NLTK versions up to 3.9.2 contain a critical vulnerability in the StanfordSegmenter module that allows arbitrary code execution. This occurs because the module loads external Java .jar files without proper validation or sandboxing, enabling attackers to execute malicious Java bytecode. The vulnerability can be exploited through methods such as model poisoning, man-in-the-middle attacks, or dependency poisoning. A fix is available in version 3.7.0_5.
NLTK versions 3.9.3 and earlier contain a vulnerability in five Stanford interface classes that execute untrusted JAR files without integrity verification. These classes accept user-controlled JAR paths and invoke them via a Java subprocess call without verifying the JAR's integrity, allowing arbitrary code execution. This issue is similar to a previously fixed vulnerability in the StanfordSegmenter class but was not addressed in these other classes. A fix is available in version 2.0.0_3.
Red Hat has released a security update for Red Hat Build of Apache Camel 4.18.3 for Spring Boot addressing multiple vulnerabilities across various components. These include denial of service, remote code execution, information disclosure, security bypass, server-side request forgery, and credential exposure issues affecting dependencies such as vertx-core, jackson-databind, c3p0, mchange-commons-java, Apache HttpComponents, Netty, and others. The update fixes critical security flaws that could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, cause service disruption, or access sensitive information.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (502c2aae77a471762612a5114d299651b7e75571d5c6d9dd5665a3dc2c503327)
package.json declares a postinstall hook that executes a bundled Windows PE launcher (DakuMangalSingh\DakuMangalSingh.exe) at npm install time. The launcher is a jpackage wrapper that loads an embedded JAR named virus.jar containing classes Main, Executor, BatchExecutor, Fetch, RobotService (java.awt.Robot input synthesis), Screenshort (screen capture), and DeviceId (host fingerprinting) — the shape of a remote-command agent with screen-capture and input-synthesis capability. A bundled replicate.bat installs persistence by creating a shortcut to the dropped executable in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup so the payload auto-runs at every user logon. A cleanup.bat kills the process and recursively deletes the package folder, providing anti-forensics on the installer's host. Installing the package on Windows results in immediate arbitrary code execution, a persistent logon-triggered agent, and evidence-removal tooling — with no legitimate library functionality.
Kestra is an open-source, event-driven orchestration platform. Prior to 2.0.0, Kestra's core/src/main/java/io/kestra/core/runners/pebble/functions/HttpFunction.java passes the user-controlled http() uri argument to URI.create() and the server-side HTTP client without restricting private, loopback, or link-local destinations, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to import and execute a flow that accesses internal services or cloud metadata.
Kestra is an open-source, event-driven orchestration platform. Prior to 2.0.0-rc6, Kestra's worker/src/main/java/io/kestra/worker/endpoint/WorkerEndpoint.java serves GET /worker without authentication and serializes the complete live Task object, which can expose commands, environment variables, HTTP headers, connection details, plaintext credentials, and execution identifiers while the main API on port 8080 remains protected. This issue is fixed in 2.0.0-rc6.
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7.4.25 includes multiple security fixes addressing vulnerabilities such as deserialization issues, denial of service, authentication bypass, arbitrary code execution, and information disclosure across various components including Artemis, Undertow, Wildfly, Jackson-databind, Netty, Picketlink, and Bouncy Castle libraries. These vulnerabilities affect the platform's Java application runtime and related libraries, potentially allowing pre-authentication denial of service, code execution, authentication bypass, and resource exhaustion. The update replaces version 7.4.24 and is rated as having an important security impact by Red Hat.
