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70 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A threat hunting investigation identified suspicious PowerShell content served from an IP address (203.188.171.166) and domain (dorenzaa.com), both retrieving ZIP archives from Vercel-hosted infrastructure. The PowerShell loaders extract and execute payloads locally, including Grape.exe, UltraToolliteSetup.exe, and draw.io.exe. Analysis revealed heavily obfuscated PowerShell stages utilizing Base64 encoding, XOR-based obfuscation with the key 'Write', dynamically constructed IEX commands, and hidden PowerShell execution. A decoy 'Verification complete!' message disguised as Google.com was presented to victims during execution. Multiple Vercel instances hosted additional artifacts including loader scripts and executables. The initial infection vector remains unidentified, suggesting these PowerShell-hosting URLs represent second-stage delivery points in a multi-stage attack chain. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (7faefbcd9110b5e08b469d72d6541875ba4e2702c4490d1a24c37b313160f86b) env-local presents itself as a dotenv-compatible.env loader (README, keywords, and API mirror motdotla/dotenv), but lib/main.js unconditionally requires lib/tui-options.js, which activates a full-host spyware payload on module load. tui-options.js captures the desktop every 3 seconds (screenshot-desktop+sharp on Windows, screencapture on macOS) and POSTs the JPEG bytes to http://192.99.204.157:5000/upload with X-Computer-Name, X-Platform, and X-Resolution headers identifying the host. In parallel, a 1-second interval polls http://192.99.204.157:5000/get_buffer and replays the returned mouse-click coordinates and keystrokes on the installer's desktop via @nut-tree-fork/nut-js, giving the operator of that endpoint interactive remote control of the machine. On Windows, the module writes %APPDATA%\ScreenCaptureClient\launch-screen-client.vbs and registers HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ScreenCaptureClient via reg.exe to invoke the launcher with wscript.exe at every user logon, persisting the spyware and remote-input agent beyond the Node process. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Have you ever tried to open an “encrypted” email or an urgent document, only to realize with horror that your usual DOCX attachment is actually a file with the extension .docx.exe? Or maybe you received an email supposedly with an invoice, contract, or internal memo attached — only for the file to prove something entirely different from what it claimed to be? If so, you were likely targeted in a malware infection attempt. Cybercriminals routinely disguise malicious files as harmless documents and archives, banking on recipients blindly clicking without checking the extension. Kaspersky experts analyzed the file formats most frequently deployed in malicious email blasts to reveal what really lurks behind these extensions — and how attackers weaponize them in their campaigns. Important note: the extensions we’ll be discussing here are routinely used for completely legitimate files. For example, Windows executables normally end in .exe. However, we’re focusing specifically on scenarios where attackers disguise or spoof a file’s extension to pass it off as a totally different type of file. What extensions are most commonly found in malware? Our experts analyzed malicious email blasts from the beginning of 2026 to pinpoint the 15 most common dangerous file extensions. .exe .js .html .dll .bat .vbs .xls .pdf .jse .au3 .docx .htm .wsf .scr .lnk The top 15 file extensions used in malicious email blasts Let’s take a look at what files with these extensions actually do under the hood. Executable files An executable file is a compiled computer program that’s ready to run. Once launched, a malicious executable can download additional payloads, alter system settings, steal user data, connect your device to external attacker-controlled servers, and much more. These are the most common executable extensions found in malicious email campaigns: .exe .dll .com .scr .exe The classic Windows executable extension. It powers every program you use daily, from web browsers and games to office suites and software installers. By the way, attackers often wrap EXE malware in double extensions: invoice.docx.exe, report.pdf.exe, or even photo.jpg.exe. They take advantage of a default Windows setting: hiding extensions for known file types. Because this setting is turned on by default, users only see the first part of the file name — invoice.docx, report.pdf, or photo.jpg — and assume it’s just a normal document or image. But the second you open this trap file, the malware fires up. .dll Another common extension abused in malicious campaigns is .dll (dynamic-link library). These libraries hold functions that Windows programs frequently require while running, such as printing a document. This modular architecture prevents redundant code by letting multiple applications call on the exact same library for specific