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645 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium5.3EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12003 To allow builds of Python to be run from an in-tree layout (rather than an installed file layout), the VPATH variable is defined at build time and used to locate certain landmarks - specifically, Modules/setup.local. When this landmark is found relative to VPATH relative to the executable, Python assumes it is running in a source tree and generates a different default sys.path. This code remains in release builds, so that release-ready builds can be built in-tree. On Windows, since builds are written to 'PCbuild/', the value of VPATH is set to '..\..', which results in a landmark of '..\..\Modules\setup.local'. This path is outside the install directory of Python, and may have different permissions, potentially allowing a low-privilege user to create the landmark and an alternative `Lib` folder that will be discovered by an otherwise restricted install. Such a setup occurs with the legacy default install location for all users (in the now superseded EXE installer), due to how Windows allows all users to create folders in the root directory of their OS drive. Our recommended mitigation on Windows is to migrate away from the legacy installer and use the new [Python install manager](https://www.python.org/downloads/latest/pymanager/) to install for the current user. Installs where the directory two levels above the Python installation directory have equivalent permissions are unaffected (in general, a per-user install cannot be modified at all by other users, removing any escalation of privilege risk, and could be directly modified by a privileged user, making the potential tampering irrelevant). Alternative mitigations might include preemptively creating and restricting access to a `Modules` directory. Be aware that only 3.13 and 3.14 will receive updated legacy installers - earlier fixes are only provided as sources. Platforms other than Windows allow VPATH to be overridden, but as they don't usually use a separated directory in the build for binaries, are unlikely to have a landmark reference outside of the install directory. The landmark detection involving VPATH is a fallback for when a more specific landmark - .\pybuilddir.txt - is absent, and was included for compatibility. Future releases of Python will no longer include the fallback, and so builds will need to generate or preserve the pybuilddir.txt file in order to work in-tree. This landmark file has been generated on Windows since 3.11, and on other platforms for longer. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-29518Red Hat Security Advisory: rsync security update High7.3EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-29518 Two security vulnerabilities have been identified in the rsync utility used in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9. One is a remote memory disclosure caused by an integer overflow in compressed-token decoding (CVE-2026-43618). The other is a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) symlink race condition that allows local privilege escalation when rsync is run in daemon mode without chroot (CVE-2026-29518). Red Hat has issued an important security update addressing these issues. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3ed93b06c95c42e3183b89e5fb1d9dea3f711bb20d766861c8d16b8d17f17cc9) Package name `chai-as-decrypted` mimics the popular `chai-as-promised`, and the README impersonates `pino` (uses pino's npm badges and links to github.com/pinojs/pino). On `npm install`, the `postinstall` hook runs `npm run smoke:pino` → `node./index.js`, whose top-level `runBackgroundTask()` spawns a detached `node lib/initializeCaller.js`. That file shadows the global `process` with a local object whose `env.DEV_API_KEY` is a base64 string; it `atob`-decodes the value to https://www.ipregionchecker.org/api/ip-check-encrypted/3aeb34a37, POSTs to it via axios, and executes the HTTP response body with `new Function.constructor("require", response)(require)` — arbitrary remote JavaScript run with full `require` access on the installer's machine, retried 5 times. The base64 hiding of the endpoint and headers behind a fake `process.env` has no legitimate purpose and is solely to evade static scanners. This is a deliberate install-time remote code execution attack against developers who mistype `chai-as-promised`. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4247d01c68df5aa81cfd5bf2bec45101bd522f079f6c9ca5289e7541fc53e198) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research Discover how continuous control validation in Tenable One can improve your CTEM program by filtering out alert noise and factoring in your active cyber defenses. Focus your team on accessible and exploitable attack paths. Key takeaways: With vulnerability exploitation ranking as the top initial access vector and frontier AI accelerating vulnerability discovery, organizations must shift from managing theoretical cyber risks to validating actual, accessible exposure. Tenable One maps active security controls including EDR, MFA, and firewalls directly onto potential attack paths, allowing teams to automatically deprioritize weaknesses that existing defenses already neutralize. Ingesting penetration testing results via the Tenable One Open Connector allows organizations to layer real-world attack simulations over real-time exposure insights to identify toxic risk combinations that threaten critical assets. Your security tools probably indicate you have thousands, perhaps tens or hundreds of thousands, of vulnerabilities across your environment. Maybe your tools prioritize these vulnerabilities based on CVSS scores or other criteria, but how do you know which vulnerabilities combine with other preventable security risks, like misconfigured cloud buckets and identity weaknesses, to create attack paths threat actors could realistically traverse? How do you validate which vulnerabilities an existing security control mitigates? You need this context to distinguish the real risks from the theoretical