Files built with the polyglot technique have been showing up more and more in cyberattacks in recent years. They let attackers slip malware past email filters and file scanners, deceive victims in phishing attacks, and complicate incident investigations. To pull this off, attackers deliberately construct a file that a system can interpret as different formats depending on which application opens it. A classic example is a file that can be handled as a PNG image or a ZIP archive. All it takes is changing the file’s extension, or simply using one or another application to open it. Let’s take a look at why it’s even possible to create files like this, which format combinations have turned up in real-world attacks, and how organizations can protect themselves from this threat. Why polyglot files are possible The data formats behind polyglot files are seldom exotic. It all comes down to a clever combination of common formats that happen to be structurally compatible. Polyglots exploit at least one of the following quirks in certain file formats: Most file formats need decoding from the very first byte, but some require to read them from the end. The clearest example is a ZIP archive: a corrupted or missing beginning doesn’t stop applications from reading the file, because all the needed headers actually sit at the end. This lets attackers simply glue two files together — in the example above, a PNG and a ZIP. The beginning reads as a valid PNG image, while the end reads as a valid ZIP archive. Many formats work like Russian matryoshka nesting dolls: despite outwardly having a specific extension matching its intended usage, inside the file is essentially a ZIP archive containing the necessary data. This group includes modern office documents (DOCX/XLSX/PPTX), Android installation packages (APK), Java library files (JAR), and many others. Some formats have no strict structural requirements — or their requirements are loose enough that the application that’s processing the file can locate the fragment it needs even when that fragment isn’t at the beginning. The Polydet GitHub repository describes numerous examples of possible file combinations for building a polyglot. Under the MITRE classification, this technique falls under the Masquerading category ( T1036.008 , Masquerade File Type). Examples of polyglot files in known cyberattacks Publicly available malware campaign analyses reveal all kinds of polyglots. Attackers adapt the entire attack scenario to fit a specific file type combination. The Head Mare group delivered the PhantomPyramid malware as a ZIP attachment. The file consisted of Windows executable code (EXE) with a small ZIP archive glued onto the end. When the victim opened the archive, it contained a file with the extension PDF.LNK, which would then launch that same polyglot attachment — this time as an executable file. In the attack documented by JPCERT , attackers created a file that started as a PDF and was detected as a PDF by most scanners but carried a DOC extension and opened in Office applications as a valid DOC file containing malicious macros. The attacks spreading the StrRAT and Ratty Trojans used a polyglot built from a signed Windows installer package (MSI) with malicious Java code (JAR) tacked onto the end. The StrelaStealer attacks used a polyglot with an HTML extension: a Windows library (DLL) with a decoy HTML document glued onto the end. A shortcut in the archive launched the file twice: once via the start command (the equivalent of a double-click, which opened a browser showing the HTML document), and once via rundll32 (which launched the malicious DLL). In a simulated but elegant attack, researchers joined two ordinary ZIP files together and found that different popular archive tools displayed the combined file differently: some showed only the first archive, some only the second, and some showed both at once as if it were a single archive with shared contents. If the attacker is familiar with the vic…
In February 2026, an active malware delivery campaign named Powercat was observed distributing infostealer malware disguised as utility or cheat software for popular PC games including Roblox, Minecraft, and Grand Theft Auto V. The multi-stage infection chain begins with an initial executable that profiles victims and establishes persistence, followed by a Java-based loader that deploys the final infostealer payload. The malware targets cryptocurrency wallets (Exodus, Atomic, Monero-Gui), browser data from Chromium-based applications, Discord tokens, and gaming accounts with payment information. It includes surveillance capabilities such as keylogging, webcam capture, and screen recording. The campaign particularly targets children who frequent gaming platforms and pay-to-cheat websites, with evidence suggesting collected personal information may be used for blackmail or coercion into illegal activities.
HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to 6.9.11, the hidden scan command concatenates attacker-controlled Implementation Guide titles, profile titles, and source references into scan.html without escaping in Scanner.java. As a result, a user who scans an attacker-supplied IG/profile and then opens or publishes the generated local/CI HTML report can trigger stored cross-site scripting, executing attacker-controlled JavaScript in the report's browser context. This issue is fixed in version 6.9.11.
