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3,635 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2b46ca6ae72ce6f079c34ec6d1d1d2be46b36fe429374393f0fe57539fe56ee3) Package name mimics the widely-used 'jsonwebtoken' library and falsely declares 'auth0' as author, while the repository URL points to the unrelated 'github.com/radix-ui/primitives'. On require(), decode.js unconditionally invokes a helper (getThirdCookie) that performs an HTTPS GET to https://jsonkeeper.com/b/E69V3 — an anonymous, mutable paste endpoint — and passes the response body into `new Function.constructor("require", errCode)`, then executes the resulting function with the host's require. This grants the remote content full Node.js capabilities on the consumer's machine as soon as any code loads the module. The code path is hidden behind a benign-sounding helper name and uses indirect Function construction to evade simple pattern matching. The combination of impersonated author metadata, name confusion with a top-100 auth library, and an obfuscated require-time remote-code loader is an unambiguous supply-chain attack. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (936d3c8bc6611b58f5321ba5aab651bb3d2db821d172816283ca04633be00863) The `stella` CLI shipped in bin/stella.js prompts users for their phone number and the WhatsApp verification code and POSTs both to a hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint at http://62.238.2.22:8787 (paths /api/v1/auth/register/register and /verify). Subsequent chat input is sent to the same host. There is no disclosure that authentication credentials leave the user's machine to an anonymous IPv4 address unrelated to the advertised homepage stella-ai.app. In addition, bin/postinstall.js and install.bat implement a dropper flow that downloads stella-latest.tar.gz from the same bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint, extracts it under ~/.stella, installs the Bun runtime via `curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash`, and executes the fetched contents; the Windows bootstrap pipes http://62.238.2.22:8787/install.ps1 directly into `iex`. The download URL is mutable, unpinned, unverified, and served over cleartext from an anonymous IPv4 address, so whatever bytes the endpoint currently serves execute with the user's privileges. Package metadata reinforces the mismatch: homepage stella-ai.app, repository github.com/anomalyco/opencode, operational endpoint a raw IPv4. ## Source: ghsa-malware (042a564970d9ea4747ece2d03fa02b3acf2085e515df00bf24153eeac0c698d7) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-54063qax-os excelize · Unthrottled Resource Allocation High7.5EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-54063 Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. Prior to 2.11.0, the checkSheet() function in github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 uses an attacker-controlled <row r="N"> XML attribute value directly as the length argument to make([]xlsxRow, row) without validating it against the Excel row limit (TotalRows = 1,048,576). A specially crafted XLSX file can trigger two denial-of-service variants: (A) an out-of-memory process kill when r=2147483647 forces a ~16 GB allocation attempt, and (B) a runtime panic via out-of-bounds slice indexing when r=-1. Any service that opens attacker-supplied XLSX files and calls GetCellValue is affected. No authentication is required. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (eadf76ef8e123f9ce50c2910c71912996a3d079a91076ffed8d29830a1687ae1) package.json declares both a dependency and a devDependency on 'transform-es2015-sticky-regex' pointing at http://pack.nppacks.com/npm/transform-es2015-sticky-regex. On `npm install`, npm fetches whatever tarball that plain-HTTP, non-registry host currently serves and installs it into node_modules with no version pin and no integrity hash — the maintainer of pack.nppacks.com can substitute arbitrary code at any time and it will land in the installer's dependency tree on the next install. The package name is also a namespace-confusion of the well-known 'babel-plugin-transform-es2015-sticky-regex' (Babel plugin naming convention prefixes 'babel-plugin-'); the shipped index.js does not implement the sticky-regex transform but a DefinePlugin-style identifier replacer, and a source comment states the package is 'for Security Research Testing Purpose'. Additional network-capable dependencies (axios, node-fetch, ws) are declared but unused by the shipped code, pre-staging network primitives for whatever the swapped tarball chooses to import. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f29d6bfc122cb5792d95cfade56e62789f83366b30fc0d58a88a84113d89962c) Package impersonates the pino logger (README is pino documentation, package name is a lookalike). The main export is a middleware factory that spawns lib/caller.js as a detached Node child process. caller.js retrieves JavaScript from hardcoded remote endpoints at https://json.extendsclass.com/bin/863e90480800 and https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3, then evaluates the response body using the Function constructor with require passed in scope, yielding arbitrary code execution in the consumer's environment under the endpoint owner's control. The destination URLs are base64-encoded and stored under a decoy DEV_API_KEY property (e.g., aHR0cHM6Ly9qc29ua2VlcGVyLmNvbS9iL1hSR0Yz decodes to the jsonkeeper.com URL) to hide the C2/dead-drop from casual review. Mutable third-party paste services as the code source mean the delivered payload can change at any time without any package update. ## Source: ghsa-malware (1155002b11d7043b2de14581ed13165ffe96a13c73e839c5650c8cace990ded7) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (acfd49527fb8be1135feb424b68f6c46779ba146d8372d276eac1735770d6e5a) rtc-integration-frontend-sdk@99.9.0 registers a postinstall lifecycle hook ("postinstall": "node index.js") that fires automatically on npm install. index.js collects installer host reconnaissance — os.hostname(), userInfo().username, platform/arch, local network interface addresses, the public IP resolved via a call to https://api.ipify.org, the current working directory, and the package name — and POSTs the collected data to a hardcoded Discord webhook at discord.com/api/webhooks/. The package name and 99.9.0 version shape are consistent with a typosquat/version-bump lure; installing the package causes unconditional install-time exfiltration of host identifiers to an attacker-controlled endpoint. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (37979cc60cff25e26406f3426f0dd7aeac12c13e55402c89f78228080cac0ad9) The package advertises itself as a pino-style logger but its exported middleware spawns lib/caller.js as a detached Node child process. lib/caller.js performs an HTTP GET against a third-party mutable JSON-bin host (json.extendsclass.com/bin/26d6d7d075e1, with secondary jsonkeeper.com bins) and passes the returned string to `new Function.constructor("require", s)`, then invokes it with the real `require`, giving the fetched code arbitrary execution with full module access in the caller's Node process. lib/const.js and lib/caller.js embed base64-encoded jsonkeeper.com bin URLs disguised as environment-variable defaults (e.g. DEV_API_KEY decodes to https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3), a standard evasion shape for staged remote-code loaders. The pino-like API surface and `module.exports.pino = middleware` are a lookalike wrapper around the fetch-and-eval loader. ## Source: ghsa-malware (03a124b9fdf68baca03f8e109847668f7265163746492e8fb234cf1822a4464a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (bb2b2601b0e4e6659a7fd042e4f227e3d22880c51355a793dbdc2e42d39805d5) driftpin@1.0.0 advertises itself in the README as an SVG sanitization/minification/conversion utility, but the only actual export from index.js is an undocumented function `getPlugin`. When a consumer calls `getPlugin()()`, the returned closure performs an HTTP GET against https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/3P9BF — an anonymous, mutable paste host — parses the JSON response, and passes the response's `model` field directly to `eval`. Whoever controls the paste can change its contents at any moment to run arbitrary JavaScript inside any process that loads driftpin and invokes the export. The advertised SVG functionality is a cover story; the documented API surface (sanitizeSVG/minifySVG/saveSVG/convertSVGToPNG) is not actually exported. Additionally, index.js `require('request')` without declaring `request` in package.json dependencies, indicating the backdoor was grafted onto an unrelated skeleton. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3dbd06d83019ce10a1c0da788fc10633f55f9f6c82058ca6841c4650b5611afb) On module load, jwtmethod's decode.js executes a top-level routine that performs an HTTPS GET to https://jsonkeeper.com/b/E69V3 and passes the response body to `new Function.constructor('require', errCode)`, then invokes the resulting function with the host's `require`. The fetched content is attacker-controlled (jsonkeeper.com is a mutable third-party paste host) and is executed with full Node capabilities, giving the attacker arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine the moment any consumer imports the package. Package metadata is forged to impersonate the auth0/jsonwebtoken ecosystem: package.json sets `author: auth0` and points `repository`/`bugs` at github.com/radix-ui/primitives, and README.md is the unrelated `react-text` documentation from radix-ui — a lure designed to entice installers looking for a JWT library. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (15ac606888cb1a54710bafa78dc76d760bef1088bb5e2cc0f0323614341345e5) The package is named `nodemon-patch` but its package.json metadata (homepage https://nodemon.io, author Remy Sharp / github.com/remy, repository, funding) and lib/ source are copied verbatim from the legitimate `nodemon` package by Remy Sharp. The package author has not published nodemon and the name is a single-suffix variant of a top-100 npm package, consistent with namespace impersonation. The local lib/ code mirrors upstream nodemon and is functionally benign on its own, but package.json declares a runtime dependency on `webpack-patch@^1.1.7` — a similarly-shaped `*-patch` name that is not a dependency of real nodemon and does not correspond to any established OSS library — plus `chai` as a runtime (not dev) dependency. Any developer who runs `npm i nodemon-patch` expecting nodemon will silently pull `webpack-patch` into their dependency tree, where its install/require-time code would execute. The combination of cloned identity metadata + a same-suffix sibling dependency with no legitimate provenance is the namespace-abuse / dropper-lure shape, but confirming installer harm requires inspecting webpack-patch itself. ## Source: ghsa-malware (84b347fd7c4e127c9aa639ba72b588847c1f591145be983528f62bffd9fd016b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b976e6ab638a52663d25f360bffec6706dc82991ad27c552788a5a4d785ff89f) The package presents itself as the popular `pino` logger (README badges, file layout mirroring pino's lib/proto.js, lib/redaction.js, lib/transport.js, DEFAULT_LEVELS, and `module.exports.pino = middleware`), but on use it