Search: server.py
1,271 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-19246HKUDS nanobot · Server-Side Request Forgery Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-19246 A vulnerability has been found in HKUDS nanobot up to 0.2.1. This affects the function _download_image_data_url of the file nanobot/providers/image_generation.py of the component Provider-returned Image URL Handler. The manipulation leads to server-side request forgery. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of the patch is 5095. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The vendor explains: "We confirm that provider-returned image URLs required the same SSRF protections applied to other network retrieval paths. (...) The patch is currently available on main and is planned for the next patch release, v0.3.1." EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-48039pipeboard-co meta-ads-mcp · Improper Authentication Critical9.1EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48039 Meta Ads MCP is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that lets AI assistants run Meta Ads. Prior to version 1.0.109, `AuthInjectionMiddleware.dispatch()` at `http_auth_integration.py:272` unconditionally forwards unauthenticated Streamable HTTP requests to downstream MCP tool handlers without issuing a `401` response, allowing any network-reachable caller to invoke MCP tools without authentication. When no per-request credential is present, tool handlers fall back to the `META_ACCESS_TOKEN` environment variable, and when the downstream Meta Graph API call fails, `api.py:263–269` serialises the raw `httpx` request URL—including the operator's `access_token` as a query parameter—into the JSON-RPC response body, delivering the credential to the unauthenticated caller. Version 1.0.109 fixes the issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The atlas-internal PyPI package version 1.8.1 contains malicious code that executes during installation. The setup.py script overrides the egg_info command to automatically run code that collects the installer's hostname, current working directory, and OS username. This information is URL-encoded and sent via an HTTP GET request to an attacker-controlled out-of-band server. The package has no legitimate functionality beyond this data exfiltration behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-61632facelessuser pymdown-extensions · Path Traversal Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-61632 ### Summary The `b64` extension inlines images referenced by `<img src="...">` as base64 data URIs. When resolving the `src` path it joins it onto the configured `base_path` with `os.path.normpath` and opens the result directly, with no check that the resolved path stays inside `base_path`. A `src` containing `../` sequences, or an absolute path, therefore reads a file outside `base_path` as long as that file has an allowed image extension (`.png`, `.jpg`, `.jpeg`, `.gif`, `.svg`). The base64 of that file is then embedded in the rendered output, disclosing its contents. This is a separate code path from the `snippets` traversal issues (GHSA-jh85-wwv9-24hv, GHSA-62q4-447f-wv8h). It lives in `pymdownx/b64.py` and has no path restriction of any kind. Confirmed on `10.21.3` installed from PyPI. ### Details In `pymdownx/b64.py`, function `repl_path` (around lines 68 to 90 on `main`): ```python if is_absolute: file_name = os.path.normpath(path) # absolute src: base_path ignored entirely else: file_name = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(base_path, path)) # relative src: '../' escapes base_path if os.path.exists(file_name): ext = os.path.splitext(file_name)[1].lower() for b64_ext in file_types: if ext in b64_ext: with open(file_name, "rb") as f: # opened with no containment check ... ``` There is no `startswith(base_path)`, no `os.path.realpath` comparison, and no rejection of `..`. Both branches are reachable from an attacker-controlled `src`. ### PoC Reproduced against an unmodified `pymdown-extensions==10.21.3` from PyPI. The script creates a `base_path` directory and a PNG one level above it, then renders Markdown whose image `src` points outside `base_path`, and confirms the outside file's bytes appear base64-encoded in the output. ```python import base64, os, shutil, tempfile, markdown root = tempfile.mkdtemp() base_path = os.path.join(root, "docs"); os.makedirs(base_path) outside = os.path.join(root, "secret"); os.makedirs(outside) png = base64.b64decode( "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk" "+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==" ) with open(os.path.join(outside, "secret.png"), "wb") as f: f.write(png) md = markdown.Markdown( extensions=["pymdownx.b64"], extension_configs={"pymdownx.b64": {"base_path": base_path}}, ) html = md.convert('<img src="../secret/secret.png">') assert base64.b64encode(png).decode() in html, "not leaked" print("LEAKED:", html) ``` Output: ``` LEAKED: <p><img src="..."