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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.7% | Critical9.8EPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-43037 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments. This advisory contains the container images for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21.20. See the following advisory for the RPM packages for this release: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2026:25185 Space precludes documenting all of the container images in this advisory. See the following Release Notes documentation, which will be updated shortly for this release, for details about these changes: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.21/html/release_notes/ Security Fix(es): * kernel: ip6_tunnel: clear skb2->cb[] in ip4ip6_err() (CVE-2026-43037) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. All OpenShift Container Platform 4.21 users are advised to upgrade to these updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.21/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-cli. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium4.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-49482 ClipBucket v5 is an open source video sharing platform. Prior to version 5.5.3 - #141, ClipBucket v5 contains an improper neutralization of SQL wildcard characters in the subtitle editing endpoint. An authenticated user can send a % character as the number parameter to overwrite all subtitle titles of any video they own in a single HTTP request. This issue has been patched in version 5.5.3 - #141. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium6.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-47238 ClipBucket v5 is an open source video sharing platform. Prior to version 5.5.3 - #133, a normal authenticated user can edit another user's video subtitles because of a lack of authorization. They can upload subtitles, edit their name or delete them. This issue has been patched in version 5.5.3 - #133. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.6 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-42558xibosignage xibo-cms · Cross-site Scripting High7.6EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42558 Xibo is an open source digital signage platform with a web content management system and Windows display player software. Prior to 4.4.2, a vulnerability chain consisting of Stored XSS and Iframe Sandbox escape in the Xibo CMS allows users with DataSet permissions to use the Data Connector functionality to craft messages which escape the sandbox and facilitate XSS. Exploitation of the vulnerability is possible on behalf of an authorized user who has both of the following privileges, which are not granted to non-admins as standard: Include "Add DataSet" button to allow for additional DataSets to be created independently to Layouts Users should upgrade to version 4.4.2 which fixes this issue. Upgrading to a fixed version is necessary to remediate. Users unable to upgrade should revoke such privileges from users they do not trust. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-32280Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.19.33 packages and security update High7.5EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-32280 A denial of service vulnerability (CVE-2026-32280) exists in the Go crypto/tls package used by Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19.33. This flaw affects the certificate chain building process and could cause service disruption. Red Hat has released updated RPM packages and container images to address this issue. Users of OpenShift Container Platform 4.19 are advised to upgrade to the fixed versions as soon as they become available through official channels. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | MediumTenable Research On June 2, 2026, the White House signed an Executive Order directing federal agencies to harden their systems with AI-enabled cyber defenses and to stand up a new AI cybersecurity clearinghouse — most of it on a 30-day clock. Here’s what the EO requires and how Tenable can help. Key takeaways: The new AI Security Executive Order will require national security and civilian federal agencies to prioritize cyber defenses to account for new frontier AI model capabilities. Tenable is well positioned to help federal agencies gain visibility across their environments, including AI assets, and to prioritize the vulnerabilities and other exposures that pose the highest risk; Tenable AI-enabled exposure management capabilities can help support vulnerability remediation and automate multi-step remediation workflows. The vulnerability and patching clearinghouse which will be developed under the Executive Order will require strong engagement from private sector partners, including Tenable, to drive actionable insights on AI-associated vulnerabilities and mitigation prioritization. On June 2, 2026, the President signed an Executive Order (EO) titled “ Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security .” The direction is clear and the calls to action are fast-moving. Within 30 days: Federal agencies must begin hardening their information systems with AI-enabled cyber defenses. CISA must issue new directives or guidance for civilian agencies. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury), with the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), must stand up a new AI cybersecurity clearinghouse focused on finding and fixing software vulnerabilities. Within 60 days, Treasury, with the Department of War (DoW), NSA and CISA, in consultation with the White House and other agencies, must establish a classified benchmarking process to assess the capabilities of frontier AI models through voluntary collaboration with AI developers. While the Executive Order applies to U.S. federal agencies, the need to prepare for changes in the threat landscape brought about by the advanced cyber capabilities of frontier AI models applies to any organization that needs to manage cyber risk. Here’s a breakdown of what the AI EO requires, the deadlines that matter, and where Tenable fits. What the AI Executive Order requires The EO’s operative provisions sit in Section 2 (“Upgrading American systems for advanced AI”) and Section 3 (“Secure frontier model deployment”). The cybersecurity core is in Section 2. Within 30 days: National security and defense systems. The Committee on National Security Systems must prioritize the cyber defense of National Security Systems (NSS) and the Secretary of War must do the same for DoW information systems (Section 2(a) and 2(b)). Civilian federal systems and critical infrastructure. CISA, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the National Cyber Director, must release Binding Operational Directives (BODs) “and other guidance as appropriate” to: Expedite and prioritize the cyber defense of civilian federal information systems. Establish or expand federal programs and services that enhance AI-enabled defensive tools. Facilitate access to cybersecurity tools and services, including where appropriate, covered frontier models, for agencies, state and local authorities, and critical infrastructure operators such as rural hospitals, community banks, and local utilities. Worth noting, while the EO directs CISA to release BODs or other guidance for federal civilian agencies, the specific implementation directives are not yet known (Section 2(c)). The AI cybersecurity clearinghouse. The Secretary of the Treasury, with the National Cyber Director, NSA, and CISA, must form an AI cybersecurity clearinghouse, in voluntary collaboration with the AI industry and critical infrastructure operators. The EO tasks the clearinghouse with three concrete functions, per Section 2(d): Coordinate and deconflict scanning for software vulnerabilities Discover and validate those vulnerabilities Coordinate and prioritize the remediation and distribution of vulnerability patches. Grant funding for AI vulnerability detection. OMB, with the National Cyber Director and CISA, must determine whether existing federal grant programs have funding that can be directed toward