Nexus Repository 3 did not fully sandbox JEXL expressions used in Content Selectors. An account holding the nexus:selectors:create permission could construct an expression that read Java object properties not intended to be exposed to the expression engine, disclosing internal JVM class metadata such as class and classloader names. This issue does not permit method invocation, object construction, or arbitrary code execution. This has been fixed by restricting property access in the JEXL sandbox to the intended data types.
A sophisticated malware campaign targets Roblox players by distributing fake versions of the Xeno script executor through gaming forums and Discord communities. The attack deploys a multi-stage Java infection chain that mimics legitimate Windows and gaming components, including files disguised in Xbox Game Bar directories. The final payload functions as both an information stealer and remote access trojan, capable of stealing browser cookies, Discord, Roblox, and Minecraft accounts, cryptocurrency wallets, and payment data. Beyond typical credential theft, it records keystrokes, accesses webcams, streams desktops, manipulates files, executes PowerShell commands, and provides attackers with interactive system control. Previously documented as Powercat, the malware continues active development with new command-and-control infrastructure. Activity increased significantly in March 2026, particularly threatening children and teenagers who may expose personal accounts, webcam images, and financial information fr...
ArcadeDB before 26.7.2 (arcadedb-engine) allows trigger scripts to look up host classes in java.lang.* (via Java.type) because ScriptTriggerExecutor adds java.lang.* to the allowed packages. An authenticated user with UPDATE_SCHEMA permission can create a JavaScript trigger that invokes java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec() (or ProcessBuilder), achieving OS command execution when the trigger fires.
veraPDF PDF parser is a PDF parser for veraPDF. Prior to 1.30.2 and 1.31.23, veraPDF-parser contains a denial-of-service vulnerability in veraPDF-parser/src/main/java/org/verapdf/pd/font/cmap/CMapParser.java and veraPDF-parser/src/main/java/org/verapdf/parser/postscript/PSOperator.java, where a crafted Type 0 font /Encoding or /ToUnicode CMap stream can execute unbounded PostScript array allocation or a zero-increment for loop and exhaust validator memory or CPU. This issue is fixed in versions 1.30.2 and 1.31.23.
A Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) vulnerability was identified
in the mail template functionality of the Axway SecureTransport product in version 5.5-20260326. This
flaw
allows an attacker with admin privileges to inject arbitrary Java code expressions, which are
executed server-side when the template is rendered (i.e., during email
sending). Successful exploitation of this flaw allows an attacker to
execute
arbitrary code on the server that results in full host compromise.
This issue affects all Axway SecureTransport versions prior 5.5-20260528 update.
Appium Java Client is the Java language binding for writing Appium tests that conform to the W3C WebDriver protocol. From 8.2.1 until 10.1.1, when directConnect(true) is enabled, AppiumCommandExecutor.setDirectConnect() reads the directConnectHost, directConnectPort, and directConnectPath fields from the server's NEW_SESSION response and rebuilds the client's server URL from them, validating only that the protocol is https, with no host allowlist or IP validation; a rogue or compromised server can therefore redirect all subsequent session traffic to an arbitrary destination, enabling full interception of session traffic and a server-side request forgery pivot to internal hosts, including cloud metadata (IMDS) credential theft. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.1.1.
Deserialization of Untrusted Data (CWE-502) in the Tribes-based clustering component
in Apache Software Foundation Apache Axis2/Java through 2.0.0 on Apache Tomcat
(only when Tribes clustering is enabled, which is off by default) allows an
unauthenticated remote attacker with network access to the clustering port to
execute arbitrary code via a crafted serialized Java object delivered to the cluster
channel and deserialized in
org.apache.axis2.clustering.tribes.Axis2ChannelListener#messageReceived. Users are
recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.1, which fixes this issue by removing the
clustering feature entirely.
Hackers are actively exploiting a vulnerability in the FastJson open-source Java library, allowing remote code execution without user interaction or elevated privileges. [...]