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--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ac906893a6ea1562025bfa35bf4f1998cfd745619f21c4dc3880aa386dc3cfe1) dist/index.js exports a small tailwind scrollbar-hide plugin followed by a trailing eval(atob('<~32KB obfuscator.io payload>')) that executes on every require()/import of the package. The decoded payload pulls in http, https, zlib and child_process.spawn (with require('child_proc'+'ess') split-string obfuscation and an obfuscator.io string-array dispatcher) and contains hardcoded Ethereum JSON-RPC method names (eth_getBlockByNumber, eth_blockNumber), etherscan-style transaction listing paths (?module=account&action=...&startblock=0&endblock=99999999), a process.env.ETH_RPC_URL read, and hardcoded RPC/explorer hosts under drpc.org, publicnode.com, blockscout.com and blast-api.io. A CSS utility plugin has no legitimate need for network I/O, spawned child processes, or dynamic evaluation of an obfuscated blob. The package name inverts the word order of the established tailwind-scrollbar-hide plugin, consistent with a typosquat carrier for the loader. ## Source: ghsa-malware (db8f8e9574e99a7ff90f6934b87642ac2408d46e35bd267f6281d3e8061071db) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (a34add291ef7584aec7041449cb2e80d36ae98f93c2725e1aa018707e3334119) On bin start, @xiaohhhh1/canvas-agent opens an outbound WebSocket to the hardcoded relay wss://canvas.xiaohhhh1.com/api/agent-relay and treats inbound messages as HTTP requests to its own loopback API at 127.0.0.1:17371. The bridge unconditionally injects the local agent token (x-canvas-agent-token) into forwarded requests, so remote 'request' messages satisfy token authentication and can invoke /agent/codex/turn and /agent/claude/turn, which spawn the Codex app-server and Claude CLI locally with attacker-supplied prompts and a caller-controlled permissionMode. Codex/Claude are autonomous coding agents that can write files in the workspace and, when permissionMode is widened to danger-full-access, execute arbitrary shell commands. The same code path also bypasses the loopback server's browser-Origin allow-list: the origin gate is populated only after token validation, and the relay bridge presents the valid token without any user-consented browser Origin, so remote-originated calls pass the token+origin check the README advertises. The net effect is a network-to-local-agent-to-shell control path from a hardcoded author-controlled server into the installer's machine and any repository it is run against.

Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments. This advisory contains the container images for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.17.56. See the following advisory for the RPM packages for this release: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2026:47726 Space precludes documenting all of the container images in this advisory. See the following Release Notes documentation, which will be updated shortly for this release, for details about these changes: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.17/html/release_notes/

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b9276dba65fd393d94c5beb06122b1297994c96bda03d940f34fcc59016e4c5b) The bundled CLI at bin/claude-cli.js hardcodes a hub endpoint https://hub.client-llm.com that is concealed behind a bespoke base64+XOR decoder (function _deHub, XOR key 'gnP2p!7xQ'). The decoder is used exactly once, to reconstruct this single URL; no other strings in the bundle use it. On `claude-cli start`, this hidden hub is added by default to the active hub list (opt-out only, undocumented), while the README presents hub participation as an opt-in feature the user manually configures. Once started, the CLI opens a WebSocket to <hub>/node, and on receiving {t:"job", id, body} messages it POSTs the remote-supplied body to the installer's local http://127.0.0.1:<port>/v1/messages endpoint using the local API key (x-api-key header) and streams the response back over the WebSocket. In default mode this dispatches a `claude -p` child process on the installer's machine driven by attacker-controlled prompts, consuming the installer's paid Anthropic subscription and, given agentic/tool-enabled Claude sessions, exposing remote-controlled execution paths on the installer's host. The targeted obfuscation of the destination URL, the mismatch between documented opt-in behavior and actual default-on enrollment, and the remote job-dispatch channel together constitute a backdoor combined with silent relay of the installer's Claude credentials and quota.

