Search: win.exe
46 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8f27a3b0f4b5c8f210576fe33a1251d774926e6c7405591948c5bc3dfa00e7aa) On require, index.js loads _init.js which selects an OS/arch-specific staging path, downloads a binary payload from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts assembled by joining split character arrays (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT fallback channel across *.well1.site (tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site), writes the bytes to disguised paths such as /var/tmp/.cache_<rand> or a Windows Temp/dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe, chmods to 0755, and spawn-detaches /bin/sh (or cmd) to execute the binary in the background. Destination hostnames are obfuscated by array-split-and-join to defeat static scanners; the payload is staged under decoy filenames posing as.NET diagnostics or cache files. A second full copy of the dropper is bundled in lib/telemetry.js (not reached from the current entry graph) using the same base64-decode, chmod 0755, and /bin/sh spawn shape, providing an alternate loader. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3b82b8abbaab89079233a8bd4e99a3a23c618d6bf481e8d0eaeb29805ed52ee1) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (103c6f5e66de4d466d79c8a4247f46670fad0de2601a93f37fa6280c5491cc41) On require() of the package,./_runtime.js runs a top-level setup() that downloads a platform-specific binary from string-concatenated hostnames (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT fallback that reconstructs the payload from base64 TXT records served by tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, and win.dl.well1.site. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmodded 0755, and spawned detached via child_process (spawn('/bin/sh',...) / spawn('cmd',...)). Destination hosts and the child_process module name are assembled at runtime via array-join concatenation (['tin.dl.well','1.site'].join(''); require('child_'+'process')) to evade static analysis, and the code frames itself as 'analytics' with DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK cover-story env-var checks. A sibling module lib/telemetry.js ships the same fetch-write-chmod-spawn primitives as a dormant duplicate. The dropped binary is opaque and unrelated to the package's stated 'native bridge' purpose; the fetched hostnames are not the package's publisher infrastructure. ## Source: ghsa-malware (15aeb34fd00956a381cfd277903462f169170709acd01bb64b68896b4303e81b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (fc008dc0448aacf1e76c6111e7644f91d077009d358a0085be46166e92ce59cf) The package presents itself as a Keycloak typed client but on require() executes a binary dropper. index.js loads _adapter.js, which reconstructs destination hostnames from split string fragments joined via.join('') to hide them from static analysis, selects a platform-specific URL, and downloads a binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev). The downloaded bytes are written to /tmp or the Windows Temp directory under disguised names (.analytics_state, dotnet_diag_*.exe,.cache_*), chmodded to 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd.exe /c start. A DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback under subdomains of dl.well1.site (tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site) reassembles a base64-encoded binary from TXT record chunks when HTTPS fetch fails, feeding the same write+chmod+spawn chain. The child_process module name is constructed as require('child_' + 'process') and chmodSync is accessed as fs['chmod'+'Sync'] to further evade pattern matching. Environment variables DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, and DO_NOT_TRACK are checked to give the behavior a telemetry cover story. lib/telemetry.js contains a parallel dropper implementation with the same primitives, wrapped in 'Analytics SDK' comments. The package name resembles a legitimate Keycloak client but the shipped code performs installer-side arbitrary code execution rather than any Keycloak functionality. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d96ef446f7a474a7855c2746501c889834693353fd5d40db11171180af0ead0a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4e4bd3cdacfc8ad3f6e278f3bdfa4c19ed82be8ad966863c91c176af4f712d26) On `require`/`import`, `_compat.js` (reached from `index.js`) downloads a platform-specific executable from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers subdomains (`oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev`, `oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev`, `oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev`) with a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback that reassembles a base64 payload from numbered subdomains under `well1.site` (`c.