></p> ``` The base64 of a file outside `base_path` is present in the output. The absolute-path branch behaves the same way: an absolute `src` bypasses `base_path` entirely via `os.path.normpath(path)`. Both were confirmed leaking. ### Impact An application that renders untrusted Markdown with `pymdownx.b64` enabled exposes the contents of image-extension files on the server, or any path the process can read, to whoever controls the Markdown and whoever views the output. The reach is bounded by the image-extension check, so it is a targeted file read rather than full arbitrary read, but it still discloses file contents that were never meant to be exposed. ### Suggested fix Resolve the real path and require it to stay within `base_path` before opening: ```python file_name = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_path, path)) base_real = os.path.realpath(base_path) if file_name != base_real and not file_name.startswith(base_real + os.sep): return m.group(0) # leave the tag untouched; do not read outside base_path ``` The same containment check should apply to the absolute-path branch rather than trusting an absolute `src`. Using `realpath` instead of `abspath` also closes the related symlink-following gap in the snippets handler. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-42561Red Hat Security Advisory: satellite/iop-vulnerability-engine-rhel9 container image available as a Technology Preview High7.5EPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-42561 A denial of service vulnerability exists in the python-multipart library used for parsing multipart/form-data requests. The flaw allows an attacker to cause excessive CPU usage by sending requests with many repeated headers without termination or a single very large header value. This affects ASGI applications using frameworks like Starlette or FastAPI that rely on python-multipart. The issue is mitigated by upgrading to python-multipart version 0.0.27 or later. If immediate upgrade is not possible, limiting request body size at the server or proxy can reduce exposure but does not fully resolve the vulnerability. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-44660Red Hat Security Advisory: General availability of the satellite/iop-host-inventory-rhel9 container image MediumEPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-44660 A memory leak vulnerability exists in UltraJSON (ujson) when using ujson.dump() to write JSON to a file-like object that raises an exception during the write operation. The leak occurs because the serialized JSON string object is not properly decremented, causing memory to grow linearly with each failed write. This affects applications that serialize data using ujson.dump() to potentially attacker-controlled file-like objects that can fail. The issue is fixed in UltraJSON version 5.12.1. A workaround is to replace ujson.dump() with file.write(ujson.dumps(obj)), which avoids the leak. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Vanta Stealer is a Python-based information stealer utilizing PyArmor protection and PyInstaller packaging to complicate defensive analysis. The malware systematically harvests credentials from Chromium-based browsers, communication platforms like Discord and Telegram, gaming applications including Steam, Riot Games, Roblox and Minecraft, cryptocurrency wallets, Mullvad VPN configurations, and sensitive documents. It performs token enrichment by validating stolen Discord credentials against the API to retrieve account details, billing information, Nitro status, and server privileges. The modular architecture downloads dedicated browser extraction utilities at runtime, maintains independence between collection modules, and generates structured inventory reports before consolidating harvested data into ZIP archives. Exfiltration occurs via HTTP POST to attacker-controlled infrastructure with victim metadata. Distribution likely occurs through social engineering campaigns involving phishing emails, trojanized... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-54765Traefik · Gateway HTTPRoute backendRef filters can leak backend context across routes sharing a Service:port Medium6.3EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-54765 ## Summary There is a medium severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider. When two accepted HTTPRoutes target the same backend Service:port but configure different `backendRef` filters, Traefik may resolve both routes to the same child service and apply only one route's filter set to all requests reaching that backend. In Gateway deployments where `backendRef` filters set security-sensitive headers — such as tenant identity, authorization context, or values the backend trusts — an attacker who can create an accepted HTTPRoute sharing the same backend Service:port may cause their route's filter context to be applied to another route's requests, potentially crossing namespace boundaries when a `ReferenceGrant` permits cross-namespace targeting. