Search: server.js
1,212 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 1.0% | Critical9.1EPSS 1.0%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-65600 ## Summary There is a critical authentication-bypass vulnerability in Traefik's `ReplacePathRegex` middleware. When it is configured with a regular expression that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory separator (for example `regex: "^/api(.*)"`, `replacement: "/$1"`), a crafted request can produce an un-normalized replacement path such as `/../admin`, which Traefik forwarded to the backend without validation. A backend that normalizes the path may resolve it to a protected route, letting an unauthenticated attacker reach resources located behind authentication middleware. This is the same class of issue that was fixed for `StripPrefix` in CVE-2026-48020; that post-replacement normalization check had not been applied to `ReplacePathRegex`. The fix rejects any request whose replaced path does not match its normalized form. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in the ReplacePathRegex middleware allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication middleware and access protected routes by sending a single crafted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists because ReplacePathRegex does not perform post-replacement path normalization validation - the same check added to StripPrefix in the fix for CVE-2026-48020 was not applied to ReplacePathRegex. ### Details When ReplacePathRegex is configured with a regex that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory path separator (e.g., `regex: "^/api(.*)"`, `replacement: "/$1"`), an attacker can inject implicit traversal sequences into the capture group. **Root cause:** `pkg/middlewares/replacepathregex/replace_path_regex.go`, function `ServeHTTP` (lines 56-74). After the regex substitution produces a new path, the middleware forwards it to the backend without checking whether the path normalizes differently - unlike StripPrefix which rejects such paths with HTTP 400 after the CVE-2026-48020 fix. **Attack flow:** 1. Attacker sends `GET /api../admin` 2. `sanitizePath` passes it unchanged (`api..` is a valid segment name, not a dot-segment) 3. Router matches `PathPrefix(/api)` → selects the public router (no auth middleware) 4. ReplacePathRegex applies `^/api(.*)` → captures `../admin` → replacement produces `/../admin` 5. No normalization check exists → path forwarded to backend as-is 6. Backend framework (Express, Flask, Django, Spring, ASP.NET) normalizes `/../admin` to `/admin` 7. Attacker receives protected content without authentication **Suggested fix:** Add the same JoinPath equality check after line 67: ```go if cleanPath := req.URL.JoinPath(); cleanPath.Path != req.URL.Path { http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest) return } ``` ### PoC **Prerequisites:** Docker Engine 20.10+, Docker Compose v2, curl **1. Create `docker-compose.yml`:** ```yaml services: traefik: image: traefik:v3.7.6 command: - "--api.insecure=true" - "--providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml" - "--entrypoints.web.address=:80" ports: - "8080:8080" - "80:80" volumes: - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro healthcheck: test: ["CMD", "traefik", "healthcheck"] interval: 5s timeout: 3s retries: 5 backend: image: node:22-alpine working_dir: /app volumes: - ./server.js:/app/server.js:ro command: ["node", "server.js"] healthcheck: test: ["CMD", "wget", "-qO-", "http://localhost:3000/health"] interval: 5s timeout: 3s retries: 5 ``` **2. Create `dynamic.yml`:** ```yaml http: routers: public-api: rule: "PathPrefix(`/api`)" entryPoints: [web] middlewares: [rewrite-api] service: backend-svc priority: 1 protected-admin: rule: "PathPrefix(`/admin`)" entryPoints: [web] middlewares: [auth] service: backend-svc priority: 2 middlewares: rewrite-api: replacePathRegex: regex: "^/api(.*)" replacement: "/$1" auth: basicAuth: users: - "admin:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/" services: backend-svc: loadBalancer: servers: - url: "http://backend:3000" ``` **3. Create `server.js`:** ```javascript const http = require('http'); const path = require('path'); const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { const normalized = path.posix.normalize(req.url.split('?')