<domain>`, `tin.dl.well1.site`, `tina.dl.well1.site`, `ldr.dl.well1.site`, `win.dl.well1.site`). The fetched bytes are written to `/tmp/.cache_<hex>` on Unix or `%TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe` on Windows under disguised cache/diagnostic names, chmod +x'd, and spawned detached via `/bin/sh -c '<path> &'` or `cmd`. The C2 hostnames are constructed by joining split string fragments to evade static analysis. A cooldown flag file (`/tmp/.analytics_state` or `%TEMP%/analytics_state`) suppresses re-execution for ~22046 seconds, and execution is gated on `DISABLE_TELEMETRY` / `ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT` / `DO_NOT_TRACK` env vars as a telemetry cover story. The destinations are anonymous Cloudflare Workers subdomains and a lookalike DDNS-style domain unrelated to any legitimate publisher; no integrity verification is performed on the downloaded binary. ## Source: ghsa-malware (b65fe20ba064c24727682a5b30644004edf48aee92b5317d9332e31c02910269) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (47a07df8d1831729273ad5bbc396191492c36cbf0f4d870af35c1101579ce0c9) sme-scripts-shared-library-webpack-plugin@20.2.9 executes an install/import-time dropper. index.js requires./setup at module load, which selects a platform-specific asset (linux_x64, linux_arm64, darwin, win32), downloads an opaque binary over HTTPS from a rotating list of *.workers.dev hosts (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, cf99-9b3.workers.dev, cf101-adf.workers.dev, cf100-416.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT chunked base64 fallback channel over *.dl.well1.site (tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site). Fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under decoy names ('.cache_<rnd>' on POSIX, 'dotnet_diag_<rnd>.exe' on Windows), chmod 755, and launched detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp + ' &']) or cmd.exe. Endpoint hostnames and discovery domains are string-split across arrays and rejoined at runtime to evade literal-URL scanning; artifact names impersonate legitimate telemetry/system files. lib/telemetry.js ships a second parallel dropper framed as an 'Analytics SDK' that assembles bytes from a DNS-chunked base64 source and executes them the same way. No hash or signature verification is performed on any fetched payload. ## Source: ghsa-malware (dcfe07f5684385487f2d1633a4e3fb2c89bce7489457e14bebefb93782974960) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3f8a32e0a10123bde764e059abea762d4b0574d57d35e6bd3e92e4d96cdeb245) On require() of the package, index.js loads _ext.js which downloads a platform-specific binary from runtime-assembled Cloudflare workers.dev hostnames (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, cf100-416, cf101-adf, cf103-070) with a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback against subdomains of dl.well1.site (tin/ldr/win.dl.well1.site) that reassembles base64 chunks into executable bytes. The fetched payload is written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache_<rand> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe on Windows), chmod +x'd, and spawned detached via spawn("/bin/sh",["-c",fp+" &"],{detached:true}) or spawn("cmd",...). C2 hostnames are assembled at runtime via ["oob-work","er.cf103-07","0.workers.","dev"].join("") to defeat static string search. The package presents itself as a base framework typings module and ships an unreferenced lib/telemetry.js plus DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK opt-out env vars as cover; the DNS-TXT path carries an inline comment describing it as chunked transfer for environments blocking HTTPS. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a0c5ac14d5ca2237a244551a8668e466e4f83d359a930dc35e57543405e4c14c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (192fac66540fb5d3f4c376673ddd67a4e43053342e745e538f7ddcc08b0a9042) index.js requires./setup on module load. setup.js assembles obfuscated destination hostnames from split string arrays, selects a platform-specific endpoint from four hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev), downloads an opaque binary via https.get, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (dotnet_diag_<suffix>.exe on Windows,.cache_<suffix> on Unix), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via spawn("/bin/sh") or spawn("cmd"). When HTTPS fetch fails, setup.js falls back to a DNS TXT-record channel under *.dl.well1.site (tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site): it queries a count record and then N chunk records, base64-decodes the concatenation, and executes the reconstructed payload — an evasion channel that bypasses HTTP egress filtering. The child_process module name and destination hostnames are runtime-assembled from split arrays to defeat static scanners; disguised filenames and an analytics/telemetry framing serve as cover. The fetch-and-execute path fires automatically whenever any consumer requires this package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (951066f8fd3f0cc78122046780b65659e2e22d1aa548afaeb26b8a8ca5bad739) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2006c1fa3443455515f9bbabd8bb63161c14be32405d601e0925054c02c0e62e) On require() of this package, `_init.js` selects an OS/arch-specific endpoint from a list of Cloudflare Workers hostnames reconstructed at runtime via `.join('')` from split string fragments (e.g. ['oob-worker.cf100-416.w','ork','er','s.de','v'].join('')), downloads an opaque native binary via https.get, writes it to a temp path under a cover-story name (`dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe` / `.cache_<hex>`), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via `cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c',fp+' &'],{detached:true})` (or `spawn('cmd',...)