In this article Activity overview How ClickFix works Campaign overview ClickFix moved from open pages to fingerprinting gates The fingerprinting gate Mitigation and protection guidance Indicators of compromise (IOC) References Learn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a macOS ClickFix campaign distributing infostealers, including MacSync and Atomic Stealer (AMOS) , through a large cluster of look-alike domains. The campaign evolved from broadly serving ClickFix lures to using a server-side browser-fingerprinting gate that shows the lure primarily to visitors whose environment appears consistent with a genuine macOS browser. This cloaking limits visibility for crawlers, sandboxes, and some automated analysis workflows. The blog details the domain pattern, fingerprinting checks, infection chain, detection coverage, and hunting pivots that defenders can use to identify related activity. Activity overview Microsoft Threat Intelligence has been tracking a macOS ClickFix operation that distributes information-stealing malware through a large family of algorithmically named domains. Over several weeks of monitoring, Microsoft observed a notable shift in tradecraft: the same infrastructure moved from openly serving the malicious command in the served page’s HTML source to concealing the lure behind a server-side fingerprinting gate that reveals the payload only to visitors the server assesses as a genuine macOS target. The chain ultimately delivers information stealers such as MacSync or Atomic Stealer (AMOS). This activity is consistent with the broader shift in macOS ClickFix tradecraft that Microsoft Threat Intelligence previously documented , in which threat actors instruct users to run Terminal commands that retrieve remotely hosted content rather than the traditional approach of delivering a disk image for manual installation. The cluster described here is notable for two reasons: its domains are mass-produced by a recognizable name generator, and it adopted server-side cloaking on existing infrastructure, giving defenders a clear before-and-after view of the same operation. In this blog, we describe the campaign’s domain-generation pattern, the two delivery phases we observed, the fingerprinting gate that now fronts the infrastructure, and the end-to-end infection chain. We also provide hunting guidance, mitigation recommendations, and defanged indicators of compromise. How ClickFix works ClickFix is a social-engineering technique where attackers persuade users to copy and run a command in Terminal instead of downloading a traditional macOS application. The lure usually appears as a fake verification step, software update, download error, or CAPTCHA, with the command disguised as something required to complete the action. Because execution starts from a user-run Terminal command rather than a downloaded app bundle, the flow can avoid parts of the normal macOS application trust path, including quarantine handling, code-signing evaluation, and notarization checks typically applied to downloaded applications. In this campaign, ClickFix remains the delivery mechanism, but the important change is that the lure is no longer shown to every visitor. The page first profiles the visitor through a browser-fingerprinting gate and primarily requests consistent with a genuine macOS browser environment receive the fake “Download for macOS” page and copied Terminal command. Figure 1a – The counterfeit “Download for macOS” page served to a qualifying visitor by a cloaked gate (apricotfilepoint[.]com). The page displays a forged “Verified Publisher” badge and offers a one-click Copy of an obfuscated curl one-liner. Delivery is conditional. During analysis, the same URLs returned different content to different requests. In some case the macOS ClickFix lure, and in others an apparently benign decoy page. In our testing, a request presenting a Windows browser received a decoy page such as a fake browser-extension or VPN landing page (Figure…

### Impact An input validation issue allowed any staff user to create a post with content that could be used to hijack another staff user's Ghost Admin session resulting in privilege escalation. ### Vulnerable versions This vulnerability is present in Ghost from v4.9.0 up to v6.54.0. ### Patches v6.54.1 contains a fix for this issue. ### How to update For self-hosters using Docker, find [Docker's official Ghost image here](https://hub.docker.com/_/ghost). Updating a Docker-based Ghost instance [is documented here](https://docs.ghost.org/install/docker#updating-ghost). If your Ghost is a Ghost-CLI install see our documentation on [updating it to the latest version here](https://docs.ghost.org/update). ### References Ghost thanks Versa for disclosing this vulnerability responsibly. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Ghost at [security@ghost.org](mailto:security@ghost.org).