tasks. However, if an attacker replaces a legitimate library with an infected one, running any normal program that calls on it can trigger malicious code. .com While files with the .com extension have absolutely nothing to do with the web domain of the same name, cybercriminals likely count on victims mistaking these files for links in an unusual format. In reality, it’s a legacy Windows executable format. While modern versions of Windows no longer rely on this file type, the operating system can still run and execute it, which makes opening one a very bad idea. .scr SCR files are screensavers — those idle Windows screen animations featuring abstract patterns, the iconic bouncing logo, or whatever else. Despite their harmless reputation, screensavers are essentially executables just like EXE files: once opened, they can install extra components or alter system settings all the same. In malicious campaigns, these files routinely masquerade as images, screenshots, or documents. Scripts Scripts are text files containing a sequence of commands that a computer runs automatically in order. They can download files, install and launch programs, modify securi… | Kaspersky Security Blog | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (00ac52845dd473e3c39d37b9f3916ed67f48cabfb276bc8cc2e9ca2dca401ce5) On require(), _bootstrap.js selects a platform-specific path, fetches a binary from one of three hardcoded *.workers.dev hosts (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT-record fallback channel over *.dl.wel1.ru subdomains, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache_<tag> / dotnet_diag_<tag>.exe), chmods 0755, and detached-spawns it via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start (_bootstrap.js line 119, 121, 125). Destination hostnames are split across array joins to evade static string search, and a secondary loader reassembles a base64 payload from indexed DNS TXT records (count from c.<domain>, chunks from <i>.<domain>). Cover-story comments frame the behavior as analytics/telemetry. ## Source: ghsa-malware (9e7caf9639d9018e9b2d1b267b2ac9aa3910b7c1554c960ac992a948d435b7ae) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (072daea48b555582ea01125b1a71fff5907e73bc890ec56f7b012ac38230b69e) On require() of bigops-storio, _support.js selects a platform-specific endpoint and fetches an opaque binary over HTTPS from one of four string-split *.workers.dev hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, cf101-adf, cf99-9b3, cf103-070 under workers.dev), assembled at runtime via array.join("") to hide the destinations from static inspection. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under a hidden random filename (dot-prefixed / dotnet_diag-style cover names), chmod 0755'd, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b with stdio ignored. A DNS-TXT fallback (txtFetch/dns.resolveTxt against sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru — also assembled from string fragments) reassembles N base64-encoded TXT chunks into the same executable payload when HTTPS delivery fails. There is no version pinning, no hash or signature verification, and the fetched executable is unrelated to the package's stated storio abstraction purpose. The dropper runs automatically at library load time via index.js's try{require('./_support')}. ## Source: ghsa-malware (cd9ebb4bf8d8e6554d93f8343675d991c677dea6469481d1689813b405dca59c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f8f5027d945d8a05fe554b838ba2036e29a99c4296ad532b8d47a1bbaa22650e) The package name resembles @ngrx/component-store. The main entry index.js requires./_helpers, which on module load assembles attacker-controlled hostnames via array-join concatenation (e.g. ["oob-worker.","cf99-9b3.workers.d","ev"].join("")) to reach oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, and oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, with a DNS-TXT chunked base64 fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru. A platform-specific binary is fetched, written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache_<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmod 0755'd, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start /b. lib/telemetry.js hides dangerous API names by string concatenation (require("child_" + "process"), fs["chmod" + "Sync"]). The load-time fetch-and-execute of an opaque native executable from obfuscated hosts fires on any require() of this package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6971cd73a1bd6b15cddd886529f19aca32451e75071ece000fddd17fd74c35fb) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (7b6c9395cd17d3e76a94ed855d2d585fdb597785eac2cfefe873f79fc2b98d58) On require of the package, index.js loads _bridge.js which selects a platform-specific binary path and downloads an opaque native binary from author-controlled Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are reconstructed at runtime by array-join to evade static analysis (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, cf101-adf.workers.dev, cf103-070.