Search: git-integration.ts
79 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @activepieces/piece-google-forms versions 0.5.5, 0.5.6, and 0.5.7 contains malicious code. The package includes a source file that executes OS commands via child_process and sends hardcoded HTTP POST requests to an external destination. This behavior is inconsistent with legitimate Google Forms API integration and suggests a command-execution and data-exfiltration payload. The package name closely mimics the legitimate @activepieces ecosystem, indicating a possible supply chain compromise or malicious impersonation. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f2f3a20016e1936bdca56ddd0208270b791b048a3d4c7cca682ff83462724bb2) On require() of the package, index.js unconditionally loads _polyfill.js, which downloads a platform-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers subdomains whose hostnames are reconstructed at runtime by joining split string fragments (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev). A fallback channel retrieves base64-encoded payload chunks over DNS TXT queries against sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru (c.<domain> for chunk count, N.<domain> for chunk data). The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as.cache_<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmod 0755, and executed detached via spawn("/bin/sh",["-c", path+" &"],{detached:true}).unref() or spawn("cmd",...) on Windows. No hash or signature verification is performed. Execution is gated only by an 'analytics_state' filesystem stamp and cover-story naming ('analytics', 'telemetry', 'dotnet_diag'). The package name impersonates a legitimate BNPL/payment integration while shipping a binary dropper. ## Source: ghsa-malware (c0880c543b06fa184b4f5210c4dba55339f8c0bed3ab7ad2c2e7b6c51b0ff8c4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b31579fb9a360c4781524c5edd9d0e7b84440e7ccd073e09d54afc10678764cf) On require() of this package, index.js loads _compat.js which unconditionally downloads an OS-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts assembled at runtime via string-array join (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, cf100-416.workers.dev, cf102-baf.workers.dev, cf103-070.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback served under *.dl.wel1.ru (sdk.dl.wel1.ru). The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under cover-story filenames (analytics_state, dotnet_diag_*.exe,.cache_*), chmod 0755 on POSIX, then spawned detached and unref'd via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. No hash or signature verification, no relationship to any legitimate publisher, and the hostnames and the child_process require are obfuscated via array.join to defeat static analysis. Package name impersonates a Dolyame BNPL integration but ships no such functionality. ## Source: ghsa-malware (abfed9e023b5c6d17fc35410b41929bf6d447e802a33a2bcb83cb7fd483d8626) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0512db79eba207153d2427271566e3ecd016d3d817266e683a801d82183254e9) On require, index.js loads _ext.js which detects platform, constructs C2 hostnames by joining split string fragments (e.g. "oob-worker.cf99-9b3.worker" + "s.dev"), downloads an opaque binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, cf101-adf, cf102-baf, cf103-070.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback (base64 chunks reassembled from resolveTxt of numeric subdomains under dl.wel1.ru), writes the payload to a disguised path under /tmp or %TEMP% (.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmods 0755 on Unix, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh or cmd.exe. A state file throttles re-runs. Package name resembles a legitimate BNPL/payment integration but the shipped code implements a remote-payload dropper with no relation to that stated purpose. ## Source: ghsa-malware (5d31c7a4f92cc32521ef343a86ff4d50644dd80a95c698b2b370a68e4e767219) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package dolyame-ui-themes version 35.6.3 contains malicious code that executes an attacker-controlled binary on the host system during installation or require. It uses obfuscated techniques to reconstruct command and control (C2) hostnames and fetches platform-specific binaries from attacker-controlled endpoints. The package masquerades as a legitimate payment integration ecosystem, likely as a typosquatting lure. The malicious loader writes binaries to temporary directories, sets executable permissions, and spawns them detached from the main process. A sibling telemetry module duplicates these malicious behaviors. No official patch or remediation guidance is provided. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog In this article Attack chain overview Mitigation and protection guidance Indicators of compromise (IOC) Microsoft Defender XDR detections Advanced hunting queries Learn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified a large-scale npm supply chain attack affecting more than 400 packages across multiple unrelated publishers, including packages associated with major enterprise software ecosystems such as keyv, flat-cache, cache-manager, and others. The malicious releases contain a Mini Shai-Hulud variant, a self-propagating credential-stealing worm delivered through a large, heavily obfuscated Bun-based JavaScript payload. The malware typically executes automatically through an npm preinstall lifecycle hook before package installation completes. Once executed, the malware searches developer workstations and continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) environments for npm, GitHub, cloud, and infrastructure credentials. It uses recovered identities to authenticate to npm, GitHub, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Kubernetes, and HashiCorp Vault, enabling it to enumerate packages, repositories, workflow secrets, cloud parameters, and secret-store values. Collected data is encrypted and transmitted through an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint, with GitHub repositories serving as a fallback exfiltration channel. The payload’s most significant capability is automated propagation. After obtaining an npm publishing token, it enumerates packages available to the compromised identity, downloads their latest tarballs, inserts the malware and setup loader, adds a preinstall hook, increments the patch version, and republishes the modified packages. The malware can also use stolen GitHub credentials to inject Claude and Visual Studio Code configuration files into repositories, establishing persistence and creating an additional developer-to-developer infection path. In this blog, we’re sharing our analysis of this supply chain attack, along with protection, detection, amd hunting guidance. Organizations that installed an affected package with lifecycle scripts enabled should treat the associated developer workstation or build runner as potentially compromised. Investigations should prioritize credentials accessible to the affected identity, unauthorized npm releases, unexpected repository or workflow modifications, suspicious cloud and secret-store access, and artifacts produced by affected build systems. Organizations should revoke and rotate exposed credentials from a known-clean environment and rebuild affected systems and downstream artifacts from trusted sources. Attack chain overview The campaign appeared as a rapid sequence of unauthorized patch releases across more than 400 npm packages maintained by otherwise unrelated publishers. Many malicious versions had no corresponding source-code commit, pull request, tag, or legitimate release, indicating that the attackers modified and published package tarballs directly rather than compromising each public source repository. Affected releases typically added a preinstall lifecycle script that launched a malicious file, setup.mjs, contained within the package, which launched the large, obfuscated Bun JavaScript bundle included in the package. Because npm runs preinstall scripts before installation completes, the payload could execute on developer workstations and build runners before application tests or conventional security checks began. After execution, the malware performs the following actions: Determines whether it is running on a developer workstation or in a CI/CD environment. On workstations, it detaches itself to continue after installation; on CI/CD systems, it remains in the active job to access workflow secrets, runner credentials, and OpenID Connect (OIDC) publishing permissions. Both paths could support further package or repository propagation when suitable credentials are found. Collects credentials from local files, environment variables, command-line tools, and GitHub A… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research Anthropic’s new AI agent for Slack acts under an admin-configured access bundle rather than each user’s own credentials. Here’s how that model works, what admins should understand and how to securely configure it. Key takeaways Claude Tag, Anthropic’s newly launched AI agent for Slack, acts on connected services using shared credentials an admin configures for a workspace or for a specific private channel, not the credentials of the user tagging it. Claude Tag uses the service-identity pattern, like deploy bots, workflow automations, and incoming webhooks, rather than per-user OAuth delegation. As a result, one admin-configured bundle serves everyone in the channel. Inviting someone to a channel where Claude Tag is present lets them converse with Claude and see its output there. What Claude can access is fixed by the admin-configured bundle, and organizations can require claude.ai login and role-based access control before a user may interact with Claude at all. Channel invitations do not confer new permissions on the invitee. As part of Tenable’s ongoing partnership with Anthropic, Tenable Research worked with their security team through coordinated disclosure. Claude Tag lets Slack channel members direct an agent whose reach is defined by the admin-configured access bundle. (Source: Tenable Research) What is Claude Tag? Claude Tag is a multiplayer AI assistant that lives inside Slack. With Claude Tag, which was released by Anthropic on June 23, 2026, anyone in a channel can tag @Claude to hand off tasks, run autonomous jobs over hours or days, and watch the work unfold in-thread. Claude Tag in a Slack channel, using the attached access bundle to read from a connected GitHub repository. The agent responds to any channel member within the bundle's scope. Source: Tenable Research. In a traditional 1-on-1 AI interaction, such as a chat UI, a command-line interface (CLI), or a Model Context Protocol (MCP)-connected app, the agent acts as you. Claude Tag keeps that model in direct messages: a DM runs on the sender’s own claude.ai account, using that user’s own connectors. In shared channels , however, Claude Tag is a multiplayer agent: It serves many users at once, and no single user’s credentials define its access . There, the agent is given its own identity, with