Search: ge.call

A security update for Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs addresses multiple vulnerabilities in the grafana13.1 package. Among these, CVE-2026-67313 is a denial of service vulnerability caused by uncontrolled recursion in the axios library's formDataToJSON function. This flaw can be triggered by supplying FormData with deeply nested bracket segments, exhausting the JavaScript call stack and causing process termination or request failure. The update includes fixed RPM versions for aarch64 and x86_64 architectures. No known exploits in the wild have been reported for these vulnerabilities.

The npm package 'checkout-desktop-input-card' version 35.9.4 contains malicious code that executes upon requiring the package. It downloads a binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hostnames and fallback domains, writes it to temporary directories under disguised filenames, sets executable permissions, and executes it detached from the main process. The package masquerades as a UI component but acts as a cross-platform remote code execution dropper triggered by a simple require call.

The devplatform-spa npm package version 35.1.4 contains malicious code that downloads and executes OS-specific binaries from Cloudflare Workers endpoints and fallback domains. This code writes the binaries to temporary directories under disguised filenames, sets executable permissions, and runs them detached from the main process. The malicious loader is invoked unconditionally on every require call, masquerading as telemetry with opt-out checks and no-op logging stubs.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (a16b80d2c76699beaf0773da7233c1e136a951a8edd0ba84b073ea78590c23e1) The npm postinstall lifecycle hook runs dist/config.js, which fetches JSON from https://my-api.trade-api.workers.dev?id=3 and then invokes `globalThis[data.success](data.id)`, letting the remote endpoint choose which global (eval, Function, require, etc.) to call and with what argument. The package reassigns `globalThis.require = require` earlier in the same file to make `require` reachable through this indirection. The result is arbitrary code execution on every installer machine during `npm install`, with both the executor and its argument supplied by an attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers endpoint. The package advertises itself as a color toolkit; there is no build or configuration purpose served by a network-dispatched global invocation, and the string-indexed global lookup is an evasion pattern that hides the sink from static scanners.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (a354edd3ce58afcb537f1e58b5152244cc6a98c6b0462de297262d9aba4e17d3) The package declares itself as an ESLint plugin but ships copies of nodemailer's source layout along with an obfuscated install-time loader. package.json's postinstall hook runs `node lib/utils/index.js`, which spawns a detached child process executing lib/utils/smtp-connection/index.js. That file uses obfuscator.io-style string-array indirection (`_0x438c`, `_0x926305`, etc.) to hide a call that fetches JSON from https://api.jsonbin.io/v3/b/6a72aa2bda38895dfebb1302 and passes the returned `record.cookie` string to `new Function('require', <fetched>)(require)`. The fetched content is attacker-controlled and mutable, and it executes in-process with `require` injected, giving arbitrary code execution on any machine that runs `npm install` for this package. The name `eslint-plugin-vitest-ts` is unrelated to the shipped nodemailer-shaped source, indicating a lure/typosquat. ## Source: ghsa-malware (24c2db5f1e6400e1a774b0a542c8cb8cd6aad001e80068c6aeb97ebc6af3c2d0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

DjangoCRM's massmail module renders user-controlled EmlMessage fields (subject, content) through Django's Template constructor with no sanitization, in at least three locations: message_previews.py builds an f-string embedding message.subject/message.content directly into a Template call; email_creators.py passes eml_message.subject directly as a template string to Template; and helpers.py contains the same f-string interpolation pattern.