triggers a remote code execution flow. index.js spawns `node./lib/caller.js` in a detached, stdio-ignored child when the exported middleware is invoked. lib/caller.js issues an HTTPS GET against https://jsonkeeper.com/b/QWPQX, reads the `cookie` field of the returned JSON, and passes it to `Function.constructor('require', s)`, invoking the returned function with the real `require` — giving whatever code the paste currently contains full Node capabilities inside the installer's process. The exfil/C2 URLs are further obfuscated as base64-encoded fake `process.env.DEV_API_KEY` / `DEV_SECRET_KEY` / `DEV_SECRET_VALUE` constants in lib/caller.js and lib/const.js that decode to additional jsonkeeper.com paste endpoints (https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3, https://jsonkeeper.com/b/4NAKK) and a custom `x-secret-key` header. jsonkeeper.com is an anonymous, mutable paste host — the executed payload can be swapped by the operator at any time without a package update. Name impersonation of `pino` plus a mutable-paste remote-execute channel plus URL obfuscation is an unambiguous supply-chain attack. ## Source: ghsa-malware (30f271d63c5628cb52ec8178b640bcf8becf253a8f61563940a6c1e419586509) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3a4d96efb2897a3908596981acd2c0666cfd7445def91a32e02e2f95c9475ecf) url-func-registry@1.0.4 exposes a factory `createJsonService` (registered under key 'JsonS' in the public `getFunc` API) that fetches https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/XVHGD — an anonymous, publicly-editable, author-mutable JSON hosting service — reads the `data` property from the response, and passes it to `new Function.constructor('require', data.data)` which is then invoked with the real `require` bound. This compiles and executes arbitrary JavaScript hosted at an author-controlled slug on a third-party paste service, giving whoever controls that slug full code execution in any consumer process that reaches the 'JsonS' factory. The package presents itself as a URL/singleton registry; remote code execution is not part of the documented behavior, and the `createJsonService` / 'JsonS' naming frames the sink as a benign JSON fetch. Because the payload is served from a mutable pastebin, the executed content can be swapped at any time without any package republish. The backdoor fires only when a consumer invokes the factory (not at install/import), but any downstream integration that iterates or looks up the registered factories will trigger it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2450dc325921e41fd15c24339c29dc86bef36424dd6f8447c07cffd219f3955a) package.json declares the package's own name as both a dependency and devDependency pointing to http://pack.nppacks.com/npm/security-node, a non-npm-registry host served over plaintext HTTP. On `npm install`, npm fetches whatever tarball that URL currently serves and installs it as node_modules/security-node, replacing the registry-published contents with code delivered from a mutable third-party host over an unauthenticated channel. This bypasses registry-side scanning and version pinning; the operator of pack.nppacks.com (or any on-path MITM against the plain-HTTP fetch) controls the code that lands in the installer's node_modules on every install. The shipped index.js itself is a benign Babel DefinePlugin-style transform with a self-declared 'Security Research Testing Purpose' header comment, but the tarball substitution mechanism is the installer-harm surface, independent of the current in-tarball code. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a00f33e51bb13fa7613e6b3c43b14bc85d043c97a475a9c4697234a7fa45944d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (9b77c2c0dab050d3a675407d74b649c73bfc107da05191cf041fb66e0346073a) package.json declares `optimize-regex` as a dependency (and devDependency) of itself, resolved via a plain-HTTP tarball URL at http://pack.nppacks.com/npm/optimize-regex — a host unrelated to the package's publisher and outside the npm registry. On `npm install`, npm fetches and installs whatever bytes that URL currently serves as the same package name, giving the operator of pack.nppacks.com full control over the code that ends up in the installer's node_modules. The URL is unpinned (no hash, no version), served over cleartext HTTP (mutable in transit as well as at the host), and the visible index.js is a near-verbatim clone of babel-plugin-transform-define with a package name and description that do not match that functionality — a decoy while the actual payload is delivered through URL-scheme dependency resolution. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (789e913282e371428b19e015e619b6a3dd6c8d9938ad0e08a1f37d0248d28e0a) package.json declares 'rallycoding' as its own dependency, resolved from an unauthenticated plain-HTTP URL http://pack.nppacks.com/npm/rallycoding rather than the npm registry. On `npm install`, npm fetches and installs that arbitrary tarball with no integrity pinning and no TLS, and executes any lifecycle scripts contained within it. Because the fetch is unpinned, unauthenticated, and off-registry, the operator of pack.nppacks.com — or any on-path attacker — controls exactly what code runs on the installer's machine at install time. The package additionally reuses the well-known 'rallycoding' identity from the JS teaching community and carries a comment stating 'Security Research Testing Purpose', consistent with a name-confusion lure. The harmful bytes are not shipped in this tarball but are fetched from an author-controlled host at install; regardless of what pack.nppacks.com currently serves, the mechanism is install-time execution of unpinned remote code from a non-registry HTTP source. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2da390c130eb840eb129a5d43faf0a64a0f0f602070243613aa0e2f8ea8f6d04) The package advertises itself as a wrapper for a 'qsshd executable' but the bundled Go binary is a reverse-SSH daemon that grants a remote operator persistent shell, exec, pty, and TCP port-forwarding on the installer's host. The entry point `proxy-check-i` (declared in the package's console_scripts, mapped to `qsshd.launcher:main`) uses `os.execv` to launch the bundled Go binary. The daemon establishes device identity by writing a `.device_lock` file under `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME`, `/dev/shm`, or `/tmp`, then repeatedly dials out to a relay via `github.com/mydearniko/overthing` (`tunnel.NewServer` with `RelayURI` and `ForwardAddr` pointing at the local SSH listener). SSH authentication only accepts a single hardcoded ed25519 public key embedded at build time via `//go:embed authorized_keys`, so only the key holder can connect. The reverse-connect design bypasses inbound firewalls. PyPI metadata is a cover story: PKG-INFO summary mentions only 'qsshd executable' with no README and no disclosure of SSH-server, authorized-keys, or outbound-relay behavior, so an installer cannot infer they are enabling a remote-shell daemon. Any host that runs `proxy-check-i` is remotely controllable by the key holder. ## Source: kam193 (dd01be5624206ed8c0a5ba9535c9a9e79ed8770b37eb9ebc381edbe73cb5e779) The embedded binary starts a relayed SSH-like server using a hardcoded authorized_key. Thanks to using a relay network, the attacked does not need to directly expose ports from the machine. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-07-proxy-check-i Reasons (based on the campaign): - backdoor - The package contains code to execute remote commands (probably limited to a specific set) on the victim's machine. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (21b9e477cff478ab071039c18c3adb6577a07cc1d82687b9e7d7cd2594dc9ddf) The package presents itself as fastify-plugin (name fastify-addone, repository/homepage/bugs fields point at fastify/fastify-plugin) and copies that project's source with a malicious statement inserted. lib/getPluginName.js contains a top-level statement that base64-decodes a URL via atob, fetches the JSON at https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/HDXPP, and passes the returned content field to eval. This executes attacker-controlled JavaScript in the caller's process on any require('fastify-addone') (directly or via plugin.js). The destination is an anonymous, mutable third-party JSON-hosting service — not the publisher's infrastructure — and the payload URL is hidden behind base64 to evade casual review. | GCVE Database | |||
| Low | 1.3 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2026-0279Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS · Cross-site Scripting Low1.3EPSS 0.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-0279 Multiple cross site scripting vulnerabilities in the User-ID™ Authentication Portal (aka Captive Portal) service, GlobalProtect™ gateway/portal features and Clientless VPN of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS® software enables a malicious unauthenticated user to store or execute malicious JavaScript payload. The security risk posed by this issue is minimized when the management interface and access to the User-ID™ Authentication Portal is restricted to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended best practice deployment guidelines https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431 . This issue is applicable to PAN-OS software on PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls and on Panorama (virtual and M-Series). Cloud NGFW is not affected by this vulnerability. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 2.1 | EPSS 0.3% | Low2.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-0281 An information disclosure vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS® software enables an unauthenticated attacker with network access to the management web interface to obtain web session tokens. This requires a legitimate user to first click on a malicious link provided by the attacker. The security risk posed by this issue is minimized by restricting access to the management web interface to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended best practice deployment guidelines https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431 . This issue is applicable to PAN-OS software on PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls and on Panorama (virtual and M-Series). Cloud NGFW and Prisma® Access are not impacted by this vulnerability. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 2.7 | EPSS 0.3% | Low2.7EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-0282 A file deletion vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS® software enables an unauthenticated attacker with network access to the management web interface to delete files from a temporary directory. The security risk posed by this issue is minimized by restricting access to the management web interface to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended best practice deployment guidelines https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431 . This issue is applicable to PAN-OS software on PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls and on Panorama (virtual and M-Series). Cloud NGFW and Prisma® Access are not impacted by this vulnerability. | CVE Database V5 |
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