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.6 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> # Traefik Gateway HTTPRoute backendRef filter context collision across routes sharing Service:port ## Summary Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider builds the dynamic HTTP backend service key for a Gateway `HTTPRoute` backendRef from only the backend namespace, Service name, protocol, and port. It does not include the HTTPRoute, listener, rule, or backendRef filter identity in that key. When two accepted HTTPRoutes point to the same backend `Service:port` but define different backendRef filters, Traefik can make both route WRR services reference the same child service. The child service then carries only one backendRef filter set, so one route can send requests to the backend with another route's backend context. This is security-relevant when backendRef filters set, remove, or rewrite security-sensitive context, such as tenant, identity, auth, sanitization, Host, or path headers trusted by the backend. Credit: Qican Ma, Ding Luo @XiaoMi ShadowBlade Security Lab ## Suggested Severity Suggested severity: Medium/High, configuration-dependent. Suggested CVSS 3.1: ```text CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N ``` Notes: - Requires Gateway API routes sharing the same backend Service:port with different security-sensitive backendRef filters trusted by the backend. - Cross-namespace impact is possible when route attachment and ReferenceGrant policy allow an attacker route to target the shared backend. - No RCE, memory corruption, or default-config exposure claimed. Suggested CWE: ```text CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization CWE-284: Improper Access Control ``` ## Affected Component ```text pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go — loadService(), loadMiddlewares() ``` ## Tested Versions Confirmed on: ```text Traefik source snapshot: 29406d42898547f1ffabd904f66af06c212740cf on master ``` Earliest affected version not exhaustively determined. ## Root Cause `loadService` starts the dynamic service name from backend namespace and Service name only: ```go // pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:245 serviceName := provider.Normalize(namespace + "-" + string(backendRef.Name) + "-http") ``` It loads backendRef filters using that same service name before appending the backend port: ```go // pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:258 middlewares, err := p.loadMiddlewares(conf, namespace, serviceName, backendRef.Filters, pathMatch) ``` For normal Kubernetes Services, the final child service key appends only the port: ```go // pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:304-317 portStr := strconv.FormatInt(int64(port), 10) serviceName = provider.Normalize(serviceName + "-" + portStr) ... conf.HTTP.Services[serviceName] = &dynamic.Service{LoadBalancer: lb, Middlewares: middlewares} ``` Each route/rule WRR service references the child service by name. Later route configs are merged by map key (`maps.Copy`), so both route-local WRR services can point to the same child service, which retains only one of the route/backendRef filter configurations. ## Attack Scenario 1. Gateway listener with `allowedRoutes.namespaces.from: All`. 2. Victim `HTTPRoute` `route-a` in namespace `default` targets `default/whoami:80` with backendRef filter setting `X-Tenant: tenant-a`. 3. Attacker-controlled `HTTPRoute` `route-b` in namespace `attacker` targets `default/whoami:80` (via ReferenceGrant) with backendRef filter setting `X-Tenant: tenant-b`. 4. Both routes generate the same child service key: `default-whoami-http-80`. 5. The second route's filter configuration overwrites the first (or vice versa) via `maps.Copy`. 6. Backend receives both routes' requests with one tenant's header context. ## Proof of Concept A Go test harness injects provider-level and server-level tests into the Traefik checkout. The provider test confirms the generated dynamic configuration collision. The server test builds Traefik's runtime router/service/middleware pipeline and sends `h | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.0 | EPSS 1.1% | High7.0EPSS 1.1%GCVE Database ## Summary There is a critical vulnerability in Traefik's default HTTP reverse proxy that leads to unauthenticated cross-user response poisoning. When a client opens an HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 `CONNECT` request, Traefik forwards it — body included — to an HTTP/1.1 upstream over a shared `net/http.Transport`. If the upstream answers the CONNECT with a keep-alive non-2xx response without draining the body, the now-desynchronized backend socket is returned to Traefik's shared connection pool and reused for other clients, letting an attacker make a different client read a response the attacker smuggled — which may be another user's authenticated or private content. The entrypoint's `sanitizePath` option (default `true`) is not a reliable defense: backends that answer `CONNECT /` with a keep-alive non-2xx remain exploitable. The experimental FastProxy implementation was not affected. The issue is fixed by deferring the forwarded CONNECT payload until the backend accepts the tunnel, by not returning CONNECT connections to the shared idle pool, and by discarding the CONNECT body in the ForwardAuth path. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.53 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.24 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.9 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ## Summary Traefik's default reverse proxy forwards a plain HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 `CONNECT` request and its body to an HTTP/1.1 upstream through a shared `net/http.Transport`. When the upstream answers the CONNECT with a keep-alive non-2xx response and does not drain the body, Traefik returns the now desynchronized backend socket to its shared pool and reuses it for other clients. An unauthenticated attacker uses this to make a different client read the attacker's smuggled response. Traefik's default proxy is `net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy` over a shared `http.Transport`, so it inherits the same root cause as the Caddy `reverse_proxy` CONNECT pool poisoning. Traefik ships one partial mitigation Caddy does not. The entrypoint option `sanitizePath` (default `true`) rewrites the forwarded CONNECT's empty path to `/`, so Traefik emits `CONNECT /` instead of authority-form `CONNECT host:port`. This is not a reliable defense. It avoids the smuggle only against backends that reject `CONNECT /` by closing the connection (Apache, nginx). Backends that answer `CONNECT /` with a keep-alive non-2xx and leave the body undrained still cross. That set includes any Go `net/http` server and gunicorn/Flask. Confirmed on the official image `traefik:v3.6.23` (a currently supported release), default configuration, against stock `go-httpbin` (Go) and `kennethreitz/httpbin` (Python gunicorn/Flask), attacker and victim in separate containers, over both HTTP/2 and HTTP/3. ## Affected - `traefik:v3.6.23` (official image) and current v3, default configuration, standard proxy to an HTTP/1.1 upstream. Backend keep-alive pooling is on by default (`MaxIdleConnsPerHost` 200). - Attacker frontend is HTTP/2 or HTTP/3. An HTTP/1.1 frontend is not affected. - The upstream keeps the connection alive after a non-2xx to the forwarded CONNECT and does not drain the body. - The experimental FastProxy implementation is not affected (see Not affected). ## Details Three behaviors compose. 1. Traefik forwards a plain CONNECT as an ordinary proxied request. The default proxy is `httputil.ReverseProxy` with a shared `http.Transport` (`pkg/proxy/httputil/proxy.go`). The director assigns the outbound `URL.Host` directly and does not reject CONNECT, leaving the request body a live stream. The client places a raw HTTP/1.1 request in that body (H2/H3 DATA frames), which is written onto the backend socket after the CONNECT header block. 2. `net/http` writes the CONNECT body unframed and pools the socket. For a CONNECT the transport writes the body with no `Content-Length` and no `Transfer-Encoding`. The upstream answers a keep-alive non-2xx and parses the trailing bytes as a pipelined request. Go reads the non-2xx response and returns the socket to the shared idle pool once the request body reaches EOF (the `wroteRequest` gate), while the smuggled request's response is still pending. 3. Desynchronized reuse. The smuggled request targets a slow endpoint so its response arrives after the socket is pooled. A different client that reuses the socket reads the pending smuggled response as its own. `sanitizePath` (default `true`, `pkg/server/server_entrypoint_tcp.go`) calls `req.URL.JoinPath()`, which turns the CONNECT's empty path into `/`. Traefik emits `CONNECT /`. Whether that stops the smuggle depends only on the backend: Apache and nginx answer `400 Bad Request` with `Connection: close` (socket torn down, no cross); Go `net/http` and gunicorn/Flask | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.2 | EPSS 0.6% | Critical9.2EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-53983 Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated blind server-side request forgery vulnerability in the orbital-source configuration path that allows any unauthenticated Socket.IO client to cause the ground-station process to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen destinations. Attackers can connect to the Socket.IO server on port 7000 without credentials due to disabled authentication enforcement and a wildcard CORS policy, then submit a data_submission event with submit-orbital-sources action to persist an attacker-supplied URL in the database, then trigger an orbital sync via the equally unauthenticated background_task:start event. The URL is stored with no scheme allowlist, no host validation, and no rejection of loopback, RFC1918, or link-local (cloud instance metadata at 169.254.169.254) addresses, and is passed directly to requests.get in _fetch_http_3le and _fetch_http_omm in backend/tlesync/source_adapters.py. HTTP status codes and error messages from the outbound request are emitted in the orbital_sync_state Socket.IO event to all connected clients, providing a serviceable oracle for interpreting internal-service and cloud-metadata responses even though the raw response body is not directly leaked. Because the malicious source persists in the database across restarts and re-fires every 24 hours on the scheduled sync cycle, the primitive gives durable long-term SSRF without the attacker needing to remain connected. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 1.1% | CVE-2026-15307SUSE · Security update for python-Django High8.8EPSS 1.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-15307 A security update for python-Django addresses multiple vulnerabilities including server-side file-write and request forgery via spatial lookups, potential denial-of-service issues in language checking and nested geometry collections, and a potential cross-site scripting vulnerability in admin URLField values. These issues are identified by CVE-2026-15307, CVE-2026-15337, CVE-2026-15830, and CVE-2026-15920. The update fixes critical security flaws that could impact Django applications. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The xAyOuB-XcTxTeaM PyPI package versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1, and 0.1.2 contain malicious code that automatically starts a Flask HTTP server on import, exposing unauthenticated remote control endpoints. This allows remote attackers to cause the package to send abuse traffic from the installer's IP. The package also logs into multiple hardcoded Garena Free Fire guest accounts using embedded credentials and emits invite-spam packets to targets specified by the attacker. TLS verification is disabled for these outbound connections, and sensitive credentials are stored in cleartext within the package. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-18974heshengtao super-agent-party · Information Disclosure Medium6.9EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-18974 CVE-2026-18974 is an information disclosure vulnerability in heshengtao super-agent-party versions 0.4.0 and 0.4.1. It affects the get_file_content function in server.py within the execute_tool_manually endpoint. The vulnerability arises from manipulation of the tool_name or tool_params arguments, allowing remote attackers to disclose information. Exploit code has been publicly released, but no vendor response or patch is currently available. The CVSS 4.0 score rates this as a medium severity issue. EPSS 0.5%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog In this article Activity overview How ClickFix works Campaign overview ClickFix moved from open pages to fingerprinting gates The fingerprinting gate Mitigation and protection guidance Indicators of compromise (IOC) References Learn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a macOS ClickFix campaign distributing infostealers, including MacSync and Atomic Stealer (AMOS) , through a large cluster of look-alike domains. The campaign evolved from broadly serving ClickFix lures to using a server-side browser-fingerprinting gate that shows the lure primarily to visitors whose environment appears consistent with a genuine macOS browser. This cloaking limits visibility for crawlers, sandboxes, and some automated analysis workflows. The blog details the domain pattern, fingerprinting checks, infection chain, detection coverage, and hunting pivots that defenders can use to identify related activity. Activity overview Microsoft Threat Intelligence has been tracking a macOS ClickFix operation that distributes information-stealing malware through a large family of algorithmically named domains. Over several weeks of monitoring, Microsoft observed a notable shift in tradecraft: the same infrastructure moved from openly serving the malicious command in the served page’s HTML source to concealing the lure behind a server-side fingerprinting gate that reveals the payload only to visitors the server assesses as a genuine macOS target. The chain ultimately delivers information stealers such as MacSync or Atomic Stealer (AMOS). This activity is consistent with the broader shift in macOS ClickFix tradecraft that Microsoft Threat Intelligence previously documented , in which threat actors instruct users to run Terminal commands that retrieve remotely hosted content rather than the traditional approach of delivering a disk image for manual installation. The cluster described here is notable for two reasons: its domains are mass-produced by a recognizable name generator, and it adopted server-side cloaking on existing infrastructure, giving defenders a clear before-and-after view of the same operation. In this blog, we describe the campaign’s domain-generation pattern, the two delivery phases we observed, the fingerprinting gate that now fronts the infrastructure, and the end-to-end infection chain. We also provide hunting guidance, mitigation recommendations, and defanged indicators of compromise. How ClickFix works ClickFix is a social-engineering technique where attackers persuade users to copy and run a command in Terminal instead of downloading a traditional macOS application. The lure usually appears as a fake verification step, software update, download error, or CAPTCHA, with the command disguised as something required to complete the action. Because execution starts from a user-run Terminal command rather than a downloaded app bundle, the flow can avoid parts of the normal macOS application trust path, including quarantine handling, code-signing evaluation, and notarization checks typically applied to downloaded applications. In