Search: client-user-id.com
599 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (edaa4cae089339e593113bcee558fa15ea81472239c76e21019b89f46b76f204) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (b75d3af16af275fa32096cbedb4a2b4da30c1f792225458ee195588210cb5d83) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (495ecd6839a9e4c4fd16156aed3c3f34148ecf5be8fe33d83edf3b7f9499ae5c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (b54c44dd7b2fa09440f3eead9fcd5adc09a8d61b988cfc1f5f0c43fc60893150) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (68b3f3ba592e9127f77806490aa6d31774861f0578c0979acb3927221b5553eb) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-47742shopperlabs shopper · Missing Authorization Medium6.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-47742 Shopper is a Headless e-commerce Admin Panel. Prior to 2.8.0, Sub-form Livewire components used in the product editor (Edit, Inventory, Seo, Shipping, Files) had no authorization on their store() method. Any authenticated panel user, regardless of role, could mutate any product's pricing, stock, SEO metadata, shipping dimensions, and attached media without holding edit_products. The affected components accepted the product ID as a public Livewire property without #[Locked], so an attacker could also target an arbitrary product by tampering with the wire payload from the client. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.1 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-45551Intermesh groupoffice · Cross-site Scripting Medium5.1EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-45551 Group-Office is an enterprise customer relationship management and groupware tool. Prior to 26.0.25, 25.0.100, and 6.8.165, GroupOffice allows authenticated users to persist arbitrary legacy settings for any user_id via index.php?r=core/saveSetting. A separate client-side sink in the email module injects the email_font_size setting directly into JavaScript without escaping. By combining these two issues, any low-privileged authenticated user can overwrite an administrator's email_font_size setting with a JavaScript payload and trigger stored XSS in the administrator's browser when the GroupOffice web client loads views/Extjs3/modulescripts.php. This vulnerability is fixed in 26.0.25, 25.0.100, and 6.8.165. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-48525jpadilla pyjwt · Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48525 > [!NOTE] > Practical impact depends on whether request body-size limits are enforced upstream (proxy/web-server/framework). Deployments with typical body-size caps (≤2 MB) bound the amplifier significantly; deployments accepting larger token inputs are more exposed. When verifying detached JWS tokens using the unencoded-payload option (`"b64": false`, RFC 7797), PyJWT performs **Base64URL decoding of the compact-serialization payload segment** *before* enforcing the detached-payload rules. For `b64=false`, PyJWT later **discards** that decoded payload and replaces it with the caller-provided `detached_payload`. In practice, this turns the middle segment into an attacker-controlled “work amplifier”: a remote client can supply an arbitrarily large Base64URL payload segment that forces **CPU work + memory allocations** even if the signature is invalid. This creates an **unauthenticated DoS** vector against any endpoint that verifies detached JWS using PyJWT. --- ## Affected Component(s) * `jwt/api_jws.py` * `PyJWS.decode()` / `PyJWS.decode_complete()` * `_load()` (parsing and Base64URL decoding) --- ## Root Cause (exact logic flaw) ### What happens in the code In `jwt/api_jws.py`, `decode_complete()` does the following (order matters): * Calls `_load(jwt)` first, which decodes the token segments * Only after that, checks `header.get("b64")` and if `False`, it replaces `payload = detached_payload` and rebuilds the signing input This behavior is visible in `decode_complete()`: * `_load(jwt)` happens **before** the `b64=false` handling * then `payload = detached_payload` and `signing_input = ... detached_payload` happens afterward ([GitHub][1]) Inside `_load()`, PyJWT unconditionally performs: * `payload = base64url_decode(payload_segment)` This is the expensive step the attacker can amplify ([GitHub][1]) ### Why this becomes a vulnerability For `b64=false` detached JWS, the payload segment in compact form is effectively **not needed** for verification in PyJWT’s own logic (since the library uses `detached_payload` as the real payload). Yet PyJWT still decodes it first, meaning: * cost is paid **even when signature is invalid** * the decoded bytes are **discarded** * attacker controls the size of this cost via token length --- ## Impact (evidence-driven) ### Security impact * **Unauthenticated remote DoS**: decoding work happens before signature rejection → attacker does not need signing key. * **CPU amplification**: Base64URL decode time scales linearly with payload segment size. * **Memory amplification**: decoded output allocates large byte buffers (tens of MB per request). * **Operational impact**: request queueing / worker starvation under modest concurrency bursts. ### Standards context (RFC 7797) RFC 7797 explicitly notes this option is used when payload is large and/or detached, and discusses interoperability requirements around marking it critical (“crit” with “b64”). ([IETF Datatracker][2]) (PyJWT supports `crit` validation, but the issue here is decode order / unbounded decode