Search: index.ts
1,948 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.9% | High7.5EPSS 0.9%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-13457 The InstaWP Connect – 1-click WP Staging & Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 0.1.3.6 via the (top-level script) function. This is due to the plugin stores its encrypted options file as options-{migrate_key}.txt in wp-content/instawpbackups/ without deploying an index.php or .htaccess to prevent directory listing, exposing the 40-character migrate_key on Apache servers with directory indexing enabled, which allows an attacker to derive the AES-256-CBC passphrase via SHA256(migrate_key), decrypt the options file to recover the api_signature. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to get the database access details and api_signature. Exploitation requires the target WordPress site to be hosted on Apache with directory listing enabled (Options +Indexes) for the wp-content/instawpbackups/ directory, and time limited because it can only be exploited during the migration period. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.0 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-18699MongoDB Server · NULL Pointer Dereference Medium6.0EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-18699 An issue in MongoDB Server's query planner could allow an authenticated user with read-level privileges to cause the server process to terminate unexpectedly by submitting a specially formed query against a collection with a text index. This could result in a denial of service, affecting connected clients and in-flight operations. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.4 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-73086ai nanoid · Integer Overflow or Wraparound High7.4EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-73086 nanoid is a secure, URL-friendly, unique string ID generator for JavaScript. Prior to versions 3.3.12 and 5.1.11, the nanoid(size) function in index.js and index.cjs coerces the user-influenced size parameter to a signed 32-bit integer, allowing a value of 2147483648 to become -2147483648 and corrupt the process-wide CSPRNG poolOffset in fillPool(), which causes subsequent session tokens, CSRF tokens, API keys, and unique identifiers to become the deterministic string "uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu" until the process restarts. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.12 and 5.1.11. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (79b553d84d7f4dc5347840ddb97f16738eed2e52ac9757b48d2cb31ba1af7122) The package name base65-12x typosquats the popular base-x base-encoding library and reuses base-x's repository as its homepage. Both the CJS entry (index.js around line 116) and the ESM entry (src/esm/index.js around line 114) append an approximately 123 KB top-level obfuscated block after a copy of the legitimate base-x source. The block installs a VM-style dispatcher on globalThis (registries named vmr_3f4688 and vmw_bf472f), manipulates Object.defineProperty and __proto__, and contains multiple fetch references, so a network-capable code path is wired up and runs unconditionally when a consumer requires or imports the package. A base-encoding library has no functional need for a large globalThis-poisoning obfuscated VM with network fetch at module top level; the payload is duplicated across both module systems so it fires for CJS and ESM consumers alike. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4891fcf0d0e6192d9be14faf68411bd475129a1245b5c863a9daaa6f66e66166) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (59226f2c38efcc1dd5de6423edfc866125564cd726915307d7a05ca5b5f13529) base65-13x@5.0.2 impersonates cryptocoinjs/base-x, reusing its README, homepage, and API surface, but the exported decode(string) function in both src/esm/index.js (line 114) and src/cjs/index.cjs (line 116) contains a ~123KB VM-style obfuscated payload using rotated identifiers (vmR, vmr_92f1a9, vmw_4ee781) built via Object.defineProperty. The blob contains multiple references to the Function constructor and fetch, indicating dynamic code construction and outbound network I/O. Genuine base-x is roughly 50 lines of pure arithmetic with no obfuscation and no network activity. Any consumer invoking decode() on this package executes the packed VM, which dynamically constructs code with fetch capability. The destination hosts and constructed code are concealed by the obfuscation and are not statically