this campaign, ClickFix remains the delivery mechanism, but the important change is that the lure is no longer shown to every visitor. The page first profiles the visitor through a browser-fingerprinting gate and primarily requests consistent with a genuine macOS browser environment receive the fake “Download for macOS” page and copied Terminal command. Figure 1a – The counterfeit “Download for macOS” page served to a qualifying visitor by a cloaked gate (apricotfilepoint[.]com). The page displays a forged “Verified Publisher” badge and offers a one-click Copy of an obfuscated curl one-liner. Delivery is conditional. During analysis, the same URLs returned different content to different requests. In some case the macOS ClickFix lure, and in others an apparently benign decoy page. In our testing, a request presenting a Windows browser received a decoy page such as a fake browser-extension or VPN landing page (Figure… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @kyronixai/executer version 1.0.5 contains malicious code that opens a WebSocket connection to a hardcoded external server. This connection allows remote parties to send commands that the package executes on the host system, including arbitrary shell commands and filesystem operations such as reading, writing, deleting, moving, copying files, and creating directories. There is no cryptographic authentication of these commands, and the remote server is a personal domain unrelated to the package scope, enabling full remote control of any machine running this package version. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The trailserver npm package version 1.0.5 contains malicious code that, when installed or imported, silently installs Python and several Python libraries, then runs a Python script that monitors clipboard content, captures screenshots including OCR-selected regions, and records keystrokes. The collected data is sent to a hardcoded remote server controlled by the attacker. The malicious payload also hides its user interface and can auto-type content into other applications, with a hidden panic-exit feature. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The PyPI package 'numpyp' is a malicious typo-squatting package mimicking the popular 'numpy' library. It exports functions that send any input data provided by the user to a hardcoded external server controlled by the attacker without disclosure. This can lead to inadvertent leakage of sensitive information such as secrets or proprietary data if a developer mistakenly installs and uses 'numpyp' instead of 'numpy'. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.3% | High7.1EPSS 0.3%GCVE Database MLflow AI Gateway versions 3.13.0 through 3.15.2 contain a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability due to lack of validation on the api_base parameter when creating a gateway secret. Any authenticated user, including those with read-only access, can create a secret with a malicious api_base pointing to internal addresses. This allows the gateway proxy endpoint to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary internal resources, potentially exposing sensitive cloud instance metadata and IAM credentials. The vulnerability arises because the existing SSRF protections are not applied to this code path, and the CreateGatewaySecret action lacks specific permission scope enforcement. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.0 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-71192OpenStack Swift · Incorrect Authorization Medium6.0EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-71192 In OpenStack Swift through 2.38.0, the S3API middleware does not sanitize Swift-native control headers (X-Copy-From, X-Copy-From-Account) from S3 API requests when s3_acl=true. An attacker can inject these headers into a signed PUT request targeting their own bucket, causing Swift to perform a server-side copy from another tenant's private object. The source object authorization is bypassed because the S3API middleware has already authorized the request against the destination. The attacker can read any object whose project_id, container name, and object name are known, regardless of the source object's ACLs or ownership. This requires the non-default s3_acl=true configuration. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.0 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-71191OpenStack Swift · Incorrect Authorization Medium6.0EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-71191 In OpenStack Swift through 2.38.0, S3API middleware does not enforce that semantic x-amz-* headers are covered by the SigV4 signature on presigned URL requests. An attacker who obtains a presigned PUT URL can inject an unsigned X-Amz-Copy-Source header, causing Swift to perform a server-side copy from an arbitrary source object using the signer's authorization context. The attacker can read any object the signer has access to, provided the target project_id, container name, and object name are known. This affects all deployments using the default s3_acl=false configuration. | CVE Database V5 |
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