applicants developing advanced AI vulnerability detection (Section 2(e)). Within 60 days: Cybersecurity workforce. The Office of Personnel Management must expand hiring and placement pathways for cybersecurity specialists through the United States Tech Force (Section 2(f)). Secure frontier model deployment. Treasury, NSA, and CISA, in consultation with NIST and others, must develop a classified benchmarking process to assess the advanced cyber capabilities of AI models. They must also set the threshold for designating a “covered frontier model,” and design a voluntary framework through which developers can give the government up to 30 days of pre-release access to those models. The Executive Order is explicit that it does not create any mandatory licensing, preclearance, or permitting requirement for AI models (Section 3). No fixed deadline: Criminal enforcement. The EO directs the Attorney General to prioritize enforcement against those who use AI to illegally access or damage computer systems (Section 4). For federal cybersecurity leaders, this is less a future-state policy document than a near-term planning trigger. Watch for CISA’s issuance of BODs and other guidance, and for readouts on the clearinghouse, during June and July. How Tenable can help The EO’s center of gravity — finding software vulnerabilities, validating them, prioritizing them, and driving remediation — is the work Tenable's platform is built to do. While the AI Executive Order focuses on vulnerability discovery, validation, prioritization, and remediation, the benefit of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform is that it addresses vulnerabilities alongside other security weaknesses, including misconfigurations of AI systems and overpermissioned AI agents, to serve as the system of action for mitigating cyber exposure and reducing cyber risk across organizations’ expanding attack surfaces. Below, learn how specific Tenable capabilities map to the EO’s requirements. Continuous vulnerability detection across the attack surface Sections 2(a) through 2(d) turn on the ability to find vulnerabilities across a wide range of systems continuously. Tenable One Vulnerability Management and Tenable Security Center provide network-based and agent-based assessment across IT assets, with credentialed scanning for greater depth. Tenable One Cloud Exposure extends that visibility to cloud workloads and configurations, and Tenable One Attack Surface Management maps internet-facing assets that agencies may not know they have. For agencies operating classified or air-gapped environments — relevant to the National Security Systems named in Section 2(a) — Tenable Enclave Security is built to run vulnerability and configuration assessment inside those boundaries. Risk-based prioritization, not “patch everything” Section 2(d) doesn’t only call for discovering vulnerabilities — it calls for prioritizing them for remediation. That distinction matters because no agency can patch everything at once. Tenable’s Vulnerability Priority Rating (VPR) uses machine learning, trained on the company’s corpus of more than 1.7 trillion security findings accumulated over more than 25 years of continuous scanning, to forecast which vulnerabilities are most likely to be exploited, so defenders can focus on the smaller set that represents real, immediate risk. By leveraging AI-generated features and expert intelligence from Tenable's Research Special Operations team, VPR helps organizations pinpoint the critical 1.6% of vulnerabilities that represent actual business risk . Tenable also ingests CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog — the continuously updated, authoritative list of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) under active exploitation — directly into prioritization, aligning remediation guidance to the same source CISA uses to track risk across the federal enterprise. AI-enabled defensive tooling Section 2(c) directs CISA to establish or expand programs that enhance AI-enabled defensive tools. As frontier AI models accelerate the rate at which vulnerabilities can be discovered and exploited , the traditional window for manual remediation is rapidly closing. The June 2026 AI Executive Order recognizes this shift, directing federal agencies to counter machine-speed threats with AI-enabled cyber defenses within 30 days. Tenable Hexa AI , the agentic engine of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform , is designed to help counter machine-speed threats, supercharge productivity, and accelerate risk reduction by automating multi-step remediation workflows. Security teams can leverage pre-built agents directly in the user interface or build custom agents via the Model Context Protocol (MCP), turning exposure intelligence into decisive action at machine speed. At the same time, as agencies build custom models or adopt third-party tools like ChatGPT and Copilot, they fundamentally expand their attack surface. It is now critical to protect enterprise AI, shadow AI, training data, and underlying infrastructure from emerging threats like adversarial attacks, data poisoning, and model theft. Tenable secures this expanding attack surface with Tenable One AI Exposure , which is designed to help agencies see, manage, and control the risks introduced by generative AI. Tenable One AI Exposure allows agencies to discover and inventory AI tools and libraries, and apply AI usage policies across the environment — a growing requirement as agencies adopt AI and need to account for it as part of | Tenable Research | |||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium4.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42543 IRIS is a web collaborative platform that helps incident responders share technical details during investigations. Versions prior to 2.4.28 are vulnerable to a cross-site request forgery attack, because they use the HTTP method `GET` to change state on the server. Version 2.4.28 contains a patch. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research By participating in Project Glasswing and working with Claude Mythos Preview, Tenable can help customers better understand how emerging frontier AI models behave, their evolving risks and benefits for cybersecurity, and the kinds of controls organizations will need as AI adoption accelerates. Key takeaways Tenable is also interested in using Mythos Preview to drive new research, strengthen the security of Tenable, and help customers better understand how emerging frontier AI models behave, their evolving risks and benefits, and the kinds of controls organizations will need as they accelerate AI adoption. Tenable previously announced the integration of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform with the Claude Compliance API to give Tenable customers better AI visibility and governance capabilities, along with Claude-powered workflows in Tenable Hexa AI, the agentic engine of the Tenable One platform. Over the past year, it has become increasingly clear that AI is going to fundamentally reshape cybersecurity. Not eventually. Now. The pace of vulnerability discovery is accelerating. Attack surfaces are expanding faster than ever. Security teams are already overwhelmed trying to determine what actually matters. At the same time, frontier AI models like Claude Mythos Preview are demonstrating that new capabilities in reasoning and agentic workflows are on the horizon and could significantly accelerate cyber offense and challenge cyber defense over the next few years. Tenable joining Project Glasswing is a strategic step forward for defenders, and an extension of our existing partnership with Anthropic . We also believe the industry is entering a period where defender advantage will not come from access to any single model. It will come from understanding what matters most, reducing exposure before attackers strike, and coordinating remediation at the speed modern threats demand. Improving what matters most The industry already has more findings than humans can realistically process. The real challenge is understanding what matters most. Which exposures are actually dangerous? Which combinations