WPChat plugin for WordPress before 1.4.6 contains a broken access control vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to invoke the admin claim-offer action by reusing the publicly exposed wpchat_frontend nonce without any capability check. Attackers can call SmartSearchManagerService::claimOffer() via POST /wp-json/wpchat/v1/smart-search/claim-offer to register an attacker-controlled email against the site's domain using the site's stored api_token, corrupting the WPChat account and newsletter identity bound to the installation.
Threat actors are abusing Microsoft Teams' external chat feature to conduct social engineering attacks and deliver malicious payloads. They impersonate IT support using throwaway Microsoft 365 tenants with deceptive display names to bypass warnings. Attacks often start with email bombing, followed by Teams contact offering help, then use legitimate remote access tools to gain control quickly. This technique exploits collaboration features rather than software vulnerabilities.
Revolut experienced a significant service outage affecting multiple online banking and financial services worldwide. The disruption impacted sign-ins, card payments, transfers, currency exchange, stock trading, and live support chat. The company confirmed that customer funds and data remain safe. This outage follows previous data breaches disclosed by Revolut in recent years. The incident is ongoing, with the company actively working to restore full service.
The SupportCandy – AI Customer Support Ticket System & Live Chatbot Agent plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to time-based SQL Injection via the 'sort_by' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 3.5.3 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with custom-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. Exploitation requires the authenticated attacker to hold both a Subscriber-level (or higher) WordPress role and a SupportCandy Agent account with the 'Assign Agents' permission configured.
The SupportCandy – AI Customer Support Ticket System & Live Chatbot Agent plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'name' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 3.5.3 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. This exploit chain requires the 'Register user if not exists' setting to be disabled, which is its default configuration.
Signal has released version 8.30, completing the rollout of its secure backups feature across all supported platforms including iOS and desktop apps. This feature allows users to create end-to-end encrypted backups of their chats, either hosted by Signal or stored locally on the device. The backups require a recovery key for decryption, and hosted backups include an additional rotating key for enhanced security. The update introduces local encrypted backups to iOS and desktop, aligns Android backups to a cross-platform format, and improves media storage efficiency. The backup system excludes disappearing messages set to vanish within 24 hours. The new iOS client also supports direct encrypted iPhone-to-iPhone transfers via Wi-Fi Aware. This release marks the completion of Signal's first phase of its backups project.
The WPBot – AI ChatBot for Live Support, Lead Generation, AI Services plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'conversation' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 8.7.3 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The action is gated only by a nonce that is localized into every public-facing page via wp_localize_script, rendering the nonce check ineffective as an access control barrier for unauthenticated users.
The Support Genix – Helpdesk, AI Chatbot, Knowledge Base & Customer Support Ticketing System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass leading to Administrator Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.52 via the `guest_ticket_login()` function and its `p` parameter. This is due to the site-wide AES-256-CBC encryption key being derived from only three two-digit `wp_rand(10, 99)` values and a Unix timestamp via `md5()` — yielding approximately 19.5 bits of entropy — combined with a deterministic IV derived from the password, no authentication tag on the ciphertext, and no capability check, nonce, or session validation on the publicly reachable `/sgnix/?p=<token>` endpoint. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, who can obtain a single legitimate guest ticket token as a known-plaintext oracle and bound the plugin activation timestamp, to exhaust the ~729,000-candidate keyspace entirely offline, recover the site-wide encryption key, and forge a self-consistent `{ticket_id, ticket_user}` token targeting any administrator-owned ticket. Submitting the forged token to the unprotected endpoint causes `wp_set_auth_cookie()` to be called for that administrator, granting the attacker full administrative access to the WordPress site.
A vulnerability in the openclaw CLI allows a gateway client with operator.write privileges to perform persistent configuration changes via the chat.send command interface, which was intended to be restricted to operator.admin users. This issue arises from an authorization mismatch in the handling of /config set and /config unset commands routed through chat.send. The vulnerability was patched in version 2026.3.7. Exploitation requires an authenticated gateway client with specific permissions and enabled command support. The severity is rated medium due to the scoped nature of the privilege escalation and the requirement for prior authentication.
