Search: mcp.server.ts
640 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-9467debugmcp mcp-debugger · Path Traversal Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-9467 CVE-2026-9467 is a path traversal vulnerability in the debugmcp mcp-debugger product up to version 0.20.0. It affects the handleGetSourceContext function in the src/server.ts file. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without user interaction and requires low privileges. The exploit code is publicly available, and the vendor has not responded to disclosure attempts. The vulnerability has a medium severity with a CVSS score of 5.3. No official patch or remediation guidance is currently available. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research As frontier AI models collapse the traditional exploit window, Tenable Hexa AI transforms the security operating model from manual triage to agentic orchestration. See how you can automate vulnerability remediation and super-charge exposure management with Tenable Hexa AI. Key takeaways AI models like Claude Mythos have reduced the time from vulnerability discovery to weaponization from weeks to minutes, making manual defense untenable. Tenable Hexa AI serves as an agentic engine that orchestrates complex, multi-step remediation workflows across modern attack surfaces to accelerate the speed of preemptive security and propel your exposure management program. Using the Model Context Protocol (MCP) included in Tenable Hexa AI, your team can build and deploy custom agents that anchor your preferred LLMs in the Tenable Exposure Data Fabric, ensuring every automated action is governed, auditable, and accurate. Why you need to implement agentic AI in cybersecurity (and specifically, in vulnerability management) For most of my career in cybersecurity, we’ve operated on a fundamental, if unspoken, assumption: We had a grace period. Whenever a new vulnerability was discovered, we knew we had time, often weeks or months, before adversaries would begin exploiting it. The time between vulnerability discovery and exploitation gave us breathing room. It gave us time to patch, triage, and remediate. But not any more. The gap between discovery and exploitation has been shrinking for years, and the vulnerability discovery capabilities demonstrated by frontier AI models like Claude Mythos are narrowing it even more. We have entered the era of AI speed. When an LLM can unearth a 27-year-old vulnerability in a hardened OS in minutes, and then weaponize it in seconds, old defensive cycles can’t keep up, and that’s untenable. This is why I’m so excited to announce the general availability of Tenable Hexa AI , the agentic engine of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform , at EXPOSURE 2026 : because it’s designed to help your organization address the escalating, AI-driven pace of vulnerability discovery. The agentic AI imperative in cybersecurity: Scale your preemptive defense to match machine speed with agentic innovation from Tenable Tenable Hexa AI is built to be a force multiplier and a flexible engine for innovation. Featuring a suite of built-in agents ready to automate assessment configuration, asset tagging, dashboard creation, ticket creation, and more, Tenable Hexa AI is designed to help your organization overcome the operational challenges deepened by adversarial AI use. When the window between discovery and exploitation hits near-zero, security teams locked in manual vulnerability management operating models are forced into a state of perpetual emergency. Manually stitching together context and telemetry from cloud, identity, OT, and vulnerability silos in an arduous effort to prioritize remediation for downstream IT and DevOps teams is a losing battle. And when you can’t provide clear, risk-based remediation priorities to IT and DevOps teams, you end up bombarding them with seemingly urgent tickets that may not in fact be critical to your organization. Constant shifts in remediation priorities and endless debates over what needs fixing and why is not sustainable. It creates friction and causes you to lose the cybersecurity race. In a world where attackers move at machine speed, only comprehensive exposure intelligence combined with the agentic AI orchestration capabilities provided by the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform can give you clarity and control. Tenable Hexa AI doesn’t just tell you where you are vulnerable; it mobilizes your preemptive defense. Capabilities of Tenable Hexa AI With this GA release, Tenable delivers foundational capabilities to help your organization accelerate the pace of vulnerability discovery and remediation, including: Your choice of agents - Use our pre-built, out-of-the-box agents to start reducing risk immediately, or use the Model Context Protocol (MCP) server built into Tenable Hexa AI to create custom agents tailored to your organization’s environment. Advanced multi-step reasoning - Tenable Hexa AI executes complex, end-to-end workflows spanning your attack surface (e.g., IT, cloud, identity, OT, etc.) in a single request, eliminating the need for practitioners to toggle between views to get exposure context. It understands that a CVE in your web app is a critical threat specifically because it is linked to a privileged service account with a path to your sensitive data. Automated remediation workflows - Tenable Hexa AI orchestrates remediation workflows, automatically creating and routing tickets, generating custom policies, and producing audit-ready reports, so security teams can act fast on every critical exposure. End-to-end exposure path insights - Practitioners can query their environment by identity attributes, such as service accounts, privileged users, and Active Directory groups, to surface exposure paths that traditional asset inventories miss. Tenable Hexa AI also provides guided assistance for complex Active Directory sensor configurations. Build your own AI agents for cybersecurity with Tenable Hexa AI In addition to out-of-the-box agentic capabilities for use cases like automated assessment configuration, asset tagging, and ticket creation, customers can also build custom agents via Tenable Hexa AI's built-in MCP that are informed by your organization’s unique security policies and internal business logic. Tenable Hexa AI serves as the orchestration layer connecting your favorite AI tools to your infrastructure and other security tools, all with the data and context from the Tenable Exposure Data Fabric. By anchoring the models your organization uses in the authoritative context of your own environment, Tenable Hexa AI moves you beyond generic AI answers to governed and auditable automation. Whether you are automating complex remediation or generating board-ready dashboards, Tenable Hexa AI ensures the output is both verifiable and auditable. The Tenable Exposure Data Fabric is key because an agent is only as effective as the data it has access to. Tenable Hexa AI is powered by the Tenable Exposure Data Fabric, a repository of 20 years of vulnerability research and the industry’s largest collection of contextualized exposure data. In other words, we’ve built an agentic engine for cybersecurity that uses the world’s best exposure data to drive machine-speed actions. This is the only way to ensure your AI is validating the real state of your environment, rather than just guessing. Real-world agentic AI use cases for Tenable Hexa AI While there are virtually infinite ways to apply agentic orchestration to your unique cybersecurity challenges, here are four high-impact areas where manual workflows traditionally break down and make it impossible for you to keep pace with AI-powered vulnerability discovery: Supply chain response - Neutralize third-party threats by using Tenable Hexa AI to correlate software components with affected internal assets. Automated patching - Use custom Hexa agents to beat the Mythos clock by orchestrating patches the moment a vulnerability is validated. Remediation assignment - Use Tenable Hexa AI to automatically match CVEs to asset owners in seconds and trigger immediate response workflows. These use cases demonstrate how Tenable Hexa AI can bridge the gap between exposure intelligence and action. Make the untenable Tenable The collapse of the exploit window is a wake-up call. It gives us the opportunity to change how we work. By shifting from manual triage to agentic orchestration, organizations are seeing a shift in productivity and how they prioritize and action exposure reduction. While early design partners have already reclaimed days per month on foundational tasks like asset tagging, the value is not found solely in the hours saved, but rather, in the precision of the response. By automating the correlation between cloud, identity, AI, OT, and vulnerability data, Tenable One provides the clear, contextualized instructions that IT and DevOps teams need to act with confidence. This eliminates the administrative friction and back-and-forth negotiation that often results in critical vulnerabilities going unaddressed. Reclaiming those days means your best people are no longer buried in spreadsheets; they are focused on high-impact strategy, architecture hardening, and preemptive defense. Tenable Hexa AI is available today as part of the Tenable One Foundation and Tenable One Advanced packages . | Tenable Research | |||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-44427modelcontextprotocol registry · Open Redirect MediumEPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-44427 CVE-2026-44427 is an open redirect vulnerability in the modelcontextprotocol (MCP) registry affecting versions 1.1.0 through 1.7.4. The issue exists in the TrailingSlashMiddleware component, where a crafted URL with a protocol-relative path can cause the server to respond with a Location header pointing to an external domain. This allows attackers to redirect users to potentially malicious sites. The vulnerability is fixed in version 1.7.5. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-42559modelcontextprotocol rust-sdk · Origin Validation Error High8.8EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42559 CVE-2026-42559 is a high-severity vulnerability in the modelcontextprotocol Rust SDK (rmcp crate) prior to version 1.4.0. The Streamable HTTP server transport did not validate the incoming Host header, enabling a DNS rebinding attack. This flaw could allow a malicious website to send authenticated requests to an MCP server running on a victim's loopback or private network interface. The vulnerability is fixed in version 1.4.0. No known exploits in the wild have been reported. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.2 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.2EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42260 Open-WebSearch is a multi-engine MCP server, CLI, and local daemon for agent web search and content retrieval. Prior to 2.1.7, isPublicHttpUrl / assertPublicHttpUrl in src/utils/urlSafety.ts do not recognize bracketed IPv6 literals and do not resolve DNS, which combine to allow non-blind SSRF with the response body returned to the caller. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.7. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.8 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-43901bx33661 Wireshark-MCP · Path Traversal Medium6.8EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-43901 Wireshark MCP is an MCP Server that turns tshark into a structured analysis interface, then layers in optional Wireshark suite utilities. In 1.1.5 and earlier, wireshark-mcp exposes a wireshark_export_objects MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled dest_dir parameter and passes it to tshark's --export-objects flag with no mandatory path restriction. The path sandbox (_allowed_dirs) is None by default and only activates when the environment variable WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.0 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-45001OpenClaw before 2026.4.20 contains a guard bypass vulnerability in the agent-facing gateway config.patch and Medium6.0EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-45001 OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.4.20 have a vulnerability in the agent-facing gateway config.patch and config.apply endpoints that allows bypassing security guards protecting operator-trusted settings. This flaw enables a prompt-injected model with access to the owner-only gateway tool to persist unauthorized changes to critical settings such as sandbox policy, plugin enablement, gateway authentication/TLS, hook routing, MCP server configuration, SSRF policy, and filesystem hardening. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-43995FlowiseAI Flowise · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-43995 Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.0, multiple tool implementations directly import and invoke raw HTTP clients (node-fetch, axios) instead of using the secured wrapper. These tools include (1) OpenAPIToolkit/OpenAPIToolkit.ts, (2) WebScraperTool/WebScraperTool.ts, (3) MCP/core.ts, and (4) Arxiv/core.ts. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 1.0% | High8.1EPSS 1.0%CVE Database V5 CVE-2026-30635 is a command injection vulnerability in automagik-genie 2.5.27 MCP Server. It allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands via the view_task (also known as view) in the readTranscriptFromCommit function located in dist/mcp/server.js. This occurs when a user reads from an external FORGE_BASE_URL. The vulnerability has a high severity score of 8.1 but currently has no known exploits in the wild or available patches. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | Critical9.8GCVE Database The profullstack/mcp-server package contains a critical OS command injection vulnerability in its domain_lookup module. The module constructs shell command strings by directly concatenating user input without sanitization or escaping, then executes them via execAsync(). This allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands as the server process via specially crafted POST requests to /domain-lookup/check and /domain-lookup/bulk endpoints. The server listens on all interfaces (0.0.0.0) with no global authentication middleware, increasing exposure. Proof-of-concept exploits demonstrate arbitrary command execution despite error responses. The CVSS 3.1 score is 9.8 (critical). | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-44284labring FastGPT · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Medium6.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-44284 FastGPT is an AI Agent building platform. Prior to version 4.14.17, FastGPT had an inconsistent SSRF protection gap in MCP tool URL handling. The direct MCP preview/run endpoints already rejected internal/private network URLs, but the MCP tool create/update endpoints could still save an internal MCP server URL. That stored URL could later be used by workflow execution without revalidating the destination. An authenticated user with permission to create or manage MCP toolsets could store an internal endpoint such as http://localhost:3000/mcp and later cause the FastGPT backend workflow runner to connect to that internal destination. This issue has been patched in version 4.14.17. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.2 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.2EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-44694 ### Summary Authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery affecting the webhook trigger tools, the n8n API client (`N8N_API_URL`), and per-request URLs supplied via the `x-n8n-url` header in multi-tenant HTTP mode. ### Impact A caller with access to the MCP session can drive HTTP requests from the n8n-mcp host to internal services and cloud metadata endpoints that the SSRF gate is meant to block. The response body is returned to the caller, making internal-service enumeration and credential theft immediate without any out-of-band channel. - **Multi-tenant HTTP deployments** where tenants share an `AUTH_TOKEN`: any tenant with valid credentials can reach the operator's cloud metadata service and exfiltrate temporary IAM / GCP service account / Azure managed-identity credentials. - **Single-tenant deployments**: indirect prompt injection through tool arguments reaches the same surface; an attacker who can influence the LLM's tool calls can read internal services from the n8n-mcp host. - **Stdio deployments** are reachable via the same prompt-injection path. ### Patched Versions Fixed in `n8n-mcp@2.50.2`. **Note for operators:** The same SSRF gate that previously covered webhook URLs now also covers the n8n API client base URL. If `N8N_API_URL` points at `http://localhost:5678` (n8n on the same host) or an RFC1918 address (n8n on the same private network), set `WEBHOOK_SECURITY_MODE=moderate` (allows localhost, still blocks RFC1918 and cloud metadata) or `WEBHOOK_SECURITY_MODE=permissive` (allows RFC1918 too — only safe on a trusted private network). Default `strict` is correct for deployments where n8n is reachable at a public hostname. ### Workarounds For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately: 1. **Restrict network egress** from the n8n-mcp host with a firewall, reverse proxy, or cloud security group. Explicitly deny cloud metadata IPs (`169.254.169.254`, `169.254.170.2`, `100.100.100.200`, `192.0.0.192`, and the GCP `metadata.google.internal` resolved IP) and any RFC1918 networks the server does not legitimately need to reach. 