HireFlow v1.2 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control. The application does not enforce object-level authorization on the /candidate/<id> and /interview/<id> endpoints. The route handlers retrieve records by the user-supplied ID without verifying that the requesting user is the owner or has an authorized role. Any authenticated user can access any other user's candidate profiles and interview notes by iterating the integer ID in the URL path, constituting a horizontal privilege escalation and full data breach of all records in the system.
AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, GET /api/workspace/:slug/tts/:chatId in AnythingLLM returns the text-to-speech audio for another user's chat response within the same workspace because the route validates workspace membership but does not enforce ownership of the targeted chat row. As a result, an authenticated user can access another user's private assistant response in audio form if the chatId is known or guessed. This constitutes an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) affecting private chat response content exposed through the TTS endpoint. This issue has been patched in version 1.12.1.
A race condition vulnerability in the Linux kernel's MCTP routing code (CVE-2026-43455) was resolved. The issue involves improper locking around key->dev access in mctp_flow_prepare_output(), leading to a potential resource leak due to lost device references. This flaw could cause a denial of service by exhausting resources. The vulnerability affects multiple Linux kernel versions and has a medium severity rating with a CVSS score of 5.5. A patch is available and should be applied to affected systems.
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.37, the _safe_extractall helper that all recipe pull, recipe publish, and recipe unpack flows route through validates each archive member's name for absolute paths, .. segments, and resolved-path escape — but does not validate member.linkname, does not reject symlink/hardlink members, and calls tar.extractall(dest_dir) without filter="data". A bundle that contains a symlink with a name inside dest_dir but a linkname pointing outside it, followed by a regular file whose path traverses through the just-created symlink, escapes dest_dir and lets the attacker write arbitrary content to an attacker-chosen location on the victim's filesystem. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.37.
### Impact
A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted `Authorization` header to any LLM API route (for example `POST /chat/completions`) and reach this query through the proxy's error-handling path.
An attacker could read data from the proxy's database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages.
### Patches
Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. The caller-supplied value is now always passed to the database as a separate parameter. Upgrade to `1.83.7` or later.
### Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, set `disable_error_logs: true` under `general_settings`. This removes the path through which unauthenticated input reaches the vulnerable query.
### References
- Patched release: [`v1.83.7-stable`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable)
**Discovery Credit**: Tencent YunDing Security Lab
kube-router versions prior to 2.9.0 run a GoBGP gRPC management server bound to the node's primary IP address without authentication or TLS. This allows any pod in the cluster to access the gRPC API on port 50051 and perform unauthorized actions such as injecting arbitrary BGP routes, enumerating BGP peer configurations, adding or deleting BGP neighbors, and modifying routing policies. Although kube-router's default BGP export policy limits route propagation, the vulnerability enables local BGP state manipulation on nodes, which could impact cluster networking. A fix is available in version 2.9.0 that addresses this exposure.
The @evomap/evolver proxy daemon has an unbounded HTTP request body parser on the POST /asset/submit route that accepts and persists arbitrarily large JSON payloads without size validation. An unauthenticated local attacker can exploit this to repeatedly send large requests, causing the messages.jsonl file to grow without limit and exhaust disk space. On daemon restart, the large file is synchronously read into memory, causing an out-of-memory crash that makes the denial-of-service persistent. The service listens only on localhost and has no per-request authentication, allowing any local process or container sharing the host network namespace to exploit this.
The Loco Translate plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 2.8.2 via the `fsReference` AJAX route. This is due to the `findSourceFile()` method normalizing user-supplied `ref` paths containing `../` directory traversal sequences without validating that the resolved path remains within the intended bundle or content directory. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Translator-level access and above (custom `loco_admin` capability required, granted to the `translator` role and administrators by default), to read arbitrary `.php`, `.js`, `.json`, and `.twig` files from the server filesystem outside the intended translation directory. Files named wp-config.php are excluded.
Axios versions prior to 1.15.1 and 0.31.1 contain a vulnerability in the no_proxy environment variable handling that allows bypassing proxy restrictions via IP aliasing. Specifically, when no_proxy=localhost is set, requests to 127.0.0.1 and [::1] do not bypass the proxy as intended, due to the shouldBypassProxy() function performing only string matching without resolving loopback IP aliases. This can lead to server-side request forgery (SSRF) risks where an attacker can route internal requests through a malicious proxy.
AzuraCast versions prior to 0.23.6 have a missing permissions check on the media file download endpoint GET /api/station/{station_id}/file/{id}/play. This flaw allows any authenticated user to download media files from any station, regardless of their permissions, enabling cross-station media exfiltration in multi-tenant deployments. The vulnerability arises because the /play route lacks the Permissions middleware that protects other file-related endpoints. Media IDs are auto-incremented, making enumeration and unauthorized access trivial. A fix is available in version 0.23.6.
OpenClaw's Gateway Control UI bootstrap configuration endpoint was accessible without proper Gateway authentication in versions up to 2026.4.21. This could expose sensitive bootstrap and configuration fields intended only for authenticated sessions. The issue was fixed in version 2026.4.22 by enforcing the same Gateway read-authentication on the bootstrap config route as other Control UI reads.
A vulnerability was detected in crocodilestick Calibre-Web-Automated up to 4.0.6. Affected by this vulnerability is the function generate_auth_token of the file cps/kobo_auth.py of the component Kobo auth-token Route. The manipulation results in improper authorization. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit is now public and may be used. Upgrading to version 4.0.7 addresses this issue. The patch is identified as 9f50bb2c16160564c9f8777dc2ceed3eb95e4807. The affected component should be upgraded.