of an unused segment.) --- ## Affected Versions * **Confirmed affected:** PyJWT **2.12.1** (tested from your local editable install and repo). * **Likely affected:** all versions that include detached payload support for JWS decoding, which was introduced in **2.4.0** (“Add detached payload support for JWS encoding and decoding”). ([pyjwt.readthedocs.io][3]) (For GHSA, this phrasing is strong: “confirmed” + “likely since feature introduction”.) --- # Threat Model ### Typical real deployment A service verifies signed HTTP requests or webhooks using detached JWS: * token is provided in JSON body / query / header * actual payload is the HTTP request body passed as `detached_payload` ### Attacker * remote unauthenticated client * can send requests to verify endpoint * does **not** need a valid signature (invalid signature still triggers the expensive decode path) ### Attack chain 1. Attacker crafts a JWS compact token with header containing `"b64": false` and `crit:["b64"]`. 2. Attacker inflates the **payload segment** (middle segment) to millions of Base64URL characters. 3. Server calls `PyJWS.decode(...detached_payload=...)`. 4. PyJWT decodes the inflated segment (CPU + memory). 5. Signature is rejected afterward (401) — but resources already consumed. 6. Repeated requests or bursts cause queueing/worker starvation → DoS. --- # Proof of Concept - file names + results ## PoC placement * [server_localhost.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26132755/server_localhost.py) * [client_localhost.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26132757/client_localhost.py) * [flood_localhost.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26132760/flood_localhost.py) --- ## PoC # 1 - Localhost verification server **File:** [server_localhost.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26132755/server_localhost.py) **Purpose:** real HTTP endpoint (`POST /verify`) that calls PyJ | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-46544microsoft UFO · Insecure Direct Object Reference Medium5.3EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-46544 Microsoft UFO open-source framework for intelligent automation across devices and platforms. In 3.0.1-4-ge2626659, Microsoft UFO accepts client-supplied session_id values in WebSocket task messages and reuses an existing in-memory session object if that session_id already exists. If a prior session has completed and remains in memory with populated results, a different authenticated client can send a new TASK message using the same session_id. The server re-enters the existing session object and sends the stale stored result to the new requester through the normal send_task_end() callback path. This is an authenticated cross-client stale result replay issue. The issue requires that the attacker knows or can predict a live or recently completed session_id. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.9 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-44450prolix-oc Lumiverse · Argument Injection Critical9.9EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-44450 Lumiverse is a full-featured AI chat application. Prior to 0.9.7, the MCP server creation endpoint validates the command field against an allowlist of binary names but forwards the args array to the child process without any validation. Every binary on the allowlist accepts an inline-code execution flag (-e for node/bun, -c for python3/deno), giving any logged-in user arbitrary OS-level code execution on the Lumiverse server. The route requires only requireAuth (not requireOwner). The server binds on all interfaces (::) and the host-header rebinding check is bypassed trivially by any HTTP client that sends Host: localhost:<port> directly, making this exploitable from any machine with network access to the server port. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.7. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-39968baptisteArno typebot.io · Improper Access Control High7.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-39968 TypeBot is a chatbot builder tool. In versions 3.15.2 and prior, the fix for GHSA-4xc5-wfwc-jw47 ("Credential Theft via Client-Side Script Execution and API Authorization Bypass") is incomplete. While the builder's getCredentials tRPC endpoint was patched with workspace membership checks, the bot-engine runtime still allows any authenticated user to use credentials from any workspace via the preview chat endpoint. The bot-engine's getCredentials() utility function uses a falsy check (if (workspaceId && ...)) for workspace ownership validation. Since the preview endpoint accepts a client-controlled workspaceId field and the Zod schema allows empty strings, an attacker can supply workspaceId: "" to bypass credential ownership verification entirely. Exploitation can result in credential exfiltration, external service abuse, financial damage and a data breach. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The gator-client npm package version 9.9.11 contains malicious code that exfiltrates host identifiers via DNS queries to an attacker-controlled domain. The package collects sensitive system information such as username, hostname, and current working directory, then encodes and sends this data out-of-band using DNS resolution to bypass typical HTTP egress filters. The malicious behavior is obfuscated in the code to evade detection, and the package's advertised purpose is a cover story. Installation or use of this package compromises the host, and all secrets on the affected system should be rotated. Removal of the package does not guarantee full remediation due to potential further compromise. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 5.8 | EPSS 0.3% | Medium5.8EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-4366 Red Hat build of Keycloak is an integrated sign-on solution, available as a Red Hat JBoss Middleware for OpenShift containerized image. The Red Hat build of Keycloak for OpenShift image provides an authentication server that you can use to log in centrally, log out, and register. You can also manage user accounts for web applications, mobile applications, and RESTful web services. Red Hat build of Keycloak Operator for OpenShift simplifies deployment and management of Keycloak 26.4.12 clusters. This erratum releases new images for Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4.12 for use within the OpenShift Container Platform cloud computing Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) for on-premise or private cloud deployments, aligning with the standalone product release. Security fixes: * Denial of Service via specially crafted SAML input (CVE-2026-7307) * Information Disclosure via evaluate-scopes Admin API (CVE-2026-37978) * Unauthorized account takeover via WebAuthn token replay (CVE-2026-37982) * Information disclosure via OIDC token introspection endpoint audience bypass (CVE-2026-37979) * Access token disclosure and implicit flow bypass via forged client data (CVE-2026-7571) * Session fixation in OIDC login flow that can lead to account takeover (CVE-2026-7507) * Open redirect when using wildcard valid redirect URIs in Keycloak (CVE-2026-7504) * Information disclosure via broken access control in user lookup endpoint (CVE-2026-37981) * Unauthorized resource access and data modification via Insecure Direct Object Reference (CVE-2026-4630) | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 4.4 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-0857Mesalvo Meona Client · Weak Password Hashing Medium4.4EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-0857 Use of a Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in Mesalvo MEONA (MEONA Server and MEONA Client) for user accounts whose password was last set under a version before MEONA 2024.10. MEONA versions before 2024.10 protected stored passwords with SHA-1 (versions from October 2015) or stored them without protection (earlier versions). Since MEONA 2024.10 (June 2024) Argon2 is the default method and every password that is set or changed is stored with Argon2; passwords last set under an earlier version keep the earlier method until they are changed. An administrator could in addition select the storage method per account. A MEONA super administrator can read the stored value of such accounts in the user administration of the MEONA Client or export it through administrative database functions. Only accounts managed locally in MEONA are affected; accounts authenticated through the operating hospital's directory service (Active Directory / Entra ID) have no password stored in MEONA. In typical installations end users authenticate through the directory service and local accounts are limited to emergency and technical accounts. Exploitation requires super administrator permissions in MEONA (or direct access to the MEONA database) from within the operating hospital's network; MEONA is operated exclusively within closed hospital networks without exposure to the public Internet, and where a hospital permits remote access to that network at all, it is only through the hospital's own remote-access infrastructure (e.g. VPN) under the hospital's control. Installations in which every password has been set or changed under MEONA 2024.10 or later are not affected. Mesalvo is not aware of any exploitation outside the reported security test. This issue affects MEONA Server and MEONA Client in versions 2024.10, 2025.04 and 2026.03 (for accounts with passwords last set under earlier versions). MEONA 2025.04.24 and 2026.03.02 (planned Q4 2026) remove the legacy storage methods, require every affected account to set a new Argon2-protected password at next logon, and no longer display stored credential values in the user administration. See Mesalvo Security Advisory MSA-2026-002. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-0856Mesalvo Meona Client · Improper Access Control High7.8EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-0856 Improper Access Control vulnerability in Mesalvo MEONA (MEONA Client and MEONA Server) allows an authenticated MEONA user to access administrative functions of the MEONA Client (admin panel). The MEONA Server does not independently verify the role asserted by the MEONA Client. A user who holds a valid MEONA user account and is able to execute a modified copy of the MEONA Client on a device within the operating hospital's network can assert an administrator role and access administrative functions with regular user credentials. Exploitation requires: (1) a valid MEONA user account issued by the operating hospital; (2) network access to the MEONA Server, which is operated exclusively within closed hospital networks without exposure to the public Internet (where a hospital permits remote access to that network at all, it is only through the hospital's own remote-access infrastructure (e.g. VPN) under the hospital's control); (3) the ability to modify MEONA Client binaries and to execute the modified copy on a device in that network. On managed devices with application control, as recommended in Mesalvo's hardening guidance (MSA-2026-001), this requires local administrator privileges on the device. Mesalvo is not aware of any exploitation outside the reported security test. This issue affects MEONA Client and MEONA Server in versions 2024.10, 2025.04 and 2026.03. Mitigations are available with MEONA 2025.04.24 and 2026.03.02 (planned Q4 2026); see Mesalvo Security Advisory MSA-2026-001. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e6318f85af0cd86060232fbc606115e300e1022220ffda545f9e6c6157ef6f55) Package masquerades as a pino-pretty-style logger but performs multiple installer-harming actions when required. On import, dist/logger.js: (1) on Linux, appends a hardcoded attacker ssh-ed25519 public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (creating ~/.ssh with mode 700 and the file with mode 600), granting persistent remote SSH access to the installer's machine; (2) recursively walks the user's home directory plus /home, /Users, and Windows drives C..J collecting.env,.json,.txt/.doc/.docx/.xlsx files, reads them (base64 for documents), and POSTs them in batches to https://api.vensaru.site/api/validate/files along with OS, IP, and username; (3) reads./.env from the project root and harvests env.ts, config.ts, createClobClient.ts, clob.ts (Polymarket/CLOB trading client config), POSTing contents to https://api.vensaru.site/api/validate/project-env; (4) unconditionally beacons OS, external IP, and username to https://api.vensaru.site/api/validate/system-info to enumerate victims. Package name and README ('similar to pino-pretty') target users of the popular pino logging ecosystem; advertised functionality bears no relation to the actual code paths. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7b7879f732c5c9dfcf7600a8f560fa7661c10cfceb882b18b2090c8a5ea4f35b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.4% | Medium6.5EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-37979 A flaw was found in Keycloak. This access control vulnerability in Keycloak's OpenID Connect (OIDC) token introspection endpoint allows a confidential client to bypass audience restrictions. An attacker-controlled client with valid credentials can retrieve sensitive token claims intended for other resource servers, compromising the confidentiality of lightweight access tokens. This issue can be exploited remotely by any confidential client in the realm with valid credentials. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.4% | Medium4.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-8830 A flaw was found in Keycloak. An authenticated user can bypass configured WebAuthn policies during credential registration by manipulating client-side JavaScript. This occurs because the server-side processAction() fails to validate that the newly created credential's parameters, such as public key algorithms, match the realm's configured WebAuthn policies. This could lead to the creation of credentials that do not adhere to administrative security requirements, potentially weakening the overall security posture of the system by allowing non-compliant authentication methods. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.2 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-23998fleetdm fleet · Improper Certificate Validation High8.2EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-23998 Fleet is open source device management software. Prior to version 4.81.0, a vulnerability in Fleet’s Windows MDM management endpoint could allow requests to be processed without proper client certificate validation. In certain circumstances, this could allow an attacker to impersonate an enrolled Windows device and retrieve sensitive configuration data. Fleet’s Windows MDM management endpoint relies on mutual TLS (mTLS) client certificates to authenticate enrolled devices. In affected versions, requests that did not present a client certificate could be incorrectly treated as trusted. As a result, an attacker with prior knowledge of a valid enrolled device identifier could potentially impersonate that device and receive configuration payloads intended for it. These payloads may contain sensitive information such as Wi-Fi or VPN configuration data, certificates, or other secrets delivered through MDM profiles. This issue does not allow enrollment of new devices, administrative access to Fleet, or compromise of the Fleet control plane. Impact is limited to the targeted Windows device. Version 4.81.0 contains a patch. If an immediate upgrade is not possible, affected Fleet users should temporarily disable Windows MDM. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.8 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-44695outline · Cross-Site Request Forgery Medium5.8EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-44695 Outline versions prior to 1.7.1 contain a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the Slack integration callback endpoint. This flaw allows an attacker who obtains a Slack OAuth code for the same Outline Slack client to trick a logged-in Outline user into linking their account to the attacker's Slack identity. This linkage enables the attacker to perform Slack /outline search commands as the victim user. The vulnerability is resolved in Outline version 1.7.1. | GCVE Database |
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