create meaningful attack paths? What should be fixed first? What actions will materially reduce risk? Those are exposure management problems. We’re working with frontier AI models to evaluate and benchmark how advanced reasoning capabilities may improve exposure analysis, attack path understanding, prioritization, and remediation decision-making to help our customers and partners improve their own security and risk management initiatives. As part of Project Glasswing, we’re particularly interested in driving new research using Mythos Preview to better understand where it can help reinforce existing security analysis, and strengthen our own defenses by using frontier models to improve the security of Tenable. We also plan to use Mythos alongside other models to help challenge assumptions, and identify relationships and risk patterns faster than traditional approaches alone. We believe frontier models will increasingly become another important source of security insight and telemetry flowing into exposure management platforms. The long-term differentiator for defenders will not be access to a single model. It will be the ability to combine those signals with authoritative context, asset intelligence, attack path analysis, and coordinated remediation across the enterprise. Understanding the AI attack surface Another important reality is that organizations are increasingly responsible for AI systems they did not build themselves. That creates a rapidly expanding attack surface. Our goal is simple: when meaningful advances in AI capabilities arrive, we will be ready to translate them into practical customer value quickly and responsibly. Participating in frontier AI initiatives like Project Glasswing help us better understand emerging model behaviors, evolving risks, and the kinds of controls organizations will need as AI adoption accelerates. That learning directly informs both our products and our own internal security practices. The future of cybersecurity One thing is becoming increasingly clear: frontier AI capabilities will not remain rare for long. Capabilities that seem extraordinary today will eventually become widely available across the industry, including to attackers. In that world, defender advantage will not come from access to any single model. It will come from understanding what matters most, reducing exposure before attackers strike, and coordinating remediation at the speed modern threats demand. That is the work we’re focused on at Tenable. That is our commitment to our partners and customers. And we’re excited to be doing it alongside Anthropic and the broader Project Glasswing community. | Tenable Research | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.9% | CVE-2026-33811Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs bug fix and enhancement update High7.5EPSS 0.9%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-33811 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments. This advisory contains the RPM packages for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19.48. See the following advisory for the container images for this release: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:68540 Security Fix(es): * net: golang: Go net package: Denial of Service via long CNAME response in LookupCNAME (CVE-2026-33811) * encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal (CVE-2026-33818) * net/mail: golang: Go net/mail: Denial of Service via crafted email inputs (CVE-2026-39820) * golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing (CVE-2026-39821) * net/mail: golang: net/mail: Denial of Service via pathological email address parsing (CVE-2026-42499) * mime: golang: Golang MIME: Denial of Service via maliciously-crafted MIME header (CVE-2026-42504) * html/template: golang: Go html/template: Cross-Site Scripting via pathological input (CVE-2026-56858) * encoding/xml: golang: Go: Denial of Service via XML decoding recursion depth issue (CVE-2026-56859) * net/url: golang: golang net/url: Denial of Service from quadratic complexity in path resolution (CVE-2026-56860) * crypto/tls: golang: Golang crypto/tls: Denial of Service via indefinite KeyUpdate messages (CVE-2026-56862) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. All OpenShift Container Platform 4.19 users are advised to upgrade to these updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.19/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-cli. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-45281 Nextcloud is an open source content collaboration platform. In Nextcloud Server from versions 32.0.0 to before 32.0.9, and 33.0.0 to before 33.0.3, with the knowledge of other users’ principal URL an attacker could possibly send a request to gain full access to their calendar. Therefore, the attacker must be an authenticated user. This is because of improper authorization controls in the backend of the calendar. If the attacker had access to the calendar, they would be able to view and modify it. It is recommended that the Nextcloud Server is upgraded to 33.0.3 or 32.0.9. It is recommended that the Nextcloud Enterprise Server is upgraded to 33.0.3, 32.0.9, 31.0.14.5, 30.0.17.9, 29.0.16.16, 28.0.14.17, 27.1.11.26, 26.0.13.26, 25.0.13.29, 24.0.12.34, 23.0.12.35, 22.2.10.39, or 21.0.9.23 | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.6 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-45284nextcloud security-advisories · Improper Access Control Medium4.6EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-45284 Nextcloud is an open source content collaboration platform. From version 1.3.6 to before version 8.4.0, an improper check allowed users that where provided by LDAP to still authenticate towards user OIDC after they where deleted. This issue has been patched in version 8.4.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | – | CriticalTenable Research Oracle addresses 35 CVEs in its May 2026 Critical Security Patch Update with 35 patches, including 11 critical updates. Key Takeaways The May 2026 Critical Security Patch Update (CSPU) contains fixes for 35 unique CVEs in 35 security updates 11 issues (31.4% of all patches) were assigned a critical severity rating Oracle E-Business Suite received the highest number of patches at 12, accounting for 34.3% of all patches Background On May 28, Oracle released its Critical Security Patch Update (CSPU) for May 2026 . Beginning in May 2026, Oracle introduced CSPUs as a monthly release cycle that sits between the larger quarterly Critical Patch Updates (CPUs), addressing a focused set of high-severity issues on a faster cadence. This CSPU contains fixes for 35 unique CVEs in 35 security updates across 5 Oracle product families. Out of the 35 security updates published, 31.4% of patches were assigned a critical severity. High severity patches accounted for the bulk of security patches at 51.4%, followed by critical severity patches at 31.4%. This month's update includes 11 critical patches across 11 CVEs. Severity Issues Patched CVEs Critical 11 11 High 18 18 Medium 6 6 Low 0 0 Total 35 35 Analysis This month's update saw the Oracle E-Business Suite product family contain the highest number of patches at 12, accounting for 34.3% of the total patches, followed by Oracle REST Data Services at 11 patches, which accounted for 31.4% of the total patches. A full breakdown of the patches for this CSPU can be seen in the following table, which also includes a count of vulnerabilities that can be exploited over a network without authentication. Oracle Product Family Number of Patches Remote Exploit without Auth Oracle E-Business Suite 12 3 Oracle REST Data Services 11 7 Oracle Communications 8 4 Oracle Database Server 3 3 Oracle Hospitality Applications 1 1 Solution Customers are advised to apply all relevant patches in this CSPU. Please refer to the May 2026 advisory for full details. Identifying affected systems A list of Tenable plugins to identify these vulnerabilities will appear here as they're released. This link uses a search filter to ensure that all matching plugin coverage will appear as it is released. Get more information Oracle Critical Security Patch Update Advisory - May 