visible. ## Source: ghsa-malware (8f16b7879f3a0b67bc7621645bf52c742af231c6e4156550ff4393f0167936ad) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (14cc9506a804a2663d0cde1c610fa8cba5733e6797652b6365569ada5ef3901d) base65-11x is a name-lookalike of the widely used base-x encoder. Both entrypoints (src/cjs/index.cjs and src/esm/index.js, ~127KB each vs. ~4KB for real base-x) contain the legitimate base-x source followed by a ~123KB single-line obfuscated payload wrapped in a custom-VM IIFE (identifiers vmN, vmA_ab9191, vmU_d6a896; Object.defineProperty-based dispatch on a global slot). The payload sits at module top level, so it executes automatically whenever a consumer require()s or import()s the package. A pure base-encoding utility has no functional need for runtime-VM-packed code on load, and the payload is duplicated across CJS and ESM entrypoints to ensure execution regardless of module system. The specific payload behavior is concealed inside the VM interpreter and cannot be recovered without executing it. ## Source: ghsa-malware (672a03fa0011f4095fdff19eaa7e65ffa8ae44f34e673a707488903c5b6eab67) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database @openzeppelin-4/contracts is a malicious npm package published by npm account `mssjeep843` that impersonates OpenZeppelin's `@openzeppelin/contracts` (the v4 line) via the look-alike scope `@openzeppelin-4`, falsely describing itself as a "compatibility distribution". It ships no Solidity contracts — only an install-time payload (index.js) run via preinstall/postinstall that harvests credential-shaped environment variables and reads and exfiltrates SSH private keys, cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Kubernetes/Docker), Solana/Anchor/NEAR/Sui wallet keys, Foundry keystores, `.git-credentials` and local `.env` files to `https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09`. It is one of a series of DeFi/crypto impersonation packages from the same account sharing this webhook.site endpoint, which also squat Aerodrome Finance, Camelot AMM, Euler EVC, BoringVault and Uniswap Permit2. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2841eb854dad391b8cf3d290704a888d5ac186a1f51aec84594eaa09acdfeb68) Package name @openzeppelin-4/contracts impersonates the @openzeppelin/contracts scope but ships no Solidity contracts — only index.js, executed via lifecycle scripts. index.js enumerates process.env for credential-shaped keys (KEY, TOKEN, SECRET, AWS, GITHUB, NPM, MNEMONIC, WALLET, INFURA, etc.), reads installer secret files including ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.git-credentials, gcloud application default credentials, Solana/Anchor/Sui keys, Foundry keystores, and project.env files, then POSTs the collected data to https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09. Delivery uses spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }) with a randomized 60–240 second delay, and the script bails out when the hostname or username matches sandbox/scanner patterns (scan-, detonation, sandbox, ubuntu-fc-uvm) or when canary env markers are present, evading install-time analysis. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database @openzeppelin-5/contracts is a malicious npm package published by npm account `mssjeep843` that impersonates OpenZeppelin's `@openzeppelin/contracts` (the v5 line) via the look-alike scope `@openzeppelin-5`, falsely describing itself as a "compatibility distribution". It ships no Solidity contracts — only an install-time payload (index.js) run via preinstall/postinstall that harvests credential-shaped environment variables and reads and exfiltrates SSH private keys, cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Kubernetes/Docker), Solana/Anchor/NEAR/Sui wallet keys, Foundry keystores, `.git-credentials` and local `.env` files to `https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09`. It is one of a series of DeFi/crypto impersonation packages from the same account sharing this webhook.site endpoint, which also squat Aerodrome Finance, Camelot AMM, Euler EVC, BoringVault and Uniswap Permit2. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (800da818da3fee0353766227eafcd43c0c7cf7fd0126af5ded48b7c1ba522e21) Package name typosquats @openzeppelin/contracts. package.json declares both preinstall and postinstall as `node index.js || true`, so the payload auto-executes on `npm install`. index.js harvests process.env entries matching KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|MNEMONIC|WALLET|AWS|GITHUB|NPM and reads installer-side credential files including ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.git-credentials, gcloud/solana/sui/foundry keystores, and local.env files. The bundle is POSTed to a hardcoded webhook.site endpoint (path 326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09) via a detached child process spawned with a randomized 60–240 second delay to outlive install-time scanning windows. A hostname regex (/^(scan-|detonation|sandbox|ubuntu-fc-uvm)/i) throws early on known sandbox/scanner hosts as anti-analysis gating. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 4.6 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium4.6EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-20763 A vulnerability in the tdx-guest component causes the function enter_l2_vcpu to pass an incorrect RCX operand to the TDG.VP.ENTER TDCALL. This results in the TDX module receiving a VM index of 0 and misinterpreting invalidation control bits, potentially leading to escalation of privilege. The issue has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 4.6 (medium severity). It was fixed in version 0.3.1 by correcting the RCX value calculation. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c53ad8755f0eb26cef8c05b49cdad8c69b93072e0d9ed176b071a7d367349cab) package.json declares `postinstall: node index.js`, causing index.js to run automatically on `npm install`. The script collects the installer's username (via `whoami`), `os.hostname()`, `process.cwd()`, and non-internal IPv4 addresses from `os.networkInterfaces()`, then sends them as query-string parameters via HTTPS GET to the hardcoded endpoint `https://xghhv5sajm33m7krgi4n8my0mrsig84x.oastify.com`. The `*.oastify.com` host is a Burp Collaborator out-of-band interaction domain. Package metadata is consistent with a dependency-confusion probe: gibberish name `dependencyfsdsfdsfg`, version `99.9.0`, empty author/description/keywords. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4f4ac1d40b3f429020ad268d0a7f47652bfa391d1e7960e7d1690cacab61003f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d2054792481618ddf941c251fc0793ec8c1b85fe14107567b5c29cac9330d5be) package.json declares a postinstall hook that executes index.js on npm install. index.js requires os, https, and child_process, runs `whoami` via execSync, and reads os.hostname(), process.cwd(), and non-internal IPv4 addresses from os.networkInterfaces(). The collected host and identity data is sent as query-string parameters via https.get to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain (xghhv5sajm33m7krgi4n8my0mrsig84x.oastify.com). Package metadata is consistent with a dependency-confusion lure: version 99.9.0, empty author/description/keywords, and a nonsense dependency name `dependencyfsdsfdsfg` pinned to ^99.9.0. ## Source: ghsa-malware (30b6f1747cf452fcc6c383a05d4c901dd7da71fcae0757210cb361e408a73d6a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database @aerodrome-finance/contracts is a malicious npm package that impersonates Aerodrome Finance. It carries no legitimate functionality; the published tarball contains only a package.json and an install-time payload (index.js). Both `preinstall` and `postinstall` run `node index.js || true`, so the code executes automatically when the package is installed. Version 1.0.0 harvests environment variables whose names match `KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASS|PRIVATE|MNEMONIC|RPC|AWS|GITHUB|NPM|KUBE|VAULT|AUTH|PGP|GPG|SEED|WALLET`, the contents of `~/.npmrc` and `~/.gitconfig`, and directory listings of `~/.ssh`, `~/.foundry/keystores`, `~/.config/hardhat`, and `~/.config/gcloud`, along with the hostname, username, working directory, and platform. The collected JSON is exfiltrated via an HTTPS POST to `https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09`. Errors are swallowed so the install never visibly fails. Version 1.1.0, published roughly 2.5 hours after 1.0.0 for all six packages within the same ~9-second window, reads full file contents (up to 4000 bytes) instead of just listing them. New targets include `.aws/credentials`, `.aws/config`, `.ssh/id_rsa`, `.ssh/id_ed25519`, `.ssh/config`, `.kube/config`, `.docker/config.json`, `.netrc`, `.pgpass`, `.pypirc`, `.git-credentials`, and two GCP credential files (`application_default_credentials.json` and `legacy_credentials`) — the `~/.config/gcloud` directory listing is still collected too. It also reads local `.env`, `.env.local`, `.env.production`, `.env.development`, and `secrets.env` files from the working directory, and adds cryptocurrency wallet theft: key files from Solana, Anchor, NEAR, and Sui wallet paths, plus the first three files under `~/.foundry/keystores`. The credential regex gains BEARER, API, INFURA, ALCHEMY, HELIUS, QUICKNODE, ANKR, and PRIVATE_KEY to catch RPC and API provider tokens. Both versions exfiltrate to the same webhook.site endpoint. In 1.0.0, index.js opens with a fake comment claiming it is `@plumenetwork/nest-artifacts`, an unrelated install-time shim — `@plumenetwork/nest-artifacts` is not itself a malicious package, just a leftover label from whatever template the attacker reused across this batch, published by npm account `mssjeep843`. The fake comment was removed in 1.1.0. Five sibling packages from the same account impersonate Euler's EVC, Aerodrome Finance, Camelot AMM, and the BoringVault pattern, sharing this same webhook.site endpoint, byte-identical payload template, and 1.0.0-to-1.1.0 escalation. Two further packages from the same account (PyPI `dlmm` and `dlmm-sdk`, impersonating Meteora's DLMM SDK) ran an equivalent harvester and are tracked separately as MAL-2026-13728 and MAL-2026-13729. Any environment that installed either version should rotate the exposed secrets and treat harvested keys as compromised, prioritizing wallet private keys and RPC/API tokens if 1.1.0 was installed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2c46806c21e6a0f5a5593eca11bbd822991f566dc05eb50c7ec56f88b649c3be) Package name typosquats the legitimate @aerodrome-finance scope. Lifecycle hooks auto-execute index.js on npm install, which reads installer secrets from ~/.aws/, ~/.ssh/, ~/.kube/, ~/.docker/, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.pypirc, ~/.git-credentials, gcloud/solana/anchor/sui key directories, Foundry keystores, and.env files, and scrapes process.env for keys matching KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASS|PRIVATE|MNEMONIC|AWS|GITHUB|NPM|WALLET|SEED. The collected data is POSTed to a hardcoded webhook.site endpoint via https.request from a detached child process (spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], {detached:true, stdio:'ignore'})) that sleeps 60-240 seconds before sending, to outlive install and scan windows. Sandbox/honeypot evasion is present: host regex checks for scan-/detonation/sandbox/ubuntu-fc-uvm prefixes, non-root/sandbox user checks, canarytoken/honey env checks, and a check for npm mirror registries. Static evidence confirms co-use of child_process, https, os, and fs, with os.hostname() and a POST to https.request in index.js. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database @aerodrome-finance/slipstream is a malicious npm package that impersonates Aerodrome Finance's Slipstream concentrated-liquidity AMM. It carries no legitimate functionality; the published tarball contains only a package.json and an install-time payload (index.js). Both `preinstall` and `postinstall` run `node index.js || true`, so the code executes automatically when the package is installed. Version 1.0.0 harvests environment variables whose names match `KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASS|PRIVATE|MNEMONIC|RPC|AWS|GITHUB|NPM|KUBE|VAULT|AUTH|PGP|GPG|SEED|WALLET`, the contents of `~/.npmrc` and `~/.gitconfig`, and directory listings of `~/.ssh`, `~/.foundry/keystores`, `~/.config/hardhat`, and `~/.config/gcloud`, along with the hostname, username, working directory, and platform. The collected JSON is exfiltrated via an HTTPS POST to `https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09`. Errors are swallowed so the install never visibly fails. Version 1.1.0, published roughly 2.5 hours after 1.0.0 for all six packages within the same ~9-second window, reads full file contents (up to 4000 bytes) instead of just listing them. New targets include `.aws/credentials`, `.aws/config`, `.ssh/id_rsa`, `.ssh/id_ed25519`, `.ssh/config`, `.kube/config`, `.docker/config.json`, `.netrc`, `.pgpass`, `.pypirc`, `.git-credentials`, and two GCP credential files (`application_default_credentials.json` and `legacy_credentials`) — the `~/.config/gcloud` directory listing is still collected too. It also reads local `.env`, `.env.local`, `.env.production`, `.env.development`, and `secrets.env` files from the working directory, and adds cryptocurrency wallet theft: key files from Solana, Anchor, NEAR, and Sui wallet paths, plus the first three files under `~/.foundry/keystores`. The credential regex gains BEARER, API, INFURA, ALCHEMY, HELIUS, QUICKNODE, ANKR, and PRIVATE_KEY to catch RPC and API provider tokens. Both versions exfiltrate to the same webhook.site endpoint. In 1.0.0, index.js opens with a fake comment claiming it is `@plumenetwork/nest-artifacts`, an unrelated install-time shim — `@plumenetwork/nest-artifacts` is not itself a malicious package, just a leftover label from whatever template the attacker reused across this batch, published by npm account `mssjeep843`. The fake comment was removed in 1.1.0. Five sibling packages from the same account impersonate Euler's EVC, Aerodrome Finance, Camelot AMM, and the BoringVault pattern, sharing this same webhook.site endpoint, byte-identical payload template, and 1.0.0-to-1.1.0 escalation. Two further packages from the same account (PyPI `dlmm` and `dlmm-sdk`, impersonating Meteora's DLMM SDK) ran an equivalent harvester and are tracked separately as MAL-2026-13728 and MAL-2026-13729. Any environment that installed either version should rotate the exposed secrets and treat harvested keys as compromised, prioritizing wallet private keys and RPC/API tokens if 1.1.0 was installed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d9834357b7108ed122b3c272b3f913e0d2e931ab3629e94227b61f787fbe2525) Package published as @aerodrome-finance/slipstream advertises 'Aerodrome Slipstream AMM contracts and ABIs' but ships only index.js, which is executed via preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks. On install, index.js enumerates process.env filtering keys matching a credential regex (KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASS|PRIVATE|MNEMONIC|AWS|GITHUB|NPM|WALLET|SEED|...), reads installer-side secret files including ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa and id_ed25519, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.docker, ~/.foundry/keystores, Solana/Sui key material, and.env files, serializes the collected data, and hands it off to a detached Node subprocess (spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], {detached:true, stdio:'ignore'}); ch.unref()) that sleeps 60-240 seconds before POSTing the JSON payload to https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09. The code also bails out when hostname/user match sandbox indicators (scan-, detonation, sandbox, ubuntu-fc-uvm, honey, canarytokens, npmmirror), evading install-time sandbox observation. The package name impersonates the Aerodrome Finance DeFi project and the harvest list targets crypto/DeFi developers (wallet keystores, RPC provider tokens, Foundry/Solana/Sui keys). | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database ethereum-vault-connector is a malicious npm package that impersonates Euler's Ethereum Vault Connector (EVC) protocol. It carries no legitimate functionality; the published tarball contains only a package.json and an install-time payload (index.js). Both `preinstall` and `postinstall` run `node index.js || true`, so the code executes automatically when the package is installed. Version 1.0.0 harvests environment variables whose names match `KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASS|PRIVATE|MNEMONIC|RPC|AWS|GITHUB|NPM|KUBE|VAULT|AUTH|PGP|GPG|SEED|WALLET`, the contents of `~/.npmrc` and `~/.gitconfig`, and directory listings of `~/.ssh`, `~/.foundry/keystores`, `~/.config/hardhat`, and `~/.config/gcloud`, along with the hostname, username, working directory, and platform. The collected JSON is exfiltrated via an HTTPS POST to `https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09`. Errors are swallowed so the install never visibly fails. Version 1.1.0, published roughly 2.5 hours after 1.0.0 for all six packages within the same ~9-second window, reads full file contents (up to 4000 bytes) instead of just listing them. New targets include `.aws/credentials`, `.aws/config`, `.ssh/id_rsa`, `.ssh/id_ed25519`, `.ssh/config`, `.kube/config`, `.docker/config.json`, `.netrc`, `.pgpass`, `.pypirc`, `.git-credentials`, and two GCP credential files (`application_default_credentials.json` and `legacy_credentials`) — the `~/.config/gcloud` directory listing is still collected too. It also reads local `.env`, `.env.local`, `.env.production`, `.env.development`, and `secrets.env` files from the working directory, and adds cryptocurrency wallet theft: key files from Solana, Anchor, NEAR, and Sui wallet paths, plus the first three files under `~/.foundry/keystores`. The credential regex