This update for jline3 fixes the following issue:
Update to upstream version 3.30.17:
* Security Fixes
+ Native Stack Buffer Overflow in Public INPUT_RECORD.memmove
JNI Method (Windows) (GHSA-6r3w-6jpj-x5w6)
+ Authenticated SSH Shell Channel Resource Leak via Null or
Non-Numeric PTY Dimensions (GHSA-7h86-pjwh-gpqj)
+ Authenticated SSH DoS via Unbounded Window-Change Terminal
Geometry (GHSA-m935-wqpj-pvp3)
+ TCP Socket File Descriptor Leak When Maximum Connections
Reached (GHSA-c87g-867h-cqr6)
* Bug Fixes
+ strip control characters from file names in posix builtins
+ bound !# history expansion to prevent exponential blowup
+ verify server host keys in the ssh client builtin
+ address remaining security vulnerabilities reported by
AFINE/CERT.PL
+ backport security fixes from master
+ backport security fixes to 3.x (path traversal + DSR plain
text)
+ strip control characters from ssh banner and prompts
* Dependency updates
+ bump com.diffplug.spotless:spotless-maven-plugin from 3.8.0 to
3.10.2
+ bump slf4j.version from 2.0.18 to 2.0.19
+ bump org.apache.maven.plugins:maven-surefire-plugin from 3.5.6
to 3.6.0
+ bump org.apache.maven.plugins:maven-compiler-plugin from
3.15.0 to 3.16.0
+ bump org.apache.felix:maven-bundle-plugin from 6.0.2 to 6.1.2
+ bump actions/setup-java from 5 to 6.0.0
+ bump org.graalvm.sdk:graal-sdk from 25.1.3 to 25.3.4.1
+ bump com.mycila:license-maven-plugin from 5.0.0 to 5.1.2
+ bump org.easymock:easymock from 5.6.0 to 5.7.0
+ bump com.google.jimfs:jimfs from 1.3.1 to 1.3.2
+ bump org.apache.maven.wrapper:maven-wrapper from 3.3.2 to
3.3.4
+ bump org.apache.maven:apache-maven from 4.0.0-rc-3 to
4.0.0-rc-6
+ bump eu.maveniverse.maven.njord:extension3 from 0.9.9 to
0.9.10
+ bump com.palantir.javaformat:palantir-java-format from 2.96.0
to 2.97.0
+ bump release-drafter/release-drafter from 7.6.0 to 7.7.0
+ bump groovy.version from 4.0.32 to 4.0.33
+ bump release-drafter/release-drafter from 7 to 7.6.0
+ bump org.apache.maven.plugins:maven-jar-plugin from 3.5.0 to
3.5.1
- Update to upstream version 3.30.16
* bugfix release with security hardening, SSH agent forwarding
fix, and terminal compatibility improvements.
* Breaking Changes
+ SSH agent forwarding is no longer enabled by default;
pass -A to explicitly request it
+ reject overlong hex components in OSC color responses
+ strip OSC and other escape sequences in ansiAppend
+ search multiple lib paths for versioned libutil.so
+ use Path.resolve instead of URI.resolve in cat and sort to
prevent SSRF
+ check closed flag in PtyInputStream to prevent hang on empty
input
+ confine ConfigurationPath lookups to the config directory
+ disable Read File command in nano restricted mode
+ drain buffered data before EOF in NonBlockingPumpInputStream
+ look up openpty in libc.so.6 for glibc 2.34+
+ guard styleMatches and highlighter rules against ReDoS
+ backport telnet DoS mitigations (GHSA-47qp, GHSA-2r2c)
+ propagate EOF in PtyInputStream to avoid infinite loop
+ bump org.apache.ivy:ivy from 2.5.3 to 2.6.0
+ bump actions/setup-node from 6 to 7
+ bump com.palantir.javaformat:palantir-java-format from 2.94.0
to 2.96.0
+ bump sshd.version from 2.18.0 to 2.19.0
+ bump org.codehaus.gmavenplus:gmavenplus-plugin from 5.0.0 to
5.1.0
+ bump org.graalvm.sdk:graal-sdk from 25.0.3 to 25.1.3
+ bump com.diffplug.spotless:spotless-maven-plugin
A vulnerability was found in David-Crty databasement up to 1.7.1. This impacts the function https:/github.com/David-Crty/databasement/pull/511 of the file app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/RestoreRequest.php of the component database-servers API Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument schema_name results in path traversal. The attack may be launched remotely. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been made public and could be used. Upgrading to version 1.7.2 will fix this issue. You should upgrade the affected component.