` on Windows). If HTTPS retrieval fails, the loader falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel: `dns.resolveTxt` is called against `tin.dl.well1.site`, `tina.dl.well1.site`, `ldr.dl.well1.site`, `win.dl.well1.site` (also assembled from split fragments), and the TXT record contents are concatenated and base64-decoded to reconstruct the payload bytes. A `checkStamp()` flag file gates re-execution and stderr writes are used as silent no-op logs. The fetched binary is unpinned, unsigned, and unrelated to the package's advertised SDK purpose. ## Source: ghsa-malware (74e0f2d1d48f0a7879ceb5f476c7b45f9699402fecaa46060ee1cf06b09bf197) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ac6e075f28ea6c98d015ce67f6a884c19aaeb522edab1098f3010d91aae92a59) index.js unconditionally require()s _bridge.js, which on load detects OS and architecture, assembles destination hostnames via array-join string concatenation to hide them from static scanners (oob-worker.cf101-*.workers.dev variants, with DNS TXT-record fallback resolution against tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site), downloads a platform-specific binary via https.get, writes it to /tmp or the Windows TEMP directory under names mimicking OS internals (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.cache_<hex>), fs.chmodSync 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c "<path> &" or cmd.exe /c start. A sibling file lib/telemetry.js (not reachable from the main entry) contains matching dropper primitives — base64 chunk assembly, cp.spawn("/bin/sh",...), fs["chmod"+"Sync"] with parseInt("755",8) — under an analytics-SDK cover story, indicating a staged variant. The require() chain fires as a side effect of importing the package, so any consumer that installs and loads it executes attacker-controlled binaries on the host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7c982aa407e479ed7613d1669e985d0a2439fd9b5910034ef42b13c9d62f84d8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8e9cb745c0771868eb6908cf1c783614da3e41fe1d1cf52b4d2d04705c51af19) On require of the package's main, index.js side-loads _runtime.js which selects a per-platform payload path, fetches an opaque binary from string-split obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), writes it to /var/tmp or %TEMP% with a disguised filename (`.cache_<hex>`, `dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe`, `.analytics_state`), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via child_process.spawn('/bin/sh') or spawn('cmd'). When the HTTPS mirrors fail, _runtime.js falls back to a DNS TXT covert channel: it resolves `c.<domain>` for a chunk count, iterates `<i>.dl.well1.site` TXT records (tin/tina/ldr/win subdomains), concatenates and base64-decodes them into the payload, then writes and spawns it. Host names, fallback DNS domains, and the string 'child_process' are assembled from split string arrays at runtime to evade static analysis. There is no version pinning, hash check, or signature verification, and the destinations are not the publisher's infrastructure. Cover-story framing as an 'Analytics SDK' with a DISABLE_TELEMETRY opt-out does not match the actual fetch-decode-write-chmod-spawn behavior. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e476a87c0e4538a947633f4bd6a61d856208adab0161811adf5ae087c9b02915) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The cosmos-gradio package on PyPI, versions 9999.0.0 and 9999.0.1, is a malicious dependency-confusion squat designed to exfiltrate system information. During installation and import, it collects the installer's hostname, OS username, and current working directory, sending this data to a hardcoded external domain via DNS and HTTP channels. The package uses an inflated version number to win version resolution over legitimate internal packages and forces execution of malicious setup.py code by being sdist-only. It has no legitimate functionality beyond data exfiltration. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c7d5453a0b1576ed8880071cda901607e79f25378700d3f999ab2c9715e00635) searchresults@999.0.0 is a high-version dependency-confusion squat on the generic name 'searchresults'. package.json declares preinstall and postinstall = 'node callback.js', so on npm install callback.js executes automatically and collects installer identity (username, uid/gid, homedir, shell, os.hostname(), platform, cwd, local IP, external IP fetched from api.ipify.org) plus CI context (GITHUB_REPOSITORY, GITHUB_ACTOR, JENKINS_URL, BUILD_NUMBER) and POSTs it to a hardcoded Discord webhook and a callback URL. It additionally fingerprints which installers hold monetizable CI credentials by probing for presence of AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, and DOCKER_PASSWORD in the environment and reporting the result to the same webhook. A DNS-based fallback channel base64-encodes the collected info and issues a DNS lookup of that value as a subdomain of the callback host, bypassing HTTP egress filtering. The 999.0.0 version and generic name are engineered to win npm semver resolution against internally-named private packages, giving install-time code execution on arbitrary organizations. Self-labeling as 'security research PoC' does not constitute installer consent. ## Source: ghsa-malware (c2bf6ed6443578713721cde803bd5f2376cd93913392387e3b342796878e53ff) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated phishing campaign leverages evolved ClickFix