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22 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-124696Progress Software Kendo UI for jQuery · Cross-site Scripting High7.1EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-124696 In Progress Kendo UI for jQuery, Spreadsheet sheet names are inserted into the SheetsBar menu button's data-sheet-name attribute without encoding. An attacker who can influence a sheet name can inject an event-handler attribute and execute JavaScript when a user hovers over the menu button. Successful exploitation may compromise the confidentiality and integrity of data available in the user's browser context. The first affected version is 2024.4.1112; the latest vulnerable version is 2026.3.1015. The issue is fixed in version 2026.4.1111. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-124689Progress Software Kendo UI for jQuery · Cross-site Scripting High7.1EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-124689 A Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Progress Software Kendo UI for jQuery versions from 2026.3.1014 up to, but not including, 2026.4.1110. The vulnerability occurs because the ActionSheet component does not encode title, subtitle, and header button label values before rendering, allowing an attacker who can influence these values to inject malicious JavaScript. Successful exploitation can compromise the confidentiality and integrity of data in the user's browser context. The issue is fixed in version 2026.4.1110. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-82557Apache Wicket · Missing Authorization Medium6.9EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-82557 CVE-2026-82557 is a missing authorization vulnerability in Apache Wicket versions 10.3.0 through 10.11.0. The flaw allows a form submitting component that is not visible or enabled to be invoked by a request, bypassing visibility and enablement checks. This can lead to unauthorized execution of submit button callbacks without proper validation. The issue was introduced in version 10.3.0 and fixed in 10.12.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Microsoft PowerToys 0.102 introduces two new mouse utilities, CursorHide and Mouse Button Lock, along with command-line tools and Command Palette enhancements. CursorHide automatically hides the mouse pointer while typing or when the mouse is idle. Mouse Button Lock allows users to lock a mouse button virtually, facilitating dragging or selection without holding the button physically. These features aim to improve usability, accessibility, and productivity. There is no indication of any security vulnerability or threat associated with these new features. | Bleeping Computer | |||
| Medium | 5.1 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-76982Apache Wicket · Cross-site Scripting Medium5.1EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-76982 CVE-2026-76982 is a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Apache Wicket affecting versions from 8.0.0 through 8.18.0, 9.0.0 through 9.23.0, and 10.0.0 through 10.10.0. The issue arises because the Button component clears the escape-model-strings flag for attribute encoding but does not encode the element body when rendering a <button> element, allowing unescaped markup from the model to be rendered. This can lead to XSS if an attacker can influence the model data rendered inside a <button> element. The vulnerability affects Button and its subclasses AjaxButton, AjaxFallbackButton, and WizardButton. Users are recommended to upgrade to fixed versions 8.19.0, 9.24.0, or 10.11.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-59717home-assistant core · Open Redirect Medium4.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-59717 Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy. Prior to 2026.6.1, the Android Companion app is vulnerable to an open redirect. The app passes the URL fragment from a homeassistant://invite deep link into the onboarding flow without ever displaying the destination hostname. Because no screen in the invitation or onboarding flow shows the parsed server URL before onboarding commits to it, a victim has no way to distinguish a legitimate invite from a malicious one. An attacker can craft an invite so that a single tap on the legitimate-looking "Connect to my Home Assistant server" button opens their /auth/authorize endpoint in the URL-less onboarding WebView, presenting a look-alike login page that captures the victim's credentials. Since invitations are intended to onboard brand-new users, targets are especially unlikely to notice the substitution. This issue is fixed in version 2026.6.1. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (963f070cd6563a11008f0726b4e0a11e5612dce9b53c58d9ea537566ab1774e2) On require, index.js loads _helpers.js which fetches a platform-specific binary from obfuscated hosts assembled via array-join (oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked-base64 fallback channel to *.dl.wel1.ru, writes the bytes to /tmp/.cache_<rnd> or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<rnd>.exe, chmods 0755, and spawns the file detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', fp+' &'],{detached:true}) or cmd equivalent on Windows. No integrity or signature check is performed on the fetched bytes. Destination hostnames are string-split to evade static detection, and file/lock names (analytics_state, dotnet_diag_*.exe,.cache_*) plus code comments framing the spawn as 'Detached process to avoid blocking npm install' present the behavior as telemetry. A lockfile with a ~22000s max age throttles re-fetching into a scheduled beacon pattern. The DNS-TXT channel provides a covert payload path when HTTPS egress is blocked. Any installer requiring this package executes attacker-controlled arbitrary code on their host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4fcffe6de0ccd3c2c780baeec4bc4617727847bcd6170d0bd92d067abc3fade4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c249dddf9e2ab4659fe99f1945e7b6dd832178da7b207fa86923d8c23ae60143) On require, _adapter.js selects a platform-specific endpoint, fetches an opaque binary over HTTPS from one of several Cloudflare Workers mirrors (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), writes it to /tmp/.cache_<hex> or the Windows TEMP directory as dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. Mirror hostnames are reconstructed from split string arrays joined at runtime to evade static scanners. If HTTPS retrieval fails, the module falls back to a DNS TXT covert channel under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru and net.dl.wel1.ru: it reads a count TXT at c.<domain>, pulls N base64-chunked TXT records from <i>.<domain>, concatenates and base64-decodes them, and feeds the resulting bytes into the same write-chmod-spawn pipeline. A lockfile at /tmp/.analytics_state throttles re-execution. lib/telemetry.js is a companion 81 KB module presenting itself as an observability SDK and contains the same write-chmod-spawn pattern with concatenation-obfuscated API names (require("child_" + "process"), fs["chmod" + "Sync"]). The disguised filenames, obfuscated destination reconstruction, and DNS-TXT covert-channel transport are deliberate evasion of egress filtering and scanning. ## Source: ghsa-malware (5b28949ae736b99d0d9789f12608af2d0682c50e64c8d4e11f18693dc74fe0be) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (5f786ddb8f05c51044f41661db16ceb96657060ba36d0ead043d430cf4e30a11) Requiring the package loads _vendor.js, which reconstructs remote hosts from array-join fragments (resolving to Cloudflare Workers hosts such as oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev and a *.dl.wel1.ru fallback discovered via DNS-TXT), downloads a platform-specific binary over HTTPS with no hash or signature verification, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache_<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start. A TTL stamp is used to avoid re-fetching on subsequent loads. The advertised purpose (a BNPL button UI set) has no legitimate need for downloading and executing an external binary, and the destination hosts are obfuscated to defeat static string scanning. ## Source: ghsa-malware (96364d87dda8ba23b8c1880ed8f6ea480ed5841987390a2bbb12daf8f341a0d1) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (cfda80d3053a8c106f2665b5c1a9a9235532a4acca7abd2a436b5c69fe7673d6) On require() of the package's main entry, _runtime.js fetches an opaque native binary from anonymous Cloudflare workers.dev subdomains (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback resolving hosts under dl.wel1.ru (sdk./ext./pkg./net.), writes it to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c... & or cmd /c start. Hostnames are assembled at runtime from split-string arrays and child_process is loaded via a runtime require() inside _activate(), consistent with static-scanner evasion. Filenames masquerade as dotnet_diag /.cache and a TTL marker (analytics_state) rate-limits re-execution. Installing or requiring this package yields full-host code execution on the installer under attacker-controlled bytes. ## Source: ghsa-malware (20ea76efd9c7012010991937c1135b107f66754480f47907e869438deeee3bed) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (1cf21e1f6c1fc8a9e9caa3a8383da1b2fb4dd863fc531e17771209b14284e087) dist/cjs/index.js appends an eval(atob(...)) blob to what appears to be a React Button re-export. The decoded payload queries public Ethereum RPCs for the latest transaction from the hardcoded address 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a, extracts two IPv4 addresses encoded in the tx.to field, then fetches XOR-encoded next-stage JavaScript from those IPs over HTTP/HTTPS at the paths /0x/cls and /0x/ls and executes it via eval and spawn('node', ['-e',...], {detached:true}). Network and process sinks are hidden behind base64 wrapping and per-character \uXXXX unicode escapes for require('http'), require('https'), require('child_process'), and 'spawn'. Any project that require()s this package receives arbitrary remote code execution controlled by whoever writes to the on-chain dead-drop address, in a detached Node subprocess. ## Source: ghsa-malware (b4462e97d828e2448139b0e3f348c00cd4f9f5611b7886c6c199796f5895a5a8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Leveraging legitimate software is one of cybercriminals’ tactics of choice, with remote management tools ranking among their top tools. A recent example involves the remote administration utility ScreenConnect. It’s designed for IT support teams to troubleshoot systems and configure software seamlessly in the background. However, when weaponized by