gains BEARER, API, INFURA, ALCHEMY, HELIUS, QUICKNODE, ANKR, and PRIVATE_KEY to catch RPC and API provider tokens. Both versions exfiltrate to the same webhook.site endpoint. In 1.0.0, index.js opens with a fake comment claiming it is `@plumenetwork/nest-artifacts`, an unrelated install-time shim — `@plumenetwork/nest-artifacts` is not itself a malicious package, just a leftover label from whatever template the attacker reused across this batch, published by npm account `mssjeep843`. The fake comment was removed in 1.1.0. Five sibling packages from the same account impersonate Euler's EVC, Aerodrome Finance, Camelot AMM, and the BoringVault pattern, sharing this same webhook.site endpoint, byte-identical payload template, and 1.0.0-to-1.1.0 escalation. Two further packages from the same account (PyPI `dlmm` and `dlmm-sdk`, impersonating Meteora's DLMM SDK) ran an equivalent harvester and are tracked separately as MAL-2026-13728 and MAL-2026-13729. Any environment that installed either version should rotate the exposed secrets and treat harvested keys as compromised, prioritizing wallet private keys and RPC/API tokens if 1.1.0 was installed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e356d2defccd58232dcae91909871df86b18c3ba9adcaf07e0d754a57cf390fc) Package impersonates Euler Labs' 'Ethereum Vault Connector' Solidity project but ships a Node.js credential stealer as index.js, invoked automatically via preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks. On install, index.js filters process.env for keys matching KEY/TOKEN/SECRET/PASS/PRIVATE/MNEMONIC/AWS/GITHUB/NPM/WALLET and reads standard installer credential paths (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.config/gcloud, Solana/Sui/Anchor keys, ~/.foundry/keystores) and local.env files. Collected data is exfiltrated via a detached child node process that sleeps 60-240 seconds (to outlive the install sandbox) and POSTs a JSON body to https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09. The script also bails out when hostname matches scan-/detonation/sandbox/ubuntu-fc-uvm patterns, username is scan/nonroot/sandbox, environment contains honey/canarytokens markers, or the npm registry is a known mirror — sandbox-evasion behavior confirming hostile intent. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database npm/@dreamguyxeon/baileyx is a Baileys WhatsApp Web API fork with the same undisclosed remote-controlled consentless newsletter auto-follow as related DGXeon packages. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js, after session setup it waits 120 seconds, fetches https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json, and silently FOLLOWs listed newsletter JIDs. Trigger is runtime (makeNewsletterSocket), not install. It also fetches Baileys version metadata from DGXeon13/dgxeon-soket and aliases libsignal to npm:@dgxeon13/libsignal-node@1.0.0 (a separate package that patches @whiskeysockets/baileys). Independently corroborated by LPM Firewall's public malicious report for 2.0.0. Related OSV entries: dgxeon-baileys (MAL-2026-2252), baileys-dgxeon (MAL-2025-806). Tarball sha256 for 5.0.0: 0dffc5f0c8fd53b520c26de8788e6eafb1d939070a698e39f9f9853f42e6f7db. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c1b873d1c35283cbabd9bc82c8bffa55d3151abec85a75522ed8565c93d0546a) This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that contains an undocumented runtime hijack of the consumer's authenticated WhatsApp account. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js (lines 102-122), when the consumer creates a WhatsApp socket — the package's main advertised function — a 120-second setTimeout fires, fetches https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json, and for each newsletter ID in that list issues a QueryIds.FOLLOW request under the user's authenticated session. The list is hosted on a mutable `main` branch under the package author's GitHub account, so the author can rotate the targeted channels at any time post-publication without republishing the package. The behavior is not mentioned in the README and is not gated by any user prompt or configuration. The main entrypoint lib/index.js is additionally wrapped in a custom base91 string-table decoder with anti-debugger `debugger` statements and `eval("this")`, concealing the bootstrap edges from casual review. The package also aliases the security-critical `libsignal` dependency to the same author's scope (`npm:@dreamguyxeon/libsignal-node@1.0.0`), placing crypto primitives under the same trust boundary as the silent-relay code. Installer harm: any consumer who connects this fork to their WhatsApp account has their identity used to silently follow channels of the author's choosing, with the target list mutable indefinitely. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.2 | EPSS 0.7% | Critical9.2EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-15681 TBEA TLogger V2.1.0.0B0.0.0.0 contains an authentication bypass in its web server. After a user has previously authenticated to the device, an unauthenticated attacker can directly access protected functionality through the /index.asp endpoint without providing valid credentials. This allows the attacker to access functionality intended for authenticated users and may expose or modify device configuration and data. Logging out from the bypassed state can additionally cause the web server to crash. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.0 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-72718goose · Code Injection High7.0EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-72718 goose is general-purpose AI agent that runs on your machine. Prior to 1.44.0, the `goose review` command runs the system `git` executable to gather the diff for review without stripping attacker-controlled Git configuration. A malicious repository whose `.git/config` sets [`core] fsmonitor = <command>` causes Git to execute that command on the host during the index refresh performed by `git diff HEAD`. The command runs before goose contacts a model and without a submitted prompt, model call, tool approval, or trust prompt. The context-gathering Git process is not sandboxed and is outside goose's tool-permission model. Arbitrary commands run with the privileges and environment of the user running goose, allowing file access or modification and exfiltration of environment secrets and provider API keys. The vulnerable Git invocations are built by git_command() in crates/goose-cli/src/commands/review/handler.rs and are used by touched_files() and collect_diff() for `git diff --name-only HEAD` and `git diff HEAD`. This issue is fixed in version 1.44.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 5.7 | EPSS 0.2% | High5.7EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-68187 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exec: fix unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack() The stop value is derived from bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT. The index variable is an unsigned long. If bprm->p drops below PAGE_SIZE and stop becomes zero the loop condition index >= stop is always true. After the index == 0 iteration the decrement wraps to ULONG_MAX and bprm->page[ULONG_MAX] reads sizeof(void *) bytes in front of the array. The pointer has wrapped to -1. That garbage pointer is then passed to kmap_local_page() and PAGE_SIZE bytes are copied from wherever that lands into the stack of the process being created. And the loop doesn't terminate either... Getting there only requires bprm->p < PAGE_SIZE. On !MMU bprm_set_stack_limit() and bprm_hit_stack_limit() are empty. So the only constraint on how far bprm->p is pushed down is valid_arg_len(), i.e. that each individual string still fits in what is left. bprm->p starts at PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *) so a single argument or environment string of a little over 31 pages leaves it in the first page: Oops - load access fault [#1] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: victim Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4 #1 epc : __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 ra : transfer_args_to_stack+0xaa/0xae s4 : ffffffffffffffff s2 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ffffffdc98000000 a2 : 0000000000001000 status: 0000000a00001880 badaddr: ffffffdc98000000 cause: 0000000000000005 [<801a5324>] __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 [<800d5f6a>] load_flat_binary+0x43a/0x65e [<800a2de4>] bprm_execve+0x1d4/0x316 [<800a351a>] do_execveat_common+0x12e/0x138 [<800a3d44>] __riscv_sys_execve+0x38/0x4e Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt This is an arcane bug but we should still fix it. Count down from MAX_ARG_PAGES so the loop ends when index reaches stop, stop == 0 included. The iterations performed are unchanged for every other value of stop. Only CONFIG_MMU=n builds are affected, transfer_args_to_stack() is used by binfmt_flat and binfmt_elf_fdpic on nommu only. The loop predates git history. commit 7e7ec6a93434 ("elf_fdpic_transfer_args_to_stack(): make it generic") only moved it from binfmt_elf_fdpic.c into fs/exec.c and narrowed the copy to the used part of the first page. The condition and the decrement are unchanged from 2.6.12-rc2. | GCVE Database | ||