2026 Oracle May 2026 Critical Security Patch Update Risk Matrices Oracle Advisory to CVE Map Join Tenable's Research Special Operations (RSO) Team on Tenable Connect for further discussions on the latest cyber threats. Learn more about Tenable One , the Exposure Management Platform for the modern attack surface. | Tenable Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research Learn how attackers exploit automated bot traffic as part of software supply chain attacks to artificially inflate download counters and mask malicious payloads as legitimate. Key takeaways Volume doesn’t equal trust. Packages with numerous versions and high download counts might seem legitimate, but attackers can easily manipulate those metrics. Attackers exploit automated infrastructure. By initially flooding the registry with numerous benign versions of a package, threat actors trigger automatic downloads from mirrors, scanners, and analysis bots, which artificially inflate traffic. Although old download-inflation techniques still work, attackers are developing new sophisticated techniques to deceive developers into installing malicious packages. Downloads count metric Following recent software supply chain attacks in which Tenable has seen attackers steal access tokens and secrets from developer workstations and CI/CD build servers, we started actively monitoring and analyzing npm packages uploaded to the public registry. Initially, we used download counts as a primary metric to determine package relevance. During our monitoring, we identified a recurring anomaly: Brand new packages displayed unusually high download counts within hours of upload. Upon further investigation, we discovered that those packages also had many versions. We found that packages whose content got updated frequently — usually by systematically uploading many new versions for the same package — had an unusually high downloads count. We observed this technique being used deliberately in the wild for the first time in our analysis of the malicious “ambar-src” package , which reached more than 50,000 downloads in three days after attackers uploaded more than 700 versions. We named this technique “download pumping.” Developers and security tools frequently use download counts as one of the metrics to assess a package's legitimacy. Since there is no simple method for determining if a package is legitimate, this artificial inflation effectively disguises the threat. Analysis In the “ambar-src” campaign, threat actors systematically published hundreds of benign versions of the package before introducing the actual malicious payload. Because npm registers each interaction with these updates as traffic, this repetitive version-publishing process achieved two goals: It heavily populated the package’s release history, creating a dense changelog that made the project appear actively maintained and historically legitimate to developers evaluating it. Every time a new version was published, automated systems like repository mirrors and analysis bots automatically downloaded it. Because the attackers systematically uploaded hundreds of versions, they artificially generated a massive wave of automated traffic, inflating the package's download count to more than 50,000 downloads in just three days. From Tenable’s initial analysis, each version uploaded to the npm public registry typically receives between 100 and 150 downloads from automated systems. We verified that fact by running our proof-of-concept (POC) and analyzing the download count. Download pumping PoC To validate these mechanisms, we conducted a POC that replicated the download pumping behavior. We created test packages and systematically published a high volume of new versions to the npm registry. As the npm team stated in their blog , their download stats are naive by design, and they do not put much effort into filtering automated bot traffic. Thus, various repository mirrors, analytical bots, and automated security scanners immediately pulled each new version we uploaded. This validated that an attacker can predictably generate a baseline of downloads entirely through automated publishing, requiring zero organic user interaction. During our POC, we wanted to see how different package properties might affect the automated download volume. We were working under the assumption that packages with postinstall scripts raise the interest level of security scanners. Postinstall scripts are highly interesting to defenders because attackers frequently use these lifecycle hooks to automatically execute malicious payloads the moment a package is installed. Since this is a common malware-deployment technique, automated security scanners prioritize downloading and inspecting packages that have these scripts configured. It is important to note that security scanners don’t have to download the package itself to determine if the npm package has a postinstall script configured, as this data is available in the package metadata in the public registry. For those reasons, we believed that security scanners are more likely to download packages with install scripts configured, as they are more likely to contain malicious code. We deployed three distinct test packages to npm to test our assumption and observed the following results: Version bump only: 135.55 downloads per version This was our baseline test package. We didn’t add or remove any code when publishing a new version, nor did we make any other attempt to make the package look interesting. We simply bumped up the version number each time. Static postinstall script: 141.91 downloads per version This was our second test package, and the first one to have a postinstall script configured, but we didn’t change the script when publishing new versions. Dynamic postinstall script: 158.16 downloads per version In this third test package, we changed the postinstall script every time we bumped up the version. We did this as we believed that security scanners would be more interested in packages whose postinstall script changed, as it could be an indicator of compromise. Graph showing how Tenable’s first POC software package experienced a spike in downloads when we started publishing new versions of it. This data demonstrates a straightforward cause-and-effect: automated infrastructure and security scanners naturally generate more download traffic for packages that exhibit interesting or actively changing behaviors. Other package managers While our research focused specifically on the npm ecosystem, the fundamental mechanics behind this technique are not unique to npm. Other package registries such as PyPI , RubyGems , and NuGet operate with similar automated infrastructure — mirrors, security scanners, and analysis bots — that pull new versions as they are published. Although the specific download amplification and trust metrics may differ across ecosystems, the core principle remains the same: where automated systems react to new publications, there is potential for abuse. Real-world example of download pumping As already stated, we first observed this technique being used in the wild during our analysis of the “ambar-src” package . Let’s look at this in more detail. The attackers created an npm package containing utility code that can be used for legitimate purposes, such as MathUtils, StringUtils and Time functions. The attackers then systematically uploaded 428 legitimate versions of the package in just two hours. The attackers did this to gain initial credibility and attempt to lure developers to use their code. Three days later, the attackers uploaded a new version containing malicious code. By this point, the attackers’ package already had more than 30,000 downloads. In total, the attackers uploaded 724 versions including malicious and legitimate versions. This led to an artificially generated wave of automated traffic, resulting in around 50,000 downloads total. This repetitive version-publishing process successfully inflated the package's download count and created a dense release history, making the project appear historically legitimate before the malware was deployed. Past research on npm download manipulation The manipulation