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61 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General An attacker exploited a flawed GitHub Actions workflow in the npm package @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen to publish 10 malicious versions. The vulnerability stemmed from an issue_comment trigger lacking author-association checks, allowing arbitrary users to trigger npm publishing from forked repositories. The malicious payload used multiple execution methods, including a binding.gyp file exploiting node-gyp's Python evaluation and a preinstall hook, ultimately delivering a large obfuscated script that downloaded Bun v1.4.0. This attack aligns with the Mini Shai-Hulud toolkit previously seen in other supply chain compromises. All malicious versions have been removed from npm. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated software supply chain attack named ChainDrop has infected hundreds of npm packages, including popular caching libraries with millions of weekly downloads. Beginning August 4, 2026, attackers compromised a GitHub account of a keyv package maintainer, injecting malicious code into legitimate repositories. The malware executes credential-stealing payloads targeting developer workstations and CI/CD runners, harvesting npm tokens, GitHub credentials, cloud access keys, SSH keys, and database credentials. Using stolen credentials, the worm self-propagates by compromising additional repositories and publishing poisoned packages with valid provenance attestations. ChainDrop employs Bun runtime for execution, establishes persistence through developer tool configurations, and exfiltrates encrypted data using blockchain-based command-and-control infrastructure. This campaign represents an evolution of the Shai-Hulud npm worm. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General An active supply chain attack has compromised the keyv and cacheable npm packages, affecting tens of millions of weekly downloads. The attack began on August 4, 2026, when the maintainer account Jaredwray was compromised, enabling attackers to publish malicious code across multiple packages. The malware deploys through a preinstall hook that downloads a Bun runtime and executes obfuscated payloads designed to harvest cloud credentials from AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes, GitHub Actions, and npm tokens. The threat exhibits worm-like behavior by using stolen npm tokens to republish trojanized versions of additional packages beyond the original namespaces. Stolen credentials are exfiltrated to attacker-controlled GitHub repositories via DNS-resolved destinations, with persistence mechanisms planted in developer environments through .claude and .vscode hooks. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Attackers compromised a GitHub maintainer account controlling keyv, cacheable, flat-cache, and file-entry-cache Node.js packages that collectively receive over a billion downloads monthly. Malicious code was pushed directly to the main branch and automatically published to npm with valid signatures. A hidden preinstall script downloads a Bun runtime to execute an obfuscated payload that harvests npm, GitHub, AWS, Kubernetes, and Vault credentials, scans for SSH keys and environment files, and exfiltrates data to attacker-controlled GitHub repositories and Ethereum smart contracts. The worm then uses stolen npm tokens to infect additional packages autonomously. This self-propagating attack, tracked as ChainDrop, belongs to the Shai Hulud family responsible for previous campaigns targeting TanStack, Mistral AI, and OpenSearch packages in May 2026. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog In this article Attack chain overview Mitigation and protection guidance Indicators of compromise (IOC) Microsoft Defender XDR detections Advanced hunting queries Learn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified a large-scale npm supply chain attack affecting more than 400 packages across multiple unrelated publishers, including packages associated with major enterprise software ecosystems such as keyv, flat-cache, cache-manager, and others. The malicious releases contain a Mini Shai-Hulud variant, a self-propagating credential-stealing worm delivered through a large, heavily obfuscated Bun-based JavaScript payload. The malware typically executes automatically through an npm preinstall lifecycle hook before package installation completes. Once executed, the malware searches developer workstations and continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) environments for npm, GitHub, cloud, and infrastructure credentials. It uses recovered identities to authenticate to npm, GitHub, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Kubernetes, and HashiCorp Vault, enabling it to enumerate packages, repositories, workflow secrets, cloud parameters, and secret-store values. Collected data is encrypted and transmitted through an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint, with GitHub repositories serving as a fallback exfiltration channel. The payload’s most significant capability is automated propagation. After obtaining an npm publishing token, it enumerates packages available to the compromised identity, downloads their latest tarballs, inserts the malware and setup loader, adds a preinstall hook, increments the patch version, and republishes the modified packages. The malware can also use stolen GitHub credentials to inject Claude and Visual Studio Code configuration files into repositories, establishing persistence and creating an additional developer-to-developer infection path. In this blog, we’re sharing our analysis of this supply chain attack, along with protection, detection, amd hunting guidance. Organizations that installed an affected package with lifecycle scripts enabled should