CVE-2026-92172 is a high-severity vulnerability in Meta Horizon OS prior to version 66.0.0.733.524. The flaw involves improper restriction of communication channels, allowing an application to receive a privileged PendingIntent with a com.oculus.horizon CallerIdentity via a broadcast receiver. This enables the application to impersonate the com.oculus.horizon package to any endpoint within the OS that relies on CallerIdentity authentication.
CVE-2026-92173 is a critical vulnerability in Meta Horizon OS prior to version 74.0.0.878.1682. It involves improper restriction of communication channels, allowing an arbitrary application with NotificationListenerService to receive a privileged PendingIntent containing a CallerIdentity from com.oculus.vrshell. This enables impersonation of the com.oculus.vrshell package and other packages signed with the same key for authentication within the OS.
Joomla Extension - joomcode.com - Unauthenticated SQL injection in read and write queries in JCTables 1.21.1 - The front-end CRUD API controller performs no Joomla token validation and no authentication check on any task. Table names, column names, and values are taken directly from request parameters and concatenated into SQL queries, allowing SQLi for reading and writing queries.
Joomla Extension - ordasoft.com - Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in OrdaSoft Joomla CCK < 8.3.16 - site/uploader.php is reached through the component’s normal frontend routing (task=getContent), a task with no authentication or ACL check anywhere in the dispatch chain. The handler validates the uploaded file’s content with a real magic-byte MIME check, but the extension allow-list that would otherwise restrict the saved file’s extension was present in the source and commented out. The saved file’s extension was taken directly from the attacker-supplied filename with no validation, and the file was written to a path directly under the Joomla web root that is executed by the PHP handler. An image/PHP polyglot, a file whose header bytes satisfy the MIME check with PHP source appended after, passed the content check while carrying a .php extension of the attacker’s choosing.
The npm package com.epi.e2e_test version 1.2.2 contains malicious code that executes automatically during installation. A preinstall script runs an index.js file which collects host-specific identifiers such as the home directory, hostname, username, DNS servers, current working directory, and the package.json contents. This data is then sent via HTTPS to a hardcoded external server (meta.brs.cx) without user consent. This behavior is indicative of reconnaissance activity commonly associated with dependency confusion or internal name attacks.
Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel in the ADS discovery of the Go implementation of Apache PLC4X (PLC4Go) allows an attacker able to send UDP datagrams to the discovering host to redirect subsequent connections to an arbitrary, attacker-chosen address. The discovery result's connection
address was derived from the AmsNetId claimed in the response body rather than from the datagram's actual source address. One spoofed discovery response can therefore insert an inventory entry pointing at any host, including hosts outside the local network, and an application that connects to discovered devices
will open its ADS session, including any configured route credentials, to that host.
Additionally, discovery listeners in both implementations can be disabled by a single malformed datagram:
- In PLC4Go ADS discovery, a short version block causes a panic that ends the listener for the rest of the discovery call, so legitimate devices answering afterwards are not reported.
- In PLC4J, the ADS and EtherNet/IP discoverers stop on an unhandled exception from a malformed response.
- The PLC4J Modbus discoverer can be made to spin indefinitely, consuming a CPU core, by a scanned host that sends a partial response.
Exploitation requires the application to invoke the discovery API, which is opt-in, and for the connection redirect, to act on the discovered items.
This issue affects Apache PLC4X: PLC4Go from 0.11.0 before 1.0.0; PLC4J ADS and Modbus drivers from 0.10.0 before 1.0.0; PLC4J EtherNet/IP driver from 0.11.0 before 1.0.0. PLC4Go is consumed as the Go module github.com/apache/plc4x/plc4go; versions refer to the corresponding Apache PLC4X releases.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.0.0, which fixes the issue. Version 1.0.0 derives the connection address from the datagram's source address and logs a warning when the claimed AmsNetId disagrees with it.
Integer Overflow, Improper Validation of Array Index, Uncontrolled Recursion and Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value in the Go implementation of Apache PLC4X (PLC4Go) allow a malicious device, or an attacker able to inject network traffic, to crash or exhaust the memory of the client application,
causing a denial of service.
The individual defects are:
- Generated parsers pre-allocate arrays with the element count claimed on the wire (0.13.0 through 0.13.1).
- Transport read helpers allocate buffers of the size claimed on the wire without an upper bound.
- ADS and KNXnet/IP response handling indexes into received data without checking its length, causing a panic.
- ADS and EIP frame-length handling accepts, or arithmetically wraps to, a length of zero, breaking message framing.
- Recursive protocol types are parsed without a nesting-depth limit. The same defect in the Java implementation is covered by CVE-2026-102509 https://cveprocess.apache.org/cve5/CVE-2026-102509 .