of npm downloads metrics is not a new discovery. In a 2021 research blog , independent developer Andy Richardson showed how prone the npm registry’s download tracking is to abuse, by demonstrating that bad actors can send HTTP requests to a package’s tarball URL to fake downloads. Using automated tools, the researcher successfully drove nearly 1 million spoofed downloads in a single week for a completely unused package. Tenable validated this technique still works in 2026. By sending HTTP requests directly to the URL of the package’s tarball, Tenable successfully inflated a test package’s metric to 17,000 downloads in approximately one hour, using nothing more than a standard office laptop and an internet connection. However, this new version-flooding method we’ve identified offers two distinct advantages: First, it provides amplification, because an attacker gains 100 to 150 automated downloads from repository mirrors for every single version they upload, rather than just one download per HTTP request. Second, systematically publishing these updates populates the release history, creating a dense version log that makes the package appear actively maintained and historically legitimate. Mitigation of supply chain attacks Organizations should not depend on download counts or version histories to determine if a package is legitimate. As we have demonstrated, attackers can easily fake these metrics using automated systems, creating a false sense of trust. Instead, organizations should adopt common industry best practices, such as version pinning and implementing minimum package-age restrictions. These best practices are effective, as security vendors and the open-source community actively monitor these registries and typically detect malicious packages fairly quickly, within a couple of days at most. By enforcing a short waiting period of three to four days before allowing a new package or new version of an existing package into your environment, you allow the community time to identify these threats in the public registry. Once they are detected, they are removed from the public registry, eliminating the risk. It is worth noting that npm is actively working to improve the security of its ecosystem. Recent efforts include adding support for package-age checks directly in the npm CLI, as well as strengthening authentication mechanisms for package maintainers to reduce the risk of account takeovers. While these are meaningful steps in the right direction, the reality is that no single measure can fully prevent malicious code from reaching the public registry. Supply chain attacks will continue to evolve, and organizations should also layer their own defenses rather than rely on the ecosystem alone. For example, organizations can add extra protection for CI/CD build servers by deploying ephemeral CI/CD runners that are destroyed immediately after a single use to prevent malware from lingering. Operating those temporary runners without persistent storage makes it harder for threat actors to save their payloads or establish persistence across different build jobs. Additionally, organizations should enforce least-privilege network access. Restricting outbound traffic makes it harder for malicious payloads running on the build server to reach the open internet to download second-stage malware payloads like “msinit.exe.” So what? Currently, developers are still being hacked through open-source supply chain techniques . The metrics developers and security tools depend on — download counts, version history, maintenance activity — are superficial indicators that, as we have demonstrated, an attacker can manipulat with minimal effort. But the problem runs deeper than fake signals. Even when a package has a legitimate track record with a trusted maintainer behind it, that trust can be compromised overnight. Recent waves of account takeovers, social engineering campaigns, and credential theft targeting established maintainers have shown that a package's history is no guarantee of its current safety, even for legitimate packages. A new version published under a trusted name can carry a malicious payload, and the package manager has no built-in mechanism to catch it. In practice, there is no deterministic method to determine if a new package is malicious or not. Therefore, each package you install and use must be treated like it could be malicious. The meaningful trust signal comes after the fact: from security vendors and the open-source community actively scanning and analyzing packages once they are published. This is exactly why enforcing minimum-age requirements on new packages and new versions is such an effective control . A short waiting period of a few days gives the security community time to detect, flag, and remove threats from the public registry before they ever reach your environment. Organizations that consume packages the moment they are published are accepting risk that is entirely avoidable. Download pumping is ultimately just the initial entry vector for a much larger objective. Attackers using these techniques are generally aiming for one of two outcomes. First, they aim to compromise build servers and CI/CD pipelines. By successfully injecting a malicious dependency into these systems, threat actors achieve “God-mode” over the infrastructure, which can lead to a full compromise of the entire production environment. Second, and even worse, they aim to compromise the developers of highly popular packages. By hijacking a trusted maintainer’s environment, attackers can inject malicious code that thousands of downstream organizations automatically pull, creating a massive cascading effect across the broader software supply chain. How Tenable can help defend against supply chain attacks To defend against supply chain attacks, you need to know exactly what code is running in your environment. The Tenable One Exposure Management Platform and Tenable Nessus can help you build a complete asset inventory of the npm packages used across your organization. Use the following Nessus plugins to build an inventory of the npm modules in your environment: 200172 - Node.js Modules Installed (Windows) 179440 - Node.js Modules Installed (macOS) 178772 - Node.js Modules Installed (Linux) As Tenable continuously analyzes your environment, you get direct visibility into exactly what is installed on your systems. This visibility ensures you can quickly locate and remove compromised packages as soon as a new threat is discovered. Beyond building a complete inventory, organizations also need to actively monitor their environments for live threats. Tenable One Cloud Exposure , a CNAPP, builds on this visibility by continuously monitoring your cloud environment to proactively detect these types of supply chain attacks in real time. Together as part of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform, these tools proactively detect supply chain attacks across your environments, ensuring your security teams can immediately identify and neutralize malicious activity before attackers can fully compromise your production systems. | Tenable Research | |||