2. **Run in stdio mode** instead of HTTP if the multi-tenant surface is not needed (no shared `AUTH_TOKEN` to compromise). 3. **Disable workflow management tools** via `DISABLED_TOOLS=n8n_trigger_webhook_workflow,n8n_create_workflow,n8n_test_workflow` if the deployment does not need them. ### Credit Reported by [@fg0x0](https://github.com/fg0x0). | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-42282czlonkowski n8n-mcp · Sensitive Data in Logs Medium4.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42282 ### Impact When `n8n-mcp` runs in HTTP transport mode, authenticated MCP `tools/call` requests had their full arguments and JSON-RPC params written to server logs by the request dispatcher and several sibling code paths before any redaction. When a tool call carries credential material — most notably `n8n_manage_credentials.data` — the raw values can be persisted in logs. In deployments where logs are collected, forwarded to external systems, or viewable outside the request trust boundary (shared log storage, SIEM pipelines, support/ops access), this can result in disclosure of: - bearer tokens and OAuth credentials sent through `n8n_manage_credentials` - per-tenant API keys and webhook auth headers embedded in tool arguments - arbitrary secret-bearing payloads passed to any MCP tool The issue requires authentication (`AUTH_TOKEN` accepted by the server), so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger it; the runtime exposure is also reduced by an existing console-silencing layer in HTTP mode, but that layer is fragile and the values are still constructed and passed into the logger. The fix removes the leak at the source. Impact category: **CWE-532** (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File). CVSS 3.1 score: **4.3 Medium** (`AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`). ### Affected Deployments running n8n-mcp **v2.47.12 or earlier** in HTTP transport mode (`MCP_MODE=http`). The stdio transport short-circuits the relevant log calls and is not affected in practice. ### Patched **v2.47.13** and later. - npm: `npx n8n-mcp@latest` (or pin to `>= 2.47.13`) - Docker: `docker pull ghcr.io/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp:latest` The patch routes tool-call arguments through a metadata-only summarizer (`summarizeToolCallArgs`) that records type, top-level key names, and approximate size — never values. The same pattern was adopted earlier for HTTP request bodies in GHSA-pfm2-2mhg-8wpx. ### Workarounds If developers cannot upgrade immediately: - Restrict access to the HTTP port (firewall, reverse proxy, or VPN) so only trusted clients can authenticate. - Restrict access to server logs (no shared SIEM ingestion, no support read-only access) until the upgrade lands. - Switch to stdio transport (`MCP_MODE=stdio`, the default for CLI invocation), which has no HTTP surface and short-circuits the affected log calls. ### Credit n8n-MCP thanks [@Mirr2](https://github.com/Mirr2) (Organization / Jormungandr) for reporting this issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-41495czlonkowski n8n-mcp · Sensitive Data in Logs Medium5.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-41495 ### Impact When `n8n-mcp` runs in HTTP transport mode, incoming requests to the `POST /mcp` endpoint had their request metadata written to server logs regardless of the authentication outcome. In deployments where logs are collected, forwarded to external systems, or viewable outside the request trust boundary (shared log storage, SIEM pipelines, support/ops access), this can result in disclosure of: - bearer tokens from the `Authorization` header - per-tenant API keys from the `x-n8n-key` header in multi-tenant setups - JSON-RPC request payloads sent to the MCP endpoint Access control itself was not bypassed — unauthenticated requests were correctly rejected with `401 Unauthorized` — but sensitive values from those rejected requests could still be persisted in logs. Impact category: **CWE-532** (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File). ### Affected Deployments running n8n-mcp **v2.47.10 or earlier** in HTTP transport mode (`MCP_MODE=http`). The stdio transport is not affected. ### Patched **v2.47.11** and later. - npm: `npx n8n-mcp@latest` (or pin to `>= 2.47.11`) - Docker: `docker pull ghcr.io/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp:latest` ### Workarounds If users cannot upgrade immediately: - Restrict network access to the HTTP port (firewall, reverse proxy, or VPN) so only trusted clients can reach the endpoint. - Switch to stdio transport (`MCP_MODE=stdio`, the default for CLI invocation), which has no HTTP surface. ### Credit n8n-MCP thanks [@S4nso](https://github.com/S4nso) (Organization / Jormungandr) for reporting this issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.4 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-44336MervinPraison