treat the associated developer workstation or build runner as potentially compromised. Investigations should prioritize credentials accessible to the affected identity, unauthorized npm releases, unexpected repository or workflow modifications, suspicious cloud and secret-store access, and artifacts produced by affected build systems. Organizations should revoke and rotate exposed credentials from a known-clean environment and rebuild affected systems and downstream artifacts from trusted sources. Attack chain overview The campaign appeared as a rapid sequence of unauthorized patch releases across more than 400 npm packages maintained by otherwise unrelated publishers. Many malicious versions had no corresponding source-code commit, pull request, tag, or legitimate release, indicating that the attackers modified and published package tarballs directly rather than compromising each public source repository. Affected releases typically added a preinstall lifecycle script that launched a malicious file, setup.mjs, contained within the package, which launched the large, obfuscated Bun JavaScript bundle included in the package. Because npm runs preinstall scripts before installation completes, the payload could execute on developer workstations and build runners before application tests or conventional security checks began. After execution, the malware performs the following actions: Determines whether it is running on a developer workstation or in a CI/CD environment. On workstations, it detaches itself to continue after installation; on CI/CD systems, it remains in the active job to access workflow secrets, runner credentials, and OpenID Connect (OIDC) publishing permissions. Both paths could support further package or repository propagation when suitable credentials are found. Collects credentials from local files, environment variables, command-line tools, and GitHub A… | Microsoft Security Blog | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package server-hemera-mongo versions 0.0.12 and 0.0.16 were compromised as part of a large-scale npm supply-chain worm campaign in August 2026. The malicious versions include a preinstall hook that executes an obfuscated payload using a downloaded Bun runtime. This payload steals a wide range of credentials and secrets from the infected environment and propagates by republishing other packages accessible via stolen tokens. Any environment that installed these versions with install scripts enabled should be treated as fully compromised, requiring immediate credential rotation and package removal. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @ornikar/intl-config versions 10.0.2 through 10.0.10 were compromised as part of a large-scale npm supply-chain worm campaign in August 2026. The malicious versions include a preinstall hook that downloads and executes an obfuscated Bun runtime payload which steals a wide range of credentials and secrets from the infected environment. This payload propagates by republishing other packages accessible via stolen npm tokens, causing widespread contamination. Any environment that installed these versions with install scripts enabled should be considered fully compromised, requiring immediate credential rotation and removal of the package. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Multiple npm packages across @tanstack, @mistralai, @uipath, @squawk, and safe-action namespaces were compromised in a worm-like attack affecting over 50 packages. The malicious code executes during installation, downloading the Bun runtime and running a payload that harvests GitHub credentials and cloud secrets. The attack specifically targets AWS environments by querying the IMDS and attempting privilege escalation through STS and SSM endpoints across multiple regions. Stolen credentials are automatically used to publish additional malicious package versions across different maintainer accounts, creating a self-propagating infection chain. The attack patterns mirror previous Shai-Hulud compromises, using a drop-and-execute technique and command-and-control infrastructure at git-tanstack.com, a domain designed to mimic legitimate tanstack.com traffic. Organizations should rotate GitHub credentials, audit AWS credentials, and check for suspicious activity. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General The Intercom TypeScript Library version 7.0.4 has been compromised with malicious code that harvests GitHub credentials. Upon installation, the package executes a preinstall hook that downloads the Bun runtime, then runs a payload to extract GitHub credentials using the gh auth token command. The attack employs sophisticated C2 communication by querying GitHub's commit search API for specific strings embedded in public repositories, effectively using legitimate services to evade detection. The attack patterns mirror previous Shai-Hulud compromises, which exhibit worm-like behavior by automatically using stolen credentials to infect additional npm packages. With 361,510 weekly downloads, this compromise poses significant risk for a widespread infection wave similar to November 2025 when over 1,000 packages were affected. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (936d3c8bc6611b58f5321ba5aab651bb3d2db821d172816283ca04633be00863) The `stella` CLI shipped in bin/stella.js prompts users for their phone number and the WhatsApp verification code and POSTs both to a hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint at http://62.238.2.22:8787 (paths /api/v1/auth/register/register and /verify). Subsequent chat input is sent to the same host. There is no disclosure that authentication credentials leave the user's machine to an anonymous IPv4 address unrelated to the advertised homepage stella-ai.app. In addition, bin/postinstall.js and install.bat implement a dropper flow that downloads stella-latest.tar.gz from the same bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint, extracts it under ~/.stella, installs the Bun runtime via `curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash`, and executes the fetched contents; the Windows bootstrap pipes http://62.238.2.22:8787/install.ps1 directly into `iex`. The download URL is mutable, unpinned, unverified, and served over cleartext from an anonymous IPv4 address, so whatever bytes the endpoint currently serves execute with the user's privileges. Package metadata reinforces the mismatch: homepage stella-ai.app, repository github.com/anomalyco/opencode, operational endpoint a raw IPv4. ## Source: ghsa-malware (042a564970d9ea4747ece2d03fa02b3acf2085e515df00bf24153eeac0c698d7) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity The Hades PyPI attack is a supply chain malware campaign that compromised 19 Python packages on the PyPI registry. The malicious packages include a setup file that auto-executes during Python startup to download and run the Bun JavaScript runtime, which then executes an obfuscated credential-stealing payload. This payload targets a wide range of developer secrets and credentials from cloud services, CI/CD platforms, and local configurations. The campaign is part of the ongoing Shai-Hulud / Miasma lineage of attacks, using novel persistence and evasion techniques including AI analysis deception and locale-based targeting. No official patch or remediation guidance is provided in the source content. | Reddit Cybersecurity | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (6c30f8b1a160c72529e2671b81be13ea671302e9bc3915ee84bd2212e0fdd5a3) The package name and module structure impersonate the official `openai` Python SDK (the package even rewrites exported classes' `__module__` attribute to `"openai"` in `openai_mcp/__init__.py`). Alongside the cloned SDK, it ships `openai-setup.pth`, which Python auto-loads on every interpreter start. The.pth file contains a single-line, heavily aliased `exec()` payload (single-letter names like `_O`, `_T`, `_u`, `_s`, `_b`, `_z`) that: (1) checks a one-shot guard `/tmp/.bun_ran`, (2) downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-<platform>-<arch>.zip` to `/tmp/b/bun` and chmods it executable, (3) locates a sibling `_index.js` on `sys.path`, and (4) runs `bun run _index.js`. Because.pth files execute at every Python startup (not just at install), every `python` invocation after `pip install openai-mcp` downloads an alien runtime and executes the package's JavaScript payload through it — an alternate-runtime dropper that evades Python-only scanners. The obfuscation, one-shot guard, identity spoofing, and runtime-laundering together establish clear malicious intent. ## Source: kam193 (f7597f40e5a7af25ae5f07e34310df24ac3284b9e0cadcb013a9c155384e9100) Typosquatting package published from a compromised account with an embedded infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collects all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The tiktoken-mcp package on PyPI is a malicious typosquatting package impersonating the legitimate OpenAI tiktoken package. It includes a .pth file that executes obfuscated JavaScript code via the Bun runtime on every Python interpreter start. This code downloads the Bun runtime, searches for attacker-controlled JavaScript files on sys.path, and executes them, enabling stealthy execution outside Python inspection. The package acts as an infostealer, collecting sensitive data such as API keys, credentials, cryptocurrency assets, and password manager data, and attempts persistence and propagation by publishing infected packages. It may also perform destructive actions if invalid GitHub tokens are detected. The affected versions are 0.13.1 and 0.13.2. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ae87e0c65760999b8ff4e28d11505b15a71a1a46dd8d761122e3d9d8e2cd85b6) The package is published as 'tlask', a single-character edit of the widely used 'flask' package on PyPI. Metadata and module contents are copied verbatim from Pallets' Flask: METADATA Summary reads 'A simple framework for building complex web applications.', Project-URLs point to flask.palletsprojects.com and github.com/pallets/flask, and entry_points.txt declares 'flask=flask.cli:main'. The source files under tlask/ match Flask's own modules. No installer-harmful payload was identified — no network I/O, no exec/eval, no install or import-time hooks, no credential reads, and no lifecycle scripts that would execute attacker-controlled code on `pip install`. The risk is name-confusion: a developer who types `pip install tlask` rather than `pip install flask` receives a near-identical Flask clone they did not intentionally select, and the entry_points.txt also installs a `flask` console script that could shadow the real Flask CLI in some environments. Because the package contains no exfiltration, dropper, silent-relay, or credential-distribution behavior, naming-similarity alone is a subjective signal that warrants human review rather than an automatic block. ## Source: kam193 (2b3ae446f7b8d808b84c157ec455883e0bc45e4f4180e51c5cd42ff9852712a2) Typosquatting package published from a compromised account with an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (89a034f9ba4356799034d728884eccecf5c53779d85280556419cda38e671a30) The package name 'rlask' is a single-character edit of the popular 'flask' package. METADATA declares 'Maintainer-email: Pallets <contact@palletsprojects.com>', and entry_points.txt registers 'flask=flask.cli:main' rather than an rlask-specific entry — indicating the distribution is a verbatim repackaging of Flask 3.1.x source while falsely advertising Pallets maintainership. The exported API (Flask, Blueprint, Config, request, session, etc.) mirrors Flask's surface. No exfiltration, install-time hooks, subprocess execution, credential