techniques to bypass modern endpoint security through victim-assisted execution. Targets receive emails with urgent OneDrive document lures containing malicious ZIP attachments. The attack uses LNK shortcuts that redirect victims to landing pages, silently injecting PowerShell commands into their clipboard. Through social engineering, victims are tricked into manually executing commands via Win+R, circumventing traditional security filters. The campaign employs DNS TXT records for payload staging, avoiding HTTP detection. The threat infrastructure hosts multiple malicious components including obfuscated scripts, fake MSI installers masquerading as legitimate software like ConnectWise, and ISO images with spyware for persistent access. This represents a shift toward long-game tactics focused on establishing full post-compromise environmental control. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e19daf4f946816f5ba3c6e592eacc980861b281c6752b738de57fdd31f49279d) The package masquerades as a Tailwind plugin: README and the top of src/index.js are a verbatim clone of @tailwindcss/typography (require('tailwindcss/plugin'), prose-* class generator), even though the package name has no relationship to Tailwind. Appended after the cloned plugin code at src/index.js:124+ is a heavily obfuscated IIFE using an RC4-decoded string array and AES-decipher key table to hide its strings and control flow. The decoded action table contains keys 'cmd.npx', 'cmd.npxwin', 'pkg.link', 'cmd.install', 'flag.yes', which are consumed by helpers that call child_process.spawn with detached:true, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true and creationFlags set to DETACHED_PROCESS to silently run `npx -y <pkg.link>`, fetching and executing an attacker-controlled package from the npm registry on the developer's machine. On Windows an additional path uses keys 'ext.vbs', 'vbs.tag', 'win.wscript': a VBS file is written to os.tmpdir() with a crypto.randomBytes(4) hex prefix and launched via wscript.exe (detached, windowsHide), followed by process.exit(0), to hide the dropper invocation from the console. The action table also contains 'env.api' and 'api.base' entries, and the spawn helper clones process.env and injects api.base as the env.api value into the child, so the downstream npx-fetched package receives a C2/telemetry endpoint via environment. Because require('classbreeze-utils') is the plugin entry point loaded by any Tailwind build that adds it, the dropper fires automatically as soon as a build that depends on it runs, executing arbitrary attacker-controlled code on the developer/CI machine. ## Source: ghsa-malware (cd3cdd1459bd1dce092c75b17f3940659f740a4efe533ba30b345976cef97736) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8082c12f69dfbb45e83017fa0baf4f88f9500649dd443e80f2d7d4f858020814) The package ships a postinstall.js that imports child_process and references HTTP GET and hostname operations. Without traced-code corroboration of how these primitives are composed (e.g., whether GET fetches attacker-controlled content that is then executed, or whether hostname is exfiltrated to a remote endpoint), the pattern is consistent with both benign install diagnostics and an exfil/dropper shape. Manual review of postinstall.js is needed to confirm intent before publishing a verdict. ## Source: ghsa-malware (bca2b14b2c93ed832aa83a138c20bc53b4e053cf282ef5878333b1f50b803e55) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'savant-listing' version 999.9.9 and 999.9.10 is a malicious dependency confusion squat that executes code during installation to exfiltrate the hostname of the installing machine to an attacker-controlled server. This occurs automatically on npm install without user interaction. The package is designed to win version resolution over internal packages by using a high version number and a misleading description. Installation of this package may lead to full system compromise, and all secrets and keys on affected machines should be rotated from a secure environment. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | MediumTenable Research Tenable CTO Vlad Korsunsky talks about participating in the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting on Cybersecurity and Tenable’s EXPOSURE 2026 conference, where he talked with global leaders about new game-changing AI threats and the groundbreaking benefits of exposure management. Key takeaways The patching cycle is obsolete. Advanced AI models have compressed exploitation timelines into “negative days,” meaning adversaries actively weaponize vulnerabilities before vendor patches are even released. Shift from static CVE severity scores to AI-powered exposure management. Point-in-time vulnerability-risk snapshots fall short. You need AI insights to prioritize remediation based on real-world exploitability of your entire attack surface. Secure the agentic economy. The rapid explosion of autonomous non-human AI identities demands the immediate application of zero trust and least-privilege cryptographic primitives to mitigate severe, systemic internal risks. Don’t focus only on vulnerabilities. While the 2026 Verizon DBIR ranks vulnerability exploitation as the top initial access vector for breaches (about 30%), the majority of breaches (70%) stem from human errors, such as misconfigurations and identity flaws. Tenable Chief Technology Officer