In this article Pre-encryption Encryption Post-encryption Defending against DeadLock ransomware Indicators of compromise Microsoft Threat Intelligence tracks DeadLock ransomware as an emerging financially motivated operation distinguished by its use of decentralized infrastructure to support victim communications and data leak operations. Its recovery ecosystem combines the Session messaging network with blockchain-backed services that store and deliver resources used throughout the extortion process. This architecture likely increases the resilience of portions of its communication, leak-hosting, and negotiation infrastructure, allowing DeadLock operators to recover from some disruption efforts while maintaining continuity for victims. Microsoft has observed DeadLock ransomware being deployed by multiple groups including an affiliate of the Lynx and INC ransomware ecosystems. First observed in July 2025, DeadLock operators employ double extortion tactics, encrypting victim environments while threatening to publicly release exfiltrated data. As of July 2026, the operators have published more than 80 compromised organizations on their data leak site, called the DeadLock blog, with more than half of the claimed victims in Europe. Microsoft identified DeadLock ransomware impacting organizations across information technology (IT), mining, transportation and logistics, manufacturing, hospitality, consumer goods, and other sectors in Europe, Asia, North America, South America, and Africa. The DeadLock encryptor includes a resource-aware throttling mechanism designed to maintain system responsiveness during encryption. In addition to its encryption capabilities, the ransomware also appears to implement language or country-based geofencing designed to avoid running in environments associated with former Soviet and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)-linked countries as well as select Middle Eastern countries, a pattern commonly observed among ransomware operators believed to operate from those regions. Together, these capabilities demonstrate how DeadLock combines established ransomware tradecraft with decentralized infrastructure designed to improve operational resilience. In this blog, we present a technical analysis of the DeadLock ransomware encryptor, covering its execution flow, defense evasion techniques, encryption design, and post-encryption behaviors, including a decentralized recovery chat system. We also provide indicators of compromise (IOCs), Microsoft Defender detections, and mitigation guidance to help organizations defend against this threat and similar ransomware activity. Pre-encryption Configuration parsing Before performing any malicious activity, the DeadLock encryptor decrypts an embedded configuration blob using XOR decoding with an 8-byte key. Below are the malware’s configuration fields and their values. Field Value Victim UID Malware public key 03bf50bbf97c4e951e66ff12b689a37a3ce675b4921e254eae76da77573843e4a9 Encryption rule 1000,05052429880,025124288000,010524288000,F991114288000 Language exclude list Geofencing language IDs (see Language geofencing ) Process stop list Processes to terminate (see Process and service termination ) Service stop list Services to stop and delete (see Process and service termination ) File exclude list Extensions and file names to avoid encrypting (see Directory traversal ) Directory exclude list Pre-traversal filter with directories to avoid encrypting (see Directory traversal ) Sub-path Exclude List Sub-paths to avoid encrypting during traversal (see Directory traversal ) Text ransom note Full text ransom note content (see Ransom notes deployment ) HTML recovery chat Full HTML/JS interactive chat page (see Recovery chat: Technical architecture ) Language geofencing As an early exit check, the malware queries the system’s default and user interface (UI) languages. If either language matches the exclude list in the configuration, the malware self-deletes immediately withou…
ReadyEcommerce before 4.5.2 contains a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability that allows authenticated customers to inject malicious HTML payloads through the chat and support ticket messaging systems by exploiting unsanitized rendering via the v-html directive in Messages.vue, RightChatSidebar.vue, SupportTicketMessages.vue, and SupportTicketDetails.vue. Attackers can submit crafted message content that executes arbitrary JavaScript in the browser of any shop owner or administrator who views the message, enabling session cookie theft and account takeover.
The Chat Widget: Floating Customer Support Button for 30+ Channels, Supporting SMS, Calls, and Chat WordPress plugin before 1.8.2 does not validate the type, extension, content, or size of files submitted to its public response endpoint and stores them under the uploads directory, so an unauthenticated user can upload arbitrary files. The original extension is discarded (files are stored under a bare UUID), so this does not yield code execution or stored XSS; impact is bounded to disk consumption and content hosting. The storing path requires the channel's response storage or mail-forwarding to be configured.
The AI Engine – The Chatbot, AI Framework & MCP for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 3.6.5 This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the reauth_for_authorize function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create new administrator accounts with attacker-supplied credentials via a CSRF-based REST authentication bypass, granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link. This bypass can be combined with WordPress's ?_method=POST method-override support to convert a top-navigation GET request into an authenticated POST to the REST users endpoint, requiring no existing account on the attacker's part.
The WPBot – AI ChatBot for Live Support, Lead Generation, AI Services plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 8.5.9 via the wpbot_send_email_transcript_free. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to exfiltrate full chat transcripts and associated user PII — including names, email addresses, and phone numbers — stored in the wpbot_user and wpbot_conversation tables to an attacker-controlled email address.
The Chatbot plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in versions up to, and including, 8.5.9 via the wpcs_send_email() AJAX handler. This is due to the wpcs_send_email() function being registered on both wp_ajax_wpcs_send_email and wp_ajax_nopriv_wpcs_send_email with no nonce verification, capability check, or rate limiting, while forwarding attacker-controlled recipient, subject, and body directly to wp_mail(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to send arbitrary emails to any recipient from the site's domain, enabling spam, phishing, and abuse that can lead to the site's IP/domain being blacklisted.
The WPBot – AI ChatBot for Live Support, Lead Generation, AI Services plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 8.5.6. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to trigger arbitrary re-embedding of stored RAG documents, modifying the rag_documents table and consuming the site owner's paid third-party AI API credits (OpenAI, Gemini, OpenRouter, or xAI).
The WPBot – AI ChatBot for Live Support, Lead Generation, AI Services plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 8.5.6. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary chat session records from the wpbot_user and wpbot_conversation tables, including chat history and conversation logs, by supplying a crafted userid value.
A ClickFix campaign has been identified that abuses Anthropic's Claude platform through shareable chat links to distribute MacSync Stealer targeting macOS users. Attackers utilized malvertising with paid Google ads to direct victims searching for Claude-related terms to malicious shared Claude chats falsely labeled as 'Apple Support.' These chats contained obfuscated installation commands that, when executed, deployed a multi-stage infection chain. The malware steals credentials from browsers and password managers, cryptocurrency wallet data, sensitive files, and system information. The campaign ran from June 12-19, 2026, targeting primarily Mac users with Russian-language comments in the code suggesting Russian-speaking threat actors. Domains used adopted themes related to U.S. local services to appear legitimate.