ones to ensure your team focuses on remediating what matters most. The work of validating, prioritizing, and remediating vulnerabilities alongside other security weaknesses to understand the true exposure they create has become much more urgent, as frontier AI models accelerate vulnerability discovery. In this environment, the traditional patch-based defense model will get crushed. Moreover, defenders cannot afford inaccurate decision-making and wasted remediation work that addresses low-priority vulnerabilities. They desperately need the context and validation that a continuous threat exposure management (CTEM) program provides. This is why security leaders are evolving their vulnerability management programs to exposure management programs. Exposure management allows you to continually assess your attack surface, prioritize risks , and orchestrate automated remediation of security weaknesses at machine speed. Exposure management also helps validate which exposures attackers can actually reach by understanding the accessibility and exploitability of an attack path. It uses validation to shift your organization from managing theoretical risks to executing on actual exposure. What is exposure validation in CTEM? Validation is one of the five steps in the CTEM lifecycle. It is the process of providing consistent, continuous, and automated evidence of an attack’s feasibility. It stress-tests your defenses against real-world attack conditions, using your own environment’s controls and configurations to confirm whether an exposure is genuinely reachable and exploitable. Validation moves security from a reactive “patch everything” mindset to a preemptive, evidence-based exposure strategy . It continuously confirms which weaknesses your existing defenses have already blocked and surfaces the ones that demand immediate attention. Expanded CTEM validation capabilities in Tenable One Validation isn’t new to Tenable: we’ve been using validation techniques in Tenable solutions for more than 25 years. Tenable developed nearly 3,000 direct check plugins to actively probe a vulnerability and prove its exploitability in situations where software version detection isn’t sufficient for our high-accuracy standards. These plugins actually mimic attack techniques and monitor the target’s response to confirm the presence of the vulnerability. What is new in Tenable One is the addition of continuous control validation in the platform. By factoring in your active security controls, Tenable One helps eliminate the noise of theoretically exposed assets that are functionally blocked from exploitation. Security teams can visually map their active prevention and detection controls directly onto potential attack paths, automatically prioritizing weaknesses that existing controls already neutralize. Analysts can also filter top attack paths based on the presence of security controls and whether you can prevent attack chains for faster triage and investigation. Common control validation examples include: Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools that block Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) memory dump tools used to harvest credentials. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) methods that prevent unauthorized access via password guessing , password spraying , or credential stuffing . Firewall and data loss prevention (DLP) tools that prevent data exfiltration by detecting data staging and enforcing egress rules. See how continuous control validation works in Tenable One. Proactively manage risk prioritization with continuous security control validation. Eliminate noise from theoretical risks that are functionally blocked by existing defenses by integrating compensating security controls into the exposure prioritization process. Access a unified dashboard where assets, vulnerabilities, and exposure risks are consolidated. Filter attack paths to identify which are protected by compensating controls. View types of compensating controls deployed in the environment. Examine attack paths that could be protected with endpoint protection tools. Review security controls associated with specific attack paths, including SIEM and EDR controls. Inspect individual nodes within attack paths to determine which security controls are protecting them. Identify assets monitored by SIEM tools such as Splunk. Verify endpoint protection coverage on assets, including Microsoft Defender installations. Filter attack techniques to focus on specific threats like LSASS Memory techniques, which extract credentials from compromised systems and can be mitigated by endpoint protection tools. Identify attack paths and assets lacking appropriate EDR coverage. Prioritize remediation by examining high-priority attack paths where compensating controls are absent. Collaborate with security control owners to confirm coverage and address gaps in protection for critical assets. Integrate penetration testing data into Tenable One Beyond direct check plugins and continuous control validation, security teams can also integrate penetration testing results into Tenable One that simulate real-world attacks against your cyber defenses. This is another way to validate which exposures are truly exploitable and contextualizes them against your broader attack surface. The Tenable One Open Connector makes it easy to ingest the latest pentest results and layer them with real-time exposure insights to turn your findings into active, continuous defenses. Integrating pentest data into an exposure management program adds critical context to help you understand toxic risk combinations and enrich your understanding of high-severity weaknesses that threaten your most critical business assets. Context is essential in exposure management In the AI era, your security team can’t waste precious time on the wrong issues. With exposure management, context is essential to pinpoint the most critical risks to your organization. Security control validation, coupled with asset criticality, threat activity, entitlement privileges, and attack pathways, give your security team the advantage it needs to stay ahead of threat actors. Learn more about Tenable One , the exposure management platform for the modern attack surface. | Tenable Research | |||