The npm package 'cors-update' impersonates the legitimate 'cors' Express middleware but contains malicious code that fetches and executes attacker-controlled JavaScript code from a hardcoded URL. This execution occurs with full access to Node.js require, enabling arbitrary code execution in the host application. The malicious code disguises its network request as a blockchain RPC call and disables TLS verification, increasing risk. Applications that install and invoke this package as a substitute for 'cors' are vulnerable to remote code execution.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags() When iptfs_skb_add_frags() copies frag references from the source frag walk into a new SKB, it increments the page reference count via __skb_frag_ref() but does not propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to the destination SKB's skb_shinfo->flags. If the source SKB carries shared frags (e.g. from a page-pool backed receive path), the new inner SKB will appear to ESP as having privately owned frags. A subsequent esp_input() call for a nested transport-mode SA then takes the no-COW fast path and decrypts in place, writing over pages that are still referenced by the outer IPTFS SKB. This causes kernel-visible memory corruption and can trigger a panic. All other frag-transfer helpers in the kernel (skb_try_coalesce, skb_gro_receive, __pskb_copy_fclone, skb_shift, skb_segment) correctly propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; align iptfs_skb_add_frags() with this convention by setting the flag inside the loop immediately after __skb_frag_ref() and nr_frags++, so every exit path that attaches a frag unconditionally propagates SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mpls: fix NULL deref in mpls_valid_fib_dump_req() on CONFIG_INET=n On CONFIG_INET=n builds, mpls_valid_fib_dump_req() walks the parsed attribute table itself instead of calling ip_valid_fib_dump_req(). The RTA_OIF arm passes tb[RTA_OIF] to nla_get_u32() without checking it is present, so an RTM_GETROUTE dump for AF_MPLS with strict checking and no RTA_OIF hits a NULL dereference. RTM_GETROUTE is RTNL_KIND_GET, which rtnetlink_rcv_msg() permits without CAP_NET_ADMIN, so an unprivileged user can trigger it. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: 0010:mpls_valid_fib_dump_req (net/mpls/af_mpls.c:2189) Call Trace: mpls_dump_routes (net/mpls/af_mpls.c:2236) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2331) __netlink_dump_start (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2446) rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7033) netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556) netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345) netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900) __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:790) ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2684) ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2738) __sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2770) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Skip unset attributes, as ip_valid_fib_dump_req() does.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: p54: validate RX frame length in p54_rx_eeprom_readback() p54_rx_eeprom_readback() copies the requested EEPROM slice out of a device-supplied readback frame without checking that the skb actually holds that many bytes. Commit da1b9a55ff11 ("wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()") closed the destination overflow by copying a fixed priv->eeprom_slice_size (and rejecting a mismatched advertised len), but the source side is still unbounded: nothing verifies the frame is long enough to supply that many bytes. A malicious USB device can send a short frame whose advertised len matches priv->eeprom_slice_size while the payload is truncated. The equality check passes and memcpy() reads past the end of the skb, leaking adjacent heap: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507) Read of size 1016 at addr ffff88800f077114 by task swapper/0/0 Call Trace: <IRQ> ... __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105) p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507) p54u_rx_cb (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c:163) __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657) dummy_timer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2005) ... </IRQ> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800f0770c0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704 The buggy address is located 84 bytes inside of allocated 704-byte region [ffff88800f0770c0, ffff88800f077380) Check that the slice fits in the skb before copying.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: fib: free fib_alias with kfree_rcu() on insert error path fib_table_insert() publishes new_fa into the leaf's fa_list with fib_insert_alias() before calling the fib entry notifiers. When a notifier fails, the error path removes new_fa with fib_remove_alias() (hlist_del_rcu) and frees it right away with kmem_cache_free(). fib_table_lookup() walks that list under rcu_read_lock() only, so a concurrent lookup that already reached new_fa keeps reading it after the free: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fib_table_lookup (net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1601) Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810676d4eb by task exploit/297 Call Trace: fib_table_lookup (net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1601) ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu (net/ipv4/route.c:2814) ip_route_output_key_hash (net/ipv4/route.c:2705) __ip4_datagram_connect (net/ipv4/datagram.c:49) udp_connect (net/ipv4/udp.c:2144) __sys_connect (net/socket.c:2167) __x64_sys_connect (net/socket.c:2173) do_syscall_64 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe which belongs to the cache ip_fib_alias of size 56 Triggering the error path needs CAP_NET_ADMIN and a registered fib notifier that can reject a route; a netdevsim device whose IPv4 FIB resource is exhausted is enough. Free new_fa with alias_free_mem_rcu(), as fib_table_delete() already does for a fib_alias removed from the trie.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: qca: fix NVM tag length underflow in TLV parser In the TLV_TYPE_NVM branch of qca_tlv_check_data() the tag loop bound is "while (idx < length - sizeof(struct tlv_type_nvm))". "length" is a signed int from the firmware TLV header and sizeof(struct tlv_type_nvm) is a size_t (12), so "length" is converted to size_t and any firmware-supplied "length" < 12 makes the subtraction wrap to a huge value. The loop body then reads a 12-byte struct tlv_type_nvm past the end of the short vmalloc'd firmware buffer (and the EDL_TAG_ID_* handlers can write past it). Rewrite the bound as "idx + sizeof(struct tlv_type_nvm) <= length"; both operands are non-negative, so it no longer underflows and a "length" too small for one record correctly skips the loop. BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in qca_download_firmware.isra.0 (drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:421) Read of size 2 at addr ffffc900000e5004 by task kworker/u9:0/52 Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on Call Trace: ... kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) qca_download_firmware.isra.0 (drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:421 drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:617) qca_uart_setup (drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:948) qca_setup (drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c:2029) hci_uart_setup (drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c:438) hci_dev_open_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5227) hci_power_on (net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:920) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: tear down new links on vif update error path When ieee80211_vif_update_links() adds new links it allocates a link container for each and calls ieee80211_link_init() (which registers the per-link debugfs files with file->private_data pointing into the container) and ieee80211_link_setup(). If the subsequent drv_change_vif_links() fails, the error path restores the old pointers and jumps to 'free', which frees the new containers but never removes their debugfs entries or stops the links. The debugfs files survive with file->private_data dangling at the freed container, so a later open()+read() (e.g. link-1/txpower) dereferences freed memory in ieee80211_if_read_link(), a use-after-free. The removal path already dismantles links correctly via ieee80211_tear_down_links(), which removes each link's keys and debugfs entries and calls ieee80211_link_stop(); the add path on the error branch does not. Commit be1ba9ed221f ("wifi: mac80211: avoid weird state in error path") hardened this same error path for the link-removal case (new_links == 0) but left the newly-added links' teardown unaddressed. drv_change_vif_links() can fail at runtime on MLO drivers (internal allocation / queue / firmware command failures). Remove the new links' debugfs entries and stop them before freeing. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888011290000 by task exploit/145 Call Trace: ... ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) short_proxy_read (fs/debugfs/file.c:373) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572) ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) ... Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a RIP: 0010:ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate compound request size before reading StructureSize2 When ksmbd validates a compound (chained) SMB2 request, ksmbd_smb2_check_message() reads pdu->StructureSize2 without first checking that the compound element is large enough to contain it. StructureSize2 is a 2-byte field at offset 64 (__SMB2_HEADER_STRUCTURE_SIZE) from the start of each element. The compound-walking logic only guarantees that a full 64-byte SMB2 header is present for the trailing element: when NextCommand is 0, len is reduced to the number of bytes remaining after next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off. A remote client can craft a compound request whose last element has exactly 64 bytes, so the 2-byte StructureSize2 read at offset 64 extends one byte past the receive buffer, producing a slab-out-of-bounds read. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_smb2_check_message (fs/smb/server/smb2misc.c:402) Read of size 2 at addr ffff888012ae31ac by task kworker/0:1/14 The buggy address is located 172 bytes inside of allocated 173-byte region Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work Call Trace: ... kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ksmbd_smb2_check_message (fs/smb/server/smb2misc.c:402) handle_ksmbd_work (fs/smb/server/server.c:119) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) Reject any compound element that is too small to hold StructureSize2 before dereferencing it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: policy: preallocate inexact bins before xfrm_hash_rebuild reinsert xfrm_hash_rebuild()'s first loop preallocates the bins/chains the reinsert loop needs, so the reinsert (after hlist_del_rcu()) cannot allocate or fail. But its guard is inverted: it skips policies with prefixlen < threshold and preallocates for the rest. prefixlen < threshold is exactly when policy_hash_bysel() returns NULL and the reinsert takes the allocating xfrm_policy_inexact_insert() path. So the loop preallocates for the exact policies (which never allocate) and skips the inexact ones, whose bin/node is then allocated GFP_ATOMIC during reinsert. On failure the error path only WARN_ONCE()s and continues, leaving a poisoned bydst node; the next rebuild's hlist_del_rcu() dereferences LIST_POISON2 and takes a GPF. Reachable under memory pressure, deterministic via failslab. Invert the guard so preallocation covers exactly the reinserted policies; the reinsert then allocates nothing and cannot fail. Crash: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xfbd59c0000000024: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead...] ... Workqueue: events xfrm_hash_rebuild RIP: 0010:xfrm_hash_rebuild+0x5b3/0x1190 RAX: dead000000000122 (LIST_POISON2 + offset) ... Call Trace: hlist_del_rcu (include/linux/rculist.h:599) xfrm_hash_rebuild (net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1365) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: fix sk_dst_cache double-free in xfrm_user_policy() xfrm_user_policy() clears the socket dst cache with __sk_dst_reset(), i.e. the non-atomic __sk_dst_set(sk, NULL): it reads sk_dst_cache with rcu_dereference_protected(), stores NULL and dst_release()s the old dst. That is only safe if no other thread modifies sk_dst_cache concurrently. For a connected UDP socket that does not hold: the transmit fast path (udp_sendmsg -> sk_dst_check -> sk_dst_reset) resets the cache locklessly with an atomic xchg(). A per-socket policy change racing a send can make both sides observe the same old dst and each dst_release() it, dropping the socket's single reference twice and freeing the xfrm_dst bundle while it is still referenced: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_release Write of size 4 at addr ffff88801897b6c0 by task exploit/155 Call Trace: ... dst_release (... ./include/linux/rcuref.h:109) xfrm_user_policy (./include/net/sock.h:2239 ./include/net/sock.h:2256 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:3053) do_ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1347) ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1417) do_sock_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2368) __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2393) __x64_sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2396) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Reachable by an unprivileged user via a user+network namespace. Use the atomic sk_dst_reset() so the cache is cleared and released with a single xchg(): whichever side wins releases the dst once, the other sees NULL and does nothing. Behaviour is otherwise unchanged.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (23978b08a7e3f8af97d2c8060e7fc3aca9a18d9f3435163a9d3ab97ac0b9d4d0) Package ships a darwin/arm64 Go binary that opens an outbound WebSocket to a hardcoded author-controlled relay at wss://relay.sextant.top and links a PTY library (github.com/creack/pty) with a WebSocket client (github.com/coder/websocket), implementing the network-driven pseudo-terminal remote-shell pattern that yields full-host code execution to the operator of that relay. The binary additionally binds listeners on 0.0.0.0:7280, 0.0.0.0:7281, and 0.0.0.0:9000 (a 'ws://%s:%s%s' format string is present), exposing the PTY/WebSocket surface to the local network rather than loopback. Embedded strings include a regex specifically matching Anthropic API keys ('sk-ant-[a-z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,}') and references to CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR and ~/.claude paths, allowing extraction of the installer's Anthropic credentials, which are then reachable via the same relay channel. A separate POST to https://relay.sextant.top/install combined with a call to http://ip-api.com/json/?fields=status,message,country,countryCode,city,timezone,query reports installer geolocation and host identity to the author. The npm-facing metadata describes the package only as 'Sextant (sxt) binary for darwin/arm64', while the license field points to a GitHub repository named 'claude_control' — the shipped functionality (remote control of Claude Code / Gemini CLI sessions plus API-key exfiltration) is not disclosed in the package description or README.