Malicious npm package published by user `shetty123` as part of a Telegram account hijacking framework targeting Indian Telegram users. All 502 published versions (1.0.1 through 1.3.207) are malicious. Pairs with `ams-ssk`, which provides the operator's server-side AMS/CMS infrastructure.
`common-tg-service` performs full Telegram account takeover at runtime when the service is initialized (no install-time hooks, which lets it bypass scanners that gate on preinstall/postinstall lifecycle scripts). Behavior includes: implanting a hardcoded 2FA password (`Ajtdmwajt1@`) and recovery email on hijacked accounts; polling an operator-controlled Gmail inbox over IMAP (`imap.gmail.com`) to auto-submit 2FA confirmation codes; revoking all device authorizations except the attacker's session; harvesting OTP codes by monitoring Telegram chat 777000 and forwarding them to the operator; running SRP ownership checks against managed accounts and flagging rotated 2FA as unrecoverable; and fetching remote JSON configuration from `npoint.io` so operators can change behavior without re-publishing.
Blocked outbound requests are laundered through a relay at `helper-thge.onrender.com`. Stolen accounts and updates are exfiltrated to attacker-controlled Telegram channels (`-1001801844217` and `-1001972065816`). Operator infrastructure includes `paidgirl.site`, `cms.paidgirl.site`, `report-upi.netlify.app`, and `promoteClients2.glitch.me`.
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (e769b4a4ea131df52366622b66d63dfbc7c1f5642ac8478c37f86d6c25477bb8)
The package presents itself as a generic 'Common Telegram service for NestJS applications' but functions as one party's production application published as a library. Multiple installer-harming behaviors are present:
1. Authentication backdoor. AppModule registers AuthGuard as a global APP_GUARD. dist/guards/auth.guard.js line 84 accepts the literal string 'santoor' as a valid x-api-key (or apiKey query parameter) and grants access to any route. Any NestJS service that imports AppModule from this package exposes every endpoint to anyone who sends `x-api-key: santoor`. The same value is baked into the shipped Swagger UI as the default auth value.
2. Silent relay of consumer outbound HTTP. dist/utils/fetchWithTimeout.js (used package-wide) automatically POSTs the original request (URL, method, headers, body, params) to https://helper-thge.onrender.com/execute-request whenever an upstream call returns 403 or 495, unless the consumer overrides process.env.bypassURL. The relay endpoint is author-controlled and authenticated with the same 'santoor' shared secret, so the author can read every mirrored request — including any auth headers or bodies the consumer's service was sending to its own upstreams.
3. Default proxy and IP-management routing through author infrastructure. dist/components/Telegram/utils/generateTGConfig.js line 97 defaults PROXY_API_URL to https://cms.paidgirls.site/ip-management and PROXY_API_KEY to 'santoor'. With proxying enabled, all MTProto traffic for the consumer's Telegram sessions is routed through SOCKS5 proxies chosen by the author, who can intercept, drop, or correlate the consumer's Telegram identities.
4. Remote zip drop into the consumer's working directory. dist/cloudinary.js line 87 fetches https://cms.paidgirls.site/folders/<folderName>/files/download-all, writes the response to process.cwd()/temp.zip, and calls zip.extractAllTo(process.cwd(), true) — overwriting any files in the consumer's working directory with whatever the author's server returns. There is no hash check, signature, or version pinning, and the destination is mutable. If extracted files land where the consumer's process later loads code or config, this is full RCE in the consumer's environment.
5. Hardcoded couplings that are not disclosed. dist/guards/auth.guard.js lines 15-26 hardcode ALLOWED_IPS and ALLOWED_ORIGINS for paidgirls.site, zomcall.netlify.app, and tgchats.netlify.app, and the package wires logging notifications to specific Telegram channels owned by the author.
Taken together, importing AppModule from this package gives the author master authentication on the consumer's API, a persistent traffic-mirroring channel, control of the consumer's Telegram proxy path, and an ability to write arbitrary files into the consumer's process CWD on demand.
## Source: ghsa-malware (3e16628ad8dc1e6a6c98044a97ae5b72aec56f8a5a5bbc5bdff50bdaf51d978e)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
CVE-2026-22726 is a medium severity vulnerability in the CloudFoundry Foundation Routing release that allows a malicious developer to configure route services to send application traffic to network destinations outside of the app's configured egress rules. This improper restriction of communication channels can enable access to internal HTTP services reachable by the Gorouter that were not previously accessible from outside networks or the application itself. The vulnerability affects Routing release versions from v0.118.0 through v0.371.0 and CF Deployment versions from v0.0.2 through v54.14.
Chartbrew version 4.9.0 contains an improper access control vulnerability where a legacy dashboard route exposes project report data to any authenticated team member, regardless of their project access rights. This flaw allows low-privileged users within the same team to access another project's dashboard data, including sensitive stored report passwords. The vulnerability has been fixed in version 5.0.0.
CVE-2026-7418 is a high-severity buffer overflow vulnerability in UTT HiPER 1250GW firmware versions up to 3.2.7-210907-180535. It affects the strcpy function in the route/goform/NTP file, where manipulation of the Profile argument can lead to remote exploitation. Public exploit code has been disclosed, increasing the risk of exploitation.
A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the UTT HiPER 1250GW device firmware up to version 3.2.7-210907-180535. The flaw is in the strcpy function within the route/goform/ConfigAdvideo file, where manipulation of the Profile argument can cause a buffer overflow. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely. Public exploit code has been released, increasing the risk of attacks.