threat actors, ScreenConnect becomes a versatile attack vehicle used to harvest data, deploy malware, and move laterally across corporate networks. During a recent incident detected by Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response , our experts identified an attempt to use ScreenConnect in an attack. This allowed a detailed study of how attackers used this application in a large-scale malware distribution campaign. The following breakdown illustrates the mechanics of ScreenConnect-assisted attacks, and outlines key strategies to defend your organization against them. How ScreenConnect reaches target computers In the campaign analyzed by our experts, the attackers bundled ScreenConnect with legitimate free business software. They established a network of phishing websites to spoof popular tools, including OBS Studio, DS4Windows, DNS Jumper, Glary Utilities, Bandizip, Process Hacker, and others. These rogue websites featured high-quality designs that could be taken for the official pages, making them highly convincing to unsuspecting users. Once the victim clicks the download button for the software, an archive is downloaded to their computer that contains additional files alongside the requested application: A legitimately signed Microsoft executable ( exe ), renamed to match the expected application installer (for example, OBS-Studio-Installer.exe ) A malicious library named res.1033.dll An Assets directory containing installers for both ScreenConnect and the intended application Launching the renamed file disguised as the app installer triggers DLL sideloading of a malicious library. This library silently runs the ScreenConnect installation without restarting the system, while using the standard Windows installer to set up the software the user originally tried to install. The attackers used search engine optimization techniques to drive traffic to their fake websites. As a result, these malicious pages appeared at the top of search results for certain free software utilities on major search engines. Our experts discovered over 90 domain names translated into more than 10 different languages. While most of these websites targeted English, Russian, and Chinese speakers, several domains catered to German, French, Spanish, Arabic, and other regional audiences. A detailed analysis of the IP addresses and associated spoofed domains is available in our technical research article on Securelist, along with full indicators of compromise. Why the attackers exploited ScreenConnect In this campaign, attackers leveraged ScreenConnect to generate and execute malicious scripts on victim machines. These scripts served several key functions: they created exclusions for specific drives, directories, and processes within Windows Defender, disabled the User Account Control (UAC) security mechanism, and delivered and deployed AsyncRAT – a remote access Trojan. To maintain persistence, the scripts configured a Windows scheduled task to run the malicious code at preset intervals. AsyncRAT then established a connection with the attackers’ command-and-control server to receive further instructions. The primary objective of this campaign appears to be gaining unauthorized access to enterprise systems, likely to then resell it on cybercrime marketplaces. How to secure corporate infrastructure Although ScreenConnect in and of itself is a legitimate tool, its presence poses a security risk to corporate environments. Consequently, Kaspersky security solutions detect this application as not-a-virus:HEUR:RemoteAdmin.MSIL.ConnectWise.gen. Security teams should implement the following controls: Enforce strict applicatio… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-55665gristlabs grist-core · Cross-site Scripting High8.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-55665 Grist is spreadsheet software using Python as its formula language. Prior to 1.7.15, Grist contained two cross-site scripting vulnerabilities where an attacker-controlled value reached a link's href without scheme validation, so a javascript URL could run in a victim's Grist origin on a single click. On the account-selection page, /welcome/select-account used its next query parameter as the account buttons' link target. In document tours, the GristDocTour table's Link_URL column became a clickable button, allowing an editor of a shared document to store a javascript URL there that ran when another user opened the document and clicked the tour link. Because the script runs in the victim's authenticated session, it can call Grist APIs as the victim, reading or modifying data and changing sharing settings and access rules. A document editor could therefore escalate to owner-level access. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.15. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Threat actors are leveraging fake CAPTCHA pages to trick victims into sending premium SMS messages as part of an international revenue share fraud (IRSF) scheme. Operating since at least June 2020, this campaign uses traffic distribution systems and social engineering to direct users through multi-stage fake verifications requiring SMS messages to international phone numbers across 17 countries with high termination fees. Each CAPTCHA step triggers messages to over a dozen destinations, generating over 60 SMS messages per victim costing approximately $30. The operation employs back button hijacking, sophisticated tracking cookies, and affiliate advertising networks to maximize reach while obscuring the fraud from detection. Both individual victims and telecommunication carriers suffer financial losses through this deceptive scheme. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 8.2 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2025-4565Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 Product Security and Bug Fix Update High8.2EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-4565 Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform provides an enterprise framework for building, deploying and managing IT automation at scale. IT Managers can provide top-down guidelines on how automation is applied to individual teams, while automation developers retain the freedom to write tasks that leverage existing knowledge without the overhead. Ansible Automation Platform makes it possible for users across an organization to share, vet, and manage automation content by means of a simple, powerful, and agentless language. Security Fix(es): * automation-controller: AIOHTTP HTTP Request/Response Smuggling (CVE-2025-53643) * automation-controller: AIOHTTP's HTTP Parser auto_decompress feature is vulnerable to zip bomb (CVE-2025-69223) * automation-controller: Django: Algorithmic complexity in XML Deserializer leads to denial of service (CVE-2025-64460) * automation-controller: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data (CVE-2025-66471) * python3.11-django: Algorithmic complexity in XML Deserializer leads to denial of service (CVE-2025-64460) * python3.11-protobuf: Unbounded recursion in Python Protobuf (CVE-2025-4565) * python3.11-urllib3: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data (CVE-2025-66471) * receptor: Excessive resource consumption when printing error string for host certificate validation in crypto/x509 (CVE-2025-61729) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. Updates and fixes included: Automation Platform * Reduced cognitive complexity in _sync_user_superuser_flag (AAP-62771) * The FEATURE_GATEWAY_IPV6_USAGE_ENABLED feature flag has been removed and IPv6 support is enabled by default (AAP-61805) * Fixed an issue preventing gateway from working in a pure IPv4 single stack environment when IPv6 is enabled (AAP-60478) * Added dedicated aap.auth_audit logger with specialized formatters and handlers (AAP-60364) * Introduced new logs for authentication events (AAP-60364) * automation-gateway has been updated to 2.6.20260121 * python3.11-django-ansible-base has been updated to 2.6.20260121 Automation Platform UI * Page titles now reflect the current page content (AAP-61754) * Allow full search in resource dropdowns (AAP-57712) * Fixed an issue that occasionally showed a bad request status when navigating between different pages (AAP-56701) * Fixed filtering by name in Collections page (AAP-56529) * Fixed clear/browse button behavior in Client Certificate and Client Key (AAP-55296) * Fixed an issue where a Rulebook Activation in workers offline status could not be disabled or deleted (AAP-52714) * Fixed an issue where workflow job templates node credentials are missing after save for job template nodes that have a default credential that is promptable (AAP-52638) * Fixed an issue where the gateway UI reset the order of an auth mapping when the entity was edited by the user (AAP-52258) * Improves labels and descriptions for Authenticator Mappings details (AAP-51295) * Resolved an issue where controller unavailability rendered the entire AAP UI inaccessible (AAP-50106) * Fixed descriptions for Remotes and Remote Registries (AAP-49838) * Survey textarea "Default Answer" field now properly accepts newlines when pressing Enter (AAP-49820) * Fixed review page on Workflow Approval Nodes (AAP-49433) * Fixed editing of "Days of data to keep" value in management job schedules (AAP-48972) * Editing and saving credentials that use external credential lookup plugins (such as CyberArk) no longer fails with an error message (AAP-44813) * Fixed an issue where the SAML Service Provider extra configuration data field could not be cleared in the UI, as it would automatically reset to the default value (AAP-43661) * Resolved an issue where ad-hoc commands failed with a "Bad Request" error when using credentials configured with "Prompt on launch" for password fields (AAP-43603) * Updated modal warning message and layout when enabling a copied Rulebook Activation (AAP-42574) * automation-platform-ui has been updated to 2.6.5 Automation controller * Added runtime feature flags (AAP-62686) * automation-controller has been updated to 4.7.8 * receptor has been updated to 1.6.3 Automation hub * Autocomplete attribute added to the Automation Hub API password field (AAP-59910) * automation-hub has been updated to 4.11.5 * python3.11-galaxy-importer has been updated to 0.4.37 * python3.11-galaxy-ng has been updated to 4.11.5 * python3.11-pulpcore has been updated to 3.49.49 Event-Driven Ansible * Added x-ai-description field to the activation PATCH method (AAP-61969) * automation-eda-controller has been updated to 1.2.4 Container-based Ansible Automation Platform * Added lTLS support to lightspeed chatbot service (AAP-60900) * system-prompt was optimized for granite and openai