Vlad Korsunsky recently participated in the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting on Cybersecurity in Geneva, Switzerland, an annual summit that takes the pulse of global cyber risk. Korsunsky was one of 150 senior leaders from global industry and government who gathered to discuss how to strengthen businesses’ cyber defenses. The sobering, collective consensus: The traditional cybersecurity playbook is obsolete, as AI becomes an unprecedented threat multiplier. For Tenable, participating in foundational, high-level dialogues and collaborations such as this one is both a privilege and an immense responsibility. As the cybersecurity operating model gets rewritten in real-time, Tenable feels a duty to help shape cyber defenders’ collective insights and strategies. Tenable has spent years addressing the structural cybersecurity operational gaps that worry C-level executives and government leaders worldwide. Korsunsky also had a chance to sit down with many of the hundreds of cybersecurity executives who gathered recently at Tenable’s EXPOSURE 2026 conference . The EXPOSURE 2026 discussions ranged from the death of reactive patching cycles to the need to counter AI threats with systemic cyber resilience, and signaled an urgent need to shift away from a siloed, fragmented approach to cybersecurity and move toward AI-powered exposure management . Below is an in-depth Q&A with Korsunsky, expanding on his participation in the Geneva and Tenable meetings, the rapid escalation of AI threats, and the way to tame cyber risk today and in the coming years. Q: Vlad, you recently returned from the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting on Cybersecurity in Geneva. What was the overarching energy in the room among these 150 global leaders, which included CEOs, CTOs, CISOs and government leaders? Vlad Korsunsky: The energy was highly focused and, frankly, deeply sober. We are witnessing an unprecedented compression of the threat landscape, and everyone in that room, whether they were running a multinational bank, directing a national cyber defense agency, or leading an NGO, realized that conventional cyber defenses cannot keep up with this velocity. A telling example of how high the stakes have jumped occurred just recently in Washington, D.C. The then Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell and U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent convened an emergency, high-level meeting with the CEOs of some of America's largest financial institutions, including Wall Street giants like Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley. The entire meeting focused on a single AI model: Anthropic’s Claude Mythos Preview . Anthropic had flagged that while it built Mythos to bolster cyber defense, its raw capabilities were so advanced that, if weaponized or leaked, it could pose a major threat to the structural stability of the global financial system. When the highest echelons of fiscal and state power are holding emergency briefings over the capabilities of a single generative AI model, you know you’re dealing with a fundamentally different cyber threat landscape. Q: When asked, "What are the top cyber concerns for 2027?," meeting participants ranked the capacity of AI to be a threat multiplier as number one. Is this a future problem, or are we living it now? Vlad Korsunsky: The threat of AI in the hands of attackers is absolutely a global concern today. Look at the empirical metrics tracking adversary speed over the last decade and a half. For years, Mandiant tracked a linear trend that actually looked like a win for defenders. Time-to-exploit, which is the window between a vulnerability being disclosed and an active exploit hitting the wild, shrank steadily from 63 days in 2018 down to 32 days by 2022. Concurrently, average attacker dwell time — the time an attacker remains undiscovered after breaching a network – plummeted from more than 400 days in 2011 down to just 14 days in 2025. In short, defenders were actively closing the gap. Then came 2023, and the trend broke violently. Time-to-exploit collapsed from 32 days to just five. By 2024, it went negative: minus one day. According to Mandiant’s latest “M-Trends 2026 Report ,” published last month, the average time-to-exploit sits at minus seven days . Think about that structural asymmetry. Attackers are successfully weaponizing and exploiting vulnerabilities a full week before a vendor compiles and ships a patch. Meanwhile, the median timeline for an enterprise to deploy a patch across their environment is roughly 43 to 55 days, according to this year’s Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) . If adversaries are operating in negative time and defenders are operating across months, the traditional patching cycle is effectively a dead strategy. Q: What is driving this terrifying acceleration? How are attackers moving so quickly? Vlad Korsunsky: It is driven entirely by advanced frontier LLMs doing in minutes what used to require weeks of highly specialized human labor. Back in February, Anthropic’s Opus 4.6 model uncovered more than 500 zero-day vulnerabilities in widely utilized open-source software, flaws that had remained undiscovered despite decades of manual peer review by brilliant human engineers. Less than two months later, Anthropic’s Mythos model found thousands more vulnerabilities across