[0]); res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/plain'); if (normalized === '/health') { res.writeHead(200); res.end('OK\n'); } else if (normalized === '/admin' || n | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (264711675c5edabf4f3d0b1d544ca8bade34057c973ca614c82bca3cf8bdd5a1) agenttunnels ships an MCP bridge whose customer-role tools accept payloads from a remote session worker (agenttunnels-session.lakshman111.workers.dev) and act on them locally. The `tunnel_run_command` tool takes `proposal.payload.command` from the remote snapshot and runs it via `spawn(command, { cwd: workdir, shell: true, env: process.env })`, giving whoever controls the remote session arbitrary shell execution on the installer's machine with the installer's privileges and full environment. The `tunnel_apply_patch` tool takes a unified diff from `proposal.payload.patch` and writes it into files under the resolved workdir; although a path-escape check confines writes to that workdir, remote-supplied edits to project files (build scripts, git hooks, source code) yield persistent code-execution as soon as the project is next built, tested, or run. Both tools are gated only by approval flags (`proposal.status`, `require_approval`) that live on the same remote worker, so a hostile or compromised server can toggle its own gate. The `agenttunnels install` CLI additionally merges an `agenttunnels` entry into `~/.cursor/mcp.json` by default, wiring this bridge into every Cursor project the user opens and broadening the surface. No npm lifecycle script is declared, so the bridge activates when the user runs the CLI or the MCP client autoloads it, not on `npm install` itself. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (554372f29af60ad8e6e5a33171a736baddcc652772b0452c81a4010d3f1e5218) index.js is a top-level self-decoding IIFE that XOR-decodes a URI-encoded payload keyed on the enclosing function's own source and eval()s the result at module load; the decoder aborts with 'the code has been tampered!' if the source is modified, and a banner asks readers not to crack it. The decoded payload is opaque and cannot be audited without executing it. The package's own metadata and typings describe the runtime behavior: package.json advertises it as a 'client (provider) for the tsi-vpsremote control server' that 'stays alive to run commands pushed from the server', keywords include 'shell', 'ssh', 'remote-control', and 'agent', and index.d.ts exports a ProviderHandle exposing a ChildProcess named `shell`. Calling the exported provider(url) at runtime therefore establishes a persistent connection to a remote server that drives a local ChildProcess on the host running the package — a network-to-shell control channel with full-host command execution for whoever controls the paired server URL. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3437dfe049006b09ad2f66c94d934907ac32e7272a22ad75694179e136ac90a8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.9% | High7.5EPSS 0.9%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-48068 A vulnerability in the @grpc/grpc-js JavaScript gRPC client and server library allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service by sending a malformed HTTP/2 stream initiation, crashing the server process. This affects all servers created using @grpc/grpc-js. No workaround is available, but fixed versions have been released. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 4.0 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-70595TryGhost Ghost · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Medium4.0EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-70595 Ghost, a Node.js content management system, contained a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in versions from 6.26.0 up to but not including 6.54.1. This flaw allowed unauthenticated users to abuse certain features, such as Webmentions, to make limited HTTP requests to internal network hosts of the Ghost server. Although the attack did not return response data, it could potentially be used to probe internal network resources. The vulnerability is fixed in version 6.54.1. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b9ae02b92920c1e028b5785e69013ea4662e4eb3180872531d64ccca00eef239) The package declares a postinstall script that runs dist/config.js. That script fetches JSON from https://my-api.trade-api.workers.dev?id=2 and then executes `globalThis[data.success](data.id)`, where both the method name and its argument are supplied by the remote server. This gives the operator of that endpoint arbitrary code execution on any machine that runs `npm install strath` — the invocation fires automatically as part of the default install lifecycle. The behavior is unrelated to the package's advertised path-utility purpose. The same script also references `globalThis[tag](text)` with undefined identifiers, consistent with a deliberately opaque dropper shape rather than a normal build step. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (eda7da760041a49d296b9a6e8cfa90ec4b7e5daecebbf50c88d41f7fd559a1b1) npm-groat@1.1.1 declares a postinstall script that executes dist/config.js on npm install. That script performs an outbound fetch to https://my-api.trade-api.workers.dev?id=0 and then evaluates the response by calling globalThis[data.success](data.id) — treating attacker-controlled JSON fields as the name of a global function (e.g. eval or Function) and its argument. This gives the remote endpoint arbitrary code execution on the installer's host during package installation. The same file also contains a bare globalThis[tag](text) referencing undeclared identifiers, consistent with a dead-drop stager rather than legitimate configuration. The package's advertised purpose has no need to contact a remote server at install time. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (800fab99d95f1a2cef6ebf269ca240bf60518735cfb58c7c24b6a8474c72ee77) package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs index.js on npm install. index.js collects the installer's hostname, username, home directory, DNS server list, and reads /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts, then HTTPS-POSTs the collected JSON to the hardcoded out-of-band endpoint idzskk7dl8mrfoqx6thyhegqbhha50tp.oastify.com (Burp Collaborator subdomain). Execution is automatic on default install; the destination is attacker-controlled and unrelated to any declared package purpose. ## Source: ghsa-malware (687ddbe581731d5da84cb2a0e04508c31995cbc7fdd378b53090ac8b9a51a0d2) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (6921f72a1b4fbaaba87fcbe3cb30137815e7e2bb932ffa794acd0010b8954c5f) package.json declares `preinstall: node index.js`, causing index.js to run automatically on `npm install`. The script collects installer-side data — hostname, username, home directory, DNS server list, current working directory, package.json contents, and the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts — and HTTPS-POSTs it to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain at 5z5h9l8e7cktx1ihl6usn4zgb7h15rtg.oastify.com. The exfiltration fires unconditionally on install with no user interaction. ## Source: ghsa-malware (fb3a6a289e12028cd0778c9ca9e56392a64003291be3756d28490d76c491e249) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (a0d1e2b10c31f45e3c73ad895a1ccd4188cdedf5ab1a795b420f5aa2693d7686) The npm package's preinstall hook runs index.js at install time, which collects the installer's hostname, username, home directory, DNS server list, and the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts, then POSTs a JSON payload over HTTPS to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain n6usddpvkn7jcauar9va0xvleck48uwj.oastify.com. The package name mimics a documentation package for karapace (a Kafka registry project), consistent with a dependency-confusion / typosquat recon payload. Installer host identity and local system file contents leave the machine to an attacker-controlled OAST endpoint on `npm install` with no user interaction. ## Source: ghsa-malware (0504b1eeee4b53817289d98df2d4b44775e97feea2be622a724012a4dc60576f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package async-mutex-v3 version 3.1.0 is a malicious typosquat that executes attacker-controlled JavaScript code with Node.js privileges. Its default export makes an HTTP request to a hardcoded IP address and runs the returned code, enabling remote code execution. The package masquerades as an icon CDN helper but actually includes dependencies consistent with credential-stealing post-exploitation tools. Any user importing and invoking the default export will execute arbitrary code from the attacker-controlled server. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The @nextco/utils npm package version 5.0.0 contains malicious code that executes upon module load. It collects host reconnaissance data including hostname, username, directory paths, OS/architecture, Node.js version, and environment variable names. This data is base64-encoded and sent via an unencrypted HTTP POST request to a hardcoded attacker-controlled server (attacker.cl). The package does not provide an opt-out for this telemetry, exposing sensitive host information to attackers. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package rollup-plugins-check versions 0.0.1 and 0.0.2 contains malicious code that executes arbitrary JavaScript fetched from a remote server during installation. This code disables TLS certificate verification, allowing attackers to intercept and modify the payload. The package masquerades as a legitimate rollup polyfill plugin but includes a postinstall script that runs potentially harmful code with full access to Node.js require functionality. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4e6e8d8500ee41d92250882b57d98d805b381d2d08eeeac7bae55c3f5e417dff) package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs index.js on `npm install`. index.js collects the installer's hostname, username, home directory, DNS server configuration, current working directory, and the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts, then POSTs this payload over HTTPS to the hardcoded subdomain x75h3spwmlqq7bzriw6gm6w8azgq4hs6.oastify.com (a Burp Collaborator out-of-band interaction host). Execution is automatic at install time with no consent prompt and no documented purpose. The behavior matches a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon that exfiltrates installer host identity and local system files to an attacker-controlled endpoint. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a7d5d00e0c243819b3d1813314c4f4ef596f92a034d82e0a5acce92740bed5d5) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c3faac0139a1c2fd25d8b955e9290380bec365a1d3034fb793dfa723cb930463) package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs index.js on npm install. The script collects host reconnaissance (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), homedir, DNS server list, current working directory, package.json contents) and reads /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts from the installer's filesystem, then POSTs the aggregated JSON over HTTPS to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain ie02j5ztgjeb6i7tp467ydwnjep8dy1n.oastify.com. The package name mimics a legitimate SDK category but its only behavior on install is this exfiltration beacon. ## Source: ghsa-malware (39394cd04a494a4f6dceff2f54848e93a56bbbab2663fe9b48611ea39df58808) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package ventrix-kit versions 0.5.2 and 1.5.2 contain a malicious loader that executes attacker-controlled code fetched from a hardcoded IP address. When the package's default getPlugin export is called, it performs an HTTP request to a remote server and executes the 'credits' field from the response as JavaScript code with full Node.js global scope access. This allows remote code execution on the host running the package. The package masquerades as a lightweight icon helper but includes suspicious dependencies inconsistent with its advertised functionality. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-71285louislam uptime-kuma · Cross-site Scripting High8.1EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-71285 Uptime Kuma's Matomo analytics integration (server/analytics/matomo-analytics.js) injects the admin-configurable Matomo value as a bare, unquoted JavaScript expression inside a <script> block rendered on every public status page. A siteId value such as , once saved by an editor/admin, executes arbitrary JavaScript for every unauthenticated visitor of the public /status/<slug> page, enabling session-cookie theft and full page takeover. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e6144be61d70f258741e5d4cc1476021f93e3ce82ffa00a3f86189537a1438a6) The package's `tt-help watchdog` subcommand starts a long-running agent that POSTs heartbeats to a remote server (default hardcoded to http://117.71.53.99:17301, referenced in src/lib/constants.js and the README/run-explore examples) and executes commands returned in the response. In WatchdogAgent, syncCommands maps entries from the server's `commands` array into child_process.spawn(command, { shell: true }) via ProcessManager.startCommand, with auto-restart — the remote operator selects arbitrary shell commands to run on the installer's host. Each heartbeat body assembled by _buildHeartbeatBody carries hostname, non-internal IPv4 address, OS platform/release/arch, CPU count, memory, node version, uptime, load average, and the contents of ~/.tt-help.json (server, proxy, browser, userId, tuning fields), POSTed as JSON to ${serverUrl}/api/watchdog/heartbeat at the configured interval (default 15s). In addition, _startUpgradeChecker polls the npm registry every 10 minutes and, when a new version of tt-help-cli-ycl is published, invokes `npm install -g tt-help-cli-ycl@latest` via child_process.exec and re-spawns, so the publisher can push arbitrary new code to every running agent host without user confirmation. The combination of remote-command execution, ongoing host inventory + stored-config exfiltration to a bare-IP destination, and unattended auto-upgrade constitutes a full command-and-control backdoor rather than a legitimate remote-management tool. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package tailwind-animationgroup version 2.3.7 contains malicious code that executes upon import or require. This code fetches data from Ethereum blockchain transactions to dynamically determine command-and-control (C2) server IP addresses. It then downloads and executes arbitrary payloads, including spawning detached Node.js processes, effectively compromising the host system. The package's legitimate Tailwind plugin functionality is a decoy. Any system with this package installed should be considered fully compromised. | GCVE Database |
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