed The KRVTZ-NET IDS alerts from February 7, 2026, report low-severity reconnaissance activity detected by network intrusion detection systems. The alerts involve IP addresses associated with known web crawling and scanning entities such as the Naver Webcrawler and Censys scanning platform. This activity is categorized as OSINT and network reconnaissance, indicating automated scanning rather than active exploitation or attacks. No specific vulnerabilities, affected products, or known exploits are linked to these alerts. Although reconnaissance is a common precursor to cyberattacks, the detected activity itself poses minimal immediate risk to confidentiality, integrity, or availability. European organizations, especially those with public-facing services, may observe such scanning as routine internet background noise. Mitigation should focus on reducing exposure and improving detection rather than patching. Countries like Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden are most likely to be affected due to their technological infrastructure and historical targeting patterns. Overall, this represents a low-severity threat requiring vigilance but no urgent remediation. | CIRCL OSINT Feed |
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