| Medium | 6.6 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-28684Red Hat Security Advisory: General availability of the satellite/iop-host-inventory-rhel9 container image Medium6.6EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-28684 ### Summary `set_key()` and `unset_key()` in python-dotenv follow symbolic links when rewriting `.env` files, allowing a local attacker to overwrite arbitrary files via a crafted symlink when a cross-device rename fallback is triggered. ### Details The `rewrite()` context manager in `dotenv/main.py` is used by both `set_key()` and `unset_key()` to safely modify `.env` files. It works by writing to a temporary file (created in the system's default temp directory, typically `/tmp`) and then using `shutil.move()` to replace the original file. When the `.env` path is a symbolic link and the temp directory resides on a different filesystem than the target (a common configuration on Linux systems using tmpfs for `/tmp`), the following sequence occurs: 1. `shutil.move()` first attempts `os.rename()`, which fails with an `OSError` because atomic renames cannot cross device boundaries. 2. On failure, `shutil.move()` falls back to `shutil.copy2()` followed by `os.unlink()`. 3. `shutil.copy2()` calls `shutil.copyfile()` with `follow_symlinks=True` by default. 4. This causes the content to be written to the **symlink target** rather than replacing the symlink itself. An attacker who has write access to the directory containing a `.env` file can pre-place a symlink pointing to any file that the application process has write access to. When the application (or a privileged process such as a deploy script, Docker entrypoint, or CI pipeline) calls `set_key()` or `unset_key()`, the symlink target is overwritten with the new `.env` content. This vulnerability does not require a race condition and is fully deterministic once the preconditions are met. ### Impact The primary impacts are to **integrity** and **availability**: - **File overwrite / destruction (DoS):** An attacker can cause an application or privileged process to corrupt or destroy configuration files, database configs, or other sensitive files it would not normally have access to modify. - **Integrity violation:** The target file's original content is replaced with `.env`-formatted content controlled by the attacker. - **Potential privilege escalation:** In scenarios where a privileged process (running as root or a service account) calls `set_key()`, the attacker can leverage this to write to files beyond their own access level. The scope of impact depends on the application using python-dotenv and the privileges under which it runs. ### Proof of Concept The following script demonstrates the vulnerability. It requires `/tmp` and the user's home directory to reside on different devices (common on systemd-based Linux systems with tmpfs). ```python import os import sys import tempfile from dotenv import set_key # Pre-condition: /tmp must be on a different device than the target directory. tmp_dev = os.stat("/tmp").st_dev home_dev = os.stat(os.path.expanduser("~")).st_dev assert tmp_dev != home_dev, "Skipped: /tmp and ~ are on the same device (no cross-device move)" with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(dir=os.path.expanduser("~")) as workdir: # File an attacker wants to overwrite target = os.path.join(workdir, "victim_config.txt") with open(target, "w") as f: f.write("DB_PASSWORD=supersecret\n") # Attacker pre-places a symlink at the path the application will use as .env env_symlink = os.path.join(workdir, ".env") os.symlink(target, env_symlink) before = open(target).read() # Application writes a new key -- triggers the cross-device fallback set_key(env_symlink, "INJECTED", "attacker_value") after = open(target).read() print("Before:", repr(before)) print("After: ", repr(after)) print("Symlink target overwritten:", target) ``` **Expected output:** ``` Before: 'DB_PASSWORD=supersecret\n' After: "DB_PASSWORD=supersecret\nINJECTED='attacker_value'\n" Symlink target overwritten: /home/user/tmp806nut2g/victim_config.txt ``` ### Remediation The fix changes the `rewrite()` context manager in the following ways: 1. **Symlinks are no longer followed by default.** When the `.env` path is a symlink, `rewrite()` now resolves it to the real path before proceeding, or (by default) operates on the symlink entry itself rather than the target. 2. **A `follow_symlinks: bool = False` parameter** is added to `set_key()` and `unset_key()` for users who explicitly need the old behavior. 3. **Temp files are written in the same directory** as the target `.env` file (instead of the system temp directory), eliminating the cross-device rename condition entirely. 4. **`os.replace()` is used instead of `shutil.move()`**, providing atomic replacement without symlink-following fallback behavior. Users are advised to upgrade to the patched version as soon as it is available on PyPI. ### Timeline | Date | Event | | ------------ | --------------- | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS <0.1% | CVE-2026-53406Remote Control for Zoom Contact Center · Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity High7.8EPSS <0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-53406 CVE-2026-53406 is a high-severity vulnerability in Zoom Communications' Remote Control for Zoom Contact Center for Windows versions prior to 7.0.0. It involves insufficient verification of data authenticity, which may allow an authenticated local user to escalate privileges. The vulnerability has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.8, indicating significant impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. No official patch or remediation guidance is currently provided by the vendor. There are no known exploits in the wild at this time. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | – | MediumTenable Research CISA issued BOD 26-04, which replaces BOD 22-01 with a four-variable vulnerability prioritization model requiring federal agencies to patch the most dangerous vulnerabilities in as few as three days. Key takeaways BOD 26-04 replaces BOD 22-01 with a four-variable risk model that assigns graduated remediation timelines, from as few as three days with mandatory forensic triage for the most dangerous vulnerabilities to full deferral for the lowest-risk ones, ending the era of flat, one-size-fits-all patching deadlines for federal agencies. The transition represents a significant operational lift at a time when AI is compressing the window between vulnerability disclosure and weaponization, and industry remediation rates are declining: only 26% of KEV vulnerabilities were fully remediated in 2025 according to the 2026 Verizon DBIR, down from 38% the prior year. Organizations that have invested in continuous asset discovery, risk-based prioritization, and exposure management are well positioned to operationalize the directive’s four-variable model. Those still relying on periodic scanning and CVSS-based prioritization face a significant gap between current capability and compliance requirements. Background on CISA BOD 26-04 On June 10, 2026, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04, “Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk.” BOD 26-04 represents a fundamental shift in how federal agencies are expected to manage vulnerabilities. Rather than treating every known exploited vulnerability (KEV) with the same remediation deadline, the new directive introduces a graduated model that accounts for asset exposure, exploitation evidence, adversary automation capability, and technical impact severity. The result is a 16-tier remediation matrix where the most dangerous vulnerabilities must be patched within three days (with mandatory forensic triage), while lower-risk vulnerabilities can be deferred to the next system upgrade cycle. Tenable applauds this directive, which replaces both BOD 22-01 (Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, November 2021) and BOD 19-02 (Vulnerability Remediation Requirements for Internet-Accessible Systems, April 2019). It is directionally correct in Tenable’s view, and it represents a significant improvement upon its predecessors, as it consolidates seven years of federal vulnerability remediation policy into a single, risk-weighted framework. More importantly, it aligns with the risk-based, exposure-driven approach to vulnerability management that Tenable has championed as the originator of the exposure management paradigm. For years, Tenable has maintained the position that defenders must move beyond volume-based patching toward intelligent prioritization grounded in real-world exploitation evidence, asset context, and threat actor intelligence. BOD 26-04 codifies that position as federal policy. Frequently asked questions about BOD 26-04 What is BOD 26-04? BOD 26-04 is a binding operational directive from CISA that requires all Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to prioritize vulnerability remediation based on a four-variable risk model. Unlike its predecessor BOD 22-01, which assigned flat remediation timelines to all vulnerabilities in the KEV catalog, BOD 26-04 evaluates each vulnerability against four criteria and assigns a remediation deadline based on the specific combination of risk factors present. The directive is mandatory for federal agencies but not for the private sector. However, CISA explicitly encourages private sector adoption, and the track record of BOD 22-01 suggests the framework will become a de facto standard across industries. BOD 22-01’s KEV catalog is already used by organizations worldwide as a prioritization signal, and BOD 26-04’s more sophisticated model will likely follow the same adoption curve. What are the four variables? BOD 26-04 determines remediation urgency using four binary variables: Publicly exposed - Is the vulnerable asset reachable from outside the agency network via a routable IP address? This is the only variable agencies must determine themselves. In the KEV - Is the CVE listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog? This confirms real-world exploitation. Automatable by adversary - Can an attacker automate all the steps necessary to exploit the vulnerability? This assesses weaponization maturity. Technical impact - Does exploitation give attackers total control of the affected system or only partial control? CISA publishes the answers to variables two, three, and four for every CVE through its Vulnrichment Program. Agencies must determine variable one (public exposure) using their own asset inventory and CISA’s Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance. What are the remediation timelines? Table 1 in Appendix A of the directive maps all 16 possible combinations of the four binary variables to specific remediation deadlines across five tiers: Three days with forensic triage - Required when a vulnerability is in the KEV and yields total system control (regardless of whether the asset is publicly exposed or the exploit is automatable). This is the most aggressive vulnerability management timeline in federal directive history. The forensic triage component requires agencies to assess whether their systems have already been compromised. Three days (without forensic triage) - Required for certain high-risk combinations, such as a publicly exposed asset with an automatable vulnerability yielding total control, even if the CVE is not yet in the KEV. 14 days - The standard accelerated timeline for most KEV-listed vulnerabilities and several high-risk non-KEV combinations. 