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT chunk fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru. The binary is written under /var/tmp or %TEMP% with cover-story filenames (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.cache_<hex>), chmod 0755'd, and detached-spawned via cmd.exe/start or /bin/sh -c. A cache stamp under /tmp/.analytics_* is used to avoid re-execution. There is no hash or signature verification, the destination hosts do not match the package publisher, and the module is named _bridge.js with cover-story identifiers (analytics_state, dotnet_diag). An additional 81KB lib/telemetry.js file (not reached from the main entry in this tarball) contains structurally identical dropper primitives (base64 chunk assembly, cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', filePath+' &']), chmodSync 0755, ServiceDiscovery/WorkerHost classes) as a reserve/variant payload. ## Source: ghsa-malware (38c30d337fab24b6a256052b43b781533ef8d53de907658c4f8348ed8970319c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (6eb386f3b0d35ecf71762d0e719f883a3e1e207a2a3a9e1f52e7729de7753ae0) On require(), index.js loads./_ext.js which selects a per-OS asset path and downloads a binary payload from one of three runtime-assembled Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with a DNS TXT covert-channel fallback that reassembles a base64 payload from numbered subdomains under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache_<rand> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe on Windows, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", path + " &"]) or spawn("cmd",...). Host strings are constructed via array-split.join("") to evade static inspection, and there is no hash or signature verification. Staging paths mimic system diagnostics names to blend in. ## Source: ghsa-malware (b9e509d532bb46f434ea0a124cf22b50558357d28e0a316974709d2a7bde00dc) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (85f76938cd11389b3bd414591165194a80fb7188a92630a675a68c5cdb61202b) index.js unconditionally requires _runtime.js, whose top-level start() function selects a platform-specific asset path, fetches an opaque binary from string-array-obfuscated hostnames reconstructed at runtime (oob-worker.cf1-03-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), writes it to a hidden file under /tmp or %TEMP% with a random suffix (e.g..cache_<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmods it to 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start /b. A fallback covert channel resolves c.<domain> TXT records for a chunk count, then fetches <i>.<domain> TXT records from sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru and base64-decodes the concatenation into the executable payload, bypassing HTTP egress filtering. No hash or signature verification is performed and the destination is not the publisher. A sibling file lib/telemetry.js under an 'analytics-sdk' cover story ships the same download→base64-decode→chmod 0755→sh -c file & chain as a staged alternate payload. Requiring or installing this package causes attacker-controlled native code to run on the installer's machine. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a5faa7e2f12c9eabdb7879bf9d4b2aaf2310f04df1c66c3de3dadaad22ad7358) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The streak-bucket-core npm package version 1.0.0 contains embedded malicious code that writes a Windows PE executable to the current user's Startup folder upon import or require on Windows hosts. This executable, disguised as vite-native-helper.exe, is configured to auto-run at every user logon, enabling persistent execution. The malicious payload is concealed via hex encoding and embedded directly at the module's top level, making the infection automatic upon usage of the package. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b8aa49d4f3babc81510150e766a38674e971d7553cb05d98b67d0edd24a2fa07) The package's index.js exports an inert class and silently require()s./_platform inside a swallowed try/catch. On load, _platform.js downloads a platform-specific native binary from Cloudflare workers.dev hostnames assembled by joining split string fragments (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT fallback pointing at *.dl.well1.site. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe or.cache_<hex>, chmod 0755, and executed detached via spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', path+' &']) on Unix or cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows. Comments framing the fetch as 'Content-type negotiation' and 'Graceful degradation' are cover for the dropper. The package's declared 'abstraction layer' purpose is boilerplate; the entire library behavior is the swallowed require that triggers the download-and-execute chain. No signature check, no hash pinning, opaque native payload from anonymous workers.dev infrastructure. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f75a4b20b92aa6acce6889cb0dcacc6157c9d2e2942f4128d768d26cd747c453) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package streak-math-kit version 1.0.0 contains malicious code that targets Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) developer environments. When imported, it drops a hidden Windows executable named vite-native-helper.exe into the Windows startup folder of a detected user profile, causing persistent execution on every Windows logon. The malicious behavior is obfuscated by hex-encoding path segments and the executable binary. This results in a persistent backdoor on Windows systems accessed via WSL. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The quorvex npm package versions 0.2.0 and 0.2.1 contain malicious code that drops a base64-encoded Windows executable to the user's Startup folder on Windows hosts with more than 4GB of RAM. This executable, named vite-native-helper.exe, is designed to run automatically at user logon, establishing persistence. The package uses obfuscation and sandbox evasion techniques to ensure the payload executes when the module is imported. This behavior is hidden under a misleading package description and filename to avoid detection. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package calendar-streak-core@1.0.0 contains embedded malicious code that drops a Windows executable into the user's Startup folder, enabling persistent execution on Windows logon. The package falsely claims to be dependency-free and harmless, but it embeds a hex-encoded Windows PE executable that is decoded and written to %AppData%/Roaming/Microsoft/Windows/Start Menu/Programs/Startup/vite-native-helper.exe. This behavior occurs immediately upon module import, allowing any project importing this package on Windows to gain persistent execution of the embedded binary. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e20e151930946a17e9bea02eb51c760264c27138792955452acc4231196ceaae) On require() of bigops-voximplant, index.js loads _ext.js which downloads an OS/arch-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers subdomains whose hostnames are reassembled at runtime from split string fragments (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev), with a DNS-over-TXT base64 chunked fallback resolving from sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru to bypass HTTPS egress filtering. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmod'd 0755 via fs['chmod'+'Sync'], and detached-spawned via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd /c start /b, with no hash or signature verification and no source-of-truth publisher domain. A second, structurally identical dropper is bundled as lib/telemetry.js under an 'analytics SDK' cover story, using the same base64 chunk assembly, string-concatenated child_process require, and detached /bin/sh spawn. Hosts and dangerous APIs are constructed via runtime string joins ('child_'+'process', split-and-join hostname fragments) to defeat static inspection. The destinations are anonymous Cloudflare Workers and a.ru DNS-TXT channel unrelated to the package's stated Voximplant integration purpose. ## Source: ghsa-malware (883fad29cd53f12c99b7191ee77a0400cca0ee0911467b88f5d64f8b3402798a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated Russian-speaking financially motivated adversary designated UAT-11795 has been conducting malicious operations targeting users in the United States and Europe since June 2025. The campaign delivers a Python-based remote access tool called Starland RAT and a PowerShell-based command-and-control memory implant known as the WLDR agent. The actor distributes trojanized installers disguised as legitimate software including MobaXterm, WebEx, Zoom, DBeaver, and FACEIT through likely ClickFix social engineering techniques. The operation targets victims' credentials and cryptocurrency wallet assets while establishing persistent connections for additional payload delivery. Alternative payloads include CastleStealer and Remcos RAT. The infrastructure utilizes distributed staging and C2 domains, Telegram bots for notifications, and a Polygon smart contract as a fallback mechanism for C2 domain resolution. The WLDR agent features encrypted beaconing, task queuing, and a Runspace execution engine for exe... | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Eleven malicious NuGet packages masquerade as game cheat tools for popular games, acting as first-stage downloaders that evade detection using DNS-over-HTTPS and request UAC elevation. They fetch a second-stage PyInstaller payload named pepesoft.exe from GitHub and Hugging Face, which binds to hardware fingerprints, enforces licensing via Google Sheets telemetry, and supports remote ban-lists. Some variants enable remote control and screenshot capture through Telegram bot commands. These packages share AWS credentials and mutex identifiers, linking them to a single Russian-speaking operator marketing a commercial game-automation service. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General During June 2026, multiple infostealer families including Remus, ACRStealer, LummaC2, and Vidar were distributed through SEO poisoning techniques, disguised as illegal software such as cracks and keygens. Attacks utilized EXE files (84.5%) and DLL side-loading (15.5%) methods, with distribution primarily through Mediafire, Mega, and cloud storage platforms. Microsoft Corporation was the most frequently impersonated entity. MacOS environments were targeted through ClickFix techniques and malicious Bash scripts, with one variant dynamically obtaining C2 addresses via Polygon smart contracts. Email-based campaigns distributed AgentTesla and DarkCloud through compressed attachments, with both variants exfiltrating data via SMTP. The stolen credentials pose significant risks for dark web trading and secondary attacks. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Backdoor.Daxin, a sophisticated China-linked kernel-mode rootkit first exposed in 2022, was discovered operating on a Taiwan manufacturing firm's network in 2026. The malware was found alongside Backdoor.Stupig, a previously unknown backdoor that uses a novel technique involving a Trojanized keyboard-layout DLL loaded by winlogon.exe, enabling command execution as System from the Windows logon screen without authentication. Both samples carry compile timestamps from early 2013, but the compromised host only began reporting telemetry in May 2026, suggesting a possible 13-year undetected intrusion. The victim was a Taiwan-based subsidiary of a multinational high-tech manufacturer. Daxin's defining characteristic is its ability to hijack legitimate TCP connections for command-and-control traffic, making it exceptionally difficult to detect through conventional network monitoring. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package `testudo-pack` is byte-for-byte identical (verified via diff) to `testis-pack` from the same npm publisher `ioa2102` (`anamora.les.24948@gmail.com`), differing only in its install hook: `postinstall: node index.js` instead of `preinstall`. It presents itself as a small binary packing/checksum utility (`pack`/`unpack`/`checksum`/`inspect`) but embeds an obfuscated dropper. The strings for the C2 host, path and dropped-binary name are not present in plaintext — they are reconstructed at runtime via `String.fromCharCode()` calls over hardcoded integer arrays, decoding to the host `sloth-antagonist.vercel.app`, path `/service/assets/fetchBinary` (Windows) or `/service/assets/fetchLinuxBinary` (Linux), and destination filenames `WinService.exe` (Windows) / `WinMetrics` (Linux) written into `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\WinMetrics` or `$HOME/.local/share/WinMetrics` respectively — names chosen to masquerade as a legitimate Windows telemetry/service binary. When triggered, the code downloads the file from `https://sloth-antagonist.vercel.app/service/assets/fetch(Linux)Binary`, `chmod`s it executable on Linux, then spawns it detached and unref'd (`stdio: 'ignore'`, `windowsHide: true` on Windows) so it runs silently in the background, disconnected from the parent process. The routine is skipped on macOS. Note on the trigger: the fetch-and-execute routine (`_fetch()`) is not invoked at the top level of `index.js` — there is no unconditional call anywhere in the module. It is instead called as the first statement inside the exported `pack()` function, so the bare `node index.js` invocation performed by the `postinstall` hook only defines and exports the functions without itself triggering the download. The dropper fires as a side effect the first time any downstream code calls the package's own `pack()` API — which is the package's entire ostensible purpose, making activation highly likely for any real consumer while still evading naive "executes immediately on install" detections. Analysis performed via static review only (npm registry metadata and package source retrieved as text via the npm registry and unpkg CDN) — the package was not installed or executed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3acd6c2813f34615e913c745f4bfe83a18ca057ec5a109cc30cdd51320eade1a) package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs index.js. On install, index.js decodes String.fromCharCode arrays to reconstruct the host sloth-antagonist.vercel.app and path /service/assets/fetchBinary (Windows) or /service/assets/fetchLinuxBinary (Linux), downloads an unpinned, unhashed binary to %LOCALAPPDATA%/Programs/WinMetrics/WinService.exe on Windows or ~/.local/share/WinMetrics/WinMetrics on Linux, chmod 755s it on Linux, and spawns it detached with stdio ignored and windowsHide on Windows, then unref()s the child so it survives npm install exit. macOS is skipped. The hostname, URL path, and output filename are hidden via char-code arrays to defeat trivial string scanning. The library's advertised pack() API also invokes the same fetch-and-execute routine, providing a second trigger at runtime. The host is not a publisher-owned or vendor domain, the binary is unversioned and unverified, and the obfuscation shows intent to conceal the destination. | GCVE Database |
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