| Medium | 5.9 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-44776Kareadita Kavita · Insecure Direct Object Reference Medium5.9EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-44776 Kavita is a cross platform reading server. Prior to 0.9.0, the download, size-check, and chapter metadata endpoints do not enforce library-level authorization. A low-privileged user who knows or guesses a chapterId, volumeId, or seriesId belonging to a library they are not assigned to can download the full file contents, query file sizes, and read metadata for that content. This affects /api/Download/volume-size, /api/Download/chapter-size, /api/Download/series-size, /api/Download/volume, /api/Download/chapter, /api/Download/series, and /api/Chapter. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research Cybersecurity leaders and practitioners brought their burning AI cybersecurity questions to EXPOSURE 2026. They left with clear answers and a blueprint for building an exposure management program. Get a recap and see highlights from the event in words and pictures. Key takeaways As frontier AI models simultaneously accelerate the pace of vulnerability discovery and exploitation and drastically reduce the cost and complexity of launching attacks, cybersecurity faces a critical inflection point where traditional threat models and manual workflows are no longer viable. EXPOSURE 2026 gave attendees a much-needed opportunity to connect with peers, learn how they’re addressing the challenges of AI and building it into their workflows, and develop a game plan, with exposure management at its core, for protecting their organizations from AI-powered adversaries. Tenable Co-CEOs Steve Vintz (right) and Mark Thurmond For the cybersecurity leaders and practitioners who attended EXPOSURE 2026 in Boston this week, the event could not have come at a better time. While momentum for exposure management as a means to proactively reduce cyber risk has been building for more than a year, recent rapid advances in frontier AI models have made it even more critical. EXPOSURE ‘26 attendees arrived at Boston’s historic Park Plaza Hotel on Monday, May 18, 2026, just six weeks after Anthropic unveiled its groundbreaking frontier model, Claude Mythos Preview . They showed up with pressing questions about securing AI, the impact of frontier AI models on cybersecurity, and how exposure management can address all that and more. They left with clear answers, following an intensive day of training and two days of thought-provoking mainstage and breakout sessions featuring Anthropic Field CTO (Cyber) Brett Andrews, CISOs from GEICO, Smithfield Foods, Munich Re, and EōS Fitness, and Tenable experts. EXPOSURE 2026 gave attendees a rare opportunity to catch their breath amid the escalating, machine-speed pace of cybersecurity. It kicked off with an immersive day of training that provided attendees with a blueprint for building a successful exposure management program. And it offered them a chance to compare notes with peers and work collaboratively to develop a game plan for protecting their organizations from AI-powered adversaries with exposure management at its core. Cybersecurity’s quadruple AI challenge Four challenges that AI creates for cybersecurity underpinned every session at EXPOSURE 2026: Frontier AI models like Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4.6 and Mythos make it vastly faster, easier, and more economical for threat actors to discover new vulnerabilities and build exploits for them. AI creates new attack vectors (e.g., prompt injection, jailbreaks, model poisoning, context poisoning in memory, etc.) that traditional cybersecurity controls weren’t designed to address. AI expands every organization’s attack surface, giving threat actors even more entry points to exploit. AI functions as a force-multiplier for threat actors, giving them speed and the advanced, 32-step reasoning capabilities required to autonomously execute an entire network attack chain. Anthropic Field CTO Brett Andrews (left) with Tenable SVP of Product Strategy Eitan Goldstein Anthropic’s Andrews discussed the impact of frontier models on cybersecurity, the threat landscape, and how defenders can leverage AI to their advantage. To illustrate what organizations are up against, several presentations highlighted the sharp contrast between the steady acceleration in vulnerability discovery and exploitation, and the simultaneous deceleration in organizations’ patching and remediation. Tenable CTO Vlad Korsunsky In 2021, for example, the median time to exploit was 84 days, according to Zero Day Clock . Today, it’s 1.6 days. Meanwhile, in 2025, it took organizations an average of 43 days to patch critical CVEs, up 34% from 32 days in 2024, according to data that Tenable Research contributed to the 2026 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) , which was released on the first day of EXPOSURE 2026. Referencing additional data from the DBIR, Tenable Chief Product Officer Eric Doerr noted that 31% of breaches in 2025 began with an unpatched CVE as the initial access vector. This trend will likely intensify, as frontier AI models accelerate vulnerability discovery, unless security teams adapt. Doerr also spoke to data from Tenable showing that nearly two-thirds of breaches begin with something that isn’t a CVE, such as a misconfiguration, stolen credential, or exposed secret. He used this stat to prove the point that if you’re only concerned about CVEs, you’re leaving two-thirds of your organization’s attack surface exposed. It’s this other attack surface beyond just CVEs that exposure management addresses. Tenable Chief Product Officer Eric Doerr AI-powered exposure management: the blueprint for preemptive defense Presenters used these and other statistics from the DBIR, Tenable’s own telemetry, and other sources to make the case for cybersecurity transformation focused on a preemptive and much more autonomous defense. They showed how explosive, enterprisewide adoption of AI combined with AI-enabled threat actors requires that organizations build these exposure management capabilities into their cybersecurity programs: Unified visibility - Continuous, deterministic asset discovery across the entire hybrid attack surface, capturing every vulnerability, misconfiguration, and excessive permission across on-prem and cloud infrastructure, OT environments, and the rapidly expanding AI attack surface. Contextual, AI-powered insights - Moving past standard CVSS scores to focus on real-world exploitability and business impact, and mapping viable attack paths to understand exactly how an attacker could move laterally toward core assets. Machine-speed action - Shifting from manual workflows to automated, orchestrated fixes. Because human teams cannot triage alerts at machine speed, organizations must deploy agentic AI workflows with appropriate guardrails, including human oversight, to proactively harden posture and isolate active threats. Tenable CSO Robert Huber Tenable CSO Robert Huber shared his experience transforming his vulnerability management program and team into an exposure management program and team, which began two years ago. The impetus was the challenge that Huber and his team faced every quarter when he needed to report on cyber risk to the board of directors: His team had to manually gather, aggregate, harmonize, and analyze data from 50 different security tools that each had their own unique way of reporting on risk. Now, Huber’s team can produce reports in minutes. They’ve also extended their scope of visibility from less than 10,000 assets to more than 100,000 assets and reduced alert to ticket volume by 1,500 to 1, all with the same number of staff. A live AI vs. AI attack simulation created and led by Tenable Researchers Robert McSulla and Ben Smith demonstrated the capabilities of a fully autonomous, agentic defense against a fully autonomous, agentic adversary. McSulla and Smith impressed several key points upon their audience, including: Speed is not the only factor in AI-driven attacks. Yes, AI makes threat actors faster. It also makes them smarter. The demo showed how the adversarial agents reason, make decisions, adapt, and find new, unmapped attack surfaces. Defenders can gain the same advantages as attackers. Defensive agents proactively assess posture, develop and deploy patches for vulnerabilities, and take other hardening actions to reduce risk and mitigate threats. Security leaders and their teams need to get comfortable with autonomous defense. Consider your tolerance for fully autonomous defensive agents: Would you let them shut down a service, configure firewall rules, rotate credentials, or write and deploy patches? That’s what it takes to keep up with agentic attacks that achieve their objectives within three minutes. It’s time to build a governance framework for agentic defense. McSulla and Smith built a governance framework for the defensive agents in their simulation that determines intent, evaluates severity levels, and applies rules, such as when to require a human to make a decision or take an action. Bob McSulla (left) and Ben Smith Custom kicks and other fun Amid the seriousness of cybersecurity, attendees