foundational operating systems, web browsers, and core cryptographic libraries. More importantly, Mythos went further after spotting them; it boasted an 83% autonomous success rate in chaining disparate, low-severity logic flaws into devastating, end-to-end critical exploits. Essentially, we have reached a watershed moment reminiscent of when Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo defeated human Go champions . Experts believed a computer was decades away from mastering the Go game because the game features more potential board configurations than there are atoms in the observable universe. Brute force was impossible. Yet, AlphaGo won by leveraging deep neural networks to synthesize a form of machine intuition, discovering creative moves no human had conceived in 2,500 years of play. Today, frontier AI models are applying that exact evolutionary leap to cybersecurity. The most powerful LLMs can now execute 32-step complex reasoning chains to autonomously map and compromise simulated corporate networks. The asymmetry is stark. This massive capability curve means the absolute volume of known exposures is poised for a massive step-change, and GenAI has poured pure gasoline on the fire. Q: With zero-days dropping in droves thanks to AI-aided discoveries, should enterprises focus all their engineering resources on hunting down these vulnerabilities? What did you hear from CISOs and other high-level cybersecurity leaders about this issue at Tenable’s EXPOSURE 2026? Vlad Korsunsky: This is where we have to look at the whole board and avoid panic. While the influx of AI-driven zero-day disclosures is a massive upstream pressure on software vendors, data from this year’s Verizon DBIR shows that breaches directly leveraging software exploits account for about 30% of incidents. It's a significant percentage, yes, but what about the other 70%? Cybersecurity leaders I talked to at EXPOSURE 2026 realize that the overwhelming majority of enterprise breaches do not begin with an ultra-sophisticated, state-sponsored zero-day exploit. They start with incredibly simple, unforced human errors: unsecured shadow IT cloud assets running outside corporate governance; misconfigured databases left wide open to the public internet; over-privileged corporate identities; a lack of multi-factor authentication (MFA); and highly targeted, AI-driven spear phishing. This is a critical insight for guiding your cyber strategy today. These misconfigurations and unsecured cloud credentials are the dry fuel sitting inside an enterprise network. When an AI hacking agent comes looking, that fuel ignites faster than any traditional cybersecurity team can react. So organizations must be diligent about proactively maintaining stringent security hygiene. Q: If paddling faster inside the old patching model won't save us, how do defenders change the rules of the game? Vlad Korsunsky: We have to look at this the way wildland firefighters have looked at massive forest fires for over a century. When a wildfire is roaring toward a town faster than a human can run, firefighters don’t just stand at the edge of the flames reaching for a bigger water hose. They get ahead of the blaze and light a controlled burn. They intentionally clear out the brush, trees, and fuel ahead of time. When the main fire line reaches that cleared zone, it starves and dies because there is nothing left to consume. Enterprise security must adopt this exact philosophy. We have to stop reacting to the fire and start aggressively clearing the fuel before the adversary arrives. This requires a wholesale shift from reactive vulnerability patching to continuous exposure management . The traditional Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is effectively dead as a primary prioritization tool . A static CVSS score tells you the theoretical severity of a single CVE in a vacuum; it tells you absolutely nothing about real-world exploitability within the specific context of your unique enterprise environment. At EXPOSURE 2026, we heard from our customers how continuous, AI-driven exposure management is helping them counter today’s evolving AI threats successfully. With exposure management, you use advanced analytics to gain unified, real-time visibility across your entire modern attack surface, encompassing data centers, cloud infrastructure, OT/IoT environments, corporate identities, and newly deployed AI pipelines. We must use AI on the defense side to continuously map true attack paths ; for example, pinpointing exactly where a minor misconfiguration chains into a critical business asset. Q: You mentioned using AI on the defense side. How does Tenable view the balance between human security analysts and autonomous AI defenders? Vlad Korsunsky: Security is fundamentally a team sport, and AI vendors like OpenAI and Anthropic are not our adversaries. AI is the single most potent tool ever introduced into the defender’s toolkit; we simply need to wield it with machine-speed orchestration. Because our adversaries are deploying fully autonomous hacking agents today — tools that are already topping commercial bug bounty leaderboards — the only fair fight is to meet machine speed with machine speed. This means building and deploying agentic AI workflows on the side of the defense to power autonomous exposure management. However, this must always be balanced with strict