PraisonAI · Improper Input Validation Critical9.4EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-44336 PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.34, PraisonAI's MCP (Model Context Protocol) server (praisonai mcp serve) registers four file-handling tools by default — praisonai.rules.create, praisonai.rules.show, praisonai.rules.delete, and praisonai.workflow.show. Each accepts a path or filename string from MCP tools/call arguments and joins it onto ~/.praison/rules/ (or, for workflow.show, accepts an absolute path) with no containment check. The JSON-RPC dispatcher passes params["arguments"] blind to each handler via **kwargs without validating against the advertised input schema. By setting rule_name="../../<some-path>" an attacker walks out of the rules directory and writes any file the running user can write. Dropping a Python .pth file into the user site-packages directory escalates this primitive to arbitrary code execution in any subsequent Python process the user spawns — the next praisonai CLI invocation, an IDE script run, the user's python REPL, or any background Python service. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.34. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-42449czlonkowski n8n-mcp · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) High8.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42449 ### Impact In the SDK embedder path (`N8NDocumentationMCPServer` constructor, `getN8nApiClient()`, and `validateInstanceContext()`), the synchronous URL validator in `SSRFProtection.validateUrlSync()` had no IPv6 checks. IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses such as `http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]` bypassed the cloud-metadata, localhost, and private-IP range checks. An attacker able to supply an `n8nApiUrl` value could cause the server to issue HTTP requests to cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba, Oracle), RFC1918 private networks, or localhost services. Response bodies are returned to the caller (non-blind SSRF), and the `n8nApiKey` is forwarded in the `x-n8n-api-key` header to the attacker-controlled target. The first-party HTTP server deployment was not primarily affected — it has a second async validator (`validateWebhookUrl`) that catches IPv6 addresses. Impact category: **CWE-918** (Server-Side Request Forgery). ### Affected Deployments embedding n8n-mcp as an SDK using `N8NDocumentationMCPServer` or `N8NMCPEngine` with user-supplied `InstanceContext` on versions **v2.47.4 through v2.47.13**. ### Patched **v2.47.14** and later. - npm: `npx n8n-mcp@latest` (or pin to `>= 2.47.14`) - Docker: `docker pull ghcr.io/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp:latest` ### Workarounds If developers cannot upgrade immediately: - **Validate URLs before passing to the SDK** — reject any `n8nApiUrl` whose hostname is an IP literal (bracketed IPv6 or dotted IPv4) before calling `N8NDocumentationMCPServer` / `getN8nApiClient()`. Accept only URLs with DNS-resolvable hostnames. - **Restrict egress at the network layer** — block outbound traffic from the n8n-mcp process to RFC1918 ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16), link-local `169.254.0.0/16`, and cloud metadata endpoints. Defense-in-depth against this class of issue and recommended even after upgrading. - **Do not accept user-controlled `n8nApiUrl` values** — if the project's integration derives the URL from internal configuration only, this vulnerability is not reachable. Upgrading to v2.47.14 is still strongly recommended. ### Credit Reported by @manthanghasadiya. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 1.5% | CVE-2026-781254yyyu code-mcp · Injection Medium6.9EPSS 1.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-7812 A command injection vulnerability exists in the git_operation function of the src/code_mcp/server.py file in the MCP Tool component of 54yyyu code-mcp. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to manipulate the operation argument to execute arbitrary commands. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 7.3 (high severity) and public exploit code is available. The project uses continuous delivery with rolling releases, so no specific affected or fixed versions are provided. The project has been informed but has not yet responded or issued a fix. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-781154yyyu code-mcp · Path Traversal Medium6.9EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-7811 A path traversal vulnerability exists in the is_safe_path function of src/code_mcp/server.py in the MCP File Handler component of 54yyyu code-mcp. This flaw allows remote attackers to manipulate file paths, potentially accessing unauthorized files. The vulnerability is publicly disclosed with exploit code available. The project uses rolling releases, so specific affected and fixed versions are not provided. The CVSS score is 7.3, indicating high severity. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-7810UsamaK98 python-notebook-mcp · Path Traversal Medium6.9EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-7810 A path traversal vulnerability exists in UsamaK98 python-notebook-mcp affecting functions in server.py, allowing remote attackers to manipulate file paths. The flaw impacts create_notebook, read_notebook, edit_cell, and add_cell functions. Exploit code has been published. The project uses a rolling release model, so no specific affected or fixed versions are available. The vendor has been notified but has not yet responded. | GCVE Database |
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