got to pick out custom Converse sneakers featuring Tenable’s iconic new branding. The "Sneaker Bar" at EXPOSURE 2026 EXPOSURE attendees also had the chance to experience the perfect summer evening at Fenway Park, home of the Boston Red Sox. An evening at Fenway Park during EXPOSURE 2026 Tenable announcements at EXPOSURE 2026 EXPOSURE 2026 was punctuated by a host of significant announcements from Tenable, including: The general availability of Tenable Hexa AI , the agentic engine of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform that gives preemptive security teams capabilities to operate at machine speed. New AI initiatives with Anthropic to increase the agentic capabilities of Tenable One. A strategic integration with the Claude Compliance API designed to help customers improve their visibility into Claude usage across their organizations. The release of the Tenable One Open Connector , which allows customers to bring third-party, custom, and internal data from any source into Tenable One. The launch of the Tenable Open Partner Exchange Network . The Tenable Research team’s prolific contributions to the 2026 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report . | Tenable Research | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d747cc7acd8bbc1defbf475aa3202fd332fd43135a6fedddfcc37356ce02eb54) Package presents itself as the legitimate slopus/happy CLI (README instructs `npm install -g happy`; homepage, repository, bugs, and author fields all point at happy.engineering / github.com/slopus/happy), but the published name is ggk-happy and the shipped code has been modified in ways that harm installers: 1. Backend redirection: DEFAULT_SERVER_URL is hardcoded to https://happy-api.ask-ggk.com and DEFAULT_WEBAPP_URL to https://happy.ask-ggk.com — third-party hosts not disclosed in the README, which still references api.cluster-fluster.com. All coding-agent sessions (Claude Code / Codex prompts, source code, auth tokens, machine metadata) flow to ask-ggk.com instead of the publisher advertised in package metadata. 2. Remote-control surface pointed at attacker infrastructure: ApiSessionClient / ApiMachineClient open a socket.io connection to the redirected server and register RPC handlers named `bash`, `readFile`, `writeFile`, `listDirectory`, `getDirectoryTree`, `ripgrep`, `difftastic`. The `bash` handler runs `execAsync(data.command, options)` on parameters supplied by the remote server. Whoever operates happy-api.ask-ggk.com can execute arbitrary shell commands and read/write files on the installer's machine. 3. Install-time auto-takeover: scripts/postinstall.cjs, on global or root install, unconditionally spawns `node bin/happy.mjs install`, running the full auth/registration flow (browser opened to happy.ask-ggk.com, machine registered to happy-api.ask-ggk.com, daemon started) at `npm install -g` time. Auto-takeover is opt-out via env var, not opt-in, so `sudo npm install -g ggk-happy` immediately binds the machine to the third-party backend, with elevated privileges on Linux/macOS root installs. 4. Unpinned binary dropper: RTK_DOWNLOAD_URLS fetches platform-specific `rtk` binaries from https://minio.ask-ggk.com/happy/rtk-*.{zip,tar.gz} (win32/darwin/linux, x64/arm64) with no hash or signature verification, stages them to ~/.local/share/ggkhappy/rtk/bin/rtk (or %LOCALAPPDATA%\ggkhappy\rtk\bin\rtk.exe), and later invokes them via execFile. Purpose of the binary is not documented. 5. Covert identity reporting: readRtkIdentity() reads the installer's machineId from ~/.happy settings and the auth token from ~/.happy/access.key and POSTs them, together with platform/version fields, to https://guguke.ask-ggk.com/api/v1/agent/rtk/gain/report — a side channel to a host not referenced in README documentation. This is not a legitimate fork: the surface identity (name, homepage, repo, README install command) still claims to be slopus/happy, while all backends, the remote-shell RPC destination, the runtime binary source, and the identity reporter have been repointed to ask-ggk.com infrastructure. Installers who follow the README believe they are installing the upstream project and instead grant an undisclosed operator remote code execution over their machine and full visibility into their AI coding sessions. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research As frontier AI models collapse the traditional exploit window, Tenable Hexa AI transforms the security operating model from manual triage to agentic orchestration. See how you can automate vulnerability remediation and super-charge exposure management with Tenable Hexa AI. Key takeaways AI models like Claude Mythos have reduced the time from vulnerability discovery to weaponization from weeks to minutes, making manual defense untenable. Tenable Hexa AI serves as an agentic engine that orchestrates complex, multi-step remediation workflows across modern attack surfaces to accelerate the speed of preemptive security and propel your exposure management program. Using the Model Context Protocol (MCP) included in Tenable Hexa AI, your team can build and deploy custom agents that anchor your preferred LLMs in the Tenable Exposure Data Fabric, ensuring every automated action is governed, auditable, and accurate. Why you need to implement agentic AI in cybersecurity (and specifically, in vulnerability management) For most of my career in cybersecurity, we’ve operated on a fundamental, if unspoken, assumption: We had a grace period. Whenever a new vulnerability was discovered, we knew we had time, often weeks or months, before adversaries would begin exploiting it. The time between vulnerability discovery and exploitation gave us breathing room. It gave us time to patch, triage, and remediate. But not any more. The gap between discovery and exploitation has been shrinking for years, and the vulnerability discovery capabilities demonstrated by frontier AI models like Claude Mythos are narrowing it even more. We have entered the era of AI speed. When an LLM can unearth a 27-year-old vulnerability in a hardened OS in minutes, and then weaponize it in seconds, old defensive cycles can’t keep up, and that’s untenable. This is why I’m so excited to announce the general availability of Tenable Hexa AI , the agentic engine of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform , at EXPOSURE 2026 : because it’s designed to help your organization address the escalating, AI-driven pace of vulnerability discovery. The agentic AI imperative in cybersecurity: Scale your preemptive defense to match machine speed with agentic innovation from Tenable Tenable Hexa AI is built to be a force multiplier and a flexible engine for innovation. Featuring a suite of built-in agents ready to automate assessment configuration, asset tagging, dashboard creation, ticket creation, and more, Tenable Hexa AI is designed to help your organization overcome the operational challenges deepened by adversarial AI use. When the window between discovery and exploitation hits near-zero, security teams locked in manual vulnerability management operating models are forced into a state of perpetual emergency. Manually stitching together context and telemetry from cloud, identity, OT, and vulnerability silos in an arduous effort to prioritize remediation for downstream IT and DevOps teams is a losing battle. And when you can’t provide clear, risk-based remediation priorities to IT and DevOps teams, you end up bombarding them with seemingly urgent tickets that may not in fact be critical to your organization. Constant shifts in remediation priorities and endless debates over what needs fixing and why is not sustainable. It creates friction and causes you to lose the cybersecurity race. In a world where attackers move at machine speed, only comprehensive exposure intelligence combined with the agentic AI orchestration capabilities provided by the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform can give you clarity and control. Tenable Hexa AI doesn’t just tell you where you are vulnerable; it mobilizes your preemptive defense. Capabilities of Tenable Hexa AI With this GA release, Tenable delivers foundational capabilities to