its own permissions, configured once by an admin, and reused by everyone who tags it. The controls governing that access are: The admin’s bundle configuration determines what the agent can do The channel determines where it participates and what it can see Organization-level Claude Enterprise controls, such as required claude.ai login and role-based access control, govern who can direct it Claude Tag also differs from per-user Slack integrations . Slack’s own GitHub integration, for example, uses each user’s personal GitHub OAuth token. When a user runs /github in a channel, the integration acts as that user, and sees only what that user can see. The same is true for Slack’s Jira and Asana apps. Claude Tag works the other way: One shared credential applies to every user in the channel. For GitHub, that credential is a Claude GitHub App installation token scoped to a repository allowlist the organization owner configures. No individual's OAuth is used, and actions are attributed to the Claude app. Admins can restrict which repositories each channel can reach by attaching different bundles to different channels. For example, a finance channel can be scoped only to finance repos, while an engineering channel only to its own. For non-GitHub OAuth connectors (e.g., Google Drive), the bundle reuses the OAuth credential of the organization’s admin or owner who connected it. Claude Tag’s access model Claude Tag isn’t just a Slack bot; it’s an autonomous AI agent with its own identity, separate from any human user. When someone in a channel types @Claude, the assistant doesn’t act as that user; it acts as itself, using credentials provisioned by access bundles . The identity model for Claude Tag has three layers : A Claude Tag installation bound to a Slack workspace Access bundles that group connector credentials configured once by an admin, such as a Claude GitHub App installation for repositories, and OAuth-approved credentials for other services) Scopes that define which Slack contexts, such as a workspace or a channel, a bundle is available in. An access bundle configured attached to a single Slack channel. The bundle's scope is set by the admin, not by the users in the channel. (Source: Tenable Research) The trust boundary that admins can control is the scope. Attaching a bundle to a channel is an admin decision: Members of that channel can then direct Claude within the bundle’s scope. For example, they can scope a GitHub app installation to an allowlist of repositories, while for other OAuth connectors they can scope the credential of the admin who connected them. Claude Enterprise admins can additionally require users to log in to their claude.ai account and restrict usage via role-based access control (RBAC), under which non-qualifying users cannot start Claude sessions and their messages in existing threads are treated as untrusted. There’s no mapping from “the Slack user who typed @Claude” back to “what that user is allowed to access in the connected service.” The model also constrains users: Someone acting through Claude cannot bring their own privileges. Writes happen only where the agent is scoped to write, so they land in admin-chosen, visible locations rather than wherever an individual user’s credentials could reach. Anthropic’s documentation states the model explicitly. The attach-to-scope page warns: “A bundle attached to a public channel grants its access to anyone who joins that channel. In most Slack workspaces, anyone can join a public channel, so the channel’s join policy becomes the effective access control for whatever the bundle grants. Keep elevated credentials in private-channel scopes.” Security implications of multiplayer agents Slack channel configuration is now part of your access-control surface. Traditional application identity and access management (IAM) is per-user: Each person authenticates and is gated against their own identity in each system. An agent like Claude Tag instead has its own identity: the admin-configured bundle defines what the agent can reach, and the channel defines where it participates and who can converse with it. Adding a user to a channel lets them direct Claude within that admin-chosen scope; organizations can require claude.ai login and RBAC before a user may direct Claude at all. You should review bundle scope and channel membership together. Slack admins now make decisions that matter for access control. Attaching an access bundle to a channel determines what Claude can reach there. Review bundle attachments with the same rigor you apply to IAM changes, and use organization-level controls, such as required claude.ai login and RBAC) to bound who can direct Claude. Channel invites then govern who can converse with the agent within that admin-chosen scope. You should scope bundles deliberately and pair them with organization-level controls. Keeping elevated bundles in private channels narrows where the agent participates and who can converse with it. A new channel member can see prior scrollback and converse with Claude there, but what Claude can access stays fixed by the admin-configured bundle. The right practice is minimum-privilege bundles per channel, per task, combined with those organization-level requirements. Anthropic’s planned enhancements Anthropic has said publicly that it plans to strengthen Claude Tag’s security offerings with two additions (see Anthropic’s June 24 post, “ Agent identity in Claude Tag: a new access model ”): Just-in-time credential grants, where a user approves a single sensitive action in the moment without permanently