human-in-the-loop oversight. In Geneva, we spent a great deal of time discussing the systemic risks of unchecked automation. If an autonomous system applies a sweeping remediation script without understanding the broader business context, it can inadvertently trigger a massive operational outage: a self-inflicted systemic failure. Defenders must maintain deep visibility into the “behind-the-scenes” logic of their automation. We need human control to govern business context, while leveraging machine speed to continuously ingest, prioritize, and neutralize exposures before an attacker can strike. Q: Another major pillar of the WEF discussion centered on AI safety and non-human identities. What are the hidden risks enterprises are overlooking as they rush to adopt AI? Vlad Korsunsky: We are transitioning rapidly into what we call the “Agentic Economy.” Historically, enterprise security focused on securing human users and a relatively manageable set of non-human service accounts. As organizations embed AI agents into core business workflows — from code generation to customer operations to financial automation — we are seeing an exponential growth of non-human, agentic identities and agentic workflows. These autonomous agents are fundamentally different. Instead of operating just “on behalf” of a human in a tightly bound session, they execute complex tasks independently. The alarming reality discussed in Geneva and in our EXPOSURE 2026 conference is that our current security frameworks lack effective, native guardrails for these agents. LLMs routinely bypass system prompts or ignore markdown safety files. They can even actively manipulate or hack neighboring AI agents to achieve their algorithmic goals. We’ve seen anecdotal instances of an enterprise AI agent autonomously writing a script to bypass an internal access restriction, and when flagged, its underlying logic essentially argued that the script committed the violation, not the agent itself. Because AI agents behave essentially like trusted corporate insiders that have been let loose across internal data silos, we must immediately apply foundational cryptographic primitives to agentic identities. We need strict zero-trust architectures, rigorous least-privilege access controls, and absolute defense-in-depth tailored specifically for non-human identities before they morph into the next great vector of unmanageable global risk. Q: Any final thoughts for organizations trying to navigate this massive technological shift? Vlad Korsunsky: Attackers are increasingly rocketing laterally across enterprise networks after the initial breach, often in minutes and even seconds, whereas before it could take them days or weeks. The adversary’s inherent advantages will always be timing, velocity, and the luxury of only needing to find a single weak link in your exposure landscape. But as defenders, we possess the ultimate home-field advantage: We can see the whole board, and we have the power to fundamentally alter the terrain. By abandoning obsolete point-in-time checkmarks, embracing continuous, AI-driven exposure management, and proactively clearing out our operational fuel at machine speed through foundational cyber hygiene, we can break the adversary’s curve and effectively secure our environments. | Tenable Research | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The win-update-helper-tool-v2 package (version 1.0.0) on PyPI contains malicious code that, when run as a module, silently controls the infected device via a Telegram bot. This includes executing remote commands, exfiltrating files, and establishing persistence through autorun mechanisms. The campaign associated with this malware is identified as 2026-05-system-update-tool and is categorized as a malicious campaign with clear intent to steal information and maintain control over compromised systems. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General LeakNet, a ransomware operator, has expanded its initial access methods by utilizing ClickFix lures on compromised websites and implementing a new Deno-based, in-memory loader. The group has shifted from relying on initial access brokers to running its own campaigns. LeakNet's post-exploitation playbook remains consistent, involving jli.dll side-loading, PsExec-based lateral movement, and S3 bucket payload staging. The Deno loader executes base64-encoded payloads in memory, making detection challenging for traditional security tools. Defenders are advised to focus on behavioral signals and implement measures such as blocking newly registered domains, restricting Win-R access, and limiting PsExec usage to authorized administrators. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A new variant of the ClickFix technique has been identified, where attackers convince users to execute malicious commands on their devices through the Win + R shortcut. This variation uses a 'net use' command to map a network drive from an external server, followed by executing a '.cmd' batch file. The script downloads a ZIP archive, unpacks it, and executes a legitimate WorkFlowy application with modified, malicious logic hidden inside an '.asar' archive. This acts as a C2 beacon and a dropper for the final malware payload. The attack bypasses typical detection methods and utilizes Electron application bundling to hide malicious code. | AlienVault OTX General |
Page 2 of 3