models (AAP-60898) * Added ipv6 support (AAP-60532) * Fixed an issue w | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.7% | Critical9.3EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-59097 The exos 9300 application can be used to configure Access Managers (e.g.92xx, 9230 and 9290). The configuration is done in a graphical user interface on the dormakaba exos server. As soon as the save button is clicked in exos 9300, the whole configuration is sent to the selected Access Manager via SOAP. The SOAP request is sent without any prior authentication or authorization by default. Though authentication and authorization can be configured using IPsec for 92xx-K5 devices and mTLS for 92xx-K7 devices, it is not enabled by default and must therefore be activated with additional steps. This insecure default allows an attacker with network level access to completely control the whole environment. An attacker is for example easily able to conduct the following tasks without prior authentication: - Re-configure Access Managers (e.g.remove alarming system requirements) - Freely re-configure the inputs and outputs - Open all connected doors permanently - Open all doors for a defined time interval - Change the admin password - and many more Network level access can be gained due to an insufficient network segmentation as well as missing LAN firewalls. Devices with an insecure configuration have been identified to be directly exposed to the internet. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Between December 19-22, 2025, EmEditor's official website suffered a security breach, causing the main download button to serve malicious software. The fake installer, signed by WALSHAM INVESTMENTS LIMITED, contained infostealer malware targeting login credentials, browser history, and VPN settings. It specifically targeted technical staff and government offices, stealing files and installing a fraudulent browser extension for remote control and cryptocurrency address swapping. Users who downloaded during this period are advised to check the digital signature, delete suspicious files, and change stored passwords. Emurasoft is investigating the incident and has apologized for the inconvenience. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit InfoSec News The EmEditor homepage download button was compromised and served malware to users for a period of four days. This incident involved the official download link being manipulated to deliver malicious payloads, potentially infecting users who attempted to download the software during that timeframe. Although no specific affected versions or malware details were disclosed, the attack represents a supply chain compromise risk. The threat was identified through Reddit InfoSec discussions and reported by hackread.com, but with minimal technical details and no known exploits in the wild. European organizations using EmEditor or downloading it during the affected period could have been exposed to malware infection, risking confidentiality and integrity of their systems. Mitigation requires verifying software integrity, using alternative trusted download sources, and monitoring for suspicious activity. Countries with higher EmEditor usage and strong software development sectors, such as Germany, France, and the UK, are more likely to be impacted. Given the ease of exploitation through a trusted website and the potential for malware infection, the severity is assessed as high despite limited technical details. Defenders should prioritize verifying downloads and enhancing endpoint detection capabilities. | Reddit InfoSec News | |||
| Medium | 6.4 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2024-6485Bootstrap button component · XSS Medium6.4EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2024-6485 To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.4 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2025-61792Quadient DS-700 iQ · Race Condition Medium6.4EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-61792 Quadient DS-700 iQ devices through 2025-09-30 might have a race condition during the quick clicking of (in order) the Question Mark button, the Help Button, the About button, and the Help Button, leading to a transition out of kiosk mode into local administrative access. NOTE: the reporter indicates that the "behavior was observed sporadically" during "limited time on the client site," making it not "possible to gain more information about the specific kiosk mode crashing issue," and the only conclusion was "there appears to be some form of race condition." Accordingly, there can be doubt that a reproducible cybersecurity vulnerability was identified; sporadic software crashes can also be caused by a hardware fault on a single device (for example, transient RAM errors). The reporter also describes a variety of other issues, including initial access via USB because of the absence of a "lock-pick resistant locking solution for the External Controller PC cabinet," which is not a cybersecurity vulnerability (section 4.1.5 of the CNA Operational Rules). Finally, it is unclear whether the device or OS configuration was inappropriate, given that the risks are typically limited to insider threats within the mail operations room of a large company. | CVE Database V5 |
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