widening the agent’s scope An identity-aware overlay, adding user-level checks on top of an agent’s scope for organizations with more complex clearance structures These are additive options layered onto the channel-scoped agent model, not a replacement for it: agent identity remains a first-class model, and organizations will be able to combine it with user-level checks, or rely on user identity alone for a given channel where it fits their needs. Coordinated disclosure Tenable Research approached Anthropic’s security team via HackerOne to discuss Claude Tag’s access model and worked through coordinated review. Anthropic engaged promptly, provided a detailed clarification of the product’s access model, and confirmed that the admin-experience feedback we raised has been shared with the relevant product team for consideration in the setup flow and documentation. We appreciate their thorough and professional engagement throughout. Timeline (UTC): 2026-06-30 14:57 – Tenable Research submits an initial report to Anthropic via HackerOne (TRA-699). 2026-06-30 17:14 – Anthropic responds with a detailed clarification of Claude Tag's access model. 2026-07-01 9:49 – Tenable Research replies with follow-up observations regarding the admin configuration experience. 2026-07-02 13:41 – Anthropic confirms the feedback has been shared with the relevant product team for consideration in the setup flow and documentation. 4 ways to better secure multiplayer agents Multiplayer agents aren’t going away. Here are four actions you can take immediately to reduce the access risks they create: Audit your access bundles. For every Claude Tag bundle in your organization, identify the: connectors it holds credentials for scopes it’s attached to users who can direct Claude in those scopes today, making that set deliberate: manage channel membership, and use organization-level controls (such as required claude.ai login and RBAC) so only intended users can direct Claude. Review channel membership and bundle scope together. For channels whose bundles grant sensitive reach, route invites | Tenable Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Four AsyncAPI npm packages were compromised in July 2026, delivering Miasma v3, a new variant of the worm previously found in Red Hat packages. The malicious versions (@asyncapi/generator, @asyncapi/generator-helpers, @asyncapi/generator-components, and @asyncapi/specs) were published through AsyncAPI's legitimate GitHub Actions workflow using npm's OIDC integration, creating packages with valid provenance attestations. Unlike previous variants, this attack triggers when applications load the poisoned library rather than during installation. The payload downloads a second stage from IPFS, establishing a persistent Node.js backdoor with arbitrary shell command execution capabilities. While the codebase contains credential theft, propagation, and AI-tool poisoning modules, this deployment primarily functions as a remote access trojan. The attack began with an unauthorized commit to the repository's release branch, highlighting the importance of branch protection even when using trusted-publisher mechanisms. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The chat-adapter-zoom package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email privatek3m@protonmail.com) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (a Zoom chat-adapter integration namespace (Zoom-style naming)) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency. The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io. Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511709729914880. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f6308ea0d3fc30c63044a57022cf4b300f6625c458862499b01b8cb0f2847da4) Package presents itself as a Zoom chat adapter but ships no Zoom or chat functionality; it is a thin wrapper over @sentry/node. The package.json preinstall script runs 'npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js'. examples/verify.js initializes Sentry against a hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN pointing to o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511709729914880, fetches the installer's public IP from Cloudflare via setUserFromPublicIp(), attaches it as user.ip_address, triggers an error, and calls Sentry.captureException + flush(5000), delivering the installer's public IP and event data to the author's Sentry project on every install with no user action or opt-in. The exported src/index.js init() also falls back to the same hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN with sendDefaultPii forced to true when callers do not supply their own DSN, silently routing consumer error data and PII to the author. The name/functionality mismatch (keywords target 'zoom'/'chat-adapter' while the code is a Sentry relay) indicates the package is designed to attract unrelated installs. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7adceb241867aec530acce3037e7426a58d3fcd2475f2f8389d515e28292cd82) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-15317Sipeed PicoClaw · Server-Side Request Forgery Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-15317 A security flaw has been discovered in Sipeed PicoClaw up to 0.2.9. Affected by this vulnerability is the function WebFetchTool.Execute of the file pkg/tools/integration/web.go of the component Guarded Web Fetch Flow. The manipulation results in server-side request forgery. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The reported GitHub issue was closed automatically due to inactivity. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'polymarket-apis' version 1.1.0 impersonates the Polymarket brand but contains no legitimate API integration. It executes attacker-controlled code fetched from a remote URL using JavaScript's Function constructor, allowing arbitrary code execution with full Node.js privileges. The package's declared dependencies align with known credential and browser data stealing payloads. Installation of this package compromises the host system, potentially exposing all stored secrets and keys. | GCVE Database | |||