CVE-2026-66902 is a critical OS command injection vulnerability in Google::Auth for Perl versions before 0.06. The vulnerability arises because the Pluggable subclass executes a command specified in an external_account credentials JSON file without proper validation or gating. This command is run via a system call that passes the entire string to the shell, allowing arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the application process. The vulnerability is reachable through the standard Application Default Credentials flow when the configuration includes credential_source.executable. No patch or official remediation guidance is currently available.

Atlas-Livre contains an improper access control vulnerability in the admin controllers under Espace_admin/controleur/ that allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass session-based authentication guards by sending raw HTTP requests that ignore redirects. Attackers can invoke destructive admin actions such as record deletion by requesting controller endpoints with GET parameters like supp, because the PHP header() redirect is never followed by an exit or die call, allowing all subsequent code including database operations to execute regardless of session state.

Flowise is a drag-and-drop user interface for building customized large language model (LLM) flows. Prior to 3.1.3, Flowise injects $vars into the code execution sandbox without requiring variables:view, bypassing the permission-protected Variables API. Variables for the active workspace are fetched at packages/components/src/utils.ts and runtime variables are resolved from server environment variables, while the official variables route enforces variables:view. A user or API key that is denied variables:view can call /api/v1/node-custom-function and receive $vars pre-populated with all variables for the workspace, including Variable.name to Variable.value static variables and Variable.name to process.env[Variable.name] runtime variables. This can expose secrets such as database passwords, JWT secrets, SMTP passwords, and cloud keys, depending on the workspace Variables configuration. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.