reads, or outbound network I/O were observed in the shipped code. The risk is name confusion plus forged maintainer identity: a developer who mistypes 'pip install flask' as 'pip install rlask' receives a package that shadows the real Flask, controlled by an author who is not Pallets and could push a malicious update at any time. Routing to human review per the typosquat handling discipline — name-confusion judgments and impersonated-maintainer attributions should be confirmed by a human before publication. ## Source: kam193 (baacd735e23c83962845507427fa53c89bdc2e8e0456dbbce6f00a91bf4fe002) Typosquatting package published from a compromised account with an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e2041887c315474d0722cbf717e189ec1260e209c5f00da5ca3a52a60c6aebb2) The package name `rsquests` is a single-character insertion typo of the top-100 PyPI package `requests`. Package metadata and source are a verbatim copy of upstream `requests`: `rsquests/__version__.py` sets `__title__ = "requests"`, METADATA lists `Author-email: Kenneth Reitz <me@kennethreitz.org>`, and `top_level.txt` declares the top-level package as `requests` (so `import requests` after installing `rsquests` resolves to this package's bundled copy, shadowing the real upstream if it isn't installed). The full public API (get/post/put/delete/Session/...) is replicated, so a developer who mistypes `pip install requests` as `pip install rsquests` gets working behavior and may not notice the substitution. No exfiltration, RCE, dropper, credential harvest, or silent-relay payload is present in this version — the install-time and import-time code paths match the upstream library. The risk is name-confusion plus future-version risk: the squatted name normalizes the typo and provides a vector if a later release introduces a malicious payload. Routing to human review per typosquat-without-payload policy — name-similarity is a subjective signal and the absence of a current payload means this does not meet the bar for an automated block. ## Source: kam193 (b32959e10bc6b1df57d105a5e5d74cbe7b69660cb7a1e78185d3f5e0e0f07e10) Typosquatting package published from a compromised account with an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (34db1950ee9bdf9c75ae9bb2436085bbb443107321d8d7056a0bf3b8fae36978) The package is published as 'nhmpy' on PyPI but its contents are a verbatim copy of NumPy 2.4.6: the same source tree, docstrings, and license files. The distribution metadata falsely identifies the package as authored by 'Travis E. Oliphant et al.' and maintained by 'NumPy Developers <numpy-discussion@python.org>', with Project-URL pointing at https://numpy.org. Internal modules still import from the real 'numpy' namespace (e.g., nhmpy/__init__.py line 788: `from numpy._pytesttester import PytestTester`), so the package masquerades as numpy and depends on numpy being installed alongside it. The current 2.4.6 contents do not execute install scripts, perform network I/O at import, or contain obfuscated code — there is no active exfiltration or RCE payload in this version. However, the name is a one-character edit from 'numpy' (a top-tier PyPI package) and the metadata is deliberately deceptive about authorship, which is the precondition for a future malicious release under the same name. Routing for human review of the name-confusion claim and possible registry takedown. ## Source: kam193 (0b2d6b794431c52ef6b905eb676d70274a792cbca1b266a3405734a7a900860b) Typosquatting package published from a compromised account with an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A coordinated PyPI compromise campaign involving 37 malicious wheel artifacts across 19 packages was detected, utilizing Python startup hooks to execute credential-stealing payloads. The attack leverages .pth files for automatic execution during Python interpreter startup, downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime, and runs obfuscated JavaScript payloads. The malware targets high-value developer and CI/CD credentials including GitHub, npm, PyPI, cloud providers (AWS, GCP, Azure), Kubernetes, Vault, SSH keys, and AI tool tokens. This represents a PyPI branch of the Shai-Hulud/Miasma campaign family, using a Hades-themed variant for GitHub exfiltration. Compromised packages included established bioinformatics tools with significant download counts, stemming from apparent maintainer account takeover. The payload employs multi-layer obfuscation, AES-GCM encryption, and exfiltrates data through GitHub repositories with distinctive markers. The campaign demonstrates cross-runtime attack capabilities and ecosystem-spe... | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The uprobe PyPI package versions 0.1.3 and 0.1.4 were compromised to include malicious code that executes on every Python interpreter startup. This code downloads and runs an obfuscated JavaScript infostealer using the Bun runtime, collecting sensitive data such as API keys, credentials, cryptocurrency assets, and password manager data. The malware attempts persistence and propagation by publishing infected packages using stolen credentials and may wipe user data if invalid GitHub tokens are detected. The malicious behavior is hidden via obfuscation and uses a sentinel file to evade detection. The package's advertised functionality does not require a JavaScript runtime, indicating the malicious nature of the code. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4241e99d1053712e6909db44c939421695dff66556055a93058f9a55f8694929) The package was found to contain malicious code or consuming dependency that contains malicious code ## Source: kam193 (6806267ad399a4b51411f5176e26470cccb7803dff5f0f6f1e3dca6e6c82170c) Versions 0.4.4, 0.4.5 were compromised. Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions | GCVE Database |
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