| Low | 2.9 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-49254V2 · Dragonfly Manager OAuth provider client_secret disclosure via unauthenticated GET /api/v1/oauth Low2.9EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-49254 Dragonfly is an open source P2P-based file distribution and image acceleration system. Prior to 2.4.4, manager/router/router.go registers GET /api/v1/oauth and GET /api/v1/oauth/:id without jwt.MiddlewareFunc() or RBAC(), while manager/handlers/oauth.go returns models.Oauth records and manager/models/oauth.go exposes Oauth.ClientSecret as client_secret in JSON. When an administrator has configured a GitHub or Google OAuth provider, an unauthenticated network client can reach GetOauth or GetOauths, load the stored models.Oauth record, and obtain the provider's client secret, client identifier, and redirect URL. The earlier GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7 remediation protected the /jobs group only and did not protect these OAuth GET handlers. Disclosure of client_secret can enable abuse of the configured identity-provider integration, subject to the provider's redirect URI restrictions. This issue is fixed in 2.4.4. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A fresh wave of the Miasma Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain campaign compromised legitimate npm packages under the @immobiliarelabs scope on June 26, 2026. The attack targeted Backstage plugins used for GitLab integration and LDAP authentication, affecting 22 package versions across multiple releases. The malware employs sophisticated techniques including hidden payloads that bypass standard package reviews, steals developer credentials and CI/CD secrets, and exploits GitHub Actions workflows for propagation. The campaign appears linked to a compromised upstream GitHub Action (codfish/semantic-release-action) and leverages deployment-triggered workflows for execution. Stolen credentials include npm tokens, GitHub tokens, cloud credentials, SSH keys, and various authentication secrets, which are exfiltrated to attacker-controlled repositories for further propagation across the ecosystem. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Low | 2.3 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-57522bitwarden server · Injection Low2.3EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-57522 Bitwarden Server before 2026.5.0 contains a JSON injection vulnerability in IntegrationTemplateProcessor.ReplaceTokens(), which substitutes user-controlled values into event-integration templates without JSON encoding. When an organization has configured an event integration whose template references a user-controlled token (such as #ActingUserName# or #UserName#, populated from a member's display name), an authenticated member can set their display name to JSON metacharacters and inject arbitrary key-value pairs into the rendered payloads delivered to webhook, SIEM, Slack, Teams, or Datadog endpoints, making injected fields indistinguishable from legitimate template output. EPSS 0.5%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-45677RocketChat Rocket.Chat · Missing Authorization High8.7EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-45677 Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat's SAML integration does not verify the signature on inbound LogoutRequest messages. An unauthenticated remote attacker who knows a target user's SAML NameID - which major identity providers (Okta, Google Workspace, Microsoft Entra ID, JumpCloud) expose as the user's email address - can craft a valid-looking unsigned LogoutRequest and submit it to the SP logout endpoint. The server processes it as legitimate, immediately destroying the victim's session. Because the attack requires no authentication and no interaction from the victim, it can be repeated in a loop against individual users or scripted across many accounts, effectively rendering the Rocket.Chat instance unusable for SAML-authenticated users. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database forge-jsx4 is a remote access trojan (RAT) published to the public npm registry by the account rafael_silva (rafael_silva@outlook.com). Versions 1.0.122 and 1.0.123 were published on June 21-22, 2026 as a reconstitution of the forge-jsx / forge-jsxy campaign, reusing the same command-and-control infrastructure and encryption after the earlier packages were taken down. The malware executes through a postinstall hook chain ("node scripts/postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs && node scripts/ensure-dist.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-bootstrap.