Additionally, length and position arithmetic in generated serializers was performed in 16-bit integers. If an application forwards attacker-influenced payloads larger than 8 KB, the length field wraps, and the remainder of the payload may be interpreted by the receiving device (for example, an ADS PLC) as
additional, independent protocol messages.
This issue affects Apache PLC4X: from 0.11.0 before 1.0.0. PLC4Go is consumed as the Go module github.com/apache/plc4x/plc4go; versions refer to the corresponding Apache PLC4X releases.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.0.0, which fixes the issue.
`download_wheel()` runs `pip download` and hands the result straight to the seeder, with nothing checking the bytes it gets back. The embedded pip and setuptools wheels carry a `BUNDLE_SHA256` that virtualenv checks on every load, but a wheel fetched over the network for the periodic-update feature or the `--download` flag had no equivalent verification.
A compromised index, a stale mirror, or a MITM'd download (when TLS is intercepted, e.g. via a misconfigured or malicious CA) could substitute a different wheel under the same distribution/version/filename, and virtualenv would cache and seed it into every environment created afterward with no warning.
Fixed by computing the downloaded wheel's sha256 and comparing it against the digest PyPI's public JSON API reports for that exact release, independent of which index actually served the file. The check is skipped, not treated as failure, when a custom index (`PIP_INDEX_URL`, `PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL`, `PIP_INDEX`) is configured, since a private index can legitimately serve a different, intentionally rebuilt wheel. Fix: https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3251
### Impact
The generated `activate` (bash/zsh) and `activate.fish` scripts interpolate a `shlex.quote`-ed value into a position that quotes it a second time. The extra quotes terminate the quoted run early and leave part of the value parsed as shell code, so a path containing shell metacharacters runs commands when a user sources the activation script.
`activate` is affected through the virtual environment's own path, on the branch that reports a relocated environment:
```sh
echo "Virtual environment directory __VIRTUAL_ENV__ does not exist!" >&2
```
For a destination named `x'$(id)'y`, `shlex.quote` emits `'x'"'"'$(id)'"'"'y'`. The inner `"` closes the enclosing double quote and `$(id)` is left unquoted. Backtick and `;` payloads reach the same result. This branch runs whenever the recorded path is absent, which is the normal case for a virtual environment copied or distributed to another machine.
`activate.fish` is affected through the interpreter's Tcl/Tk library paths:
```fish
set -gx TCL_LIBRARY '__TCL_LIBRARY__'
```
`shlex.quote` already returns `'/tcl/(cmd)/lib'`, so the rendered line is `''/tcl/(cmd)/lib''`. fish concatenates the adjacent quoted runs and expands the `(cmd)` left between them. The same doubling also splits a path containing a space into two list elements, corrupting `TCL_LIBRARY` and `TK_LIBRARY`.
This is the same defect class as GHSA-x78j-v8h9-3j2q, which covered `activate.bat`.
### Patches
Fixed in 21.7.13 by moving the placeholders outside the surrounding quotes, so each value keeps only the quoting `shlex.quote` applied. Fix: https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3252
### Workarounds
Avoid creating or distributing virtual environments whose path contains `'`, `` ` ``, `$`, `;`, `(` or `)`, and inspect the generated activation script before sourcing one you did not create.
Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Unauthenticated path traversal exfiltrates local files through auto-reply attachments in Balbooa Forms < 2.4.3.4 - Balbooa Forms accepts upload-field state as Guest-controlled JSON during public form submission. For every object whose `id` merely looks numeric, the component trusts the supplied `filename`, concatenates it below the configured upload directory, and adds the result to an array of local attachment paths. It does not load the referenced attachment row, verify ownership/session/form/field, require that the ID exists, canonicalize the path, or enforce containment. If the form's normal “auto reply” and “attach uploaded files” options are enabled, the component sends those local paths as email attachments to the address submitted in an email field. A Guest can therefore submit a nonexistent numeric ID plus a traversal filename such as `../../../../configuration.php` and receive any file readable by the Joomla process.
CVE-2026-102425 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the Balbooa Forms extension for Joomla versions 1.0.0 through 2.4.3.3. The vulnerability arises from improper control of code generation (CWE-94) due to the way administrator-defined PHP code executes after public form submissions. Specifically, the extension replaces form-field shortcodes with user-submitted values inside a double-quoted PHP string before calling eval(), enabling attackers to inject and execute arbitrary PHP code. Exploitation requires the use of the optional PHP-after-submission feature with an attacker-controlled shortcode. The vulnerability has a CVSS 4.0 score of 9.5, indicating critical severity. No official patch or vendor advisory is provided in the data, and no known exploits in the wild have been reported.
