The asset dependency graph did not restrict nodes by the viewer's DAG read permissions: a user with read access to at least one DAG could browse the asset graph for any other asset in the deployment and learn the existence and names of DAGs and assets outside their authorized scope.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.2.1, which fixes this issue.
An example of BashOperator in Airflow documentation suggested a way of passing dag_run.conf in the way that could cause unsanitized user input to be used to escalate privileges of UI user to allow execute code on worker. Users should review if any of their own DAGs have adopted this incorrect advice.
In case of SQL errors, exception/stack trace of errors was exposed in API even if "api/expose_stack_traces" was set to false. That could lead to exposing additional information to potential attacker. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.2.0, which fixes the issue.
Dag Authors, who normally should not be able to execute code in the webserver context could craft XCom payload causing the webserver to execute arbitrary code. Since Dag Authors are already highly trusted, severity of this issue is Low.
Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.2.0, which fixes the issue.
UI / API User with asset materialize permission could trigger dags they had no access to.
Users are advised to migrate to Airflow version 3.2.0 that fixes the issue.
The `access_key` and `connection_string` connection properties were not marked as sensitive names in secrets masker. This means that user with read permission could see the values in Connection UI, as well as when Connection was accidentaly logged to logs, those values could be seen in the logs. Azure Service Bus used those properties to store sensitive values. Possibly other providers could be also affected if they used the same fields to store sensitive data.
If you used Azure Service Bus connection with those values set or if you have other connections with those values storing sensitve values, you should upgrade Airflow to 3.1.8
The example example_xcom that was included in airflow documentation implemented unsafe pattern of reading value
from xcom in the way that could be exploited to allow UI user who had access to modify XComs to perform arbitrary
execution of code on the worker. Since the UI users are already highly trusted, this is a Low severity vulnerability.
It does not affect Airflow release - example_dags are not supposed to be enabled in production environment, however
users following the example could replicate the bad pattern. Documentation of Airflow 3.2.0 contains version of
the example with improved resiliance for that case.
Users who followed that pattern are advised to adjust their implementations accordingly.
Before Airflow 3.2.0, it was unclear that secure Airflow deployments require the Deployment Manager to take appropriate actions and pay attention to security details and security model of Airflow. Some assumptions the Deployment Manager could make were not clear or explicit enough, even though Airflow's intentions and security model of Airflow did not suggest different assumptions. The overall security model [1], workload isolation [2], and JWT authentication details [3] are now described in more detail. Users concerned with role isolation and following the Airflow security model of Airflow are advised to upgrade to Airflow 3.2, where several security improvements have been implemented. They should also read and follow the relevant documents to make sure that their deployment is secure enough. It also clarifies that the Deployment Manager is ultimately responsible for securing your Airflow deployment. This had also been communicated via Airflow 3.2.0 Blog announcement [4].
[1] Security Model: https://airflow.apache.org/docs/apache-airflow/stable/security/jwt_token_authentication.html
[2] Workload isolation: https://airflow.apache.org/docs/apache-airflow/stable/security/workload.html
[3] JWT Token authentication: https://airflow.apache.org/docs/apache-airflow/stable/security/jwt_token_authentication.html
[4] Airflow 3.2.0 Blog announcement: https://airflow.apache.org/blog/airflow-3.2.0/
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.2.0, which fixes this issue.
When user logged out, the JWT token the user had authtenticated with was not invalidated, which could lead to reuse of that token in case it was intercepted. In Airflow 3.2 we implemented the mechanism that implements token invalidation at logout. Users who are concerned about the logout scenario and possibility of intercepting the tokens, should upgrade to Airflow 3.2+
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.2.0, which fixes this issue.
Apache Airflow versions 3.0.0 through 3.1.8 DagRun wait endpoint returns XCom result values even to users who only have DAG Run read permissions, such as the Viewer role.This behavior conflicts with the FAB RBAC model, which treats XCom as a separate protected resource, and with the security model documentation that defines the Viewer role as read-only.
Airflow uses the FAB Auth Manager to manage access control on a per-resource basis. The Viewer role is intended to be read-only by default, and the security model documentation defines Viewer users as those who can inspect DAGs without accessing sensitive execution results.
Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.2.0 which resolves this issue.
Apache Airflow versions 3.1.0 through 3.1.7 /ui/dependencies endpoint returns the full DAG dependency graph without filtering by authorized DAG IDs. This allows an authenticated user with only DAG Dependencies permission to enumerate DAGs they are not authorized to view.
Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.1.8 or later, which resolves this issue.
Airflow versions before 2.11.1 have a vulnerability that allows authenticated users with audit log access to see sensitive values in audit logs which they should not see. When sensitive connection parameters were set via airflow CLI, values of those variables appeared in the audit log and were stored unencrypted in the Airflow database. While this risk is limited to users with audit log access, it is recommended to upgrade to Airflow 2.11.1 or a later version, which addresses this issue. Users who previously used the CLI to set connections should manually delete entries with those connection sensitive values from the log table. This is similar but not the same issue as CVE-2024-50378
When a DAG failed during parsing, Airflow’s error-reporting in the UI could include the full kwargs passed to the operators. If those kwargs contained sensitive values (such as secrets), they might be exposed in the UI tracebacks to authenticated users who had permission to view that DAG.
The issue has been fixed in Airflow 3.1.4 and 2.11.1, and users are strongly advised to upgrade to prevent potential disclosure of sensitive information.
In Apache Airflow versions before 3.1.6, and 2.11.1 the proxies and proxy fields within a Connection may include proxy URLs containing embedded authentication information. These fields were not treated as sensitive by default and therefore were not automatically masked in log output. As a result, when such connections are rendered or printed to logs, proxy credentials embedded in these fields could be exposed.
Users are recommended to upgrade to 3.1.6 or later for Airflow 3, and 2.11.1 or later for Airflow 2 which fixes this issue
In Apache Airflow versions before 3.1.6, when rendered template fields in a Dag exceed [core] max_templated_field_length, sensitive values could be exposed in cleartext in the Rendered Templates UI. This occurred because serialization of those fields used a secrets masker instance that did not include user-registered mask_secret() patterns, so secrets were not reliably masked before truncation and display.
Users are recommended to upgrade to 3.1.6 or later, which fixes this issue
A vulnerability in Apache Airflow allowed authenticated UI users to view secret values in rendered templates due to secrets not being properly redacted, potentially exposing secrets to users without the appropriate authorization.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.1.4, which fixes this issue.
Apache Airflow versions from 3.0.0 up to but not including 3.0.5 contain a command injection vulnerability in the example DAG named "example_dag_decorator." This vulnerability arises from a non-validated parameter that allows a UI user to redirect the example to a malicious server and execute code on the worker. Exploitation requires that example DAGs are enabled in production (which is not the default) or that the example DAG code is copied to create a similar DAG. The issue is fixed in version 3.0.5.
Apache Airflow versions 3.0.0 up to but not including 3.1.1 contain a vulnerability where users with CREATE privileges but without UPDATE privileges on Pools, Connections, or Variables can update existing records by using the bulk create API with the overwrite action. This issue allows privilege escalation within the application data management. The vulnerability has a medium severity score of 4.6 and was fixed in version 3.1.1.
Apache Airflow versions 3.0.0 up to but not including 3.1.1 contain a vulnerability in the `/api/v2/dagReports` API endpoint that allows API users to execute DAG Python code in the context of the API server if the server has access to DAG files. This could lead to unauthorized code execution. The issue is fixed in version 3.1.1.