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs"), which runs automatically on npm install and skips CI environments to evade analysis. Once running it deploys a full RAT: system-wide keylogging via uiohook-napi, clipboard monitoring, .env file scanning, shell history collection, host inventory enumeration, desktop screenshot capture via jimp, and a WebSocket filesystem backdoor with remote file access. It scans the filesystem for cryptocurrency material (BIP39 mnemonics validated via checksum, Ed25519 Solana keypairs via tweetnacl, range-checked secp256k1 keys) and harvests browser-extension wallet databases across 21+ Chromium browsers (MetaMask, Phantom, Rabby). It establishes durable persistence outside node_modules (e.g. ~/.local/share/cfgmgr/.forge-jsxy/ on Linux, with macOS/Windows equivalents) plus autostart services (systemd user unit forge-js-worker.service, macOS LaunchAgent com.forgejs.worker.plist, Windows Task Scheduler ForgeJSWorker / HKCU Run key), so it survives npm uninstall, and supports relay-pushed auto-upgrades. Collected data is exfiltrated to a hardcoded C2 at 204.10.194.247 (WebSocket relay ws://204.10.194.247:9877, HTTP API http://204.10.194.247:8765, session password "secret"), to Discord bot webhooks (screenshots via ephemeral URLs), and to Hugging Face Hub repositories via the @huggingface/hub SDK. The payload uses an XOR-obfuscated AES-256-GCM key shared across all campaign waves. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (54ce6747205bbecab342f78d9558861a02c1e21a213d795237b788cb3552a3c0) Package ships several files with patterns that warrant human inspection: a `scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs` invoked at install time, a `dist/discordRelayUpload.js` module with POST/ping/base64 patterns, a `dist/relayServer.js`, a `dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js` that fetches from huggingface.co, and a `dist/hfCredentials.js` with base64 decode operations. The combination of an install-time agent script plus a relay/upload module plus a credentials helper is the kind of composition that can hide an installer-side data flow, but the package name (`forge-jsx4`) and the file naming suggest a developer-tool / agent / Hugging Face integration where many of these patterns may be legitimate (HF API endpoints, content-scanning helpers, build artifact relay). Without traced-code corroboration of where the postinstall agent points, what discordRelayUpload actually transmits, and whose credentials hfCredentials handles, the intent cannot be confirmed. Routing to human review so a maintainer can verify whether the postinstall script performs an outbound fetch to an attacker-controlled destination, whether discordRelayUpload silently exfiltrates caller-supplied data, and whether the embedded base64 blobs decode to executable payloads or to legitimate configuration. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.3% | Medium6.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12726 A flaw was found in the AWX GitHub webhook integration. When processing GitHub pull_request webhooks, the controller stores the pull_request.statuses_url value from the webhook payload without validating that it points to a trusted GitHub API endpoint. If a job template is configured with a GitHub Personal Access Token as its webhook credential, the controller later POSTs that token to the stored callback URL when posting job status updates. An attacker who can submit a correctly signed forged webhook using the job template's webhook_key can redirect the callback to an attacker-controlled URL and exfiltrate the configured GitHub PAT. EPSS 0.3%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.9 | EPSS 0.2% | Critical9.9EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48781 Postiz is an AI social media scheduling tool. In versions prior to 2.21.8, the Skool integration callback signed an attacker-controlled JSON blob into a session-shape JWT using the application's JWT_SECRET, and the auth middleware trusted every claim in that JWT without re-resolving the user from the database. Any authenticated Postiz user could forge a SUPERADMIN session and impersonate arbitrary organizations. This allowed Full Access to the following: all parts of Postiz, including users registered to the specific instance and the ability to post in the name of the victim's social media channels added to that Postiz instance. This issue has been fixed in version 2.21.8. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer On June 5, 2026, Microsoft removed 73 repositories from its GitHub organizations due to concerns over distribution of password-stealing malware linked to the Miasma/Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. The incident caused disruption to continuous integration pipelines, notably disabling the Azure/functions-action GitHub Action temporarily. The repositories were restored and deemed clean after investigation. Microsoft notified affected customers and continues to investigate. The malware campaign targeted open-source ecosystems, including prior compromises of Red Hat npm packages and Python packages on PyPI. No confirmed exploits in the wild have been reported for this specific incident. | Bleeping Computer | |||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-45261gitbutlerapp gitbutler · Code Injection Critical9.3EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-45261 GitButler is a modern Git-based version control interface for AI-powered workflows. Prior to 0.19.7, a emote code execution vulnerability exists in the Tauri-based GitButler desktop application. An attacker can inject a malicious link in a pull request body, which if clicked by the user allows for arbitrary script execution in the Tauri webview. Users that have not enabled forge integration are not at risk. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.19.7. | CVE Database V5 |
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