help your organization accelerate the pace of vulnerability discovery and remediation, including: Your choice of agents - Use our pre-built, out-of-the-box agents to start reducing risk immediately, or use the Model Context Protocol (MCP) server built into Tenable Hexa AI to create custom agents tailored to your organization’s environment. Advanced multi-step reasoning - Tenable Hexa AI executes complex, end-to-end workflows spanning your attack surface (e.g., IT, cloud, identity, OT, etc.) in a single request, eliminating the need for practitioners to toggle between views to get exposure context. It understands that a CVE in your web app is a critical threat specifically because it is linked to a privileged service account with a path to your sensitive data. Automated remediation workflows - Tenable Hexa AI orchestrates remediation workflows, automatically creating and routing tickets, generating custom policies, and producing audit-ready reports, so security teams can act fast on every critical exposure. End-to-end exposure path insights - Practitioners can query their environment by identity attributes, such as service accounts, privileged users, and Active Directory groups, to surface exposure paths that traditional asset inventories miss. Tenable Hexa AI also provides guided assistance for complex Active Directory sensor configurations. Build your own AI agents for cybersecurity with Tenable Hexa AI In addition to out-of-the-box agentic capabilities for use cases like automated assessment configuration, asset tagging, and ticket creation, customers can also build custom agents via Tenable Hexa AI's built-in MCP that are informed by your organization’s unique security policies and internal business logic. Tenable Hexa AI serves as the orchestration layer connecting your favorite AI tools to your infrastructure and other security tools, all with the data and context from the Tenable Exposure Data Fabric. By anchoring the models your organization uses in the authoritative context of your own environment, Tenable Hexa AI moves you beyond generic AI answers to governed and auditable automation. Whether you are automating complex remediation or generating board-ready dashboards, Tenable Hexa AI ensures the output is both verifiable and auditable. The Tenable Exposure Data Fabric is key because an agent is only as effective as the data it has access to. Tenable Hexa AI is powered by the Tenable Exposure Data Fabric, a repository of 20 years of vulnerability research and the industry’s largest collection of contextualized exposure data. In other words, we’ve built an agentic engine for cybersecurity that uses the world’s best exposure data to drive machine-speed actions. This is the only way to ensure your AI is validating the real state of your environment, rather than just guessing. Real-world agentic AI use cases for Tenable Hexa AI While there are virtually infinite ways to apply agentic orchestration to your unique cybersecurity challenges, here are four high-impact areas where manual workflows traditionally break down and make it impossible for you to keep pace with AI-powered vulnerability discovery: Supply chain response - Neutralize third-party threats by using Tenable Hexa AI to correlate software components with affected internal assets. Automated patching - Use custom Hexa agents to beat the Mythos clock by orchestrating patches the moment a vulnerability is validated. Remediation assignment - Use Tenable Hexa AI to automatically match CVEs to asset owners in seconds and trigger immediate response workflows. These use cases demonstrate how Tenable Hexa AI can bridge the gap between exposure intelligence and action. Make the untenable Tenable The collapse of the exploit window is a wake-up call. It gives us the opportunity to change how we work. By shifting from manual triage to agentic orchestration, organizations are seeing a shift in productivity and how they prioritize and action exposure reduction. While early design partners have already reclaimed days per month on foundational tasks like asset tagging, the value is not found solely in the hours saved, but rather, in the precision of the response. By automating the correlation between cloud, identity, AI, OT, and vulnerability data, Tenable One provides the clear, contextualized instructions that IT and DevOps teams need to act with confidence. This eliminates the administrative friction and back-and-forth negotiation that often results in critical vulnerabilities going unaddressed. Reclaiming those days means your best people are no longer buried in spreadsheets; they are focused on high-impact strategy, architecture hardening, and preemptive defense. Tenable Hexa AI is available today as part of the Tenable One Foundation and Tenable One Advanced packages . | Tenable Research | |||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-24049Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.17.54 security and extras update High7.1EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-24049 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments. This advisory contains the RPM packages for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.17.54. See the following advisory for the container images for this release: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:17598 Security Fix(es): * Kubelet: CRI-O: kube-apiserver: Kubelet, CRI-O, kube-apiserver: Denial of Service via SPDY streaming code (CVE-2026-35469) * google.golang.org/grpc/grpc-go: google.golang.org/grpc/authz: gRPC-Go: Authorization bypass due to improper HTTP/2 path validation (CVE-2026-33186) * wheel: wheel: Privilege Escalation or Arbitrary Code Execution via malicious wheel file unpacking (CVE-2026-24049) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. All OpenShift Container Platform 4.17 users are advised to upgrade to these updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.17/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-cli. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2025-58183Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.18.42 packages and security update Medium4.3EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-58183 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments. This advisory contains the RPM packages for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.18.42. See the following advisory for the container images for this release: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:17448 Security Fix(es): * golang: net/url: Memory exhaustion in query parameter parsing in net/url (CVE-2025-61726) * crypto/x509: golang: Denial of Service due to excessive resource consumption via crafted certificate (CVE-2025-61729) * pyasn1: pyasn1: Denial of Service due to memory exhaustion from malformed RELATIVE-OID (CVE-2026-23490) * golang: archive/tar: Unbounded allocation when parsing GNU sparse map (CVE-2025-58183) * golang: archive/zip: Excessive CPU consumption when building archive index in archive/zip (CVE-2025-61728) * crypto/tls: crypto/tls: Incorrect certificate validation during TLS session resumption (CVE-2025-68121) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. All OpenShift Container Platform 4.18 users are advised to upgrade to these updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.18/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-cli. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.2% | High8.7EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-33583 CVE-2026-33583 is a high-severity vulnerability in the Arqit Symmetric Key Agreement Platform prior to version 26.03. It involves exposure of the QKEY and internal system keys through an unauthenticated and unencrypted HTTP GET method. These keys are critical as they are used in the OTA-Quantum device registration process. The vulnerability allows an attacker to access sensitive cryptographic material without authentication, potentially compromising confidentiality and integrity. No official patch or remediation guidance is currently available. The vulnerability has not been reported as exploited in the wild. | CVE Database V5 |
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