60 days - Applied to lower-risk combinations, such as non-exposed assets with automatable but partial-control vulnerabilities. Fix on system upgrade - Applied when no risk criteria are met. This is the deferral tier, and it represents a significant operational relief for agencies: vulnerabilities that meet none of the four criteria can wait for the next scheduled upgrade cycle. Timelines are dynamic. If an agency removes a system from public internet exposure, the applicable timeline shifts to a longer window. Conversely, if CISA adds a vulnerability to the KEV catalog, the remediation timeline accelerates immediately. In an initial analysis at one large civilian agency, CISA found that only 1% of vulnerability instances fell into the three-day category, while over 60% qualified for deferral to the next system upgrade. The model is designed to focus resources, not overwhelm them. What changed from BOD 22-01? BOD 26-04 revokes and replaces BOD 22-01 entirely. The key differences are substantial: BOD 22-01 applied a flat remediation timeline to every vulnerability in the KEV catalog (14 days for CVEs assigned after 2021, six months for older CVEs). BOD 26-04 replaces this with a graduated model where KEV status is one of four variables, not the sole determinant of urgency. A KEV vulnerability on an internal system with partial control and no automation capability now receives 14 days, while the same KEV on a publicly exposed system with full automation and total control receives just three days with mandatory forensic triage. BOD 22-01 had no deferral mechanism. Every KEV required action. BOD 26-04 introduces the “fix on system upgrade” tier for vulnerabilities that meet none of the four risk criteria, allowing agencies to focus on the ones that matter most rather than chasing every vulnerability with equal urgency. BOD 22-01 had no forensic triage requirement. BOD 26-04 introduces mandatory forensic analysis for the highest-risk tier, recognizing that when a vulnerability is actively exploited and yields total system control, patching alone is insufficient: organizations need to determine whether they’ve been compromised. The underlying methodology also shifts. BOD 22-01 relied primarily on the KEV catalog and CVSS scoring. BOD 26-04 is informed by CISA’s Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) system, which provides a more nuanced, risk-informed vulnerability analysis methodology. Why did CISA issue BOD 26-04 now? Two converging factors drove the directive. The first is the deteriorating effectiveness of traditional vulnerability management. Citing the 2026 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report, CISA’s blog post accompanying the directive notes that only 26% of KEV-listed vulnerabilities were fully remediated by organizations in 2025, a decline from 38% the previous year. Meanwhile, the median time to fully resolve vulnerabilities rose to 43 days. In an environment where exploitation can occur within hours of disclosure, the remediation gap is widening. The second factor is artificial intelligence. CISA explicitly states that AI is accelerating both vulnerability discovery and weaponization, narrowing the window of time that exists between vulnerability disclosure and exploitation. The directive aligns with priorities in the recent AI Executive Order , Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security . As AI-enabled tools make it easier for adversaries to identify, weaponize, and deploy exploits at scale, the traditional “patch everything eventually” approach becomes untenable. Defenders need a framework that tells them what to patch first, and BOD 26-04 provides the framework enabling them to prioritize on an accelerated timeframe. This is a challenge Tenable has been tracking closely. The intersection of an AI-enabled threat landscape with already-declining remediation effectiveness creates a compounding problem: adversaries are getting faster while defenders fall farther behind. BOD 26-04 is a necessary policy response to this environment. I don’t work for a federal agency. How does BOD 26-04 affect my organization? While BOD 26-04 is mandatory only for FCEB agencies, its influence extends well beyond the federal government. BOD 22- | Tenable Research | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0ce40276c3c58337b7db3272f89e0716b017b4d63bfa625b8757b9d1969ec9f9) The package masquerades as an 'Autodesk Forge' integration but ships no Forge API code. On `npm install`, `scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs` materializes a durable copy of the package outside node_modules (under a hidden `.forge-jsxyz/runtime/` directory), spawns `dist/cli-agent.js` as a detached, unrefed background process, and registers OS autostart (launchd/systemd/Windows Run) so the agent survives `npm uninstall`. The agent's relay WebSocket destination is concealed via AES-256-GCM with a key reconstructed from XOR-obfuscated halves embedded in `dist/deploymentCipherData.js`; a leftover diagnostic script (`scripts/windows-forge-diagnostics.ps1`) reveals the hidden host as `212.193.3.61:9877`. Once connected, the agent (1) walks the entire filesystem (`/` on POSIX, every drive on Windows) via `dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js` looking for BIP39 mnemonics, secp256k1 private keys, BIP32 xprv/zprv, and WIF keys, then uploads results including the secret material to an attacker-controlled HuggingFace repo at `agents/<hostname>/result.json`; (2) enumerates every local user profile and recursively copies Chromium-family `Local Extension Settings/<extension_id>/` and `IndexedDB/chrome-extension_*` LevelDB trees (where MetaMask and other wallet extensions store keys) via `dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js` and uploads them to HuggingFace via `dist/extensionDbHfUpload.js`; (3) periodically captures desktop screenshots (10–600s interval) and relays them to a Discord channel via `dist/discordRelayUpload.js` using `https://discord.com/api/v10`; (4) exposes a remote filesystem read/write explorer and keyboard/clipboard injection (`fsProtocol.js`, `filesExplorer.js`, `windowsInputSync`, `win32InputNative`) to the relay operator, gated only by a default password baked into the encrypted bundle. ## Source: ghsa-malware (cdda3bc454a770043918f1aa9dd3a90ab538733787b052229819c1eeca3488b9) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.6 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-50131fedify · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) High8.6EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-50131 Fedify is a TypeScript library for building federated server apps powered by ActivityPub. Fedify previously addressed SSRF/internal network access in