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (38937963f906d0bf3b4dac24a1a45f574aeb53cd2f268ffb9730d88bedf50bce) The package's default export accepts (token, password) arguments and POSTs them, formatted as a Discord embed titled 'Yeni Hesap Bilgisi' with fields '🔑 Token' and '🔒 Şifre', to a hardcoded discord.com webhook URL. The destination is non-configurable, and any consumer that imports multi-reqs and invokes the default function forwards those credentials to an author-controlled Discord channel. Parameter naming and the Turkish 'Hesap Yönetim Sistemi' (Account Management System) framing indicate the module is designed to be consumed or bundled into other code as a credential-harvesting shim.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e24f6c700225d22dcccdf1af7bb58c7628366ccc59b864431af5123909b42626) package.json's preinstall hook runs index.js, which collects hostname, username, home directory, DNS servers, and current working directory, reads /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts, and HTTPS-POSTs the JSON payload to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator (oastify.com) subdomain. The exfiltration fires automatically on npm install without any user interaction, and targets installer-side system identity and account data. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e043a7baa55d15e554e0043a67f74acddbcf0e5ca437783bb551b6b0a4458b65) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (74d01af74706eee07fb8ed306ec3b830641f63b4c055d605026edff65fd11c8f) The package's preinstall hook runs index.js, which collects hostname, username, home directory, DNS servers, package path, and the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts, then HTTPS-POSTs the JSON payload to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain tebdjgz4guem6t74pf6iyowyjppgd71w.oastify.com. This fires automatically on npm install with no user interaction. ## Source: ghsa-malware (2de2d31bd044eb84689187958c0f7a03afa21e9d83ae6edb90e3c796ac5d09dd) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (800fab99d95f1a2cef6ebf269ca240bf60518735cfb58c7c24b6a8474c72ee77) package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs index.js on npm install. index.js collects the installer's hostname, username, home directory, DNS server list, and reads /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts, then HTTPS-POSTs the collected JSON to the hardcoded out-of-band endpoint idzskk7dl8mrfoqx6thyhegqbhha50tp.oastify.com (Burp Collaborator subdomain). Execution is automatic on default install; the destination is attacker-controlled and unrelated to any declared package purpose. ## Source: ghsa-malware (687ddbe581731d5da84cb2a0e04508c31995cbc7fdd378b53090ac8b9a51a0d2) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (6921f72a1b4fbaaba87fcbe3cb30137815e7e2bb932ffa794acd0010b8954c5f) package.json declares `preinstall: node index.js`, causing index.js to run automatically on `npm install`. The script collects installer-side data — hostname, username, home directory, DNS server list, current working directory, package.json contents, and the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts — and HTTPS-POSTs it to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain at 5z5h9l8e7cktx1ihl6usn4zgb7h15rtg.oastify.com. The exfiltration fires unconditionally on install with no user interaction. ## Source: ghsa-malware (fb3a6a289e12028cd0778c9ca9e56392a64003291be3756d28490d76c491e249) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (a0d1e2b10c31f45e3c73ad895a1ccd4188cdedf5ab1a795b420f5aa2693d7686) The npm package's preinstall hook runs index.js at install time, which collects the installer's hostname, username, home directory, DNS server list, and the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts, then POSTs a JSON payload over HTTPS to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain n6usddpvkn7jcauar9va0xvleck48uwj.oastify.com. The package name mimics a documentation package for karapace (a Kafka registry project), consistent with a dependency-confusion / typosquat recon payload. Installer host identity and local system file contents leave the machine to an attacker-controlled OAST endpoint on `npm install` with no user interaction. ## Source: ghsa-malware (0504b1eeee4b53817289d98df2d4b44775e97feea2be622a724012a4dc60576f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (6ad1c6bad5ee8d3cb562503b94d5534ba2c98ad5b4854c073e1482d59ab8687e) package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs index.js during `npm install`. The script reads /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts, os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, the user's home directory, dns.getServers(), and package metadata, then POSTs the collected data via HTTPS to the hardcoded subdomain 7ckdbwo9f8dtrg8y36sbe4e8lzrqfg35.oastify.com (Burp Collaborator OAST callback). The exfiltration fires automatically at install time without user interaction. ## Source: ghsa-malware (da7109b04e5b66699eebc1d774b016c4603a4fb0932136d62c0c3be356d5bb2b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b635b8b6d257c079a0d0a9c06e37910b67f2e75d1e71dced264043624951ce06) package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs index.js on `npm install`. index.js collects host identifiers (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), homedir, DNS servers, cwd, package.json contents) and reads /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts, then POSTs the resulting JSON over HTTPS to the hardcoded out-of-band collaborator subdomain lsh5x8dwumsekllw37kacgaqxh3cr2fr.oastify.com. The destination is a Burp Collaborator OOB endpoint unrelated to any documented package purpose, and execution is automatic at install time. ## Source: ghsa-malware (0723c99e49b056e9d946985e6401afa50ee28e766b0e7e0993914f4ad3538723) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (6b9fb0d73b7d26454a227e93754f11ff2405424b1279490863055e8d8c8c6498) Package targets the electrode-io internal name `electrode-ota-ui-app` with an inflated 99.0.1 version to win dependency resolution against a private registry. package.json declares both `main: index.js` and `scripts.postinstall: node index.js`, so on `npm install` and on any `require()` the package unconditionally runs `collectAndSend()` in index.js. That function gathers host identifiers via `os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, `os.platform()`, and `os.release()`, resolves the installer's public IP via ipify and geo/ISP data via ipapi.co, and POSTs a JSON payload to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain `https://itfv50wbocctx0j32fyfq8z7uy0ptdn1c.oastify.com/callback`, controlled by the package author. README self-labels as a dependency-confusion PoC, but the callback is live and any installer whose resolver picks this public package over the intended internal one is compromised.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ecc42778bb54bfdea5784d5dcb68cf43c89def3dbaeddba1d1a6bd2850cb174b) The package's preinstall script (`node index.js`) auto-executes on `npm install` and collects host identifiers (os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, home directory, DNS servers) along with the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts, then POSTs them via HTTPS to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain at 2ru8qr34u3so6bnti176tzt30u6muci1.oastify.com. The package name mimics an Azure DevOps MATLAB extension but ships no legitimate functionality (empty author, empty description); the package exists only to run the exfil beacon. Consistent with a dependency-confusion / recon probe. ## Source: ghsa-malware (db5089aca87fa4e104e5c3395d2a884191c1ffe1d146bf73b0f255872b59e55e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4e6e8d8500ee41d92250882b57d98d805b381d2d08eeeac7bae55c3f5e417dff) package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs index.js on `npm install`. index.js collects the installer's hostname, username, home directory, DNS server configuration, current working directory, and the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts, then POSTs this payload over HTTPS to the hardcoded subdomain x75h3spwmlqq7bzriw6gm6w8azgq4hs6.oastify.com (a Burp Collaborator out-of-band interaction host). Execution is automatic at install time with no consent prompt and no documented purpose. The behavior matches a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon that exfiltrates installer host identity and local system files to an attacker-controlled endpoint. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a7d5d00e0c243819b3d1813314c4f4ef596f92a034d82e0a5acce92740bed5d5) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c3faac0139a1c2fd25d8b955e9290380bec365a1d3034fb793dfa723cb930463) package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs index.js on npm install. The script collects host reconnaissance (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), homedir, DNS server list, current working directory, package.json contents) and reads /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts from the installer's filesystem, then POSTs the aggregated JSON over HTTPS to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain ie02j5ztgjeb6i7tp467ydwnjep8dy1n.oastify.com. The package name mimics a legitimate SDK category but its only behavior on install is this exfiltration beacon. ## Source: ghsa-malware (39394cd04a494a4f6dceff2f54848e93a56bbbab2663fe9b48611ea39df58808) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0bca913238607a18079a675e2fe652c25c04c2bbc62f5c577bb2b6d2424cd4a8) fundraiserservpp@2.0.0 runs `node index.js` as a `preinstall` lifecycle script on `npm install`. The script collects host metadata from the installer machine — `os.hostname()`, `os.platform()`, `os.arch()`, the user home directory path, and configured DNS servers — and issues an HTTPS POST to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain (`mrh99ucv1u3kyeba1020ae2t7kdc12pr.oastify.com/hit`) with that data as a JSON body. The beacon fires automatically at install time with no user interaction. The destination is an attacker-controlled out-of-band interaction endpoint typical of dependency-confusion reconnaissance, confirming to the operator that the package name was successfully resolved and installed inside a target build environment.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (409d11825a61bed068425296e83dcc0c87427579f7b5d724ec52e5e87465f2b5) The package ships a prebuilt darwin/x64 Mach-O binary containing a Go agent (module github.com/ccfly/rescue) that, when executed, connects to a hardcoded remote broker at cc.hn / ccfly over WebSocket (ws://ccfly, wss://, https://cc.hn) using github.com/gorilla/websocket, spawns a pseudo-terminal via github.com/creack/pty, and pipes the WebSocket stream into that PTY. Symbols include agent.serve, agent.startPTY, agent.waitAuthorized, agent.wsBase and unixPTY.Read/Write/Resize/Close, giving the remote party interactive shell control of the host. A second stage (setup.downloadCcfly, setup.fetchAndExtract, setup.npmTarballURL, setup.extractFromTarGz, setup.runCcflyInstall, setup.redeemEnrollToken, setup.(*brokerClient).escalateToRescue, with a rodata reference to https://registry.npmjs.org) fetches and executes a further ccfly npm tarball after the broker approves an enrollment token — the additional code executed on the host is chosen by the remote broker, not the installer. The binary also inspects shell RC files and /etc/hosts (setup.scanShellProfilesForProxy, setup.checkProxyResidue, setup.checkHostsResidue, setup.runEnvChecks, setup.envReport) and POSTs an environment report back to the broker (setup.(*brokerClient).post; rodata latest.zshrc, export.ccfly).