CVE-2026-101126 is a medium severity vulnerability in the Balbooa Forms extension for Joomla versions 1.0.0 through 2.4.3.3. The flaw involves improper limitation of pathname to a restricted directory, allowing potential path traversal and metadata tampering. The vulnerability arises because the extension processes JSON arrays per upload field, trusting client-supplied filenames and display names without sufficient validation. This can lead to cross-session claiming and unauthorized file metadata manipulation.
Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Unauthenticated upload filename stored XSS in Balbooa Forms < 2.4.3.4 - The public form upload endpoint validates the uploaded file's extension and detected MIME type, but stores the attacker-supplied original multipart filename verbatim in `#__baforms_submissions_attachments.name`. A later anonymous form submission associates that temporary attachment with the newly created submission. When an administrator opens the submission, the component's JavaScript retrieves the stored attachment record and concatenates `file.name` directly into an HTML string. The complete string is assigned to `innerHTML`.
Apache Airflow's Snowflake provider did not validate the connection's `account` and `region` fields before interpolating them into request URLs. The SQL API endpoint is built as `https://{account}.snowflakecomputing.com/api/v2/statements`, so an `account` value containing `/`, `?` or `#` demotes the intended domain to a path, query or fragment and leaves the attacker in control of the request host.
The provider sends that request with an `Authorization: Bearer` header carrying a JWT minted from the connection's private key, or the configured OAuth or programmatic access token. A user who can edit the Snowflake connection but cannot read its secrets — Airflow gives connection-configuration users write-only access to stored credentials, and a `private_key_file` lives on the worker rather than in the connection — can therefore cause a valid token for the account to be delivered to a host of their choosing and replay it against the genuine Snowflake endpoint. No Dag-authoring ability is required: the attacker edits the connection and waits for an existing Dag to use it. The same unvalidated value was also used to build the OAuth token-request URL and the Cortex Agent base URL.
Affects deployments where Snowflake connections are editable by users who are not trusted with the connection's credentials. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow-providers-snowflake` `6.18.0` or later, which rejects `account` and `region` values containing anything other than letters, digits, `.`, `_` and `-` in every URL the provider builds from them.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (37cd33c0908189c0085fba153be1c42776411968aa5ad652dd7ffdef88b318bc)
hardhat-zet@2.0.1 is published under a name that impersonates the Hardhat Ethereum tooling ecosystem, but its README, type definitions and docs/ tree are copied verbatim from the unrelated `pino` logger project (badges and links point at npmjs.com/package/pino and github.com/pinojs/pino). The exported `middleware` in index.js is a no-op Express middleware and matches neither the `hardhat-zet` name nor the pino README. The package's declared main (index.js) top-level-requires./lib/config, which is not a configuration file but a 4,498,609-byte obfuscator.io-style bundle: a 26,113-entry rotated string array behind two runtime decoders (functions v and F), hex-encoded identifiers, and control-flow flattening. All strings and destination URLs are hidden behind the decoders, so this code runs automatically on any `require('hardhat-zet')` and its behavior is not observable without deobfuscation. Publisher metadata (author 'Robert King <hello@jsonspack.com>', bugs URL https://jsonspack.com/issues) ties to neither the Hardhat nor the pino identity. The combination — ecosystem-typosquat name targeting crypto/Hardhat developers, cover-story README lifted from an unrelated popular package, no-op public API, and a multi-megabyte obfuscated payload auto-executed on import — is the shape of a supply-chain stealer aimed at Ethereum developers.
## Source: ghsa-malware (781273d2c802d3781fecccd4434ba418c93ce88edf920b2a1163dbacf7576254)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (a8e49b1abd7c566b17104c5a2823251df2ca253a0fa509d7c19db1c1942ad13d)
On require, index.js invokes initializeDaemon() at top level, which uses spawn('node', [lib/check-items.js], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }) followed by child.unref() to launch a persistent background process independent of the parent. The daemon HTTP-GETs a JSON payload from the hardcoded endpoint https://game.spawnrealm.com/api/item-realtime?key=abcdef123456 and passes payload.code to `new Function('require', 'module', payload.code)`, executing server-supplied JavaScript inside the installer's Node process with full `require` access. An RSA signature check is performed against a public key bundled in the package (crypto-config.js), so the author controls both the signing key and the verifier and the check provides no independent integrity guarantee. Anyone controlling game.spawnrealm.com — including via DNS or TLS — can run arbitrary code as the installing user for the lifetime of the host process. The package is advertised as a validator library, and this remote-code-loader behavior is undisclosed and unrelated to the stated purpose.
A reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the Joomla extension Vehicle Manager (Free) versions prior to 6.5.8. The vulnerability occurs on the public vehicle-detail page where the 'title' request parameter is directly echoed into a double-quoted HTML attribute without any output encoding. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML or script code by including a double-quote character to break out of the attribute context.