GHSA-p9cg-vqcc-grcx by adding public URL validation before runtime document and media fetching. However, the IPv4 validation logic present starting in version 0.11.2 and prior to versions 1.9.12, 1.10.11, 2.0.19, 2.1.15, and 2.2.4 appears incomplete. The `validatePublicUrl()` protection relies on `isValidPublicIPv4Address()` to reject non-public IPv4 destinations. The function blocks common private and local ranges such as `10.0.0.0/8`, `127.0.0.0/8`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `172.16.0.0/12`, and `192.168.0.0/16`, but it still treats several special-use, reserved, multicast, benchmarking, and carrier-grade NAT IPv4 ranges as valid public destinations. Because this validation is used as an SSRF defense before outbound fetches, this appears to be an incomplete mitigation or bypass class for the previous SSRF issue. Versions 1.9.12, 1.10.11, 2.0.19, 2.1.15, and 2.2.4 contain an updated patch. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.4 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-11626Broadcom Symantec Endpoint Protection CleanWipe Removal Tool · Execution with Unnecessary Privileges Medium5.4EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-11626 A local privilege escalation vulnerability (CWE-250) exists in Broadcom Symantec Endpoint Protection CleanWipe Removal Tool for macOS prior to version 16.0.0.65. This vulnerability allows an attacker with limited privileges to escalate their privileges to administrative level. The CVSS 4.0 base score is 5.4, indicating a medium severity. No patch or official remediation has been confirmed yet. The vulnerability affects versions prior to 16.0.0.65. No known exploits are reported in the wild at this time. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.4 | EPSS 0.2% | High8.4EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-24067 Slate Digital Connect 1.37.0 for macOS installs a privileged helper tool, com.slatedigital.connect.privileged.helper.tool, which exposes the XPC service com.slatedigital.connect.privileged.helper.tool2. The helper validates connecting XPC clients by obtaining the client's process identifier and using it to retrieve code-signing information for the process. This PID-based client validation is subject to a time-of-check time-of-use race condition because process identifiers can be reused. A local attacker can exploit PID reuse so that validation is performed against a trusted process instead of the original connecting process. This allows unauthorized access to privileged helper functionality and may lead to local privilege escalation. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2025-10263Arm C1-Ultra · Race Condition Critical9.1EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-10263 CVE-2025-10263 is a critical race condition vulnerability in the Linux kernel on ARM processors, including Arm C1-Ultra and related cores. It involves improper synchronization during Translation Lookaside Buffer Invalidation (TLBI) operations when memory permissions change, allowing a local attacker to write to memory resources owned by higher privilege levels. This flaw can enable privilege escalation to kernel level or guest VM escape to the hypervisor, potentially leading to complete system compromise. Red Hat has acknowledged the issue and is working on fixes for affected products such as Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.12.96. No known exploits are reported in the wild at this time. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity The Hades PyPI attack is a supply chain malware campaign that compromised 19 Python packages on the PyPI registry. The malicious packages include a setup file that auto-executes during Python startup to download and run the Bun JavaScript runtime, which then executes an obfuscated credential-stealing payload. This payload targets a wide range of developer secrets and credentials from cloud services, CI/CD platforms, and local configurations. The campaign is part of the ongoing Shai-Hulud / Miasma lineage of attacks, using novel persistence and evasion techniques including AI analysis deception and locale-based targeting. No official patch or remediation guidance is provided in the source content. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Medium | 4.7 | EPSS <0.1% | Medium4.7EPSS <0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-46298 A race condition vulnerability in the Linux kernel's pseries/papr-hvpipe subsystem was fixed to prevent deadlocks caused by interrupt handlers firing concurrently with ioctl or release handlers. This issue could cause the system to deadlock on affected versions prior to the patched releases. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 4.7, indicating low severity, primarily due to its local attack vector and high attack complexity. A patch is available and included in multiple Linux kernel package updates for Ubuntu 26.04 LTS and related variants. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium5.5EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-46314 A vulnerability in the Linux kernel's drm/v3d component allows a local user to cause an infinite loop in kernel context by providing an empty multisync extension with zero in_sync_count and out_sync_count. This flaw leads to a CPU core being pegged indefinitely and blocks the calling thread. The issue is fixed by rejecting multisync extensions where both counts are zero. EPSS 0.1%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity Google has released a new Command-Line Interface (CLI) for Google Colab that allows local terminals and AI agents such as Claude Code and Codex to connect to and control remote Colab runtimes. This CLI enables provisioning of GPUs/TPUs, running local Python scripts remotely, retrieving outputs, and interactive sessions. The tool is designed to integrate with AI agents by providing them context to operate the CLI. While this expands automation and AI-driven workflows, it also potentially exposes Colab runtimes to these agents, which could raise security considerations depending on usage and access controls. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Medium | 4.8 | EPSS 1.0% | CVE-2026-11487Neovim · Command Injection Medium4.8EPSS 1.0%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-11487 Neovim versions 0.12.0 through 0.12.2 contain a command injection vulnerability in the M.read function within runtime/lua/vim/secure.lua. This flaw allows an attacker with local access to manipulate the path argument to execute arbitrary commands. A patch identified by commit f83e0dcaf8cf18de94828341b0a1a61a86c75baf has been created to address this issue. The vulnerability has a medium severity rating with a CVSS score of 4.8. EPSS 1.0%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit BlueTeam This report discusses a browser-based peer-to-peer (P2P) messaging app demo called Enkrypted. Chat, which aims to provide secure and private communication using end-to-end encryption, the Signal protocol, and post-quantum cryptography. The app is local-first, requires no registration or installation, and uses WebRTC with TURN servers for connectivity. It is currently a work in progress and has not undergone formal security audits or reviews. The project is shared for testing and feedback purposes only, and users are cautioned to use it responsibly. No confirmed vulnerabilities or exploits are reported at this time. | Reddit BlueTeam | |||
| Critical | – | CriticalReddit Cybersecurity Cisco has disclosed a critical, unpatched zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2026-20245) in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager that is actively exploited in the wild. The flaw allows local attackers with netadmin privileges to perform command injection attacks, leading to root privilege escalation by uploading crafted files. Exploitation requires valid credentials or prior exploitation of related vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-20182 or CVE-2026-20127). The vulnerability affects all deployment types of the product, including on-premises and cloud-managed versions. Cisco has not yet released a patch for this zero-day but advises monitoring for indicators of compromise and engaging Cisco TAC for incident response support. The vendor has released patches for related vulnerabilities but this specific flaw remains unpatched at this time. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Medium | – | MediumTenable Research On June 2, 2026, the White House signed an Executive Order directing federal agencies to harden their systems with AI-enabled cyber defenses and to stand up a new AI cybersecurity clearinghouse — most of it on a 30-day clock. Here’s what the EO requires and how Tenable can help. Key takeaways: The new AI Security Executive Order will require national security and civilian federal agencies to prioritize cyber defenses to account for new frontier AI model capabilities. Tenable is well positioned to help federal agencies gain visibility across their environments, including AI assets, and to prioritize the vulnerabilities and other exposures that pose the highest risk; Tenable AI-enabled exposure management capabilities can help support vulnerability remediation and automate multi-step remediation workflows. The vulnerability and patching clearinghouse which will be developed under the Executive Order will require strong engagement from private sector partners, including Tenable, to drive actionable insights on AI-associated vulnerabilities and mitigation prioritization. On June 2, 2026, the President signed an Executive Order (EO) titled “ Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security .” The direction is clear and the calls to action are fast-moving. Within 30 days: Federal agencies must begin hardening their information systems with AI-enabled cyber defenses. CISA must issue new directives or guidance for civilian agencies. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury), with the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), must stand up a new AI cybersecurity clearinghouse focused on finding and fixing software vulnerabilities. Within 60 days, Treasury, with the Department of War (DoW), NSA and CISA, in consultation with the White House and other agencies, must establish a classified benchmarking process to assess the capabilities of frontier AI models through voluntary collaboration with AI developers. While the Executive Order applies to U.S. federal agencies, the need to prepare for changes in the threat landscape brought about by the advanced cyber capabilities of frontier AI models applies to any organization that needs to manage cyber risk. Here’s a breakdown of what the AI EO requires, the deadlines that matter, and where Tenable fits. What the AI Executive Order requires The EO’s operative provisions sit in Section 2 (“Upgrading American systems for advanced AI”) and Section 3 (“Secure frontier model deployment”). The cybersecurity core is in Section 2. Within 30 days: National security and defense systems. The Committee on National Security Systems must prioritize the cyber defense of National Security Systems (NSS) and the Secretary of War must do the same for DoW information systems (Section 2(a) and 2(b)). Civilian federal systems and critical infrastructure. CISA, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the National Cyber Director, must release Binding Operational Directives (BODs) “and other guidance as appropriate” to: Expedite and prioritize the cyber defense of civilian federal information systems. Establish or expand federal programs and services that enhance AI-enabled defensive tools. Facilitate access to cybersecurity tools and services, including where appropriate, covered frontier models, for agencies, state and local authorities, and critical infrastructure operators such as rural hospitals, community banks, and local utilities. Worth noting, while the EO directs CISA to release BODs or other guidance for federal civilian agencies, the specific implementation directives are not yet known (Section 2(c)). The AI cybersecurity clearinghouse. The Secretary of the Treasury, with the National Cyber Director, NSA, and CISA, must form an AI cybersecurity clearinghouse, in voluntary collaboration