| Low | – | EPSS 0.2% | LowEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-68167 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: do not try compression for data reloc inodes [BUG] There is a syzbot report that the check inside get_new_location() triggered: BTRFS info (device loop0): found 31 extents, stage: move data extents BTRFS info (device loop0): leaf 8908800 gen 16 total ptrs 28 free space 1676 owner 18446744073709551607 item 0 key (256 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 3835 itemsize 160 inode generation 5 transid 0 size 0 nbytes 0 block group 0 mode 40755 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 0 flags 0x0 atime 1669132761.0 ctime 1669132761.0 mtime 1669132761.0 otime 0.0 item 1 key (256 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 3823 itemsize 12 index 0 name_len 2 item 2 key (258 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 3663 itemsize 160 inode generation 1 transid 16 size 733184 nbytes 106496 block group 0 mode 100600 links 0 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 24 flags 0x18 item 3 key (258 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 3595 itemsize 68 generation 16 type 0 inline extent data size 47 ram_bytes 4096 compression 1 [...] item 27 key (18446744073709551611 ORPHAN_ITEM 258) itemoff 2376 itemsize 0 BTRFS error (device loop0): unexpected non-zero offset in file extent item for data reloc inode 258 key offset 0 offset 9277520992061368337 ------------[ cut here ]------------ btrfs_abort_should_print_stack(__error) [CAUSE] The above dump tree shows the first file extent item is inlined, which should make no sense for data reloc inodes, as such inodes just represent where the data extents are in the relocation destination chunk. However the relocation path preallocates space for each block, then dirties them, cluster by cluster. It's possible to have a single block at the beginning of the block group, and no other block in the same cluster. So relocation will preallocate a file extent for that block and dirty the first block. Then memory pressure forces the data reloc inode to be written back, before any other blocks are dirtied/allocated. Finally commit 3eaf5f082c4c ("btrfs: extract inlined creation into a dedicated delalloc helper") changed the sequence of delalloc. Before that commit we always tried NOCOW first, so that dirtied block would be written back into the preallocated space, and appear as a regular extent. But with that commit, we always try inline first, and since compression is forced, we try compressing the first block, and then inline the compressed data, resulting in the above inlined file extent in the data reloc tree. Then the check in get_new_location() will check the file offset, without checking if the file extent is inlined or not, resulting in the above failure. [FIX] Do not allow compression for data reloc inodes. Since data reloc inode sizes are always block aligned, as long as we do not compress, @data_len will always be at least one block, and that will cause can_cow_file_range_inline() to return false, thus no inlined extent will be created. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-68228Linux kernel · media: chips-media: wave5: Move src_buf High7.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-68228 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: chips-media: wave5: Move src_buf Removal to finish_encode During encoder processing, there is a case where the IRQ response could return the buffer back to userspace via v4l2_m2m_buf_done call. In this time, userspace could queue up this same buffer before start_encode removes the index from the ready queue. This would then lead to a case where the buffer in the ready queue could be a self loop due to the WRITE_ONCE(prev->next, new) call in __list_add. When __list_del is finally called, the loop is already made so nothing points back to ready queue list head and pointers are poisoned. A buffer should not be marked as DONE before the buffer is removed from m2m ready queue. Move removal entirely to finish_encode. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | GCVE Database |
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