with the AI industry and critical infrastructure operators. The EO tasks the clearinghouse with three concrete functions, per Section 2(d): Coordinate and deconflict scanning for software vulnerabilities Discover and validate those vulnerabilities Coordinate and prioritize the remediation and distribution of vulnerability patches. Grant funding for AI vulnerability detection. OMB, with the National Cyber Director and CISA, must determine whether existing federal grant programs have funding that can be directed toward applicants developing advanced AI vulnerability detection (Section 2(e)). Within 60 days: Cybersecurity workforce. The Office of Personnel Management must expand hiring and placement pathways for cybersecurity specialists through the United States Tech Force (Section 2(f)). Secure frontier model deployment. Treasury, NSA, and CISA, in consultation with NIST and others, must develop a classified benchmarking process to assess the advanced cyber capabilities of AI models. They must also set the threshold for designating a “covered frontier model,” and design a voluntary framework through which developers can give the government up to 30 days of pre-release access to those models. The Executive Order is explicit that it does not create any mandatory licensing, preclearance, or permitting requirement for AI models (Section 3). No fixed deadline: Criminal enforcement. The EO directs the Attorney General to prioritize enforcement against those who use AI to illegally access or damage computer systems (Section 4). For federal cybersecurity leaders, this is less a future-state policy document than a near-term planning trigger. Watch for CISA’s issuance of BODs and other guidance, and for readouts on the clearinghouse, during June and July. How Tenable can help The EO’s center of gravity — finding software vulnerabilities, validating them, prioritizing them, and driving remediation — is the work Tenable's platform is built to do. While the AI Executive Order focuses on vulnerability discovery, validation, prioritization, and remediation, the benefit of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform is that it addresses vulnerabilities alongside other security weaknesses, including misconfigurations of AI systems and overpermissioned AI agents, to serve as the system of action for mitigating cyber exposure and reducing cyber risk across organizations’ expanding attack surfaces. Below, learn how specific Tenable capabilities map to the EO’s requirements. Continuous vulnerability detection across the attack surface Sections 2(a) through 2(d) turn on the ability to find vulnerabilities across a wide range of systems continuously. Tenable One Vulnerability Management and Tenable Security Center provide network-based and agent-based assessment across IT assets, with credentialed scanning for greater depth. Tenable One Cloud Exposure extends that visibility to cloud workloads and configurations, and Tenable One Attack Surface Management maps internet-facing assets that agencies may not know they have. For agencies operating classified or air-gapped environments — relevant to the National Security Systems named in Section 2(a) — Tenable Enclave Security is built to run vulnerability and configuration assessment inside those boundaries. Risk-based prioritization, not “patch everything” Section 2(d) doesn’t only call for discovering vulnerabilities — it calls for prioritizing them for remediation. That distinction matters because no agency can patch everything at once. Tenable’s Vulnerability Priority Rating (VPR) uses machine learning, trained on the company’s corpus of more than 1.7 trillion security findings accumulated over more than 25 years of continuous scanning, to forecast which vulnerabilities are most likely to be exploited, so defenders can focus on the smaller set that represents real, immediate risk. By leveraging AI-generated features and expert intelligence from Tenable's Research Special Operations team, VPR helps organizations pinpoint the critical 1.6% of vulnerabilities that represent actual business risk . Tenable also ingests CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog — the continuously updated, authoritative list of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) under active exploitation — directly into prioritization, aligning remediation guidance to the same source CISA uses to track risk across the federal enterprise. AI-enabled defensive tooling Section 2(c) directs CISA to establish or expand programs that enhance AI-enabled defensive tools. As frontier AI models accelerate the rate at which vulnerabilities can be discovered and exploited , the traditional window for manual remediation is rapidly closing. The June 2026 AI Executive Order recognizes this shift, directing federal agencies to counter machine-speed threats with AI-enabled cyber defenses within 30 days. Tenable Hexa AI , the agentic engine of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform , is designed to help counter machine-speed threats, supercharge productivity, and accelerate risk reduction by automating multi-step remediation workflows. Security teams can leverage pre-built agents directly in the user interface or build custom agents via the Model Context Protocol (MCP), turning exposure intelligence into decisive action at machine speed. At the same time, as agencies build custom models or adopt third-party tools like ChatGPT and Copilot, they fundamentally expand their attack surface. It is now critical to protect enterprise AI, shadow AI, training data, and underlying infrastructure from emerging threats like adversarial attacks, data poisoning, and model theft. Tenable secures this expanding attack surface with Tenable One AI Exposure , which is designed to help agencies see, manage, and control the risks introduced by generative AI. Tenable One AI Exposure allows agencies to discover and inventory AI tools and libraries, and apply AI usage policies across the environment — a growing requirement as agencies adopt AI and need to account for it as part of | Tenable Research |
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